V. Dhanapalan, J.
1. These two Civil Miscellaneous Appeals have been filed by the Managing Director, M.G.R. Transport Corporation Limited, Kanchipuram (presently called as Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation Limited, Villupuram, Division III) (hereinafter referred to as the Transport Corporation) challenging the common decree and judgment passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, III Judge, Small Causes Court, Chennai ( hereinafter referred to as 'the Tribunal') made in M.C.O.P. Nos.1484 of 1993 and 1651 of 1993 dated 03.07.1997. The claimant in M.C.O.P. No. 1484 of 1993 and the first respondent in C.M.A. No. 58 of 1998 has filed a Cross Objection No. 42 of 2000. Since these two appeals are arising out of a common judgment of the Tribunal, I propose to decide the same together.
2. For the death of P. Gurusamy, K. Senthamizh Selvi, the wife of the deceased, has filed a petition claiming compensation of Rs. 7,50,000/- and the parents of the deceased have filed a petition claiming compensation of Rs. 2 lakhs.
3. The Tribunal has taken up both the above petitions together and considered the claim. In support of their claim in both the petitions, the wife of the deceased herself was examined as P.W.1, one Jeyapaul, an eye-witness to the accident was examined as P.W.2 and one Kanakambal, the mother of the deceased was examined as P.W.3 besides marking documents in Exs.P.1 to P.12.
4. On the side of the respondent Transport Corporation who is the appellant herein, one Parasuraman, the driver of the Transport Corporation bus was examined as R.W.1 and no document was marked on its defence.
5. The Tribunal, after analyzing the oral and documentary evidence and holding that 75% of negligence is on the part of the driver of the Transport Corporation bus, has passed an award fixing the compensation in both the petitions together and awarded a compensation of Rs. 2,11,200/- with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of petition till the date of deposit. It has apportioned the award to the wife of the deceased as Rs. 1,51,200/- and the remaining sum of Rs. 60,000/- to be equally shared between the father and mother of the deceased. Aggrieved by the said award, the Transport Corporation has preferred these appeals.
6. The gist of the case of the claimants in both the petitions is as follows:
According to them, on 19.01.1993, at about 8:45 p.m., when the deceased Gurusamy was crossing Sardar Patel Road opposite to Anna University from South to North, the bus coming from West to East bearing Registration No. TML 8860, belonging to the Transport Corporation, came rashly and negligently and dashed against the deceased causing him grievous injuries. He was taken to the hospital by one Umapathy, police constable, where he breathed his last. At the time of accident, the deceased was aged 30 years and he was doing electrical work and earning Rs. 3,000/- per month.
7. On the other hand, the Transport Corporation has filed a common counter before the Tribunal and contended that:
a. when its bus bearing Registration No. TML 8860 was driven by its driver at a medium speed in Sardar Patel Road opposite to Anna University, Chennai, on seeing the deceased crossing in a place prohibited for pedestrians, the driver applied brake and tried to steer the bus on the right side, yet dashed against the deceased unexpectedly and thus, the accident was caused,
b. the accident was caused only due to the negligence and carelessness of the deceased and hence, the petitions have to be dismissed.
8. Heard Mr. G. Muniratnam, Learned Counsel for the appellant Transport Corporation in both the appeals and Mr. N.M. Muthurajan, Learned Counsel for the first respondent in CMA No. 58 of 1998 and the Cross Objector in Cross Objection No. 42 of 2000.
9. Learned counsel for the appellant Transport Corporation has contended that:
a. the Tribunal has not properly appreciated Ex.P.5 the First Information Report and the Ex.P.6 the plan from which it is clear that the deceased crossed the road at a non-pedestrian crossing and invited the accident,
b. the Tribunal has not appreciated the evidence of R.W.1, the driver of the Transport Corporation bus and has wrongly relied upon the evidence of P.W.2 as an interested eye-witness,
c. no criminal case was filed against the bus driver,
d. negligence fixed as 75% on the part of the bus driver and 25% on the part of the deceased has no basis at all and the entire negligence ought to have been fixed against the deceased who invited the accident,
e. particulars like age, occupation and income of the deceased are not supported by any documentary proof except the oral evidence of P. W.1 and P.W.3,
f. the Tribunal has wrongly applied the multiplier of 13 without any basis and the claimants are entitled for compensation under the clause of 'No Fault Liability' alone and on the above grounds, the award of the Tribunal may be set aside and the appeals allowed.
10. Per contra, the Learned Counsel for the respondents/claimants has contended that:
a. the driver of the bus, at his last opportunity, could have avoided the accident but has done it and therefore, the entire negligence ought to have been fixed as against the driver of the Transport Corporation the Tribunal ought to have fixed the entire negligence on the part of the Transport Corporation bus driver
b. the Tribunal has failed to see that front left wheel ran over and crushed the deceased and as such, no contributory negligence can be attributed as against the deceased
c. the Cross Objector proved that the deceased was a qualified Degree holder in Electrical Engineering and was working at Andaman in Government employment and at the time of accident, he was running his own business. However, the Tribunal fixed only Rs. 2,500/- as the income of the deceased which is very much on the lower side
d. compensation under the head loss of expectation of life has not been considered by the Tribunal and on the above grounds, the Court has to allow the Cross Objection and dismiss the appeals preferred by the Transport Corporation.
11. In support of his contention, Mr. N.M. Muthurajan has relied on a decision of a Division Bench of this Court reported in 1982 ACJ 186 (Pandian Roadways Corporation, Madurai v. Karunanithi, Minor by his father and next friend B. Purushothaman and Anr.) in which case, the question of applying the doctrine of last opportunity has been dealt with.
12. Reliance has also been placed on a Division Bench judgment of this Court reported in : (2003)3MLJ652 (Pallavan Transport Corporation Limited v. Dhanalakshmi and Anr.) wherein it was held that deceased crossing the road at a place other than the pedestrian crossing cannot be a factor to conclude that he contributed to the accident.
13. In the light of the rival submissions made by the Learned Counsel for both sides and in view of the point raised by the Learned Counsel for the appellant that the negligence has to be fixed on the deceased as he crossed the road in a non-pedestrian crossing, let me find out whether the negligence fixed by the Tribunal as 75% on the part of the driver of the bus and 25% on the part of the deceased is proper or not and whether or not the Tribunal has considered the determining factor in case of fatal accidents and whether the Cross Objection filed by the respondent/claimant for enhancement of compensation deserves any consideration.
14. It is seen from the oral evidence on the side of the claimants, that on 19.01.1993, when the deceased was crossing the road from South to North, opposite to Anna University in Sardar Patel road, the bus bearing Registration No. TML 8860 was driven rashly and negligently from West to East and dashed against the deceased due to which he died on the spot and the said accident had occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the bus driver.
15. It is also seen from the counter that the accident has been admitted involving the bus belonging to the Transport Corporation and it was proceeding from Kalpakkam to Madras in Sardar Patel Road and when it was coming near Gunidy Engineering College, a pedestrian, all of a sudden, without noticing the bus, came from the left side towards the right. The bus driver steered the bus on to the right side in order to avoid dashing against the pedestrian but the pedestrian dashed against the left side of the bus and sustained grievous injuries.
16. P.W.1 had filed the First Information Report in respect of the accident as Ex.P.5 and a copy of the sketch in Ex.P.6. She has also filed the copy of the photo of her husband having been caught beneath the wheel of the bus as Ex.P.7. In the accident, the right wheel of the bus was on the midline of the road and the left front wheel ran over the deceased as found in Ex..P.7. Further, the sketch in Ex.P.6 also shows the place of occurrence. The occurrence had taken place in the middle of the East-West road the bus having dashed against the deceased. The bus came from East towards West. It is seen that the pedestrian was crossing the road from South towards North. The complaint was given by a police constable by name Umapathy. He had also mentioned that he was working as a Constable in the Traffic Police Station. The person who gave the aforesaid complaint mentioned that he was going in his scooter in Sardar Patel Road from West to East and the bus which was proceeding from East towards West opposite to Anna University, moved away from the road in the same road and dashed against the pedestrian on the front left portion and the left front wheel of the bus ran over the right leg of the pedestrian and he got caught beneath the bus. Hence, it is known that when the constable who gave the complaint was coming from West to East, the bus dashed against the pedestrian on the front side who was crossing the road from South to North.
17. P.W.2, Jeyapaul, who had witnessed the accident has mentioned that at the time of accident, having parked his auto, he was standing opposite to Anna University and at that time the bus proceeding from East to West, dashed against the deceased who was crossing the road towards the University and the left front wheel ran over him and the carelessness of the driver is the cause for the accident. In his cross-examination also, he has admitted that the bus came rashly and dashed against the deceased and the place where the deceased crossed the road is not a pedestrian crossing. Thus, from the evidence of P.W.2, it is seen that the deceased had crossed the road in the place prohibited for pedestrian crossing.
18. Further, R.W.1, the bus driver has deposed that one pedestrian crossed the road all of a sudden in the place of occurrence at 8.30 p.m. and in spite of having steered the bus on to the right, he was dashed by the bus on the front side, and he fell down and sustained injuries. Now, in the situation wherein the pedestrian had walked in the middle of the road and the bus was proceeding in the middle portion of the road from East to West, it is not to be accepted if it is stated that the driver had suddenly noticed the pedestrian. If the bus driver had driven the bus carefully at a medium speed, he could have applied brake having noticed the deceased crossing in the middle of the road and prevented from dashing against him. Since the pedestrian had carelessly crossed the road in the prohibited place and as the bus driver did not drive the bus at a normal speed, the Tribunal has concluded that the accident has occurred due to the carelessness and negligence of the bus driver to the extent of 75% and due to carelessness of the deceased to the extent of 25%.
19. The Learned Counsel for the respondents/claimants has argued that the normal speed limit to be maintained by the driver is 50 kms. per hour and according to him, the bus has exceeded the speed limit and the eye-witness, the auto driver is not an interested witness, who, in his evidence, has confirmed that the bus was driven rashly and negligently and dashed against the pedestrian and therefore, the entire negligence has to be fixed on the part of the driver of the Transport Corporation bus.
20. In support of his contention on the point of fixing the negligence, the Learned Counsel for the appellant Transport Corporation has pointed out that the deceased crossed the middle of the road in a non-pedestrian crossing which proves the carelessness of the deceased. But, if the bus driver has driven the bus at a medium speed, he could have avoided the accident. On the contrary, the left front wheel ran over the deceased. Ex.P.6, the sketch also shows that the bus, coming from East to West, turned right at the time of accident, crossed the middle portion and stopped at the northern side of the road. There has been no area marked for pedestrian crossing and the road is a straight road. The body of the deceased was found beneath the left front wheel of the bus. In the circumstances, it is to be seen whether the bus driver was rash and negligent in driving.
21. On the other hand, Learned Counsel for the respondents has relied on a decision of a Division Bench of this Court reported in 1982 ACJ 186 (Pandian Roadways Corporation, Madurai v. Karunanithi, Minor represented by his father and next friend B. Purushothaman and Anr.) in which case, the question of applying the doctrine of last opportunity has been dealt with. It is seen from Ex.P.6, the driver has used his last efforts to avoid the accident. Therefore, the point argued by the Learned Counsel for the respondents may have no application to the facts of the present case.
22. Further, in the decision reported in : (2003)3MLJ652 (Pallavan Transport Corporation Limited v. Dhanalakshmi and Anr.) which was relied on by the counsel for the respondents, paragraphs 8 and 9 state that the deceased crossing the road at a place other than the pedestrian crossing cannot be a factor to conclude that he contributed to the accident and those paragraphs read as under:
8. The above aspects would rather persuade this Court to come to the conclusion that the occurrence took place only because of the rash and negligent driving of the bus by the driver of the bus, belonging to the Corporation. This Court has also taken into consideration the fact that at that hour, viz., 7.30 a.m., there could not have been a heavy traffic flow. Equally this Court is not inclined to accept that the driver of the bus drove the vehicle only at 20 kmph, when admittedly the bus was plying in route No. 44 with limited stopping service.
9. The next question is as to whether there is substance in the claim of the Corporation that the victim had also contributed because he crossed the road not in the pedestrian crossing line but at a place of his own choice. P.W.2, in his evidence has stated that in the road, no space has been set apart indicating the place where the pedestrians have to cross. Even otherwise, it cannot be said that simply because the victim crossed the road at a place other than the pedestrian crossing, it should be taken that he had contributed for the accident. It cannot be said that whenever a person crosses the road at a place other than the pedestrian crossing, he is guilty of contributory negligence.
23. In the above case, it is seen that the body of the deceased was found near the front right wheel and not the left, indicating that deceased had almost crossed the road. In the instant case, the pedestrian just crossed the midline and was found beneath the left front wheel of the bus. Therefore, the facts of the case cited supra are not applicable to the present case and as such, I am also of the opinion that the deceased also had contributed to the accident to some extent.
24. In my view, if both the bus driver and the deceased were cautious, the accident could have been averted. Based on the sketch which shows the attempt made by the driver of the bus and also the situation under which the pedestrian has crossed the road, it is clear that the deceased also would have contributed to some extent to the accident. The Tribunal, on a proper analysis of all the factors and on seeing the sketch showing the manner of accident, has fixed the ratio of negligence as 75% on the part of the bus driver and 25% on the part of the deceased. I am of the considered view that the reasoning given by the Tribunal is found to be justified based on Ex.P.6. Therefore, I find no reason to interfere with the finding of the Tribunal in the aspect of fixing negligence and accordingly, the negligence fixed by the Tribunal is confirmed.
25. Having found that the negligence is on the part of the driver of the Transport Corporation as well as the deceased, let me now consider whether the quantum was fixed as per the procedure contemplated.
26. The wife who was examined as P.W.1 has stated that her husband died in the accident that took place on 19.01.1993. She has filed the First Information Report as Ex.P.1, Death Certificate of the deceased as Ex.P.2 and a copy of the post-mortem report as Ex.P.3. She also deposed that the age of her husband at the time of death was 33. In the copy of the post-mortem report, Ex.P.3, the age of the deceased was approximately mentioned as 30. In Ex.P.9, the SSLC certificate, the date of birth of the deceased was stated as 12.03.1958. From that documentary proof, it is evident that age of the deceased on the date of accident was 35 years. With regard to the income, the Tribunal has taken into consideration the evidence of P.W.1 who has deposed the deceased running an electrical equipment shop and the income of the deceased was Rs. 3,000/- at the time of accident and the same was derived from the shop. Ex.P.10 is the certificate for having studied polytechnic and Ex.P.11 is the experience certificate for his employment in Andaman. It is also found from Ex.P.12 that Provident Fund has been deducted for having worked in Andaman. Hence, the statement of P.W.1 that the deceased had worked in Andaman could be accepted. There was no evidentiary proof that the deceased was running a shop under the name and style of Guru Enterprises and was earning Rs. 3,000/- per month. Also, it is seen from the deposition of P.W.3 that her son was away at a long distance and she had asked him to come and attend contract work independently. Though it has been stated that he earned Rs. 3,000/- or Rs. 4,000/- per month by doing the aforesaid business, no document in respect of that was filed. She had also deposed that when her son was at Andaman, he sent only Rs. 1,000/- for the family. The Tribunal, after going through the oral and documentary evidence, has fixed the income of the deceased as Rs. 2,500/- per month.
27. Before the Tribunal, on the side of the respondents/claimants, they have cited a Supreme Court decision reported in : AIR1994SC1631 ( The General Manager, Kerala State Road Transport Corporation, Trivandrum, v. Susamma Thomas (Mrs.) and Ors.). An argument was advanced to follow that decision and apply 16 years multiplier to the facts of the present case. The Tribunal, taking into account, the qualification and experience of the deceased, determined the salary of the deceased as Rs. 2,500/- and after deducting one-third for his personal expenses, has fixed the dependency as Rs. 1,600/- and by applying 13 years multiplier, has arrived at the loss of income as Rs. 2,49,600/-.
28. The wife of the deceased who was the petitioner in MCOP No. 1484 of 1993 besides pecuniary damages had claimed a sum of Rs. 5 lakhs for loss of expectation of life, Rs. 43,000/- for loss of consortium, Rs. 6,700/- for funeral expenses, Rs. 300/- for damage to clothing and articles and altogether, a sum of Rs. 7,50,000/-. On the other hand, the parents of the deceased have claimed a lump sum of Rs. 2,00,000/- as compensation under one head. But, the Tribunal, after going through the documentary proof, has assessed the pecuniary damages as Rs. 2,49 ,600/-. Further, a sum of Rs. 15,000/- each has been awarded towards loss of consortium and loss of love and affection and Rs. 2,000/- towards funeral expenses and in total, a sum of Rs. 2,81,600/- has been awarded by the Tribunal. Since negligence on the part of the deceased has been fixed as 25%, after deducting the proportionate amount of Rs. 70,400/-, a sum of Rs. 2,11,200/- has been awarded to the claimants. This award of Rs. 2,11,200/- has been apportioned by the Tribunal as Rs. 1,51,200/- towards the wife of the deceased and Rs. 30,000/- each to the parents of the deceased.
29. The above assessment of quantum of compensation has been questioned before this Court by the petitioner in MCOP No. 1484 of 1993 in Cross Objection No. 42 of 2000 seeking enhancement of compensation. Though the Cross Objector has questioned the contributory negligence fixed on the part of the deceased, I am not inclined to discuss anything on that point as 25% of the negligence fixed as against the deceased has already been confirmed in the discussion made above. The only consideration before this Court is whether the Cross Objector is having any right for enhancement of compensation.
30. It is seen that the income of the deceased was taken as Rs. 2,500 /- and multiplier of 13 was applied by the Tribunal. As per Ex.P.9, the S.S.L.C. certificate, the age of the deceased has been taken as 35 years and the wife was aged 31 years at the time of accident. The Tribunal, taking the income of the deceased as Rs. 2,500/- and after deducting one-third from it, has taken Rs. 1,600/- as the income for the purpose of calculation instead of Rs. 1,667/-. The Learned Counsel for the respondent/Cross Objector has relied on paragraphs 14 and 15 of a Division Bench judgment of this Court reported in (Tamil Nadu Electricity Board and Another v. K. Vijayalakshmi and Ors.) in which what would be the compensation payable for loss of consortium has been dealt with and the relevant paragraphs read as under:
14. There is no merit in the contention of the claimants that the deceased would have carried on some business after his retirement and earned Rs. 2,00,000/-. Nor can we accept the contention of the appellants that the sum of Rs. 13,742/- paid towards encashment of earned leave at credit should be deducted. That amount was already earned by the deceased and it devolved on the claimants by succession. Deducting the personal expenses, we arrive at a figure of Rs. 4,82,080/- which the family would have got from him had he been alive. We do not find any error in the view taken by the Claims Tribunal that the claimants are entitled to a sum of Rs. 50,000/- by way of loss of consortium. That amount is quite reasonable. Adding the total comes to Rs. 5,35 ,080/-. From this, the sum of Rs. 17,712/- paid as D.C.R.G. and the sum of Rs. 10,000/- towards family benefit fund have to be deducted. Balance comes to Rs. 5,08,278/-. It can be rounded off to Rs. 5,00,000/- as the Tribunal has granted that amount and the difference is not much.
15. Thus, we are of the opinion that the total compensation of Rs. 5,0 0,000/ awarded by the Tribunal is quite just and reasonable. In the view, we have taken above, the decisions cited by Learned Counsel for the claimants referred to above need not be dealt with in detail. In all those cases, it was held that while awarding compensation, the Court must take into account future contingencies of increase in income as well as rise in price index. It has also been held that the fact that the money value is going down should be taken note of by the Court at the time of awarding compensation. We have, in fact, taken note of these factors above.
31. I have carefully analysed the above decision and I am of the view that the Tribunal has reasonably considered the compensation under the heads 'loss of love and affection' and 'loss of consortium' by fixing Rs. 15,000/- for each of these two heads. Therefore, I am not inclined to enhance the compensation granted by the Tribunal under these heads.
32. Another point advanced by the Learned Counsel for the respondent/Cross Objector is that the multiplier method applied in this case is not relevant to the principles established in assessment of compensation. In this connection, reliance has been placed by him on paragraph 8 of a decision of three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court reported in (Supe Dei and Ors. v. National Insurance Company Limited and Anr.) wherein it was held that multiplier of 17 can be applied in the case of a fatal accident involving a person aged 32 years and it reads as under:
8. While considering the question of just compensation payable in a case, all relevant factors including the appropriate multiplier are to be kept in mind. The position is well settled that the Second Schedule under Section 163-A to the Act which gives the amount of compensation to be determined for the purpose of claim under the section can be taken as a guideline while determining the compensation under Section 166 of the Act. In that view of the matter, there is no reason why multiplier of 17 should not be taken as the appropriate multiplier in this case.
33. Here, the accident took place on 19.01.1993 and the decision was rendered by the Tribunal on 03.07.1997 though the Second Schedule to the Act has come into force from 14.11.1994. Now, the question before this Court is whether the Tribunal has applied the proper multiplier as per the Second Schedule. Prior to the amendment, the Supreme Court in its decision reported in : AIR1994SC1631 (The General Manager, Kerala State Road Transport Corporation, Trivandrum v. Susamma Thomas and Ors.), while dealing with a matter of motor accident that took place in February 1984, has considered the application of multiplier. It was held in paragraph 9, 10 and 19 as under:
9. The assessment of damages to compensate the dependants is beset with difficulties because from the nature of things, it has to take into account many imponderables, e.g. the life expectancy of the deceased and the dependants, the amount that the deceased would have earned during the remainder of his life, the amount that he would have contributed to the dependants during that period, the chances that the deceased may not have lived or the dependants may not live up to the estimated remaining period of their life expectancy, the chances that the deceased might have got better employment or income or might have lost his employment or income altogether.
10. The manner of arriving at the damages is to ascertain the net income of the deceased available for the support of himself and his dependants, and to deduct therefrom such part of his income as the deceased was accustomed to spend upon himself, as regards both selfmaintenance and pleasure, and to ascertain what part of his net income the deceased was accustomed to spend for the benefit of the dependants. Then that should be capitalised by multiplying it by a figure representing the proper number of year's purchase.
19 ... In the present case, we can take about Rs. 1,400/- per month or Rs. 17,000/- per year as the loss of dependency and if capitalised on a multiplier of 12, which is appropriate to the age of the deceased, the compensation would work out to (Rs.17,000 x 12 = Rs. 2,03,000) to which is added the usual award for loss of consortium and loss of the estate each in the conventional sum of Rs. 15,000/-.
34. The Learned Counsel for the appellant Transport Corporation has contended that in the case of Tamil Nadu State Road Transport Corporation v. Rajapriya and Ors.) reported in 2005 (4) Supreme 87, while dealing with a motor accident claim in case of death of a 38 year old victim and claimants being widow and minor son, it was held that the appropriate multiplier would be 12. The relevant paragraphs read as under:
12. The multiplier method involves the ascertainment of the loss of dependency or the multiplicand having regard to the circumstances of the case and capitalising the multiplicand by an appropriate multiplier. The choice of the multiplier is determined by the age of the deceased (or that of the claimants whichever is higher) and by the calculation as to what capital sum, if invested at a rate of interest appropriate to a stable economy, would yield the multiplicand by way of annual interest. In ascertaining this, regard should also be had to the fact that ultimately the capital sum should also be consumed-up over the period for which the dependency is expected to last.
17. In Susamma Thomas's case (supra), it was noted that the normal rate of interest was about 10% and accordingly, the multiplier was worked out. As the interest rate is on the decline, the multiplier has to consequentially be raised. Therefore, instead of 16, the multiplier of 18 as was adopted in Trilok Chandra's case (supra) appears to be appropriate. In fact, in Trilok Chandra's case (supra), after reference to second Schedule to the Act, it was noticed that the same suffers from many defects. It was pointed out that the same is to serve as a guide, but cannot be said to be invariable ready reckoner. However, the appropriate highest multiplier was held to be as 18. The highest multiplier has to be for the age group of 21 years to 25 years when an ordinary Indian Citizen starts independently earning and the lowest would be in respect of a person in the age group of 60 to 70, which is the normal retirement age.
18. Considering the age of the deceased and the principles indicated above, the appropriate multiplier would be 12 and not 16 as adopted by the Tribunal and affirmed by the High Court.
35. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of a recent decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2005 12 SCC 190 (Kanhaiyalal Kataria and Ors. v. Mukul Chaturvedi and Ors.) which are worth to be considered here, read as under:
2. This appeal is filed only for the enhancement of quantum of compensation. The deceased was 32 years of age. He was a bachelor and was doing ice cream business. An award in the sum of Rs. 2,50,000/- has been passed taking the multiplier of 16. Our attention has been drawn to the Second Schedule of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in which we find that for age between 30 to 35 years, multiplier of 17 has been indicated.
3. Learned counsel for the claimants made submissions seeking enhancement of compensation on the ground that the income of the deceased has not been properly estimated. We are not going into any other aspect except the question of proper multiplier for computation of compensation. In our opinion, by taking the multiplier of 17, the amount of compensation deserves to be increased. The compensation amount may be suitably re-computed by the Tribunal by applying the multiplier of 17 and interest at the rate of 12% per annum on the increased amount be also granted.
36. In the instant case, the deceased was aged 35 years at the time of his death. The wife of the deceased was aged 31 years. The income of the deceased arrived at by the Tribunal is Rs. 2,500/- and instead of deducting Rs. 833/- as one-third of Rs. 2,500/- and taking the income as Rs. 1,667/-, the Tribunal has taken only Rs. 1,600/- as the income. The Motor Vehicles Act, being a beneficial legislation, the claimant has to be compensated properly and taking the income as Rs. 1,667/- and considering the age of the deceased as well as the claimant, I feel it would be proper for this Court to apply 16 years multiplier and as such, the compensation will be Rs. 3,20,064/- and by adding Rs. 1 5,000/- each for loss of love and affection and loss of consortium and Rs. 2,000/- for funeral expenses, the total compensation will be Rs. 3,52,064/-. Deducting 25% for the negligence on the part of the deceased, the compensation to be paid to the claimants comes to Rs. 2,64,0 48/-. As per the ratio applied by the Tribunal in apportioning the award amount between the wife and the parents of the deceased, the wife of the deceased shall get a sum of Rs. 1,81,048/- and the parents shall get a sum of Rs. 40,000/- each. Thus, in an overall consideration, the appeals preferred by the Transport Corporation deserve no consideration as I find no merit in them.
37. As the finding of the Tribunal in fixing 75% of negligence on the part of the bus driver and 25% on the part of the deceased is not disturbed, I feel it would be proper for this Court to consider the enhancement as indicated above in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court cited supra.
In the result, the appeals are dismissed as they are devoid of merits. No costs. The Cross Objection is allowed to the extent indicated above.