T. Uday Kumar Vs. the District Collector, - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- labour & services part time employee: [tarun chatterjee & h.s. bedi, jj] employee employed on part-time basis but under control and supervision of employer is a workman. he would be entitled to benefit of continuous service under section 25 and protection of section 25-f of i.d. act, 1947. orderf.m. ibrahim kalifulla, j.1. w.p. no. 8618 of 2006 has been filed by the petitioner therein seeking to challenge the order of the second respondent therein, namely, tahsildar, mambalam-guindy taluk. as per the said order, the writ petitioner was directed not to proceed with any constructions in an extent of 90 cents situated in s. no. 297/1 since an enquiry as regards the issuance of patta was pending.2. w.p. no. 4950 of 2007 is a public interest litigation and the petitioner therein seeks for the issuance of writ of mandamus to direct the respondents 1 to 4 in that writ petition to clear, maintain and construct a general hospital in the site earmarked for peripheral hospital in t.s. no. 14 of block no. 29 kodambakkam village, mambalam-guindy taluk. the t.s. no. 14 referred to.....

Judgment:
ORDER

F.M. Ibrahim Kalifulla, J.

1. W.P. No. 8618 of 2006 has been filed by the petitioner therein seeking to challenge the order of the second respondent therein, namely, Tahsildar, Mambalam-Guindy Taluk. As per the said order, the Writ Petitioner was directed not to proceed with any constructions in an extent of 90 cents situated in S. No. 297/1 since an enquiry as regards the issuance of patta was pending.

2. W.P. No. 4950 of 2007 is a Public Interest Litigation and the petitioner therein seeks for the issuance of Writ of Mandamus to direct the respondents 1 to 4 in that writ petition to clear, maintain and construct a General Hospital in the site earmarked for Peripheral Hospital in T.S. No. 14 of Block No. 29 Kodambakkam Village, Mambalam-Guindy Taluk. The T.S. No. 14 referred to therein corresponds to the original S. No. 297/1.

3. W.P. Nos. 8624 and 8625 of 2006 have been preferred by the petitioners therein challenging the order of the first respondent therein, namely, the Special Commissioner and Commissioner of Land Administration, dated 28.2.2007 in Proceedings D.Dis.K4/23586/06 in and by which the order of District Revenue Officer (hereinafter referred to as D.R.O.), Chennai, dated 15.6.2006 was confirmed. The D.R.O., Chennai had cancelled the patta issued in favour of Thiru. Nedunchezian, Chitrarasu and three others vide S.D. No. 44/04-05, dated 10.6.2004 as well as in favour of M/s. Metro Steel Rolling Mills Pvt. Ltd., in its order vide TR. No. 199/05-06, dated 5.5.2005 and restored the same in the name of the Tamil Nadu Housing Board with immediate effect.

4. The above referred to pattas, which were cancelled and which were restored in the name of Tamil Nadu Housing Board were related to the property situated in S. No. 297/1 with reference to which the petitioner in W.P. No. 4950 of 2007 has come forward with the public interest litigation.

5. As the issue concerns the property relating to S. No. 297/1 and the rights of the parties, which would need detailed discussion based on the allegations and counter allegations contained in W.P. No. 4950 of 2007, the status of the parties would be referred to as arrayed in the said writ petition. Respondents 12 to 64 were suo motu impleaded as party respondents by an order, dated 24.7.2007.

6. In order to appreciate the controversy involved in these writ petitions, a brief history has to be narrated:

7. An extent of land measuring 5.90 acres in S. No. 297/1 of Kodambakkam Village, Mambalam-Guindy Taluk belonged to one Mr. Velu Mudaliar, who settled the same in favour of his wife Mrs. Rajalakshmi Ammal. By G.O.Ms. No. 4729, dated 25.10.1961, the Government of Tamil Nadu acquired the aforesaid 5.90 acres of land for development of schemes formulated by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board. Pursuant to the above said notification, an award came to be passed on 31.7.1964 in Award No. 14/64 and the possession of entire extent of 5.90 acres was also taken and vested with the Tamil Nadu Housing Board. Subsequently, on 31.10.1973, by G.O.Ms. No. 1031, an extent of 0.95 acres in S. No. 297/2 was excluded from the land acquisition proceedings in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 48(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. By virtue of such exclusion, the acquisition was restricted to 4.95 acres. Further, while the acquired land was retained in S. No. 297/1, the excluded extent of 0.95 acres was sub-divided and shown under S. No. 297/2. After exclusion, a revised award also came to be passed in Award No. 5/74, dated 4.1.1975.

8. The Tamil Nadu Housing Board utilised the extent of 4.95 acres in S. No. 297/1 for construction of flats, named as Bharathi Dasan Colony and handed over 120 grounds and 0550 Sq.ft. of land meant for construction of Government Peripheral Hospitals to P.W.D. on 8.4.1981. The area of 120 grounds and 0550 Sq.ft. would cover an extent of 1.97 acres. While, the Tamil Nadu Housing Board along with P.W.D. was proceeding after the acquisition to fulfil the purpose of such acquisition, namely, for construction of Housing Board flats, Peripheral Hospital and other allied activities, it appeared that the erstwhile owner Smt. Rajalakshmi Ammal executed a Power of Attorney, dated 28.7.1988, which was registered as document No. 143/4 on the file of the Sub Registrar's Office Guduvancheri, in favour of one Mr. C. Mohan, for the purpose of seeking allotment of the acquired lands in her favour under the ex-owner category. But by a subsequent deed, dated 28.4.1989, she cancelled the Power of Attorney, dated 28.7.1988 and the cancellation deed was also registered as document No. 101/1988 on the file of the Sub Registrar's Officer, Guduvancheri. Nevertheless, the said Thiru. C. Mohan, in his capacity as Power Agent, stated to have executed three sale deeds on 15.3.1996, which were registered as document Nos. 1416, 1413 and 1415 of 1996 in favour of one Tmt. P. Vijayalakshmi, Thiru. Thulasidas and Tmt. N. Saraswathi and each of the sale deeds conveyed 30 cents of land in S. No. 297/1.

9. Subsequently, there was a communication, dated 19.1.2001 purported to have been issued by the Executive Engineer of the Tamil Nadu Housing Board stating that the Housing Board had no objection for Tmt. Rajalakshmi Ammal to continue to enjoy her ownership in respect of 0.90 acres of land in S. No. 297/1. Later, on 10.6.2004, patta was granted in favour of Thiru. Neduncheziyan and Chitrarasu, who are sons of V. Thulasidas, and three others in S.D. No. 44/04-05 apparently based on the purported letter, dated 19.1.2001, which was stated to have been issued by the Executive Engineer of Tamil Nadu Housing Board. Thereafter, by a subsequent sale deed, dated 1.12.2004, the purchasers of the document, dated 15.3.1996, namely, Tmt. N. Saraswathi and four others sold the 0.90 acres of land to M/s. Metro Steel Rolling Mill Pvt. Ltd., (hereinafter referred to as MSRMP Ltd.), the 11th respondent herein and one Thiru. Ramamoorthy Saravana Kumar.

10. Later on, by a registered sale deed, M/s. Metro Streel Rolling Mill Pvt. Ltd., represented by its Director Mr. Mahendra Kumar Jain conveyed its 1/3rd share in favour of one Mr. Khimraj Sakariya, petitioner in W.P. No. 8625/2007. The other 1/3rd shareholder, namely, Mr. Ramamoorthy Saravanakumar was stated to have conveyed his share in favour of the wife of the 11th respondent (i.e.) Mrs. U. Bhuvaneswari.

11. By a joint patta in C.A. No. 450/05-06, dated 9.5.2005, the patta, dated 10.6.2004 was stated to have been transferred and issued in the name of M/s. Metro Steel Rolling Mill Pvt. Ltd., and Mr. Ramamurthy Saravanakumar.

12. One Mr. M.V.V.N. Arumuga Pandian also claimed certain rights in respect of the land situated in S. No. 297/1 and had filed a number of suits and writ petitions questioning the rights of the 11th respondent and also moved the District Revenue Officer, the 9th respondent herein, for the cancellation of the patta, dated 10.6.2004 and 9.5.2005 which were issued in the name of Tmt. Saraswathy and others and later in favour of Ms. Metro Steel Rolling Mill Pvt. Ltd. and others.

13. In the meanwhile, the 11th respondent approached the 6th respondent C.M.D.A. for reclassification of the 0.90 acres of land situated in S. No. 297/1 from institutional zone to residential zone. The 6th respondent issued a notification dated 14.7.2005 calling for objections. The C.M.D.A., subsequently, published a notification, dated 9.11.2005 in the Government Gazette reclassifying the said land from 'institutional zone' to 'residential zone'. Thereafter, the 11th respondent issued an advertisement on 13.11.2005 in the newspapers for launching a Housing Project to provide for residential flats.

14. It is stated that pursuant to the said advertisement 54 flats were sold out. Thereafter, it is claimed that necessary plan was also sanctioned by the 6th respondent C.M.D.A. on 20.6.2006 for construction of the flats in the said S. No. 297/1.

15. At that point of time, the 10th respondent, Tahsildar, Mambalam-Guindy Taluk issued a notice, dated 24.3.2006 directing the 11th respondent not to proceed with the constructions since the issue relating to cancellation of patta, dated 10.6.2004 and 9.5.2005 was pending consideration.

16. Challenging the same, the 11th respondent filed W.P. No. 8618 of 2006 and pending disposal of the writ petition obtained an order of interim stay of the notice issued by the 10th respondent, dated 24.3.2006.

17. The Corporation of Chennai, the 5th respondent was also stated to have accorded sanction to the building plan submitted by the 11th respondent in its order dated 5.4.2006. The 11th respondent is stated to have commenced construction of flats on 10.5.2006 and completed the same.

18. It is in the above stated background, the 9th respondent passed orders on 15.6.2006 cancelling the patta issued on 10.6.2004 and 9.5.2005, which came to be confirmed by the 7th respondent, the Special Commissioner and Commissioner of Land Administration, in his order, dated 28.2.2007.

19. At that point of time the public interest litigation came to be filed in W.P. No. 4950 of 2007. While ordering notice to the 11th respondent on 13.2.2007, an order of interim injunction restraining the 11th respondent from proceeding with the construction was also made in the said writ petition. Subsequently, at the instance of the 11th respondent, by order, dated 20.2.2007 the Division Bench, permitted him to continue the construction, at the same time, however, made it clear that no third party should be inducted and possession should not be parted. Thereafter, challenging the orders of the 7th and 9th respondents cancelling the joint patta, dated 10.6.2004 and 9.5.2005, W.P. Nos. 8624 and 8625 of 2006 were filed, which along with W.P. No. 8618 of 2006 were also tagged along with W.P. No. 4950 of 2007. When the above writ petitions were taken up for hearing on 24.7.2007, it was brought to the notice of this Court about the sale of the residential flats to 54 persons and therefore, suo motu orders were passed impleading them as party respondents in the above writ petitions. They were accordingly, impleaded as respondents 12 to 64 in W.P. No. 4950 of 2007 and as respondents 11 to 63 in W.P. Nos. 8624 and 8625 of 2007. After notice to the newly impleaded respondents, different counsel entered appearance on their behalf.

20. That apart, one Thiru. M.V.V.N. Arumuga Pandian at whose instance the 9th respondent D.R.O. passed his order, dated 15.6.2006 cancelling the joint patta, dated 10.6.2004 and 9.5.2005 came forward with an application to get himself impleaded in W.P. No. 4950 of 2007. Since it was a public interest litigation, he was also permitted to make his say as an interloper. Moreover, he has already been arrayed as 5th respondent in W.P. Nos. 8624 and 8625 of 2007 and he was also heard.

21. In these writ petitions, the Pro Bono Publico would contend that the land which was acquired by the State Government to be used for a public purpose of construction of Peripheral Hospital as part of Housing Board Scheme and possession was vested with the State Government and the Housing Board no one, much less, the 11th respondent or respondents 12 to 64 can be permitted to claim ownership of the land and allowed to grab the Government land and make personal gain out of it by putting up construction in the form of residential flats. It is, therefore, claimed on the one hand that such an illegality should not be allowed to be perpetrated and therefore, the land, should be restored by directing the Government to construct Peripheral Hospital as originally scheduled at the time of acquisition. On the other hand, the 11th respondent would contend that he was a bona fide purchaser having regard to the valid sale deeds executed in his favour, as well as, the proceedings issued by the State Government, C.M.D.A., and Urban Land Ceiling authorities and certain orders of this Court confirming such proceedings and based on the above valid proceedings, he had promoted the land by investing several crores of rupees which had also resulted in the respondents 12 to 64 to make huge investments for the construction of the residential flats, equity demands the protection of the rights of the 11th respondent by permitting him to retain the properties along with the respondents 12 to 64. Supporting the stand of the 11th respondent, respondents 12 to 64 also contended that they were all bona fide purchasers of the respective flats by borrowing heavy amounts from Banks and financial institutions and since the petitioner in the public interest litigation as well as the 5th respondent Arumuga Pandian in W.P. Nos. 8624 and 8625 of 2007 were not bona fide in their approach in questioning the rights of the 11th respondent and through him the respondents 12 to 64, the public interest litigation should be rejected and it should be left to the decision of the State Government to decide as to in what other equitable manner the rights can be safeguarded.

22. As against the above, on behalf of the State Government, it is contended that since, after the acquisition in the year 1964, as well as after the modified award in the year 1975 the possession of the land in S. No. 297/1 in an extent of 4.95 acres was validly acquired and vested with the State and later continue to remain with the Housing Board unless there had been a valid reconveyance ordered under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, no one, much less, the respondent 11 and other respondents 12 to 64 can claim any equitable right based on their illegal encroachment of the land in question. Therefore, the State Government would contend that there is no scope for any equity to be considered in favour of respondents 11 to 64 and that it is the obligation of the State Government to fulfil the purport and intent of the acquisition by restoring the land and put the same into the use for which it was originally intended.

23. On behalf of the Pro Bono Publico, Mr. A.L. Somayaji, learned Senior Counsel addressed his arguments. The learned Senior Counsel in his submissions contended that a rank fraud was played by several parties either at the instance of the original owner Rajalakshmi Ammal or the subsequent purchasers in order to make it appear as though an extent of 0.90 acres in S. No. 297/1 was withdrawn from the original acquisition and in that pursuit, the process of this Court was also abused to certain extent and in such circumstances, having regard to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, reported in : AIR2007SC1546 (A.V. Papayya Sastry and Ors. v. Govt. of A.P. and Ors.) JT 2000 SC 218 (Prestige Lights Ltd. v. State Bank of India) and : AIR1996SC253 (Dr. G.N. Khajuria and Ors. v. Delhi Development Authority and Ors.) there can be no consideration on equity in favour of respondents 11 to 64.

24. The learned Senior Counsel brought to our notice, the recitals in the sale deed, dated 15.3.1996 said to have been executed by the Power Agent Mr. C. Mohan on behalf of Rajalakshmi Ammal, which when compared with her own stand as stated in her reply notice, dated 31.3.1998 to one of the parties, with copies marked to various other parties including some of the respondents herein, were wholly inconsistent and the above documents would show how a calculated fraud was played to grab the Government land for making a personal gain.

25. According to the learned Senior Counsel when the said parent documents did not establish any valid title to the subject land covered by S. No. 297/1, the 11th respondent, who seeks to claim title by way of a purchase effected on 1.12.2004, cannot be heard to say that he was a bona fide purchaser and now claim equitable relief on that basis. The learned Senior Counsel could also brought to our notice various other discrepancies in different documents to demonstrate how the bona fide claim and equitable rights claimed by respondents 11 to 64 cannot be considered.

26. As against the above submissions, M/s. R. Krishnamurthy and T.R. Rajagopalan, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the 11th respondent and M/s. G. Masilamani, T.V. Ramanujam and R. Muthukumarasamy, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the various respondents, who were purchasers of the individual flats, namely, the respondents 12 to 64 would contend that since at the time of purchase by the 11th respondent on 1.12.2004 along with others, there were certain documents issued by the Urban Land Ceiling Authorities as well as by an authority in the rank of Deputy Secretary which confirm to very large extent that the original owner Rajalakshmi Ammal continue to retain ownership in respect of the subject land and with reference to those Government documents, even as on date, as there is no dispute as to its existence, it will have to be held that the 11th respondent was a bona fide purchaser. The learned Senior Counsel, therefore, contended that in spite of such valid Government documents, if anyone wanted to question either such valid documents or the ownership rights of the 11th respondent as well as respondents 12 to 64, they should approach the appropriate Civil Court and not this Court by way of a public interest litigation.

27. The learned Senior Counsel would contend that the various Government proceedings, in particular, the orders of the Urban Land Ceiling Authorities as well as the letter of the Deputy Secretary were all documents which persuaded the 11th respondent to believe the lawful ownership of the original owner and applying the doctrine of 'Promissory Estoppel' the State Government is bound to protect the rights of the 11th respondent as well as the subsequent purchasers of the individual flats, namely, the respondents 12 to 64 and their possession cannot be interfered with.

28. Reliance was placed upon the decisions reported in : [2001]3SCR1056 (Kewal Chand Mimani (D) by Lrs. v. S.K. Sen and Ors.), : AIR2005SC894 (R & M Trust v. Koramangala Residents Vigilance Group and Ors.), : [1979]118ITR326(SC) (Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors.), (1996) 2 SCC 501 (Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Industrial Development Investment Co. Pvt. Ltd. and Ors.), : (1997)2SCC627 (C. Padma and Ors. v. Dy. Secretary to the Government of Tamil Nadu and Ors.), : (1998)1MLJ314 (The Senior Superintendent of Post Offices, Coimbatore Division v. The Coimbatore Diocese Society represented by its Procurator, Coimbatore and Ors.), : [1986]158ITR574(SC) (Union of India v. Godfrey Philips India Ltd.), : [2004]269ITR97(SC) (State of Punjab v. Nestle India Ltd. and Anr.) and (2007) 5 MLJ 436 (SC)-(Amey Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. and Anr. v. Public Concern for Governance Trust and Ors.).

29. At the outset, we wish to deal with the public interest litigation in the first instance as the disposal of the said writ petition would in effect find a solution for the disposal of the other writ petitions. In the public interest litigation, the issue that looms large is as to 'whether the so called ownership rights claimed by the 11th respondent and through him the other respondents 12 to 64 should prevail or the status of the subject property as the Government land should be maintained and the consequential directions to be issued.' In order to ascertain the stand of the State Government that the subject land is the property of the State, the relevant documents which are to be examined are as under:

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

S.NO DATE PARTICULARS AVAILABLE AT

WHICH VOL.&

PAGE

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

1 31.7.196 Award No. 14/1964. VI - 1

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

2 31.10.19 G.O.Ms. No. 1031, Housing. II - 1

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

3 4/1/75 Copy of the revised Award VI - 15

No.5/74.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

4 13.3.198 Order, dated 13.3.1981 of the V - 17

Subordinate Judge, Chengalpattu

in CROP No. 145 of 1976 for

disbursement of the

compensation payable in respect

of the land acquired under

award No. 5/1974, dated

4.1.1975

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

5 28.7.198 General Power of Attorney VII - 1

executed by V. Rajalakshmi

Ammal in favour of C.Mohan.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

6 28.4.198 Copy of cancellation of VII - 8

General Power of Attorney by

Rajalakshmi, dated 28.7.1988.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

7 31.10.19 Order in W.P. No. 1172 of 1985, VII - 14

in the Writ Petition filed by

Velu Mudaliar and Rajalakshmi.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

8 24.3.199 Notice issued by the II - 256

Tahsildar, Mambalam-Guindy

Taluk to the 11th

Respondent.(Impugned order in

W.P. No. 8618 of 2006)

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

9 31.3.199 Reply by Rajalakshmi to the VII - 20

legal notice issued by

Vilvijayan and Anandakumar,

dated 20.2.1998.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

10 14.1.200 Copy of the letter purported I - 4

to have been issued by the

Executive Engineer and

Administrative Officer,

K.K. Nagar Division of Tamil

Nadu Housing Board.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

11 19.5.200 Proceedings of the Tahsildar, VI - 25

Mambalam-Guindy Taluk.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

12 8/6/04 Letter of the D.R.O. to the VI - 30

Tahsildar, Mambalam-Guindy

Taluk.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

13 8/6/04 Reply by the Tahsildar, VI - 30

Mambalam-Guindy Taluk to

D.R.O., Chennai.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

14 Extracts from the Town Survey VI - 64

Register in respect of the

property situated in

S. No. 297/1 containing the

original entry in the name of

Tamil Nadu Housing Board and

the change of such entry dated

10.6.2004 in favour of

T.Neduncheziyan, and others

and subsequent change made by

proceedings, dated 5.5.2005 in

favour of M/s. Metro Steel

Rolling Mills Pvt. Ltd. and

others

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

15 29.3.200 Notice issued by the DRO to VI - 48

M.V.V.N. Arumuga Pandian,

Neduncheziyan, Chitrarasu,

Thulasidas, Saraswathy and

C. Vijayalakshmi for hearing to

be held on 31.3.2006 at 3.00 p.m.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

16 28.4.200 Copy of the letter issued by II - 270

the Deputy Secretary to

Thiru. MVVN. Arumuga Pandian,

dated 28.4.2006

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

17 15.6.200 Order of the District Revenue I - 16

Officer, Chennai District.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

18 22.6.200 Copy of the hearing notice II - 272

issued by the Special

Commissioner and Commissioner

of Administration.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

19 30.6.200 Copy of the letter issued by I - 6

the Assistant Secretary (LA) to

Tamil Nadu Housing Board.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

20 28.7.200 Letter issued by the Tamil I - 26

Nadu Housing Board to MVVN.

Arumuga Pandian furnishing the

land usage details of

S. No. 297/1 of Kodambakkam

Village, Mambalam-Guindy Taluk.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

21 12/12/06 Proceedings of the Special I - 26

Commissioner and Commissioner

of Land Administration,

granting stay of the order of

the DRO, dated 15.6.2006 and

also posting the main revision

for hearing on 21.1.2007 at

11.00 a.m.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

22 1/2/07 Copy of the hearing notice II - 272

issued by the Special

Commissioner and Commissioner

of Land Administration,

posting the hearing.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

23 23.2.200 Letter from the Managing VI - 64

Director, Tamil Nadu Housing

Board to the Special

Commissioner and Commissioner

of Land Administration, dated

23.2.2007

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

24 28.2.200 Copy of the Order of the VI - 66

Special Commissioner and

Commissioner of Land

Administration confirming the

order of the D.R.O., dated

15.6.2006

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

30. When we peruse the above documents, we find that the starting point is the award No. 14 of 1964 dated 31.7.1964. In the said award, acquisition of 16.05 acres, which were lying in different survey numbers including S. No. 297 which covered 5.90 acres, was made. The said property then stood in the name of S. Velu Mudaliar. Subsequently, in G.O.Ms. No. 1031, Housing, dated 31.10.1973, the extent of 0.95 acres was withdrawn from the acquisition and in the Schedule to the said G.O., the boundaries were specifically mentioned. In fact, by virtue of the withdrawal made in the said G.O., S. No. 297 was sub-divided as 297/1 and 2. The acquired land, namely, the 4.95 acres was stated to have situated in S. No. 297/1. The left out land, namely, the 0.95 acres situated in the sub-divided S. No. 297/2 standing in the name S. Velu Mudaliar and Rajammal surrounded on the North by 297/1 East by S. No. 294, South by 298 and West by S. Nos. 300 and 299.

31. In the revised award No. 5/74, dated 4.1.1975, the extent of acquired land in S. No. 297/1 has been specifically mentioned as 4.95 acres. In the revised award, one other land situated in S. No. 340/2 in an extent of 0.18 acres has also been mentioned. In fact, in the descriptive part of the award the extent of 4.95 acres in S. No. 297/1 and 0.18 acres in S. No. 340/2 and the total extent of 5.13 acres has been clearly mentioned.

32. The above referred to documents, therefore, make it clear that while original acquisition was in the composite S. No. 297 for the total extent of 5.90 acres, after the exemption granted in G.O.Ms.1031, dated 31.10.1973, the acquired land got reduced to 4.95 acres, which fell in S. No. 297/1, whereas the exempted extent of 0.95 acres fell in S. No. 297/2. With reference to the above statement of facts, there could not have been any dispute at all by anyone.

33. In fact, after the above said acquisition, the original owner Rajalakshmi Ammal aspired for the allotment of plots in her favour from the Housing Board under the ex-owner category. With that view, she executed a Power of Attorney, dated 28.7.1988 in favour of one Thiru. C. Mohan, s/o. Late V.L. Chellappa.

34. A perusal of the said Power of Attorney disclose that the purport of the power was to correspond and negotiate with the Housing Board or with the other appropriate authorities to get the allotment of the land or flats under ex-owners category scheme by virtue of the acquisition. However, by a document, dated 28.4.1989, the said Rajalakshmi Ammal, wife of Velu Mudaliar cancelled the Power of Attorney, dated 28.7.1988, which was registered as document No. 101 of 1989 in the Office of the Sub Registrar, Guduvancheri.

35. The recitals of the said document disclose that the Power Agent was indulging in dishonest and illegal activities and therefore, she did not want to continue the power granted in favour of her agent, namely, Thiru. C. Mohan. Prior to the execution of the power, the said Rajalakshmi Ammal along with her husband Velu Mudaliar had filed a writ petition in W.P. No. 1172 of 1985 seeking for the issuance of a Writ of Mandamus to direct the Tamil Nadu Housing Board to allot necessary flats under the ex-owner category scheme framed under Section 12 of the Tamil Nadu State Housing Board Act, 1961.

36. A perusal of the said order disclose that the very same prayer was earlier rejected by the Housing Board, by order, dated 21.9.1984. Further, after the initial acquisition made under award No. 14 of 1964, the exclusion of 0.90 acres itself came to be made in G.O.Ms. No. 1031, dated 31.10.1973. On finding that the said lands were not in the possession of the original owners Rajalakshmi Ammal and Velu Mudaliar and since they have laid out those plots and sold them to 17 persons, ultimately, this Court declined the prayer of the original owners for the allotment of necessary plots under the ex-owner category scheme. Thereafter, the original owner Tmt. Rajalakshmi Ammal sent a reply to legal notice, dated 20.2.1998 issued on behalf of M/s. Vilvijayan and C. Anandakumar. The reply of Tmt. Rajalakshmiammal was dated 31.3.1998. Some of the statements contained in the reply are very relevant for our present purpose which requires extraction and reads as under:

A perusal of the contention of the notice under reference will reveal that a rank one forgery committed by certain vested interested persons who conspired among themselves in order to swallow the Government property, which was acquired by the Government in 1963 itself for the development of the area as Kodambakkam Pudur neighbourhood scheme and taken over possession also from the erstwhile land owners late S. Velu Mudaliar and a portion of the extent of land excluded from the said acquisition in G.O.Ms. No. 1031, Housing, dt.31.10.1973, which was under the occupation of the encroachers, had also been conveyed in their favour by the erstwhile landowners by means of registered sale deeds.... In any stretch of even imagination neither the erstwhile landowner late Velu Mudaliar nor Tmt. Rajalakshmi would not have joined as party in the alleged sale agreement because the said piece of land in Survey No. 297(Part) was acquired by the Government along with a larger extent of other properties belonging to them in 1963 itself. The statement of your clients that they have put up compound wall around the suit property together with an asbestos sheet shed and a thatched shed therein is curious and self servient as it is a fertile imagine one for setting up of a case in their favour, because the said alleged property has been under the effective possession and enjoyment of Government..The said Velu Mudaliar died on 7.4.1988. After his death so far as C. Mohan is concerned, he was a power of Attorney Agent for Tmt. Rajalakshmi for getting allotment of land from the Government under ex-owner category towards the lands measuring more than 5.95 acres of land acquired by Government and the said Power of Attorney was given in 1988 and the same was also cancelled by means a registered deed in 1989 as he misused the power and could not get the said allotment and the Power of Attorney was given only to approach the concerned authorities to get eligible extent of ex-owner category land from the Government. The said Mohan might have created some incrimination documents without authority. Which will not in any way bind the said Tmt. Rajalakshmi as the same would not have executed by her..She is not in any way concerned with the said suit since the property involved is a Government property and she is not having any manner of right interested and title over the same.

37. A copy of the said reply was also marked to the Chairman, Tamil Nadu Housing Board, and the Chief Engineer, P.W.D. and certain others.

38. The above referred to documents cumulatively go to show that after the initial acquisition and the subsequent modified award made in 1975, the original owner Rajalakshmi herself had reconciled to the position that she had no rights in respect of the lands to an extent of 4.95 acres in S. No. 297/1 and that the said land absolutely belonged to the State Government and the Housing Board and if at all any mischief had been played with reference to the said land it could have been done by others including her one time power agent Thiru. C. Mohan.

39. In fact a specific allegation with reference to the said power agent was to the effect that he might have created some incriminating documents without authority and that she was not bound by any such document.

40. That apart, a perusal of the proceedings of the Tahsildar, Mambalam-Guindy Taluk, dated 19.5.2004, as well as the connected letters of the D.R.O., dated 8.6.2004, and the Tahsildar also dated 8.6.2004, and the extract from the Town Survey Register of Kodambakkam, dated 16.7.2007, makes it clear that after the acquisition of the subject land situated in S. No. 297/1 in an extent of 0.90 acres it stood transferred in the name of the Tamil Nadu Housing Board and continue to remain in the said name till it was transferred in the name of M/s. T. Neduncheziyan, T. Chitrarasu, V. Thulasi Doss, N. Saraswathy and Tmt. Vijayalakshmi on 10.6.2004. For effecting the said transfer, the proceedings referred to were the Tamil Nadu Housing Board letter, dated 19.1.2001 and the proceedings of the Assistant Commissioner, Urban Land Tax, dated 31.5.2004, the exercise of making the transfer in the name of the above referred to persons appeared to have been made based on their application, dated 19.5.2004.

41. In this context, one other set of documents to be referred to are three sale deeds in document Nos. 1416, 1413, and 1415 of 1996, dated 15.3.1996. These documents by way of sale deed were said to have been executed by Thiru. C.Mohan in his capacity as power agent of Tmt. V. Rajalakshmi Ammal in favour of C. Vijayalakshmi, V. Thulasidoss and Mrs. N. Saraswathy. As one of the purchasers Thulasidoss was stated to have subsequently expired, his sons Neduncheziyan, Chitrarasu, and his daughter V. Tamilselvi joined along with Vijayalakshmi and Saraswathy, the so-called purchasers, who applied for the transfer of patta in their name in their application, dated 19.5.2004.

42. Apparently, the execution of the three sale deeds, dated 15.3.1996 appeared to have been the starting point for the attempted change in the status and character of the subject land situated in S. No. 297/1 in an extent of 0.90 acres. Under the above referred to three sale deeds an extent of 0.30 acres each in S. No. 297/1 were sought to be transferred in favour of the purchasers. Therefore, when by virtue of the land acquisition proceedings culminating in the award No. 5/1974, dated 4.1.1975, the entire extent of 4.95 acres including the extent of 0.90 acres was acquired and possession was vested with the Tamil Nadu Housing Board, no one including the erstwhile owner could have had any hold over the said land for transferring the same in favour of any one, much less, the above referred to subsequent purchasers. In fact, a copy of the reply notice of the original owner Rajalakshmiammal herself, dated 31.3.1998 makes it amply clear that even as of the year 1998, she had in an unambiguous terms made it clear that the subject land absolutely belonged to the Government and the Tamil Nadu Housing Board.

43. Once that was the legal status of the subject land having regard to the documents which prevailed as on that date which position continue to remain even as on date and the same was also duly acknowledged by the original owner herself there was very little scope for anybody else to meddle with the ownership of the said lands by creating any document in favour of anybody else much less the so-called purchasers under the sale deeds, dated 15.3.1996 through the power agent Thiru.C.Mohan.

44. As against the above referred to definite position as regards the ownership of the Tamil Nadu Housing Board/State over the subject lands, when we examine the various other materials relied upon by the 11th respondent, we find some of those documents had been issued at the instance of certain other Government machineries. The genuineness of such documents have to be necessarily put to deeper scrutiny as such documents did not appear to have been issued in the normal course of the business transaction of the departments concerned.

45. We will presently refer to the various instances concerned with those documents which would fortify our conclusions and impressions which we gained to the effect that those documents lack genuineness. As far as the right claimed by the 11th respondent is concerned, after the sale deeds, dated 15.3.1996, executed in favour of Saraswathy, Vijayalakshmi and Thulasidoss, the 11th respondent claimed title based on the sale deed, dated 1.12.2004, executed by Saraswathy and four others, through, their power agent M/s. TVS Finance and Services Ltd., in favour of Metro Steel Rolling Mill Pvt. Ltd., T. Udayakumar and Mr. Ramamurthy Saravanakumar. Subsequently, M/s. Metro Steel Rolling Mill Pvt. Ltd., transferred its 1/3rd right in favour of Khimraj Sakariya by a sale deed, dated 19.10.2005. Similarly, Mr. Ramamurthy Sarvanakumar conveyed his 1/3 right in the subject property in favour of V. Bhuvaneshwari w/o. the 11th respondent by a sale deed, dated 28.9.2006. Presently, the 11th respondent along with Khimraj Sakariya as well as his wife Bhuvaneshwari claim ownership and the 11th respondent was stated to have promoted the property under the banner of 'Land Mark Constructions.'

46. As stated earlier, having regard to the very firm stand of the original owner Rajalakshmi Ammal in her reply notice dated 31.3.1998 as well as the cancellation of the power in the deed, dated 28.4.1989 cancelling the power of attorney, dated 28.7.1988 in favour of Thiru. C. Mohan, the very execution of the sale deeds, dated 15.3.1996, themselves had no validity in law.

47. In fact on a perusal of the sale deeds, dated 15.3.1996, we find that it contains a statement that the purchasers mentioned therein were already in possession of the schedule property as the vendor having delivered the vacant possession several years before.

48. It is quite amazing to note how the property which was already in the possession of the Tamil Nadu Housing Board as from the year 1964 and 1975 as categorically admitted by the so-called vendor herself in her reply notice, dated 31.3.1998 the said lands could have remained in the possession of the purchasers of the sale deeds, dated 15.3.1996 from any period prior to the said date.

49. In this context, it will be relevant to mention the averment contained in the counter affidavit filed by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board in W.P. No. 4950 of 2007. In the said counter affidavit, it has been categorically stated that the entire site meant for construction for Peripheral Hospital in an extent of 120 grounds 0550 Sq.ft. was handed over to P.W.D. on 28.6.1976 as per letter No. G/II/(3)87387/73, dated 22.5.1976 and on 8.4.1981 as per reference in KKN Dn. Letter No. E1/ 87387/73, dated 16.2.1981 and letter No. KKNS/4758/79, dated 20.3.1981 etc. Therefore, the above referred to communications of the Tamil Nadu Housing Board for whom the acquisition was made considered along with the fact that in the revenue records the necessary name transfer, namely, that the name of the Tamil Nadu Housing Board having been incorporated it was abundantly made clear that the subject land was in the physical and legal possession of the Tamil Nadu Housing Board after the acquisition and that the land meant for the construction of Government Peripheral Hospital from the acquired lands was duly entrusted with P.W.D. for carrying out the necessary construction. Therefore, as against the above documents, which emanated from the office of the revenue Authorities and the Housing Board authorities coupled along with the stand of the original owner herself in her reply notice, dated 31.3.1998 making it clear that the Housing Board and the Government were in absolute possession of the subject land, the sale deeds, dated 15.3.1996 in stating that the very same lands were in the possession of the original owner was nothing but a blatant lie.

50. Above all, the further statement contained in the sale deeds, dated 15.3.1996, that the purchasers were in possession of the said land long prior to the execution of the said sale deed can only be considered as a statement made without any scruples with a view to play a fraud on the State Government and the Tamil Nadu Housing Board. When such a conclusion based on the consideration of the above referred to documents is inevitable as regards the transaction made in the sale deeds, dated 15.3.1996, it will have to be held that any subsequent transaction based on the said sale deeds will also be absolutely invalid in law and no credence can be attached to any of the subsequent transactions based on the above referred to sale deeds.

51. In the said light, when the stand of the 11th respondent that he was the bona fide purchaser is considered, here again, we do not find even a semblance of genuineness in the said claim. In this context, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the 11th respondent as well as other learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents 12 to 64 wanted to place heavy reliance upon the proceedings emanated from the Office of the Urban Land Ceiling Authorities and the Office of the Deputy Secretary to Government.

52. In the first place, when we consider the stand of the 11th respondent based on the sale deed, dated 1.12.2004, it will be worthwhile to refer to certain recitals and particulars contained in the said sale deed. Unlike, the earlier sale deed, dated 15.3.1996, where there is no reference to the prior title except a deed of settlement, dated 6.12.1967 in favour of Rajalakshmiammal, in the sale deed, dated 1.12.2004 for the first time, we find reference to the ownership in respect of the entire 5.90 acres in S. No. 297 as originally owned by one Mr. K. Shanmugasundara Mudaliar. He is stated to have bequeathed the property in favour of his wife Mrs. Sowbhagyammal in his last registered will, dated 16.10.1927 registered as document No. 92/1927 in the Office of the Sub Registrar, West Madras. After the ownership of Mrs. Sowbhagyammal, it is stated that since she had no issues, the property reverted to the brothers of Shanmugasundara Mudaliar, namely, Sivanandan Mudaliar, Sivalingam Mudaliar, and Somasundara Mudaliar. Thereafter, there was a civil suit in O.S. No. 43/51 on the file of the Additional Subordinate Judge, Chengalpattu, in which a compromise was entered on 28.2.1953 pursuant to which the property came to be possessed by Somasundara Mudaliar and Velu Mudaliar. Subsequently, there was a partition between Somasundara Mudaliar and Velu Mudaliar on 3.3.1954 by way of a registered document No. 527/54 in the Office of the Sub Registrar, Saidapet. It is based on the said partition deed, Velu Mudaliar was stated to have owned the property, who in turn executed the settlement deed, dated 6.12.1967 registered as document No. 3490/67 in the Office of the Sub Registrar, T. Nagar in favour of his wife Rajalakshmi Ammal.

53. Apart from tracing the above title, there were two other references in the sale deed, dated 1.12.2004. There was also a reference to award No. 14/64, dated 31.7.1964 and the subsequent G.O.Ms. No. 1031, dated 31.10.1973 in and by which exemption of 0.95 acres was made from the acquisition. There is one other reference in the said sale deed which reads as under:

Whereas the Tamil Nadu Housing Board subsequently acquired an extent of only 4.05 acres out of 5.90 acres in S. No. 297 of Kodambakkam Village in award No. 5/74, dated 4.1.1974 and due to encroachment an extent of 0.90 acres, i.e., A, B and C Schedule mentioned property was also excluded from the revised award No. 5/74 ad it remain in possession of Mrs. V. Rajalakshmi Ammal.

54. The above referred to recitals in the said document are not supported by either the award No. 5/74, dated 4.1.1974 or by the statement of the original owner Mrs. Rajalakshmiammal herself. In fact, the extent mentioned as 4.05 acres in the said paragraph is quite misleading. When we refer to the award No. 5/74, dated 4.1.1975, we find that the extent mentioned therein is 4.95 acres in S. No. 297. The xerox copy of the said document, dated 1.12.2004 disclose that the same had been signed by the authorised signatory of Power Agent M/s. TVS Finance & Services Ltd., as well as the three purchasers mentioned in that document. The sale consideration was a total sum of Rs. 3,05,00,000/- (Rupees Three Crores and Five Lakhs only).

55. It is quite shocking to note that such a valuable consideration running to more than rupees three crores was paid by the 11th respondent and others without even verifying the correctness of the statement that the extent was only 4.05 acres or 4.95 acres in the award No. 5/74. It is not known whether due verification was made by the 11th respondent and the other purchasers as to the veracity of the statement contained in the said paragraph. When award No. 5/74 clearly mentions the extent of land as 4.95 acres, we can only state that the mentioning of the said extent in the said award as 4.05 acres was nothing but a deliberate mis-statement made either to satisfy the vendor or the purchaser or as directed by either of them. Certainly, we are unable to comprehend the intention or the purpose for which such a deliberate mis-statement was made in the sale deed with reference to the extent of the land in as much as the extent of the land was the crucial aspect in the said sale deed as otherwise, no valid title would pass on to the purchaser. Therefore, we are constrained to comment upon the lack of truthfulness as regards the said recitals. Apart from the mis-statement about the extent of land, one other statement mentioning that an extent of 0.90 acres in the schedule A, B and C properties was excluded in the award No. 5/74, dated 4.1.1975 due to the encroachment, which is also not a true one or correct statement.

56. In fact on a reading of the order, dated 31.10.1991, in W.P. No. 1172/1985, the only encroachment noted was in S. No. 297/2, and because of the said encroachment, it was stated that G.O.Ms. No. 1031 Housing, dated 31.10.1973 came to be made excluding those lands. There was a specific reference in the said order to the effect that those excluded lands were not in the possession of the original owner since she had laid out those lands as plots and sold them to 17 persons.

57. Except the above reference contained in the said proceedings, in no other proceedings or was there any other document which has been placed before us to show that there was any noted encroachment by anyone much less, the purchasers in the sale deeds, dated 15.3.1996 or any one claiming through them. Thereafter, the said recital as regards the 0.90 cents in Award No. 5/74 was another deliberate incorrect and false statement made with a view to play a fraud against the State as well as the Tamil Nadu Housing Board to grab their lands.

58. From the above discussion, we can safely conclude that neither based on sale deeds, dated 15.3.1996, nor the sale deed, dated 1.12.2004 any person, much less, the 11th respondent and the other so- called purchasers derived any valid title in respect of the 0.90 acres falling under S. No. 297/1. On the other hand, the said lands, as already stated by us continue to be owned and in the possession of the Tamil Nadu Housing Board right from the date of the award No. 5/74, dated 4.1.1975 and there was no scope for any one to claim possession other than the Tamil Nadu Housing Board.

59. The other materials relied upon to claim possession and consequential ownership are the proceedings of the Urban Land Ceiling authorities. As far as the said claim is concerned, the initial document is the notification, dated 7.2.1996 under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1978. The extent mentioned therein is 0.36.50 in S. No. 297/1C part. The notification also states that it was owned by Tmt. Rajalakshmi Ammal. As per the notification, the said land deemed to have acquired by the State Government on and from 1.3.96 by virtue of Section 11(1) of the 1978 Act.

60. With reference to the said notification, significantly there was no proceedings initiated at the instance of Tmt. Rajalakshmi Ammal, at any point of time, prior to the filing of the Writ Petition in W.P. No. 20552 of 2003. The said writ petition came to be filed in the year 2003 contending that since the 1978 Act had been repealed and since the petitioner continue to remain in possession, the impugned acquisition under the 1978 Act stood abated. It is true that the said writ petition came to be ordered on 19.12.2003 in favour of the petitioner based on a communication, produced by the learned Special Government Pleader, which was said to have been issued by one Thiru. R.M. Rajendran, Assistant Commissioner, Urban Land Tax, dated 15.12.2003 confirming that the physical possession of the land continue to remain with the land owner.

61. The writ petition was filed by none other than the Rajalakshmi herself. In the first place, it is quite shocking to note that Tmt. Rajalakshmi Ammal, who had taken a firm stand in her reply notice, dated 31.3.1998 which also contains her signature that no part of the land in S. No. 297/1 remain in her possession but on the other hand, entirety of the said land had already been possessed by the State Government and the Tamil Nadu Housing Board can come forward with the statement in that writ petition that she continue to remain in possession for the purpose of defeating the notification, dated 7.2.1996 issued under the provisions of the Urban Land Ceiling Act, 1978.

62. Having regard to our earlier conclusion, based on the reply notice, dated 31.3.1998 by Rajalakshmi Ammal herself read along with various other proceedings that after the acquisition in award No. 5/74 no part of the land in S. No. 297/1 was in her possession, it will have to be held that the said claim made by her in W.P. No. 20552/2003 was totally a false one. Merely because the order came to be passed in the said writ petition based on a representation made by the learned Special Government Pleader based on a communication issued by the Assistant Commissioner of Urban Land Tax, it cannot be concluded that the order by itself establish the possession of the erstwhile land owner as of 2003. In fact the revenue records, namely, Town Survey Register extract of which has been placed before us, which was dated 16.7.2007 disclose that only on 10.6.2004, the transfer came to be effected in the name of T. Nedunchezian and four others and prior to the said date the lands in S. No. 297/1 stood only in the name of the Tamil Nadu Housing Board. The said extract from the Town Survey Register is part of the set of documents furnished by the office of the Urban Land Ceiling Authorities.

63. In this connection, the set of documents filed on behalf of the 11th respondent as contained in Vol.5 disclose that the contents contained therein were of slippery in nature. There is a communication, dated 5.9.1996, from the Special Deputy Collector(LA), Tamil Nadu Housing Board Schemes, Madras-35, addressed to the Managing Director, Tamil Nadu Housing Board. In the last part of that letter a recommendation has been made that the claim of Tmt. Rajalakshmi Ammal for exclusion of 0.90 acres in S. No. 297/1 deserve consideration.

64. It will have to be stated that the Special Deputy Collector(LA) of Tamil Nadu Housing Board Schemes had no authority to make such a recommendation. Along with the said letter, a rough sketch has been prepared to make it appear as though the subject land was left out. There were certain other sketches prepared in the Office of the Assistant Commissioner, Urban Land Tax, Kunrathur making it appear as though the S. No. 297/1 was further sub-divided as S. Nos. 297/1A, 297/1B and 297/1C. For making such a reference to the various sub divisions, there was no supporting revenue records. There was one other communication, dated 31.5.2004 which came to be issued after the order of this Court, dated 19.12.2003 passed in W.P. No. 20552 of 2003. The said letter was addressed by the very same R.M. Rajendran, Assistant Commissioner, Urban Land Tax, who is stated to have instructed the learned Special Government Pleader in writing to make a statement in W.P. No. 20552 of 2003 that possession continue to remain with Tmt. Rajalakshmi Ammal, the petitioner in that writ petition. By this communication, dated 31.5.2004 addressed to the Tahsildar, the Assistant Commissioner, wanted the Tahsildar to carry out necessary changes in the Taluk and Village accounts in the name of Rajalakshmi Ammal and report compliance so as to enable him to send a report to the Special Commissioner and Commissioner of Land Reforms.

65. The land delivery receipt is also found in Vol.V to state that the land was handed over by the Urban Land Tax Authorities to the Revenue Inspector of Mambalam-Guindy Taluk. Thereafter, the very same R.M. Rajendran, the Assistant Commissioner, in his communication addressed to the Special Commissioner and Commissioner (ULC & ULT), dated 8.4.2004, reported that the order of this Court, dated 19.12.2003 in W.P. No. 20552 of 2003 can be accepted based on a legal opinion.

66. Having regard to the discussions with reference to the above documents, we hold that none of the statements contained in the above referred to documents contained in Vol.5 were supported by any legally acceptable basic revenue records to hold that there was any change in the character of the land from that of, namely, as possessed by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board after the award No. 5/74, dated 4.1.1975 to have lawfully transferred back to the original owner Rajalakshmi Ammal in order for the Urban Land Ceiling Authorities to initiate any proceedings for acquisition under Section 11(1) of the 1978 Act and thereafter, for the original owner to claim retention of the land after the repeal of the 1978 Act. We can only conclude that the proceedings emanated from the Office of the Urban Land Ceiling Authorities were one other set of documents, which might have been designedly made with a view to support other fraudulent transactions, which were perpetrated from the date of execution of the sale deeds, dated 15.3.1996. Here again, we want to stress upon the stand of the original owner Rajalakshmi Ammal in her reply notice, dated 31.3.1998 in having stated in no uncertain terms that after the acquisition under award No. 5/74, the possession of the lands in S. No. 297/1 changed hands, i.e. in favour of the Tamil Nadu Housing Board and thereafter, she was never put back in possession of those lands.

67. When the notification, dated 7.2.1996 is considered along with the subsequent proceedings of the Urban Land Ceiling Authorities, it has not been disclosed as to whether there was any consideration about the land acquisition proceedings which culminated in the award No. 5/1974, dated 4.1.1975 and the change of name of ownership from that of Rajalakshmi Ammal to that of Tamil Nadu Housing Board. For the Urban Land Ceiling Authorities to initiate proceedings for acquisition of excess land, the basic information as to the ownership would have been only from the land revenue authorities, namely, the concerned Tahsildar under whose jurisdiction, the record of ownership is maintained. The issuance of the notification, dated 7.2.1996, mentioning the name of Rajalakshmi Ammal as owner of the property creates serious doubts as to whether at all any such notification was issued, after duly ascertaining the ownership of the lands in question. In any event, when as a matter of fact, the ownership in respect of the land situated in S. No. 297/1, vested with the Tamil Nadu Housing Board after the award dated 4.1.1975, in award No. 5/74, the notifications issued in the year 1996 under the provisions of the Urban Land Ceiling Act, 1975 would definitely be of no consequence as that would not in any way change the character of ownership from that of Tamil Nadu Housing Board to that of Tmt. Rajalakshmiammal.

68. Further, when Tmt. Rajalakshmi Ammal having denounced her rights in respect of the land situated in S. No. 297/1, as could be seen from the reply notice, dated 31.3.1998, the attempted challenge to the notification, dated 7.2.1996 in the year 2003 was yet another deliberate attempt to hoodwink the authorities and to manipulate the proceedings in order to grab the Government land by some hook or crook.

69. Since W.P. No. 20552 of 2003 challenging the notification, dated 7.2.1996 has been filed by Tmt. Rajalakshmi Ammal by swearing to an affidavit as verified by us from the original papers of that writ petition, we can only state that the said attempt of Tmt. Rajalakshmi Ammal was a deliberate fraudulent attempt to regain ownership with reference to the land situated in S. No. 297/1 which had been lawfully acquired by the State Government under award No. 5/74, dated 4.1.1975. The filing of the said writ petition was a clear case of abuse of process of this Court, in as much as in that writ petition, this Court had no opportunity to examine the correctness of the ownership claimed by Tmt. Rajalakshmi Ammal since unfortunately, the Assistant Commissioner of Urban Land Ceiling himself reported to the learned Special Government Pleader in writing asserting as though Tmt. Rajalakshmi Ammal was the owner and that she continue to remain in possession.

70. In the light of such statement placed before this Court, the order came to be passed in W.P. No. 20552 of 2003 on 19.12.2003, holding that the Urban Land Ceiling Proceedings in the notification, dated 7.2.1996 abated after the repeal of the 1978 Act. The conduct of the Assistant Commissioner of Urban Land Ceiling in having made such a report in writing to the learned Special Government Pleader creates serious doubts as to whether there was diligent discharge of duties in having made such a report before this Court. Merely because, the said authority was functioning under the provisions of the Urban Land Ceiling Act, it did not mean that he was not expected to ascertain the correct position as regards ownership of any property before making any such statement in writing in this Court. The minimum that was expected of an authority of that level, namely, the Assistant Commissioner, was to have ascertained from the Town Survey Register which definitely contained an entry as regards the lands in S. No. 297/1 to the effect that it belonged to the Tamil Nadu Housing Board. In fact, from the records placed before us by the 11th respondent as contained in Volume III page 4, we find a copy of the village sub divisions statement of Kodambakkam Division with reference to the S. No. 297/1 in which after the name of the original owner Velu Mudaliar, the name of the Tamil Nadu Government has been recorded. The said statement has been attested by the Assistant Commissioner, Urban Land Tax, T. Nagar. The said statement apparently was issued long prior to the order passed in W.P. No. 20552 of 2003, dated 19.12.2003. Therefore, the Urban Land Ceiling Authorities cannot be heard to say that in spite of the said record maintained in the Office of the Tahsildar, Mambalam, Guindly Taluk, the Urban Land Ceiling Authorities were still able to state that Tmt. Rajalakshmiammal was the owner of the property in respect of S. No. 297/1.

71. Therefore, no reliance can be placed upon the proceedings of the Urban Land Ceiling Authorities in order to state that the purchase made by the 11th respondent on 1.12.2004 was made after ascertaining the ownership of the predecessors in title, namely, M/s. Neduncheziyan and others and prior to them Tmt. Rajalakshmi Ammal herself. Therefore, we have to necessarily reject any submission made based on the proceedings of the Urban Land Ceiling Authorities in order to state that the 11th respondent was bona fide mislead, while ascertaining the ownership of the lands in S. No. 297/1 and consequently, the subsequent purchase of flats by other respondents 12 to 64. 72. It will also be appropriate to mention at this juncture that the transfer of ownership recorded in the Town Survey Register on 10.6.2004 appeared to have been made based on two proceedings, namely, one dated 19.1.2001 of the Tamil Nadu Housing Board and the one dated 31.5.2004 by the Assistant Commissioner of Urban Land Tax Authorities. We have discussed at length as to how the proceedings of the Urban Land Tax Authorities cannot be given any credence to ascertain the ownership of the land as claimed by Rajalakshmi Ammal. As far as the proceedings, dated 19.1.2001 issued by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board, we wish to refer to the letter subsequently issued by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board itself, dated 30.6.2005 addressed to the Collector of Chennai.

73. A perusal of the said communication makes it clear that after the award No. 5/1974, dated 4.1.1975 and also G.O.Ms. No. 1031, dated 31.10.1973, the land to an extent of 4.95 acres was in the possession of the Tamil Nadu Housing Board and there was no further change in the extent of the land which was already in the possession of the Tamil Nadu Housing Board. There is also a categorical statement contained in the said letter, dated 30.6.2005 which reads as under:

The letter No. KKNS/4174/97, dated 19.1.2001 has not been issued by the Executive Engineer and Administrative Officer, R.A. Nagai Division Office.

74. Therefore, it is quite apparent that the proceedings dated 19.1.2001 stated to have been issued by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board was one other fraudulent manipulation in the creation of records at the instance of the parties, who wanted to gain a hold over the land in S. No. 297/1. Since the starting point for the 11th respondent to claim title in respect of the subject land in S. No. 297/1 in an extent of 0.90 cents is the sale deeds, dated 15.3.1996, it will have to be stated that the attempt of the parties concerned to grab the Government land must have emanated in and around that date, namely, 15.3.1996, since it is claimed in the sale deed, dated 15.3.1996 that the purchasers were already in possession, it only goes to show that every attempt was made to de-fraud the State by manipulating the government records to snatch away the valuable land and make some unlawful gains.

75. In the above said background, the impugned order of the DRO, dated 15.6.2006, is perused. His conclusions that records were manipulated and documents were fabricated to suit the needs of the parties to unlawfully grab the land were perfectly justified.

76. One other set of documents on which reliance was placed upon by the 11th respondent to support his claim was the reclassification ordered by the C.M.D.A., and the subsequent notification issued by the State Government reclassifying the land from one of 'institutional zone' to 'residential zone'. The C.M.D.A., issued a notification No. R1/3/2005 by way of paper publication both in an English daily and a Tamil daily. In the said notification, the C.M.D.A. has referred to various requests made by different parties for reclassification of lands in use and the details of the same. In Serial No. 14, the name of the applicant has been mentioned as Thiru. Ramamoorthy and others with reference to T.S. No. 14/2, Block No. 129 of Kodambakkam Village. The site address has been mentioned as Bharathidasan Salai, Ashok Nagar, Chennai. The extent has been shown as 0.36.7 in the column and the use as per first master plan, it is mentioned as 'institutional use zone'. In the column change of land use requested by the applicant, it is mentioned as 'Primary Residential use zone for construction of residential building'. At the bottom of the notification, it is stated that the land use maps relating to all the above reclassification requests are available for inspection in their office between 10.00 A.M. to 1.00 P.M. on any working day. Thereafter, there was a gazette notification, dated 22.2.2006 wherein, after referring to the power delegated by the Government of Tamil Nadu, the C.M.D.A. made the following variation in the master plan by way of an explanatory note, which was stated as under:

T.S. No. 14/2, (old S. No. 279 part), Block 129, Chennai District classified as 'institutional' use zone is now reclassified as 'primary residential' use zone as per this Notification.

77. By referring to the above two documents, it was contended on behalf of the respondents 11 to 64 that when necessary steps were taken by issuing the above notification for reclassification of the lands from 'institutional zone' to 'primary residential zone' if really any one much less, the Tamil Nadu Housing Board or the State Government, had any concern for the subject land in S. No. 297/1, the same should have been raised in the form of objections or representations to the C.M.D.A., in response to the above notification which was issued on 22.2.2006.

78. The submission was that since none were interested in the property as lawful owner other than the predecessor in title from whom the property was purchased by the 11th respondent and others, it was too late in the day for the Pro Bono Publico and for anybody else to interfere with the lawful rights of the 11th respondent and the respondents 12 to 64 through him. We are not able to appreciate the submission of the respective counsel based on the above referred to proceedings of the C.M.D.A. After all, the C.M.D.A., issued a Notification No. R1/3/05, combining various applications seeking for reclassification of several lands, which also called for objections from whomsoever interested in those lands. It will have to be remembered that the C.M.D.A. was not concerned with the correctness or otherwise of the ownership rights when somebody applied to it seeking for reclassification. The C.M.D.A. is not the authority concerned to decide ownership right of any party concerned. Since because it called for objections as regards the reclassification of the lands as a statutory authority, it cannot be taken to mean that by itself created a valid right in favour of the applicant who sought for the re-classification. The ownership right in respect of any immovable property by anyone has to be established by unimpeachable title deeds, tracing such title from the date of its origin. Unless such title is traced without any ambiguity, viz., the immovable property concerned, merely because one applied for reclassification to a statutory authority, namely, the C.M.D.A., and that such authority, subsequently, accepted the application and notified the reclassification cannot be taken to mean that on that score a valid title came to be established in favour of the concerned applicant and on that basis, the rights of the original owner, in the case on hand, the Tamil Nadu Housing Board/State Government would automatically cease to exist. The submission made on behalf of the respondents 11 to 64 on the above referred to documents can only be stated as a feeble attempt to retain possession of the Government land which possession as claimed from the sale deed, dated 15.3.1996 was illegal and was nothing but an attempt by way of deliberate land grabbing. Therefore, we reject the submissions made by referring to the above proceedings of C.M.D.A.

79. One other aspect to be examined is the grievance of the 11th respondent and the other petitioner in W.P. Nos. 8624 and 8625 of 2007 where they have challenged the orders of the 7th and 9th respondents, namely, the Special Commissioner and Commissioner of Land Administration and the DRO, dated 28.2.2007 and 15.2.2006.

80. One of the grievances of the petitioner was that the 9th respondent, namely, D.R.O., passed his orders levelling very many mala fide and derogatory remarks both against the 11th respondent and his predecessor in title and very many statutory authorities and that such serious remarks came to be made without giving proper opportunity to the 11th respondent. In other words, even without any notice to the 11th respondent, the DRO, passed his orders, dated 15.6.2006, which was confirmed by the Special Commissioner and Commissioner of Land Administration without passing a reasoned order.

81. To buttress the above stand, it was contended on behalf of the State that the 11th respondent was issued with a notice, dated 24.3.2006, wherein, while directing him not to proceed with the construction, he was informed about the pending proceedings as regards the grant of patta in the Office of the District Collector. It was therefore, contended that since specific intimation was given to him as regards the patta proceedings, he cannot be heard to say that he had no notice. However, when we examine the various records placed before us, even the original records, culminating in the order of DRO, dated 15.6.2006, we were not able to find any specific notice having been issued to the 11th respondent calling upon him to attend any enquiry before the D.R.O., for cancellation of patta. In the order, dated 15.6.2006, the D.R.O. himself has mentioned that enquiry was conducted on various dates, between 14.6.2005 and 31.3.2006 and one Thiru. Chitrarasu one of the respondents appeared for the enquiry only on 9.8.2005, 13.10.2005 and 28.2.2006.

82. It is also stated that despite information to Thiru. Mahendrakumar Jain, Thiru. Udhayakumar and Thiru. Ramamoorthy Saravanakumar representing Metro Steel Rolling Mills Ltd., they did not appear for the enquiry and that the respondent Thiru. T. Chitrarasu claimed that he represented other respondents including Mahendra Kumar Jain and others. However, the fact remains that no specific notice appeared to have been issued to the 11th respondent or Ramamoorthy Saravanakumar or Mr. Mahendra Kumar Jain.

83. A copy of the order, dated 15.6.2006 of the D.R.O. was however, sent to Mahendra Kumar Jain, Director of Metro Steel Rolling Mills Pvt. Ltd., through the 11th respondent and Mr. Ramamoorthy Sarvanakumar. As far as the appellate authority's order, dated 28.2.2007, passed by the Special Commissioner and Commissioner for Land Administration is concerned, all parties were duly heard. As far as the said order is concerned, the grievance of the 11th respondent is that there was total non application of mind while passing the said order. In fact, on a perusal of the order, dated 28.2.2007, we find that the authority has merely referred to various documents in the major part of his order and in the penultimate para of the order, he reached an abrupt conclusion that a perusal of the entire records disclosed that the suit lands in S. No. 297/1 covered by award No. 5/74, dated 4.1.1975 was handed over to P.W.D. for construction of Government Peripheral Hospital and therefore, the order of the D.R.O., dated 15.6.2006 does not call for interference. Though such infirmities as regards service of notice did exist in respect of the above referred to orders of the D.R.O., and the Special Commissioner and Commissioner for Land Administration, we feel that on that score also there is no need to call upon those authorities to renew the proceedings. Since whatever grievance the petitioners in W.P. Nos. 8624 and 8625 of 2007, wanted to urge before those authorities were elaborately addressed before us, we feel that there would be no point in directing those authorities to reopen those proceedings since we have considered all the above referred to submissions in detail and have reached a conclusion that the petitioner, namely, the 11th respondent in W.P. No. 8624 of 2007 and the other petitioner in W.P. No. 8625 of 2007 have no valid right in respect of 0.90 cents in S. No. 297/1 for the reasons we have adduced in this order. Those orders of the D.R.O., and the Special Commissioner and Commissioner of Land Administration, dated 15.6.2006 and 28.2.207, respectively, therefore, do not call for any interference.

84. One other issue raised on behalf of the 11th respondent was the locus standi of the petitioner and the interloper in filing this Public Interest Litigation.

85. Submissions were also made on behalf of the respondents 11 to 64 casting serious aspersions against the interloper as well as the pro bono publico. As far as the interloper Mr. Arumuga Pandian was concerned, it was contended that he himself did not have valid right in respect of the lands in S. No. 297/1 and that he made every attempt to grab the land by resorting to various litigations and that since he failed in some of the proceedings filed in this Court, he wanted to wreak revenge on the 11th respondent by setting up the pro bono publico under the garb of public interest litigation.

86. As far as the petitioner in Public interest litigation is concerned, we were taken through certain newspaper representations and certain alleged telephonic conversation made by the said petitioner, wherein, he attempted to blackmail the 11th respondent by threatening to resort to this litigation.

87. At the outset, we are not inclined to go into the details of very many litigations perpetrated by the interloper Mr. Arumuga Pandian since we have come to a definite conclusion based on the various materials placed before us that the subject land in S. No. 297/1 absolutely belonged to the Tamil Nadu Housing Board and nobody else has got any right in respect of the said property. When we come to such a definite conclusion as regards the subject land, the litigations perpetrated by the interloper are of no consequence. In other words, the said conclusion of ours as regards the subject land would operate not only as against the 11th respondent and the respondents 12 to 64 but also against the interloper Arumuga Pandian himself. In the Public Interest Litigation, the role of the petitioner or anyone supporting the petitioner would be only to bring to the notice of the Court the predominant public interest involved and thereafter, it is for the Court to examine whether any real public interest is involved or not in the PIL. In the event of the Court finding a predominant public interest, which required to be safeguarded, the Court will take every effort to safeguard such interest and in that process, there is no scope for anyone to gain any personal advantage much less by the petitioner concerned or anyone supporting the petitioner.

88. Viewed in that angle, we hold that when in the public interest litigation, the issue related to protection of the State owned housing board lands from the clutches of the land grabbers and once this Court is able to ascertain the status of the subject property as the property of the Housing Board and appropriate orders can be issued for protecting the status of the property, viz, the Housing Board, then it will be a wasteful exercise if the allegations and counter allegations as between the petitioner, the interloper and the 11th respondent are seriously discussed in this order. Therefore, we reiterate that such allegations and counter allegations which are to very large extent personal as between the petitioner in the public interest litigation, the interloper and the 11th respondent they are not germane to the real public interest to be protected and therefore sans of those allegations, we wish to save the land of the Housing Board and protect its possession in the interest of public at large.

89. As far as the petitioner was concerned, as stated by us earlier, it was contended that he claimed ransom for not raising this issue and since the 11th respondent refused to budge to his demand with a view to wreak vengence, he has come forward with this Public Interest Litigation.

90. As far as the interloper, Thiru. Arumuga Pandian is concerned, it was contended that he himself was one of the encroachers and in order to restore his unlawful possession, he perpetrated several litigations and since he could not secure any orders in any of those proceedings, he set up the petitioner by furnishing all the materials to file this litigation.

91. We reiterate that we are not inclined to go into the correctness or otherwise of the allegations levelled against the petitioner in the PIL., or the interloper since based on the materials placed before us, both by the petitioner as well as the respondents, we are convinced that the 11th respondent himself was not legally entitled to remain in possession, inasmuch as the subject land belongs to the State and the Tamil Nadu Housing Board. As per various proceedings issued by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board, the subject land was allotted for the construction of a peripheral hospital in a Housing Board colony. On this aspect, we also wish to refer to few decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, where the scope of the PIL has been elaborately dealt with and guidelines have been given to deal with such litigations. The said decisions are reported in : AIR2004SC280 Ashok Kumar Pandey v. West Bengal : AIR2004SC1923 and : AIR2005SC540 .

92. In : AIR2004SC280 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has succinctly stated the position in pargraph 12. The said position was reiterated in : AIR2004SC1923 . In the said decision in paragraphs 4, 14 and 15, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has explained how to handle such public interest litigation which reads as under:

4. ...There must be real and genuine public interest involved in the litigation and concrete or credible basis for maintaining a cause before court and not merely an adventure of a knight errant borne out of wishful thinking. It cannot also be invoked by a person or a body of persons to further his or their personal causes or satisfy his or their personal grudge and enmity. Courts of justice should not be allowed to be polluted by unscrupulous litigants by resorting to the extraordinary jurisdiction. The credibility of such claims or litigations should be adjudged on the creditworthiness of the materials averred and not even on the credentials claimed of the person moving the courts in such cases....

14. The Court has to be satisfied about: (a) the credentials of the applicant; (b) the prima facie correctness or nature of information given by him; and (c) the information being not vague and indefinite. The information should show gravity and seriousness involved. Court has to strike a balance between two conflicting interests: (i) nobody should be allowed to indulge in wild and reckless allegations besmirching the character of others; and (ii) avoidance of public mischief and to avoid mischievous petitions seeking to assail, for oblique motives, justifiable executive actions....

15. Courts must do justice by promotion of good faith, and prevent law from crafty invasions. Courts must maintain the social balance by interfering where necessary for the sake of justice and refuse to interfere where it is against the social interest and public good. (See State of Maharashtra v. Prabhu and A.P. State Financial Corporation v. Gar Re-Rolling Mills.)

93. When we apply the above standards prescribed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court to the case on hand and having regard to the caution outlined by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, we made a detailed reference to the various materials in order to ensure that under the guise of PIL anyone's private interest should not be allowed to be seriously impaired.

94. In our considered opinion, the materials placed before the Court disclose that if the issue raised in the PIL, is not probed into, then it may result in a public wrong or public injury, on the other hand, the issue if probed into, then it would result in redressal of a genuine public wrong. Further, eschewing the alleged antecedents of the petitioner as well as the interloper, having regard to the voluminous documents placed before us, we were able to sift the materials and ascertain the correctness of the information furnished by the petitioner and the interloper and we were able to find out that such informations were not vague or indefinite. That apart, in our conclusion, based on such materials and the information, we could assess the gravity and the seriousness of the issue involved.

95. In that process, we could notice that very valuable land to an extent of 0.90 cents located in a very prime locality surrounded by a Housing Board Colony occupied by several thousands of citizens have been deprived of full-fledged peripheral hospital being set up by a calculated move to grab the said land by twisting and creating records to suit the purpose of such land grabbing attempt.

96. Therefore, though it was shown to us that adjacent to the subject land, peripheral hospital has been located and is functioning, it will have to be held that it is not for the 11th respondent or for that matter any other encroacher to state where and how any land allotted for a public purpose should be utilised. When the subject land was specifically earmarked by the State Government for the construction of a hospital to cater to the welfare of the public at large, it cannot lie in the mouth of an encroacher to state that a hospital with some facilities has been set up in the adjacent land and therefore, the encroached land which was also meant for the construction of a hospital should be left out to be enjoyed by the encroacher sacrificing the need of the public at large. We are not in a position to appreciate such a stand put forth on behalf of the 11th respondent.

97. All the above factors would go to show that irrespective of the allegations against the petitioner and the interloper having regard to the gravity of the issue highlighted and brought to our notice which in our considered opinion is in the interest of the public at large, we are convinced that necessary orders should be passed in this PIL to ensure that no one is permitted to grab the Government land earmarked for the development of such land for the welfare of the public at large.

98. In such a situation, when the 11th respondent wants to rely upon the orders of this Court passed in W.P. No. 20552 of 2003, dated 19.12.2003, the order dated 19.4.2005 in W.P. No. 5630 of 2005 and confirmation of the said order in W.A. No. 420 of 2006, dated 3.4.2006 and the interim order, dated 28.3.2006 in W.P.M.P. No. 9583 of 2006 in W.P. No. 8618 of 2006 and the order dated 10.8.2006 passed in W.P. No. 24456 of 2006, we wish to be guided by a recent decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (A.V. Papayya Sastry and Ors. v. Govt. of A.P. and Ors.). The principles set out by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraphs 21-26 are very relevant, which are extracted hereunder:

21. Now, it is well-settled principle of law that if any judgment or order is obtained by fraud, it cannot be said to be a judgment or order in law. Before three centuries, Chief Justice Edward Coke proclaimed:

'Fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal.'

22. It is thus settled proposition of law that a judgment, decree or order obtained by playing fraud on the court, tribunal or authority is a nullity and non est in the eye of the law. Such a judgment, decree or order - by the first court or by the final court - has to be treated as nullity by every court, superior or inferior. It can be challenged in any court, at any time, in appeal, revision, writ or even in collateral proceedings.

23. In the leading case of Lazarus Estates Ltd. v. Beasley Lord Denning observed: (All ER p. 345 C)

'No judgment of a court, no order of a Minister, can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud.'

24. In Duchess of Kingstone, Smith's Leading Cases, 13th Edn., p.644, explaining the nature of fraud, de Grey, C.J. Stated that though a judgment would be res judicata and not impeachable from within, it might be impeachable from without. In other words, though it is not permissible to show that the court was 'mistaken', it might be shown that it was 'misled'. There is an essential distinction between mistake and trickery. The clear implication of the distinction is that an action to set aside a judgment cannot be brought on the ground that it has been decided wrongly, namely, that on the merits, the decision was one which should not have been rendered, but it can be set aside, if the court was imposed upon or tricked into giving the judgment.

25. It has been said: fraud and justice never dwell together (fraus et just nunquam cohabitant); or fraud and deceit ought to benefit none (fraus et dolus nemini patrocinari debent).

26. Fraud may be defined as an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing some unfair or undeserved benefit by taking undue advantage of another. In fraud one gains at the loss of another. Even most solemn proceedings stand vitiated if they are actuated by fraud. Fraud is thus an extrinsic collateral act which vitiates all judicial acts, whether in rem or in personam. The principle of 'finality of litigation' cannot be stretched to the extent of an absurdity that it can be uitlised as an engine of oppression by dishonest and fraudulent litigants.

99. The above principles set out by the Hon'ble Supreme court squarely apply to the facts of this case. When the judgment came to be passed in W.P. No. 20552 of 2003 by applying the repealing Act of the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1978, this Court had no occasion to examine the nature of possession as claimed on behalf of the erstwhile owner Rajalakshmi Ammal. Unfortunately, the Assistant Commissioner of Urban Land Tax also supported the petitioner in that Writ Petition by written instruction to the learned Special Government Pleader to the effect that she was still in possession irrespective of the proceedings which were available in his office in the form of an extract from the revenue records of Guindy-Mambalam Taluk which specifically disclosed that the property in S. No. 297/1 was transferred in the name of Tamil Nadu Government from the erstwhile ownership of Velu Mudaliar/Rajalakshmi Ammal.

100. In the said circumstances, none of the above Court orders can be relied upon by the 11th respondent as those orders would in no way support his claim. Further, the order passed in W.P. No. 20552 of 2003 cannot be relied upon by the 11th respondent, since without disclosing the true, complete and correct facts, the Court based on the representation of the Special Government Pleader passed the order.

101. In that context, reliance placed upon by the petitioner in the decision reported in (Prestige Lights Ltd. v. State Bank of India) is quite apposite. Paragraph 34 of the said judgment is very relevant for our purpose which reads as under:

It is well settled that a prerogative remedy is not a matter of course. In exercising extraordinary power, therefore, a Writ Court will indeed bear in mind the conduct of the party who is invoking such jurisdiction. If the applicant does not disclose full facts or suppresses relevant materials or is otherwise guilty of misleading the Court, the Court may dismiss the action without adjudicating the matter. The rule has been evolved in larger public interest to deter unscrupulous litigants from abusing the process of Court by deceiving it. The very basis of the writ jurisdiction rests in disclosure of true, complete and correct facts. If the material facts are not candidly stated or are suppressed or are distorted, the very functioning of the writ courts would become impossible.

102. Equally, the claim made on behalf of the 11th respondent that the subject land has been developed by him at a very huge cost advanced by the respondents 12 to 64 cannot also be accepted.

103. When once it is found that the right claimed by the 11th respondent in respect of the subject land situated in S. No. 297/1 in an extent of 0.90 cents was illegal and was not supported by any valid title and that the said land belonged to the Tamil Nadu Housing Board and the State Government, such pleas put forward by the 11th respondent and the respondents 12 to 64 cannot in any way mitigate against the lawful ownership of the State Government and the Tamil Nadu Housing Board.

104. In this context, the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in : AIR1996SC253 (Dr. G. N. Khajuria and Ors. v. Delhi Development Authority and Ors.) can be usefully referred to. Paragraph 8 of the said judgment is relevant for our purpose which reads as under:

We therefore, hold that the land which was allotted to respondent No. 2 was part of a park. We further hold that it was not open to the DDA to carve out any space meant for park for a nursery school. We are of the considered view that the allotment in favour of respondent No. 2 was misuse of power, for reasons which need not be adverted. It is, therefore, a fit case, according to us, where the allotment in favour of respondent No. 2 should be cancelled and we order accordingly. The fact that respondent No. 2 has put up some structure stated to be permanent by his counsel is not relevant, as the same has been done on a plot of land allotted to it in contravention of law. As to the submission that dislocation from the present site would cause difficulty to the tiny tots, we would observe that the same has been advanced only to get sympathy from the Court inasmuch as children, for whom the nursery school is meant, would travel to any other nearby place where such a school would be set up either by respondent No. 2 or by any other body.

105. On behalf of the 11th respondent, reliance was placed upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in : AIR2005SC894 (R & M Trust v. Koramangala Residents Vigilance Group and Ors.). Specific reliance was placed upon paragraphs 34 to 36 of the said judgment which read as under:

34. There is no doubt that delay is a very important factor while exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. We cannot disturb the third-party interest created on account of delay. Even otherwise also why should the Court come to the rescue of a person who is not vigilant of his rights?

35. We are of the opinion that delay in this case is equally fatal, the construction already started by the appellant in 1987 and building had come up to three floors. Thereafter, it was stopped in 1988 and in March 1991 it resumed after permission was granted. The writ petition was filed in November 1991 meanwhile construction was almost complete. Therefore, delay was fatal in the present case and learned Single Judge rightly held it to be so. It was also brought to our notice that 46 multi-storey buildings have come up in this area. Learned Counsel has produced photographs to show that buildings more than three and four floors have been constructed in and around this area.

36. However, we are satisfied that there is no prohibition under the provisions of the Act and Rules putting the ceiling on construction of the multi-storey building. We are also satisfied that the delay is also fatal in the present case.

106. That case related to the rights of the individual flat owners as against the promoter. It was in that context, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the belated approach to the Writ Court cannot be entertained inasmuch as the subsequent development by way of constructions made by the promoter deprived of other occupants to claim any relief in the writ petition as against the equitable rights of the promoter. The said decision, therefore, does not help the 11th respondent in the present case.

107. Reliance was also placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court reported in : [2001]3SCR1056 (Kewel Chand Mimani (D) By Lrs. v. S.K. Sen and Ors.), in particular in paragraph 27, where it has been stated as under:

27. ...it is on this score that Mr. Nariman, the learned Senior Advocate appearing for one of the respondents very strongly contended that the statute has created an enforceable obligation and question of acting contra to the provisions of law does not and cannot arise. It is on this score, the issue of complete justice between the parties has been brought to our notice. It is trite knowledge that presently, the law courts are being guided by a justice-oriented approach, since the concept of justice is the call of the day and the need of the hour. Justice is the goal of jurisprudence - processual/procedural, as much as substantive. Puritan approach has lost its significance in the present-day context; since justice ought to be end product of equity and go to the roots. It is this complete justice between the parties which stands statutorily recognised in Section 108(A) as noticed above (please see the observations of Krishna Iyer, J. in Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation v. Ramanlal Govindram).

108. In the subsequent paragraph, the Hon'ble Supreme Court also highlighted how the justice-oriented approach was not of recent origin and was being applied even four decades ago. However, in the very same judgment in paragraph 33, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has stated how any misplaced indulgence shown and laxity on the part of the law courts would be an unauthorised exercise of jurisdiction which would put a premium on illegal acts. In paragraphs 32 and 33, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has stated the principles in the following words:

32. ...There must be some semblance of right at least and that right must continue till the judgment is pronounced, because on the day of the pronouncement of the judgment, the Court can pass an appropriate order only in the event of entitlement of such judgment, but not otherwise. The Mimanis were in fact not entitled to obtain the possession on the date of the judgment by reason of the expiry of the deed of lease and how that right can be enforced by the Court in the event of non- entitlement thereof - there is no satisfactory reply thereto. 33. The principle of justice is an inbuilt requirement of the justice delivery system and indulgence and laxity on the part of the law courts would be an unauthorised exercise of jurisdiction and thereby put a premium on illegal acts.

109. Therefore, the said judgment also goes to show that where a person is in illegal possession, he has no right to claim equitable justice.

110. On behalf of the respondents 12 to 64, reliance was placed upon the decision reported in : [1994]1SCR857 (A.P. State Financial Corporation v. Gar Re-Rolling Mills and Anr.) in the context of the orders passed in the Urban Land Ceiling Proceedings and the order of this Court, dated 19.12.2003 passed in W.P. No. 20552 of 2003. Inasmuch as we have held that the said proceedings were not genuinely pursued both by the authorities constituted under the Urban Land Ceiling Act, 1978 and that full facts were not placed before the Court by the petitioner therein at the time when orders came to be passed in the said writ petition, we do not find any scope to apply equitable justice to be rendered under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as stated in the above referred to decision.

111. The other decision relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of respondents 12 to 64 is reported in : [1977]1SCR178 (The Land Acquisition Officer, City Improvement Trust Board, Bangalore, v. H. Narayanaiah etc. etc.). In fact, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has made it very clear in para 23, which is asunder:

23. ...We know the maxim that 'equity follows the law'. We have not heard of the proposition that some transcendental Equity should be so used as to defeat or amend the law as it stands. Maitland said long ago that equity came to supplement and not to supplant the law. We think that if we were to equate a notification under Section 18 with the notification under Section 6 of the Act for purposes of determining the market value, which is to be awarded. We would be doing nothing short of supplanting at least the law as found clearly laid down in Section 27 of the Bangalore Act read with Section 23 of the Acquisition Act.

112. Going by the above statement of law declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, there can be no claim based on equity in the light of blatant illegality committed against the State. The other decision relied upon is the one reported in (2007) 5 MLJ 436 (SC)-(Amey Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. and Anr. v. Public Concern for Governance Trust and Ors. That was a case where it was alleged in a PIL that a preferential allotment of Housing Board was secured by floating a bogus Co-operative Society and that later, after allotment, it came to light that it was to favour an individual developer for a commercial venture. The Bombay High Court after accepting the case of the Probono Publico issued directions, after quashing the allotment, to forfeit the constructions already made and vest it with the Statutory body for re-allotment. In para-56, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, taking note of the stage of the constructions (i.e.) beyond 4th floor as well as the alternate prayer in the PIL for making a revaluation and collect the difference, chose to take recourse to the alternate prayer while setting aside the order of the High Court. In the first blush, though the above decision appear to support the case of the contesting respondents 11 to 64 on a deeper scrutiny, we are not in a position to apply the said decision to the facts of this case. In the first place, that was a case where allotment of certain flats came to be made by the statutory Corporation by way of development of the township. Unlike, the case on hand, where the ownership is now claimed by resorting to an illegal act of land grabbing. Therefore, there is no semblance of any right in the 11th respondent, as against the above referred to decision, where initial allotment was made in a lawful manner by a Statutory Corporation. That apart, in that Public Interest Litigation, there was an alternate prayer made to the effect that there should be a direction for revaluation since one of the allegations was that the land was undervalued while making the allotment. Further, the land was meant for allotment to a Co- operative Society for construction of housing, as against the case on hand, where the allotment of the subject land for a welfare purpose, viz., for construction of a peripheral hospital. When there is large scale attempt to grab the public land by making encroachments by resorting to other illegal means even by way of manipulation of government records, we are of the view that the application of the above decision to the case on hand will not be appropriate.

113. Arguments were also addressed on behalf of the 11th respondent as well as respondents 12 to 64 based on the principle of Promissory Estoppel and the availability of the said doctrine even against the Government actions.

114. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondents 11 as well as 12 to 64, relied upon certain decisions based on the doctrine of Promissory Estoppel. As far as the said doctrine is concerned, it has been explained in P. Ramanatha Aiyer's Law Lexicon in the following words.

Estoppel, promissory. That which arises when there is a promise which promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on part of promisee, and which does induce such action or forbearance and such promise is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of promise.

115. For the application of the said doctrine in so far as, it is related to public bodies or the Government, it is well settled that the same will not apply if such promise or representation is contrary to law or which is outside their authority or power. The doctrine also cannot be invoked if it is found to be inequitable or unjust in its enforcement. When we apply the above principles to the case on hand, in the first place, we are unable to find any definite promise extended either by the State Government or the Tamil Nadu Housing Board to anyone, much less, the 11th respondent, who wants to assert his title to the subject land.

116. In fact, if the origin of the title claimed by the 11th respondent is examined, it is traceable from the sale deeds, dated 15.3.1996. As far as the said document is concerned, after a detailed analysis of the various materials, we have held that the said document came into existence as part of a fraudulent creation at the instance of the erstwhile Rajalakshmi Ammal or her so-called power agent Thiru. Mohan. We have also referred to the written statement of the said Rajalakshmi Ammal, in her reply notice, dated 31.3.1998, i.e., after the execution of the so-called sale deeds, dated 15.3.1996 to the categorical effect that the subject lands situated in S. No. 297/1 ceased to be her property and that the State Government/Tamil Nadu Housing Board was the owner of the above said property. Therefore, if at all any promise is to be claimed now on behalf of respondents 11 to 64 such promise should have been extended by the State Government or the Tamil Nadu Housing Board only to the said erstwhile owner Rajalakshmi Ammal. In the light of the various factors discussed above there could have been no scope at all for any such promise being extended in the manner so claimed and therefore, the very application of the doctrine does not arise.

117. If the respondents 11 to 64 want to rely on the proceedings of the Urban Land Ceiling Authorities, for the application of the said doctrine, hereagain, it will have to be stated that the said authorities were not concerned with the title or ownership of the subject lands. We have already pointed out that there were total lack of bona fides in the issuance of the proceedings by the said authorities inasmuch as in their own records, the Mambalam-Guindy Taluk revenue proceedings was very much in existence to disclose that at no point of time after the entry of the name of the Government as owner in respect of the land in S. No. 297/1, nobodyelse' name was recorded in the revenue register. In such circumstances, any contrary proceedings issued not in consonance with the revenue register relating to the ownership of the subject property cannot be relied upon in order to claim any promise on the part of the authorities of the State in order to apply the doctrine of Promissory Estoppel as against the State Government.

118. Though in some of the proceedings issued by the Urban Land Ceiling Authorities, it is stated that S. No. 297/1 was further classified as S. Nos. 297/1A, 1B and 1C, there were no such sub divisions said to be in existence in the parent records of the Town and Country Planning Department to support the above proceedings. Therefore, any such proceedings issued by the Tamil Nadu Urban Land Ceiling Authorities can only be considered as proceedings which was contrary to law and were outside their authority or jurisdiction. Therefore, there is no scope for applying the doctrine of promissory estoppel on this ground as well.

119. In fact, the decision relied upon by the learned Counsel is reported in (Jit Ram Shiv Kumar and Ors. v. The State of Haryana and Anr.), in paragraph 39, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has summed up the scope of application of the doctrine against the Government in the following words:

39. The scope of the plea of doctrine of promissory estoppel against the Government may be summed up as follows:

(1) The plea of promissory estoppel is not available against the exercise of the legislative functions of the State.

(2) The doctrine cannot be invoked for preventing the Government from discharging its functions under the law.

(3) When the officer of the Government acts outside the scope of his authority, the plea of promissory estoppel is not available. The doctrine of ultra vires will come into operation and the Government cannot be held bound by the unauthorised acts of its officers.

(4) When the officer acts within the scope of his authority under a scheme and enters into an agreement and makes a representation and a person acting on that representation puts himself in a dis-advantageous position, the Court is entitled to require the officer to act according to the scheme and the agreement or representation. The Officer cannot arbitrarily act on his mere whim and ignore his promise on some undefined and undisclosed grounds of necessity or change the conditions to the prejudice of the person who had acted upon such representation and put himself in a disadvantageous position.

(5) The officer would be justified in changing the terms of the agreement to the prejudice of the other party on special considerations such as difficult foreign exchange position or other matters which have a bearing on general interest of the State.

120. Applying the above restrictions stated in the said decision to the case on hand, we are unable to countenance the plea of the respondents 11 to 64 based on the doctrine of Promissory Estoppel.

121. In the light of our above conclusion on the application of the doctrine promissory estoppel, the other decisions relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel reported in : [1979]118ITR326(SC) (Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors.), : [1986]158ITR574(SC) (Union of India and Ors. v. Godfrey Philips India Ltd.), : [2004]269ITR97(SC) (State of Punjab v. Nestle India Ltd. and Anr.) are also not helpful to the respondents 11 to 64.

122. Having realised the position that no valid title passed on to the 11th respondent, a submission was also made to claim equity by contending that in the light of the fact that the subject land was promoted by the 11th respondent by investing huge sum of rupees, viz., three crores by way of the cost of the land, apart from the investments made by the respondents 12 to 64 by borrowing heavy sums from banks and financial institutions, it was submitted that a huge structure consisting of 54 flats have been put up which have been now sold out by 11th respondent to the respondents 12 to 64 by way of residential flats.

123. It was contended that since the respondent state remained as mute spectators till the completion of the construction, it will not be equitable at this stage for the State Government and the Tamil Nadu Housing Board to merely state that the lands were acquired in award No. 5/74, dated 4.1.1975 and on that basis, deprive the respondents 11 to 64 to enjoy the fruits of promotion of the property by investing several crores of rupees. It was, therefore, contended that equity demands some order to be passed sustaining the rights of the respondents 11 to 64 to retain their possession by passing some equitable orders.

124. In the first place, though the submission looks highly persuasive, we are not in a position to countenance such a submission having regard to our conclusion that the Government land was illegally occupied by certain persons with deliberate intention to grab the said land knowing full well that the property belonged to the State. The respondents 11 to 64 cannot be heard to plead ignorance of the earliest award in Award No. 14/64 or the subsequent Award No. 5/74, dated 4.1.1975 as well as Government Order in G.O.Ms. No. 1031, dated 31.10.1973. It was a futile attempt on the part of the 11th respondent to contend that in the Award No. 5/74, dated 4.1.1975, the extent of land mentioned was only 4.05 acres and not 4.95 acres. If at all anything is to be said about the said contention, it can only be said that it is a myth like statement, which was wholly incorrect. The contention of the 11th respondent that he was unaware of the real ownership of the State over the subject land can never be believed. Even though in the earlier sale deeds, dated 15.3.1996, there was no reference to the prior ownership of the 0.90 cents conveyed under those documents, at least when the sale deed, dated 1.12.2004, was drafted, which was sought to be conveyed by the individual parties through the Power of Attorney, namely, M/s. TVS Finance & Services Ltd., the ownership even prior to Velu Mudaliar and Rajalakshmi Ammal was traced and there was also a specific reference to the awards, namely, award Nos. 14/64 and 5/74 and when the 11th respondent wanted to invest a huge sum of Rs. 3,00,00,000/-, it is hard to believe that he did not even bother to verify with the relevant authorities, namely, the concerned revenue authorities and the Town and Country Planning Authorities, where the record of ownership is being kept and in which records the ownership of the Tamil Nadu Housing Board/State Government has been duly mentioned even as on the date of the execution of the sale deed, dated 1.12.2004.

125. The various other proceedings issued by the Urban Land Ceiling Authorities on which heavy reliance was sought to be placed was only a vain attempt on the part of the 11th respondent to cover up his own misdeeds. Apparently, in collusion with certain other parties, who appeared to have perpetrated the fraud by engineering the execution of the sale deeds, dated 15.3.1996 the subsequent transaction must have been emanated. As we have no doubt to conclude that the whole attempt was designedly made as a paramount exercise of land grabbing activity and in that process to make a monetary gain by involving gullible purchasers, namely, the respondents 12 to 64, we are not in a position to accede to the plea of exercise of equitable jurisdiction in favour of either the 11th respondent or the respondents 12 to 64. Though on behalf of the 11th respondent, it was suggested that he was even now prepared to pay a sum of Rs. 3,00,00,000/- (Rupees Three Crores only) to the Tamil Nadu Housing Board for conveying the subject land in favour of the respondents 12 to 64, we are of the view that countenancing the said prayer would only give a wrong signal to the land grabbers to indulge in such land grabbing activity by adopting all unlawful tactics and by involving gullible purchasers and ultimately come forward with such a plea and create an impression that after carrying out all fraudulent activities one can escape from all woe-full consequence by getting the seal of approval of the Court under the garb of exercise of equitable jurisdiction. Our endeavour is to ensure that no one indulging in such fraudulent attempt of land grabbing activity can get away with it by seeking the sympathy of the Court on the ground of equitable principles involving others who were not directly involved in the fraudulent activities designedly made.

126. As far as the respondents 12 to 64 are concerned, though it is claimed on their behalf that their loan transactions were scrutinised by very many banks and financial institutions, after a detailed analysis of the various documents, and they being innocent purchasers of the flats, they should not be deprived of their right to hold the flats which would cause very serious prejudice to them inasmuch as they have parted with the cost of construction of the flats to the 11th respondent by making heavy borrowings and that irrespective of they being allowed to enjoy the possession of the flats, they will be forced to repay the loans borrowed by them to the banks and financial institutions. Such a plea put forth on behalf of the respondents 12 to 64 looks quite appealing. In the first place, when their claim is considered in the light of the rank fraud played against the State Government, as Court of Justice, we are bound to maintain solemnity by restoring the property to the State which was earmarked for extending much more greater welfare measures to the entire public at large, who live in and around the subject land.

127. It will have to be remembered that 0.90 cents of land was part of other extent of lands adjacent to it for the construction of peripheral hospital at the time when the acquisition was made during the period, namely, 1964-1974. When a huge housing colony was proposed to be set up, the construction of a peripheral hospital with all facilities available in the Government General Hospital was thought of so that the residents of the housing colony being set up by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board can avail the medical services of every kind in that peripheral hospital to be set up. When the above said land was acquired by the State and earmarked by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board for the lofty purpose of setting up a peripheral hospital, the action of the 11th respondent in his attempt to gain a hold over the said land under the guise of promoting a project cannot be permitted to succeed and equally the claim made by the respondents 12 to 64 through the 11th respondent that they have made huge investment in the project cannot also be countenanced in their favour as that would deprive of a greater welfare activity for the benefit of the public at large which would otherwise get defeated. Therefore, the claims of the respondents 12 to 64 when pitted against the entire public at large who would otherwise avail the medical services in the event of the peripheral hospital being set up would virtually veto the claim of the latter. We are not, therefore, inclined to apply the plea of equity put forth on behalf of the respondents 12 to 64 as well in order to permit the 11th respondent to pay back a sum of Rs. 3,00,00,000/- to the Housing Board and allow the respondents 12 to 64 to take possession of the flats constructed in the subject land. Further, it will also be appropriate to mention that when there is a long waiting list for allotment of housing board plots/flats to the low income group and middle income group people, who cannot afford to compete in the private real estate market to own a residence or flat, it will be wholly unjustified if such land grabbers are shown any sympathy or mercy on the ground that the land was developed after its grabbing and therefore, they should be allowed to retain possession. It will be a misplaced sympathy if such prayers are to be countenanced, viz., the common men, who are waiting in the long queue with the fond hope that one day or other, he will get allotment in his favour by the State. Of late, when owning of a piece of land by ordinary people is becoming a dream and most of the families are drowning in the process of buying plots and construction of houses, it will be wholly inequitable to consider the claim of 11th respondent and respondents 12 to 64 to recognize their illegal holding.

128. In our considered view, mere promotion of the subject land by way of construction of so many flats by itself need not stand in the way of restoration of the land to the State Government as we feel the interest of respondents 12 to 64 can to some extent obviated by suggesting some other alternatives. We wanted to be firm and ensure that the ownership of the land of the State/Tamil Nadu Housing Board is restored from the clutches of any encroachers and in the case on hand, from the 11th respondent at this point in order to send a clear message that no one who indulge in such land grabbing activity can never be successful in their attempt and that at one point of time, the long arms of the Court will ensure that such attempts are dethroned with a firm hand. 129. Having regard to our conclusions, we pass the following order:

a. The respondents 1 to 4 are directed to take possession of the land situated in S. No. 297/1 along with the superstructure forthwith free from any encumbrance from the respondent 11 as well as 12 to 64.

b. The respondents 1 to 4 are further directed to examine the scope of using the construction now put up on the subject land in S. No. 297/1 in an extent of 0.90 cents for putting the same to the best use as part of peripheral hospital said to have been already set up in the rest of the land earmarked for that purpose, if necessary, by making any alterations required. In the event of the respondents 1 to 4 not able to use the building for the activities of the peripheral hospital, it is open to the fourth respondent to bring those flats constructed therein for sale in public auction and appropriate the same.

c. The 11th respondent is directed to refund the value of purchase money paid by respondents 12 to 64 for the purchase of flats, along with undivided share of the property promoted in S. No. 297/1, with interest at 6% p.a. from the date of payment of such purchase money within six weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. After making the refund to respondents 12 to 64, it will be open to the 11th respondent to claim the value of cost of construction made in the subject land in S. No. 297/1 from the 4th respondent, if so advised. It is for the 11th respondent to work out his claim as against the 4th respondent and it is open to the 4th respondent to deal with the said claim, if made, in accordance with law.

d. The respondents 1 to 4 and 8 are directed to place all the documents, concerning the subject land right from award No. 14/1964 till the so- called transfer of patta stated to have been made in favour of the 11th respondent and two others, dated 10.6.2004 and 5.5.2005 including the Urban Land Ceiling Proceedings, before the CBCID Authorities to cause an investigation and in the event of prima facie case being made out, every endeavour to book the culprits, be it the Government Authorities or the 11th respondent or the erstwhile owner Rajalakshmi Ammal or her so-called power agent Thiru. Mohan or the purchaser of the sale deed, dated 15.3.1996 or their Power of Attorney M/s. TVS Finance & Services Ltd. or any other person involved in manipulation of any of the records. The records should be handed over within one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.

e. Having regard to the magnitude of the scandal relating to the Government property and since a considerable time of this Court had to be devoted in this litigation, we feel it appropriate to impose exemplary costs on the 11th respondent and the 11th respondent is directed to pay costs of Rs. 50000/-. Out of the said sum of Rs. 50000/-, a sum of Rs. 35000/- shall be paid to the Tamil Nadu Mediation and Conciliation Centre, a sum of Rs. 5000/- to the Indian Red Cross Society, Tamil Nadu Branch and the balance sum of Rs. 10000/- to the Tamil Nadu State Legal Services Authority. The costs should be paid within four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.

f. It is also made clear and declared that none of the other parties, either the petitioner or the interloper Arumuga Pandian or anybody else have got any right in respect of the land situated in S. No. 297/1. Apart from the construction made by the 11th respondent, if there are any other encroachments in the said survey number, it is open to the respondents 1 to 4 as well as the respondents 8, 9 and 10 to take necessary lawful action for removing such encroachments.

g. The Fourth respondent is directed to ensure the compliance of the directions contained in paras (a), (b), (d) and (f) of this order within six months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order and file a report in proof of such compliance into the Registry.

h. W.P. No. 4950 of 2007 is allowed with the above directions. W.P. No. 8624 and 8625 of 2007 are dismissed confirming the orders of the D.R.O., dated 15.6.2006 and the order of the Special Commissioner and Commissioner of Land Administration, dated 28.2.2007 and W.P. No. 8618 of 2006 is also dismissed. All connected W.P.M.Ps. are closed. Costs as directed in sub-para (e) of this order.