Shivaraj Patil, J.
1. This writ appeal is directed against the order dated 20.9.1996 passed by a learned single judge in Writ Petition No. 2252 of 1995.
2. The respondent herein joined the Tamil Nadu State Judicial Service as District Munsif, and at present he is a District Judge, Grade I. When he was serving as a District and Sessions Judge of Ramanathapuram, at Madurai he was served with a show cause notice on 18.2.1991 asking him why disciplinary action should not be taken against him based on certain allegations. He submitted his explanation to the same on 25.3.1991. The explanation so submitted was found not satisfactory. 18 charges were framed against him. Two Honourable Judges appointed by the Honourable the Chief Justice conducted enquiry and submitted their findings on 16.4.1992 on the charges. Thereafter the respondent received a communication Roc.77/90/Con.B2 dated Nil fromHhe appellant stating that the Administrative Committee No. 1 had considered the findings given by the honourable enquiring Judges and the further representation submitted by the respondent. The matter was placed before the Full Court, which passed the order awarding a minor penalty of withholding two increments without cumulative effect in proceedings Roc.77/90/ Con. B2.
3. The validity and correctness of the said order was challenged by the respondent in W.P. No. 22696 of 1993 and sought for a writ of certiorari. The said writ petition was admitted on 28.12.1993. The learned single Judge referred the writ petition for further hearing by a Division Bench stating that some of the issues raised were of great importance and were likely to recur for adjudication. A Division Bench of this Court disposed of the said writ petition on 8.3.1994 which is reported in T.S.Sankaranarayan v. The High Court of Judicature at Madras 1994 W.L.R. 484. Since one of the grounds raised in the said writ petition related to the very appointment of the honourable enquiring Judges to take up the disciplinary proceedings stating that they were appointed by the Honourable Chief Justice and not by the Full Court, the Division Bench did not go into the merits of the other contentions raised in the writ petition in the view it took.
4. The Division Bench of this Court in the said writ petition held that the constitution of the honourable enquiring Judges itself was invalid and therefore the entire disciplinary proceedings were vitiated and consequently the impugned order imposing minor punishment of stoppage of two increments was quashed by allowing the writ petition. The said judgment of the Division Bench was not appealed against. However Review Application No. 14 of 1994 was filed by the appellant seeking clarification, stating certain ambiguity contained in the judgment was to be removed. The Review application was disposed of on 11.8.1994 clarifying on the two points sought for as under:
The learned Special Government Pleader says that there is some room for doubt as to whether the initiation should be done by the Full Court or by a small body. Having regard to the earlier opinion expressed by the Division Bench on the question of taking disciplinary action, we are of the opinion, that the same course should be adopted even in the case initiation of disciplinary proceeding. In other words, the initiation can be done either by the Full Court or by a smaller body of Judges, appointed by the Full Court.
3. The second point on which the learned Counsel seeks clarification is whether the respondents can take de novo action because only a technical flaw was pointed out by this Court. On this aspect, we are definitely of the opinion that this matter was in fact agitated by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioner and the Division Bench decidedly left this question open without observing one way or the other. It is also well known that a writ of certiorari only removes the defective order from the files of the respondents. Therefore, we do not propose to say anything more or less on this aspect.
[Italics supplied]
5. Thereafter Administrative Committee No. I ordered de novo enquiry on 31.8.1994. Pursuant to the same a charge memo dated 30.11.1994 in Roc.No. 183/94 was issued to the respondent containing the very same 18 charges framed earlier including charge No. 18 which was held not proved.
6. The respondent filed W.P. No. 2252 of 1995 seeking a writ of certiorari, calling for the records connected with the impugned charge memo dated 30.11.1994 in Roc.No. 183/94/Con. B-2. In the said writ petition it is contended that even at the time of initiation of disciplinary proceedings, the Full Court must be involved; the Full Court must be first addressed and informed of the allegations and that it is for the Full Court to deliberate over the same and decide whether there is a case to be proceeded with or to drop the same at that stage itself; the de novo enquiry initiated under the impugned charge memo dated 30.11.1994 is in violation of Article 235 of the Constitution of India inasmuch as the administrative committee No. I, on considering the matter, had framed the charges and the Full Court was not involved at the stage of initiating the proceedings or framing of charges; since the Honourable Judges who constituted the earlier body of enquiring Judges and who constituted the earlier administrative committee No. I which took decisions on the charges, find place in the present administrative committee No. 1 which decided to have a de novo enquiry on the same charges, the whole proceedings stood vitiated inasmuch as the element of bias was not ruled out, and the principles of natural justice, equity, and fair play were violated.
7. The respondent in the said writ petition (who is the appellant herein) filed counter-affidavit, opposing the writ petition making various submissions and praying for dismissal of the writ petition.
8. The learned single Judge allowed the said Writ Petition 2252 of 1995 by order dated 20.6.1996, reported in I.L.R. (1996) Mad. 1616. The learned single Judge in paragraph 31 of the said order has stated,
The word 'initiation' in the context in which it has been used in the review order only mean and indicate the proceedings are to be taken after the Full Court has decided to proceed against the delinquent officer after due deliberation.
The learned Judge has held that the non-compliance with the requirements/directions stipulated in the order of the Division Bench, i.e., to place the matter before the Full Court, has vitiated the entire proceedings which were impugned in the writ petition.
9. Noticing the enormous mental agony and sufferings of the respondent, the learned single Judge took the view that it was necessary to draw the curtain and to put an end to the enquiry, observing 'even assuming that the enquiry proceedings are re-commenced, the ultimate punishment that may be imposed on the petitioner may not be more onerous than the stoppage of two increments without cumulative effect. For imposing this minor penalty the petitioner need not be subjected to yet another enquiry.' Thus the learned single Judge allowed the writ petition and set aside the impugned order. It is against this order of the learned single Judge dated 20.6.1996 made in W.P. No. 2252 of 1995 the present writ appeal is filed.
10. The writ appeal was heard by a Division Bench of this Court, and in the light of the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties, and noticing prima facie there appeared conflict of decisions in the judgments of the Division Benches, and in that view, the Bench referred the entire case by order dated 16.10.1996 for decision by a Full Bench, instead of referring a particular question or questions. Thereafter this matter has come up before this Full Bench for hearing.
11. We have heard the arguments of the learned Counsel for the parties.
12. Shri R. Viduthalai, learned Additional Government Pleader, in support of the appeal urged.
(i) The initiation of disciplinary proceedings, which includes initial deliberation on the allegations received against a judicial officer, need not necessarily be by the Full Court co'nsisting of all the Honourable Judges; it could be done by a smaller committee or a smaller body of judges;
(ii) It would be sufficient compliance of law if the Full Court considers the enquiry report submitted by the administrative committee, and after giving due opportunity to the delinquent officer, takes a decision regarding appropriate further orders to be passed in that regard;
(iii) The charges framed by the administrative Committee No. I in the present case, are in any event, saved by the doctrine of 'de facto';
(iv) Paragraphs 11 and 12 in the judgment of the Division Bench in T.S.Sankaranarayan v. The High Court of Judicature at Madras 1994 W.L.R. 484 are in favour of the appellant wherein opportunity was given to initiate disciplinary proceedings either by the Full Court or by a smaller body of judges appointed by the Full Court;
(v) On the facts of this case, the order under appeal, in any event, is bad in law as it has foreclosed the right of the competent authority to initiate disciplinary action against the respondent. The respondent cannot take advantage of his own mistake to foreclose further disciplinary proceedings;
(vi) As a matter of fact, no prejudice was caused to the respondent by initiating the disciplinary proceedings by the administrative committee No. I. In support of his submissions he has cited few decisions.
13. Shri G.Subramaniam, learned senior counsel for the respondent submitted,
(i) The initiation of the enquiry ought to be done by the Full Court and not by administrative committee;
(ii) The impugned charges framed by the administrative committee No. I are not sustainable as being against the judgment dated 8.3.1994 made in W.P. No. 22696 of 1993 as the Full Court wasrnet 'informed' of the allegations, and the Full Court did not ' 'deliberate' on the allegations, and the Full Court was not 'involved' in the constitution of the smaller committee for this purpose;
(iii) The judgment dated 8.3.1994 reported in Sankaranarayanan's case, 1994 Writ L.R. 484 - the very respondent herein) is not bad as stated in 'K. Ramaraj v. The State of Tamil Nadu Registrar High Court 1996 W.L.R. 273; P.T. Loganathan v. The High Court of Judicature at Madras 1996 W.L.R. 286 and S.Narayanan v. State of Tamil Nadu' Registrar, High Court 1996 W.L.R. 290.
(iv) The impugned charge memo is hit by the doctrine of 'Bias' in view of the participation by one of the Honourable enquiry Judges who found the respondent guilty of the charges on the charge memo dated 18.2.1991;
(v) The impugned charge memo is bad being verbatim reproduction of the entire earlier charge memo, for non-application of mind;
(vi) The de facto doctrine does not apply to this case; and
(vii) The learned single Judge has not exceeded his authority by dropping the entire proceedings in the impugned order under appeal.
The learned senior counsel also placed reliance on few decisions in support of his submissions.
14. After careful and anxious consideration, we are proceeding to analyse and examine the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties on the facts in order to pronounce on the points that arise for consideration as under.
15. The learned single Judge in the impugned order under appeal, referring to paragraph 12 of the Division Bench judgment of this Court in T.S.Sankaranarayan v. The High Court of Judicature at Madras : (1994)2MLJ168 , has held that before initiating the disciplinary proceedings against ajudicial officer for misconduct, fc the Full Court should deliberate over the same and decide whether there is a case to be proceeded with by conducting an enquiry or whether to drop the same at that stage itself and that therefore only after the Full Court has come to a decision to proceed with the enquiry as aforesaid, the initiation of disciplinary proceedings could be made either by the Full Court or by a smaller committee of judges constituted by the Full Court therefor. The learned Judge found that there was non-compliance with the requirements/directions stipulated in the order of the Division Bench i.e., to place the matter before the Full Court, and as such the entire proceedings were vitiated. Hence the learned Judge set aside the impugned charges, and stating that the respondent had already undergone enormous mental agony and sufferings, and for the reasons stated in paragraphs 35 to 39 of the order, has taken the view that it is but necessary to draw the curtain and put an end to the enquiry.
16. In view of the rival submissions made on behalf of the parties, and in the view taken by the learned single Judge the main point that arises for consideration is, whether before initiating any disciplinary proceedings against a subordinate judicial officer for alleged misconduct, is it necessary for the Full Court comprising of the entire body of Judges to be informed itself of the allegations, deliberate over them and then decide whether to proceed with the enquiry or drop the proceedings at that stage itself? In other words, whether a committee of Judges appointed and authorised by the Full Court can itself initiate the disciplinary proceedings against subordinate judicial officer directly without involving the Full Court at that stage.
17. It would be appropriate to notice certain factual aspects relating to the constitution of various committees consisting of Judges. From the extracts of the minutes of the Full Court meetings held on 12.7.1993 and 19.7.1993, it is clear that the Full Court resolved to adopt the new scheme of procedure for submission of administrative files to Honourable the Chief Justice and other Honourable Judges in accordance with the distribution of work of the High Court (excluding matters purely relating to the office of the High Court), and constitution of administrative and other committees. According to the said resolution four administrative committees were formed. Administrative Committee No. 1 (in regard to District Judges) consisting of the Honourable Chief Justice and three other Judges to be nominated by the Honourable Chief Justice was formed. For the purpose of this case, it may not be necessary to refer to the formation of other committees and distribution of work as authorised by the Full Court in the said resolution.
18. The procedure for submission of administrative files to Honourable the Chief Justice and other Honourable Judges in accordance with the distribution of work of High Court (excluding matters purely relating to the office of the High Court), to the extent it is relevant is as follows:
______________________________________________________________________________________
S.No. Subjects Full Court, Chief Justice, Order in which
Committee of Judges of files have to
or individual Judges be submitted.
______________________________________________________________________________________
MATTERS WHICH SHOULD GO BEFORE THE FULL COURT
1. ...
2. ...
3. Consideration of final reports of Disciplinary|
Enquiries in respect of Judicial Officers and |_Full Court 1. Hon'ble Chief Justice
taking decision as to piinishment and further | 2. Full Court
action thereon. |
4. ...
5. ...
6. ...
7. ...
8. ...
______________________________________________________________________________________
SUBJECTS TO BE PLACED BEFORE THE RESPCTWE ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE.
1. ...
2. ...
3. ...
4. ...
5. To deal with all disciplinary matters relating to Judicial Officers,
including appointment of Specially empowered Authority to hold
disciplinary enquiry.
6. ...
7. ...
19. As can be seen from what is stated above, the Full Court adopted the procedure for submission of administrative files to Honourable the Chief Justice and other Honourable Judges and formation of administrative committees to deal with the respective matters. Administrative Committee No. l consisting of Honourable the Chief Justice with three other Honourable Judges to be nominated by Honourable the Chief Justice is to deal with the matters relating to District Judges. The Administrative Committee No. 1 is authorised by the Full Court to deal with all disciplinary matters relating to the District Judges, including appointment of specially empowered authority to hold disciplinary enquiry. Final reports of disciplinary enquiries in respect of Judicial Officers and taking decision as to punishment and further action thereon are to be placed before Honourable the Chief Justice and the Full Court in that order. Thus it becomes clear that the Administrative Committee No. 1 is authorised and competent to deal with all disciplinary matters relating to District Judges up to the stage of final reports of disciplinary enquiries in respect of judicial officers. Consideration of final reports of disciplinary enquiries in respect of Judicial Officers and taking decision as to punishment and further action thereon rests with the Full Court. Hence the Full Court comes into picture at the stage of consideration of final reports of disciplinary enquiries and taking decision as to punishment and further action. Thus, it is obvious that the Full Court need not necessarily be involved either before initiation of disciplinary proceedings or in initiating the disciplinary proceedings. In other words, from the procedure adopted by the Full Court as above-mentioned, it is not necessary that the Full Court should be informed of the allegations relating to misconduct of any judicial officer, nor that it should deliberate over them and decide to proceed with the enquiry or drop the proceedings at that stage itself.
20. As already noticed above, the learned single Judge proceeded on the basis that the directions given by the Division Bench of this Court in T.S. Sankaranarayan v. The High Court of Judicature at Madras 1994 W.L.R. 484 were not complied with before issuing the impugned charge memo inasmuch as the Full Court was not involved before initiating the disciplinary proceedings against the respondent; the Full Court was not informed of the allegations of misconduct against the respondent, it did not deliberate on them and did not decide to proceed with the enquiry against him; as such the entire proceedings were vitiated. Consequently he set aside the impugned charge memo and foreclosed any further enquiry against the respondent. The learned senior counsel for the respondent strongly relies on this aspect. The learned senior counsel for the respondent, fairly did not dispute that de novo enquiry could be held in the light of the decision of the Division Bench in 1994 W.L.R. 484 read with the order made in the Revision Application No. 14 of 1994, and rightly so in our opinion.
21. The Administrative Committee No. 1 in its meeting held on 31.8.1994 referring to the Division Bench judgment dated 8.3.1994 passed in W.P. No. 22696 of 1993 T.S. Sankaranarayan v. The High Court of Judicature at Madras 1994 W.LR. 484 and the order dated 11.8.1994 made in the Review Application, resolved to initiate the disciplinary proceedings afresh and directed the Registrar to prepare draft charges and the statement of allegations and place the same before it for approval. The Administrative Committee No. 1 in its meeting held on 21.11.1994 approved the draft charges and the statement of allegations placed before it, and directed the copies of the same to be sent to the respondent and to further direct him to submit his statement of defence within two weeks from the date of receipt of the same. Thereafter the impugned order dated 30.11.1994 was issued under which the charges were framed by the administrative committee No. 1. Thus it is evident that it is the administrative committee No. 1 which took a decision to initiate fresh enquiry and thereafter framed charges on 30.11.1994 under the impugned order as per the procedure adopted and authorised by the Full Court in its meeting held on 19.7.1993.
22. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Batuk Deo Patil Tripathi and Anr. : 1978CriLJ839 has held that Rule 1 of Chapter III of the Rules framed by the Allahabad High Court was within the frame-work of Article 235 of the Constitution and that the recommendation made by the Administrative Committee that the respondent should bs compulsorily retired did not suffer from any legal or constitutional immunity. This judgment is referred to and relied on by the Division Benches of this Court in Ramaraj v. The State of Tamil Nadu/Registrar High Court 1996 W.L.R. 273; P.T. Loganathan v. The High Court of Judicature at Madras 1996 W.L.R. 286; S.Narayanan v. State of Tamil Nadu/Registrar High Court, Madras 1996 W.L.R. 290 and since the said Supreme Court judgment helps us and enlightens us in resolving the controversy we consider it appropriate to quote it in extenso.
23. The High Court of Allahabad, exercising powers under Article 225 of the Constitution, and all other powers enabling it in that behalf, framed rules known as 'The Rules of Court, 1952.' As per Rule 1 of Chapter III of the Rules, an Administrative Committee consisting of the Chief Justice, the Judge in the administrative department and five other Judges appointed by the Chief Justice was constituted to act for the Court. As per Rule 7 of the said Rules, all matters laid before and disposed of by the Administrative Committee were to be circulated in a statement to all the Judges of the Court for their information. The Administrative Committee in the meeting held on January, 9,1974 resolved that the respondent No. 1 should be retired compulsorily from service. The Registrar of the High Court communicated the decision of the said Committee to the State Government on January 15, 1974, and thereafter on January 17, 1974 circulated the minutes of the Committee to the other Judges of the High Court for 'their information'. The Governor of Utter Pradesh accepted the recommendation and retired the respondent No. 1 compulsorily by an order dated 27.2.1975.
24. The respondent No. 1 assailed the said order by an application under Article 226, inter alia, on the ground that the order was illegal as it was passed on the recommendation of the Administrative Committee, while Article 233 of the Constitution requires consultation by the Governor with the entire High Court and not with a Committee consisting of a few Judges of the High Court. This ground appealed to the Division Bench, but considering that such a view was likely to upset the settled practice of the Court and that it was likely to be in conflict with the decision in Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 1254 of 1968 dated 23.2.1970, they directed to place the papers before the learned Chief Justice for constituting a full Bench to consider the question 'Whether in view of Article 233 of the Constitution, consultation with the entire High Court is necessary before making an order of compulsory retirement against the District Judge?'.
25. After the Full Bench reserved the judgment, the Supreme Court in High Court of Punjab & Haryana v. State of Haryana and Ors. : [1975]3SCR365 held that compulsory retirement of a District Judge is not incident to the power of appointment conferred by Article 233 of the Constitution but it is an incident of the control vested in the High Court by Article 235. Consequently the Full Bench reframed the question referred to it as 'Whether a District Judge can be compulsorily retired from service on the opinion recorded by the Administrative Committee constituted under Rule 1 of Chapter III of the Rules of the Court?' It also framed additional question as 'Whether circulation of a statement to all the Judges of the Court showing what matters were laid before the Administrative Committee and the manner in which these matters were disposed of amounts to consultation with the Full Court. The Full Bench answered both the questions in the negative by majority. In the result the writ petition was allowed declaring that the respondent No. 1 should be treated as continuing in service.
26. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal by Special Leave and affirmed the minority judgment of the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court. In the said judgment the Apex Court has held thus:
Yet another misconception may now be cleared. It is urged on behalf of the respondent by his learned Counsel Shri Misra that under Article 216, 'High Court' means the entire body of Judges appointed to the Court and Judges appointed to the Court and therefore, the control over the subordinate Judiciary which is vested by Article 235 in the High Court must be exercised by the whole body of Judges. The thrust of the argument is that the High Court cannot delegate its functions or power to a Judge or a smaller body of Judges of the Court. This argument requires consideration of the question whether any delegation as such is involved in the process whereby a Judge or a Committee of Judges of the Court, like the Administrative Committee in the instant case, is authorised by the whole court to act on behalf of the court. (Italic supplied)
For answering this question it is necessary in the first place to bear in mind that the power of control over the subordinate courts which is vested in the High Courts comprises such numerous matters, often involving consideration of details of the minutes nature, that if the whole High Court is required to consider every one of those matters, the exercise of control instead of becoming effective will tend to cause delay and confusion in the administration of justice in the State. A construction which will frustrate the very object of the salient provisions contained in Article 235 ought, as far as possible, to be avoided. The control vested in the High Courts, by that article comprehends, according to our decisions, a large variety of matters like transfers, subsequent postings, leave promotions other than initial promotions, imposition of minor penalties which do not fall within Article 311, decisions regarding compulsory retirements, recommendations for imposition of major penalties which fall within Article 311, entries in character rolls and so forth. If every Judge is to be associated personally and directly with the decision on every one of these matters, several important matters pertaining to the High Court's administrative affairs will pile into arrears like court arrears. In fact, it is no exaggeration to say that the control will be better and more effectively exercised if a smaller committee of Judges has the authority of the court to consider the manifold matters falling within the purview ofArticle 235. Bearing in mind therefore the nature of the power which that article confers on the High Courts, we are of the opinion that it is wrong to characterise as 'delegation' the process whereby the entire High Court authorises a Judge or some of the Judges of the Court to act on behalf of the whole Court. Such an authorisation effectuates the purpose ofArticle 235 and indeed without it the control vested in the High Court over the subordinate courts will tend gradually to become lax and ineffective. Administrative functions are only a part, though an important part, of the High Court's constitutional functions. Judicial functions, ought to occupy and do in fact consume the best part of a Judge's time. For balancing these two fold functions it is inevitable that the administrative duties should be left to be discharged by some on behalf of all the Judges. Judicial functions brooke no such sharing of responsibilities by any instrumentality..
We have pointed out above that the amplitude of the power conferred by Article 235, the imperative need that the High Courts must be enabled to transact their administrative business more conveniently and on awareness of the realities of the situation, particularly of the practical difficulties involved in a consideration by the whole court, even by circulation, of every day-to-day matter pertaining to control over the District and Subordinate Courts, lead to the conclusion that by rules framed under Article 235 of the Constitution the High Court ought to be conceded the power to authorise an Administrative Judge or an Administrative Committee of Judges to act on behalf of the Court. Accordingly, we uphold the minority judgment of the Full Bench that Rule 1 of f Chapter III of the 1952 Rules framed by the Allahabad High Court is within the framework of Article 235. The recommendation made by the Administrative Committee that the respondent should be complusorily retired cannot therefore be said to suffer from any legal or constitutional infirmity. [Italics supplied]
27. In Tripathi's case, : 1978CriLJ839 aforementioned decided by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court, we see,
(i) the main question for consideration was whether a District Judge can be compulsorily retired from ser-vice on the opinion recorded by the administrative committee constituted under Rule 1 of Chapter III of the Rules of the Court, and this question was answered in the affirmative;
(ii) since the control over the subordinate Courts is vested institutionally in the High Courts by Article 235, the High Court, has therefore, the power under Article 235 itself to frame rules for regulating the manner in which the control vested in it may be exercised;
(iii) No delegation as such is involved in the process whereby a Judge or a committee of Judges of the Court, like the administrative committee is authorised by the whole court to act on behalf of it. The power of control over subordinate courts vested in the High Courts comprises of numerous matters often involving consideration of minute details. If the whole High y Court is required to consider every one of those matters the exercise of control instead of becoming effective will tend to cause delay and confusion in the administration of justice in the State. If every Judge is to be associated personally and directly with every one of matters like transfers, subsequent postings, leave promotions other than initial promotions, imposition of minor penalties which do not fall within Article 311, decisions regarding compulsory retirement, recommendations for imposition of major penalties which fall within Article 311, entries in character rules and so forth, several important matters pertaining to the High Court's administrative affairs will pile into arrears like court arrears. In fact the control will be better and more effectively exercised if a smaller committee of Judges has the authority of the Court to consider the manifold matters falling within the purview of Article 235. For balancing the two-fold functions, administrative and judicial, it is inevitable that the administrative duties should be left to be discharged by some on behalf of the Judges.
28. The Supreme Court in the case The Registrar, High Court of Madras v. R. Rajiah : AIR1988SC1388 in paragraph 23, has stated thus:
In regard to the case of the other respondent, namely, K.Rajeswaran, the High Court took the view that the constitution of the Review Committee by the Chief Justice and not by the Full Court was illegal. We are unable to accept the view of the High Court. We fail to understand why the Chief Justice cannot appoint a Review Committee or an Administrative Committee. But in one respect the High Court, is, in our opinion, correct, namely, that the decision of the Review Committee should have been placed before a meeting of the Judges. In the case of the respondent, K. Rajeswaran, the decision and recommendation of the Review Committee was not placed before the Full Court meeting. Nor is there any material to show that the same was circulated to the Judges. In that sense, the recommendation of the Review Committee was not strictly legal.
In the said judgment the Supreme Court has referred to the Constitution Bench judgment in Tripathi's case : 1978CriLJ839 . While dealing on the facts and circumstances of the case on merits, the Supreme Court incidentally observed,
We fail to understand why the Chief Justice cannot appoint a Review Committee or an Administrative Committee.
29. The Division Bench of this Court in Sankaranarayanan 's case 1994 Writ L.R. 484 - the very respondent herein), in paragraph 11, referring to Rajiah's case : AIR1988SC1388 , has stated thus:
We have taken pains to show that the very question that is argued before us was in fact, posed by the Constitution Bench for decision and they have rendered a decision. If one makes a reference tojhe portions underlined by us in the passages quoted from the abovesaid Supreme Court judgment, one can easily deduce that a smaller body of judges can be appointed only by the Full Court and not by the Chief Justice alone. It is in this context that we have to see whether the observations of the Supreme Court in Rajiah 's case, : AIR1988SC1388 , could be understood as overruling the above categorical interpretation, and exposition of the matter in which the smaller body of Judges should be appointed, by the Constitution Bench in Tripathy's case : 1978CriLJ839 . We have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the latter judgment of the Supreme Court presided over by two Hon'ble Judges in Rajiah's case : 1978CriLJ839 did not overrule the said proposition, distinctly laid down by the Constitution Bench. One other circumstances which impels us to take the above decision is provided by another judgment of the Supreme Court in Krishna Kumar v. Union of India : (1991)ILLJ191SC
and we are in agreement with the same. We may add that even there is indication in Rajiah's case : 1978CriLJ839 that an administrative committee or a review committee could be appointed to take decision even in matters like compulsory retirement, but the decision and recommendations of such committee should be placed before the Full Court meeting or should be circulated to the Judges. In that case neither of them having been done, the order of compulsory retirement of the judicial officer was not upheld.
30. The Division Bench of this Court in K. Ramaraj v. The State of Tamil Nadu/Registrar, High Court, etc. 1996 W.L.R. 273 has referred to Tripathi's case : 1978CriLJ839 and Rajaiah's case 1996 W.L.R. 273 of the Apex Court besides other decisions. In paragraphs 11 and 12 of the said judgment it is stated thus:
Yet another aspect which has been overlooked by the Division Bench in T.S. Sankaranarayanan's case : (1994)2MLJ168 , is this. Even if the enquiry is held by the District Judge, nominated by the Chief Justice alone and the evidence has been recorded by him, the same has been considered after his report was sent to this Court by the Full Court. The files disclose that the Full Court considered the report of the Enquiry Officer along with the evidence and the findings were accepted by the Full Court as such. Once the Full Court has accepted the findings, it is not open to the party to contend that the proceedings were invalid. This aspect of the matter has been clarified by the Supreme Court in Registrar, High Court of Madras v. Rajiah : AIR1988SC1388 . In that case, it has been held that even if the Administrative Committee is not properly constituted and the report of the same is not a valid one, if the Full Court accepts the said report on considering the materials, it will be valid. In that case, it was also pointed out by the Supreme Court that the constitution of the Review Committee by the Chief Justice alone and not by the Full Court, was not illegal. The Court said 'we fail to understand, why the Chief Justice cannot appoint a Review Committee or an Administrative Committee.
12. Though it is possible for us to say that the judgment of the Division Bench in T.S. Sankaranarayanan's case : (1994)2MLJ168 is per incuriam, it is not necessary for us to do so in this case, as the ruling will not apply in view of the different facts in the case, as pointed out already.
31. In P.T. Loganathan v. The High Court of Judicature at Madras etc. 1996 W.L.R. 286, based on the judgments of the Supreme Court, has held that the initial proceedings in departmental enquiries need not be by the appropriate disciplinary authority. Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the said judgment read:
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has repeatedly considered the question whether in departmental enquiries, initial proceedings should be by the appropriate disciplinary authority and answered the same in the negative. In State of M.P. v. Shardar Singh (1970) 1 S.C.J. 442, the Supreme Court held that it is not necessary that the authority empowered under Article 311(1) of the Constitution of India to dismiss or remove an official should itself initiate or conduct an enquiry preceding dismissal or removal of the officer or even that that enquiry should be done at its instance. Very same proposition has been reiterated in P.V.Srinivasa Sastry v. Comptroller and Auditor - General A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 1821. The Court said that although Article 311 of the Constitution of India does not speak as to who shall initiate the disciplinary proceedings that can be provided and prescribed by the Rules. But if no Rules have been framed, saying as to who shall initiate the departmental proceedings, then on the basis of Article 311 of the Constitution of India it cannot be urged that it is only the appointing authority and no officer subordinate to such authority, can initiate the departmental proceeding. Earlier ruling of the Supreme Court referred to above in Shardar Singh's case (1970) 1 S.C.J. 442 was cited. In Registrar, Co-operative Societies v. F.X. Fernando (1994) 2 S.C.J. 746 the Court held that a person, who was not empowered to impose penalty, was entitled to issue a charge sheet to the delinquent officer. In Transport Commissioner v. A. Radha T. Moorthy : (1995)1SCC332 the Supreme Court held that initiation of disciplinary enquiry by an officer subordinate to the appointing authority is not objectionable and the charge sheet can be issued by the such authority.
7. Afortiori the initiation of an enquiry at the instance of the Chief Justice is in no way invalid. Having regard to the position well settled by the various judgments of the Supreme Court referred to above, we are of the opinion that t ie Division Bench in Sankaranarayanan's case, 1994 Writ L.R. 484 has stated the proposition of law too widely to be followed. At any rate, in this case, there is no material on record to enable the petitioner to invoke the said ruling to his aid.
32. The Supreme Court in P.V. Srinivasa Sastry v. Comptroller and Auditor - General A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 1821 has taken the view that although Article 311 of the Constitution of India does not speak as to who shall initiate the disciplinary proceedings, that can be provided and prescribed by the Rules. But if no Rules have been framed, saying as to who shall initiate the departmental proceedings, then on the basis of Article 311 of the Constitution of India it cannot be urged that it is only the appointing authority and no officer subordinate to such authority, can initiate the departmental proceedings.
33. The Apex Court in Transport Commissioner, Madras-5 v. A. Radha T. Moorthy (1995) 1 S.C.R. 332 in paragraph 8 has held thus:
In so far as initiation of enquiry by an officer subordinate to the appointing authority is concerned, it is well settled now that it is unobjectionable. The initiation can be by an officer subordinate to the appointing authority. Only the dismissal/removal shall not be by an authority subordinate to the appointing authority. Accordingly it is held that this was not a permissible ground for quashing the charges by the Tribunal.
34. Yet again, the Apex Court in the case of Inspector General of Police and Anr. v. Thavasi Appan : (1997)IILLJ191SC dealing with Rules 3(b)(i) and (ii), 2-A and 4 of the Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955 and Article 311 of the Constitution of India, in paragraph 8 has stated thus:
The learned Counsel also drew our attention to P.V. Srinivasa Sastry v. Comptroller and Auditor General : (1993)ILLJ824SC wherein this Court in this context of Article 311(1) has held that in absence of a rule any superior authority who can be held to be the controlling authority can initiate a departmental proceeding and that initiation of a departmental proceeding per se does not visit the officer concerned with any evil consequences. Transport Commissioner v. A. Radha Krishna Moorthy : (1995)1SCC332 was next relied upon. Therein also this Court has held that initiation of disciplinary enquiry can be by an officer subordinate to the appointing authority. These decisions fully support the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellants that initiation of a departmental proceeding and conducting an enquiry can be by an authority other than the authority competent to impose the proposed penalty.
The Apex Court, in paragraph 9 went on to say,
Generally speaking, it is not necessary that the charges should be framed by the authority competent to award the proposed penalty or that the enquiry should be conducted by such authority. [Italics supplied]
35. From the decisions aforementioned, it follows that an authority subordinate to the appointing authority can initiate disciplinary proceedings and frame charges in the absence of any particular rule or provision to the contrary. This Court has not framed any rule saying that the Full Court alone shall initiate disciplinary proceedings and/or it alone could frame charges. On the other hand, as can be seen from the procedure adopted for the manner of exercise of power, in the Full Court meeting held on 19.7.1993, above mentioned the Administrative Committee No. 1 has power to deal with all disciplinary proceedings relating to the District Judges up to the stage of final report and it is only thereafter the matter should be placed before the Full Court for taking decision as to punishment and further action to be taken thereof. Administrative Committee No. 1 not being subordinate authority, acting for the Full Court as authorised, it can better and certainly could initiate the disciplinary proceedings and issue the impugned order framing the charges.
36. In the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Sankaranarayanan's case, 1994 W.L.R. 484 the fact were:
When the petitioner was serving as District and Sessions Judge of Ramanathapuram at Madurai, he was served with a Confidential Official Memorandum dated 18.2.1991 asking him to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him. The said memorandum was issued by two Honourable Judges of this Court (hereinafter referred to as 'Honourable enquiring Judges.') The explanation given by the petitioner to the said memorandum was found not satisfactory, and 18 charges were framed by the honourable enquiring judges. Thereafter departmental enquiry was held. The Honourable enquiring Judges submitted their findings on 16.4.1992. The petitioner received a communication stating that the Administrative Committee No A of the High Court had considered the findings given1 by the Honourable Enquiring Judges and the further representation submitted by the petitioner; The matter was placed before the Full Court which passed the impugned order awarding the minor penalty of withholding two increments without cumulative effect. The petitioner challenged the said order and prayed for issue of writ of certiorari and to quash the proceedings. One of the grounds raised in the writ petition was that the constitution of the Honourable enquiring Judges by the Honourable Chief Justice of the High Court alone and not by the Full Court was not valid.
37. The Division Bench of this Court refrained from going to the merits of the case as it principally considered the question of validity of appointment of two Honourable enquiring Judges by the Honourable Chief Justice alone. Paragraph 8 of the said judgment reads:
A careful analysis of the above case commencing from the judgment of the Supreme Court in Tripathi's case, A.I.R. 1977 N.O.C. 279 (All.), enables us to lay down three proposition as follows:
(i) If there are rules framed by the High Court under one or other of the Article s of the Constitution of India, referred to above, then the disciplinary action against the Subordinate Judicial Officers can be proceeded in the manner provided by the Rules.
(ii) If no such rules are framed by a High Court, even then, it is open to the Full Court, by resolution, to appoint a smaller body of Judges as constituting a committee to initiate and take disciplinary proceedings against a Subordinate Judicial officer. [Italics supplied]
(iii) In the absence of Rules or resolution by a Full Court the Chief Justice by himself, cannot appoint a smaller body constituting the disciplinary committee or the Enquiry Committee.
In paragraph 10 of the said judgment reference is made to Tripathis's case : 1978CriLJ839 aforementioned. We think it is appropriate to extract paragraph 12 in its entirety as the thrust of the argument of the respondent herein is based on the said paragraph. The said paragraph reads:
Learned Special Government Pleader referred to certain other judgments of the Supreme Court as well as two judgments of the High Courts of Allahabad and Orissa. We do not propose to refer to the same because they do not in any way advance or improve the case of either parties. Another argument of the learned Counsel for the respondent is, that it is enough if the Full Court considers and decides the imposition of punishment on the particular officer and that it is unnecessary that even at the stage of initiation the Full Court should be involved. In other words, the contention is that for the purpose of institution of the disciplinary proceedings it is unnecessary for the Full Court to consider and appoint a smaller committee. We do not agree with this contention because it would not be advisable to accept such a proposition and further the Supreme Court in Tripathi's case A.I.R. 1977 N.O.C. 279 (All), did not make any such distinction. We say, that it would not be advisable because, the Full Court must be informed of the allegations and deliberate over the same and decide whether there is a case to be proceeded with, by conducting an enquiry or whether to drop the same at that stage itself. We feel that it will be proper for the Full Court itself to make such an important decision, rather than delegate the same to a smaller body of judges. Such a procedure, according to us will be more broad-based and also rule out any question of arbitrariness. It is therefore, our considered view that even at the time of initiation, the Full Court must be involved in the exercise of appointing a smaller committee.
In paragraph 13 it is stated that in respect of aav disciplinary proceeding which is forwarded To a smaller body of Judges, the Full Court should be involved in the decision to delegate the proceedings to a smaller body of Judges. The Division Bench has also took note of the existence of Administrative Committee No. I looking after all cases relating to district Judges. Finally the Division Bench held that the appointment of the honourable enquiring Judges in the case by Honourable the Chief Justice alone is vitiated and was contrary to Article 235 of the Constitution of India. Consequently all the subsequent proceedings commencing from the issue of the first official memorandum dated 18.2.1991 were held vitiated. We think it appropriate to remind ourselves, here itself, about the order in Review Application No. 14 of 1994 which we have already extracted above. In the said Review order it is clearly stated,
In other words, the initiation can be done either by the Full Court or by a smaller body of Judges appointed the Full Court.
The Division Bench judgment and the Review order are to be read together.
38. The learned single Judge in the order under appeal, looking to paragraph 12 of the Division Bench judgment in Sankaranarayanan's case 1994 Writ L.R. 484 has held that the impugned order issued by the administrative Committee No. I framing charges was bad as the Full Court was not informed of the allegations and did not deliberate over the same and did not decide as to whether there was a case to be proceeded with against the respondent by conducting enquiry or to drop the same at that stage itself. As to the order passed in the Review Application No. 14 of 1994, the learned single Judge has observed that it was only clarificatory in nature and it did not take away the substance and effect of the order of the Division Bench. The learned single Judge has held that the Full Court should have first considered the allegations made against the respondent and should have taken decision either to proceed with it by conducting an enquiry or to drop the same at that stage itself. In other words the Full Court should have been involved at the time of initiation of the disciplinary proceedings, and that having not been done, the impugned order passed by the Administrative Committee No. I could not be sustained. Consequently the entire proceedings were vitiated.
39. The learned senior counsel for the respondent herein, also/ argued supporting the reasoning of the learned single Judge. He added that in Tripathi 's case : 1978CriLJ839 , there were rules constituting a committee and that is not the case here; even iff a smaller body of Judges or a committee could be constituted by the Full Court such a committee should have been constituted in that behalf for the purpose of initiating disciplinary proceedings against the respondent specifically. In the Division Bench judgment in Sankaranarayanan's case, 1994 W.L.R. 484 out of the propositions laid down in paragraph 8, proposition No. 2 states that if no rules are (framed by the High Court, even then, it is open to the; Full Court by resolution to appoint a smaller body of Judges as constituting a committee to initi?jte and take disciplinary proceedings against a Subordinate Judicial Officer. Thus it has clearly stated that a smaller body of Judges as constituting a committee to initiate and take disciplinary proceeding aga.inst a judicial officer, was permissible in the ligh't of various decisions starting from Tripathi's case.
40. The main question-that was considered in that case was whether the appointment of Honourable enquiring Judges by the Honourable Chief Justice alone and not by the Full Court, was valid. After considering various decisions including Tripathi's case, the Division Bench held that the constitution of Honourable enquiring Judges by the Chief Justice alone was not valid in the light of the Article 235 of the Constitution of India. Consequently it held that all the subsequent proceedings commencing from issueof official memorandum dated 18.2.1991 were vitiated.
41. The question whether the Full Court should be involved at the time of initiation of disciplinary proceedings or whether the Full Court must be informed of the allegations and it should deliberate over the same and decide whether to proceed or not to proceed with the case before issuing the charge memo did not arise for consideration on the facts of the case. In the order dated 11.8.1994 made in Review Application No. 14 of 1994 the position is clarified, if there was any ambiguity, stating that the disciplinary proceedings could be initiated either by the Full Court or by a smaller body of Judges appointed by the Full Court. The Division Bench judgment and the review order must be read together in order to understand the correct position in this regard. If the reading of paragraph 12 of the judgment gave an impression that the Full Court should be involved at the stage of initiation and it should first decide whether to proceed or not to proceed with the enquiry on the allegations, the review order removes such an impression. It may be incidentally mentioned that J.Kanakaraj, J. had the advantage of being a party to the Division Bench judgment as well as to the review order.
42. The Division Bench has referred to and relied on the Constitution Bench judgment of the Apex Court in Tripathi's case : 1978CriLJ839 . In paragraph 10 the Division Bench has noticed that the power of control could be exercised by a smaller body of Judges or a committee which can act for the Full Court. We think it is appropriate to read and understand the Division Bench judgment consistent with the law laid down by the Apex Court in Tripathi's case, more so when the Division Bench itself has referred to and relied on it. Even in paragraph 12 of the Division Bench judgment, the Division Bench felt that it would be proper for the Full Court itself to make such an important decision rather than delegate the same to a smaller body of Judges, and that such a procedure would be more broad-based and also rule out any question of arbitrariness. As already stated above, such a question did not directly arise for consideration. Moreover the Division Bench itself in paragraph 8 has laid down the proposition that a smaller body of Judges as constituting a committee to initiate and take disciplinary proceedings against a subordinate judicial officer could be constituted by the Full Court in the absence of rules. Even if two interpretations are possible, the one which is consistent with the Constitutional provisions and the law laid down by the Apex Court must be preferred. The Full Bench of Patna High Court in Syed IqbalAli Imam Raza v. State of Bihar and Anr. : AIR1994Pat167 has taken such a view.
43. The various decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned clearly indicate that in the absence of rules, even a subordinate officer of authority to the appointing authority can initiate disciplinary proceedings and hold enquiry. More so, in the instant case, it is not the subordinate authority, but the Administrative Committee No. 1, comprising of Honourable the Chief Justice and three other Honourable Judges, has issued the impugned order framing charges, acting for the Full Court as authorised.
44. The Bombay High Court in R. W.Khan v. State of Mahasrashtra and Anr. (1996) 1 M.L.J. 899 dealing with the challenge to the order compulsorily retiring an additional District and Sessions Judge on the ground that the said decision had not been taken up by all Judges of the High Court but by Review Committee appointed by the Chief Justice, held that, in view of the resolution dated 2nd May, 198 passed by the Full Court which laid down the manner and regulated the procedure for administrative deciions, the Chief Justice was empowered to appoint a e-view Committee and the decision of the Review Con-mittee having been approved by the administrative Judges, the decision was one made by the Full Coun itself, and thus negatived the challenge of the petitioner. In paragraph 18 of the said judgment it is stated thus:
It is true that there are no rules framed by this High Court but in absence of the rules, the resolution made by the Full Court has the effect of the rules themselves. Even if Rules under various Article s of the Constitution of India were to be framed by the High Court, such rules indeed had to be approved by the Full House. Therefore, on an analogy when the resolution is made by the Full House, it is nothing less than a rule itself may it under Article 225 of the Constitution of India or may it under Article 235 of the Constitution of India. This type of situation is also foreseen by a Full Bench decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court in B.Ramanjaneyulu v. Government of Andhra Pradesh and Anr. 1981 Lab.I.C. 835 and upon consideration of the decision in Tripathi's case. The relevant passage is: 'By laying emphasis on the use of the expression 'rules' in these passages, it was argued that the decision of the Supreme Court in the above case should be regarded only as holding that the High Court can entrust the administrative functions to a smaller body of Judges only by rules framed by the High Court. We are unable to agree with this contention. Under Article 235, the administrative control is vested in the High Court. As pointed out by the Supreme Court, in the above case, it is necessary having regard to the very nature of the powers vested in the High Court that the High Court should be empowered to authorize a smaller body. Otherwise, as pointed out by the Supreme Court if the whole High Court is to consider every one of the matters, the exercise of the control instead of becoming effective will tend to cause delay and confusion in the administration of justice in the State and will frustrate the very object of the salient provisions contained in Article 235. It is open to the High Court to devise the manner and method by which the power is entrusted to a smaller body. There is nothing in the language of Article 235 which indicates that it is obligatory on the part of the High Court to do so only by framing rules. There is no reason why it cannot confer this power by means of a resolution. [Italics supplied]
In this judgment also reliance is placed on Tripathi's case : 1978CriLJ839 of the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court.
45. The aforementioned judgments are good enough o say that the distinction sought to be made by the ltamed senior that in the case of Tripathi, there were riies framed by the High Court and in the instant cas; there are no rules framed by the High Court, is of m assistance to him. We hold that in the absence of rues, it was open to the Full Court to resolve the mannqof exercise of power under Article 235 and to regulab the procedure for administrative decisions on seveial subjects and matters coming within the purview of Article 235. The resolution passed on 19.7.1993 itself has the force of Rule. Merely because rules are n't framed, the resolutions passed by the Full Court co not become ineffective or less effective in view o; the power vested by virtue of Article 235 of the Constitution in it.
46. We have to notice one more aspect projected by the learned senioi counsel for the respondent, that assuming the Full Court can appoint a Committee or a smaller body of Judges to deal with the disciplinary proceedings against any subordinate judicial officer, it should specifically appoint and authorise such a committee or smaller body of Judges in that behalf. This argument the learned senior counsel advanced referring to paragraph 12 of the Division Bench judgment in Sankaranarayan's case, 1994 W.L.R. 484. He drew our attention to the last sentence in the said paragraph, and wanted us to read the last sentence so as to understand that Full Court should be involved in the decision to delegate the proceedings to a smaller body of Judges by adding the words 'in that behalf at the end. In the view we have expressed above, judgments must be understood in the context of the facts of the case and the questions that came up for consideration and decision. Further in view of the decision in Tripathi's case and in the case of R.W. Khan v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (1996) 1 M.L.J. 899 and the Full Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in B.Ramanjaneyulu v. Government of Andhra Pradesh 1981 Lab.I.C. 835 : 1981 A.L.T.R. 439, there is no reason as to why a smaller body of Judges or a committee should be appointed every time on a case to case or individual basis. A committee or smaller body of Judges appointed may discharge its functions so long it exists during which period many cases may be dealt with.
47. As can be seen from the resolution of the Full Court dated 19.7.1993, different administrative committees were appointed to deal with different categories of subordinate judicial officers i.e., Administrative Committee No. 1 to deal with all matters relating to District Judges Grade I and Grade II, including disciplinary proceedings up to the stage of submitting final reports. Administrative Committee No. 2 to deal with the matters relating to Subordinate Judges and Chief Judicial Magistrates, and Administrative Committee No. 3 to deal with the matters relating to District Munsifs and Judicial Magistrates. We fail to understand for what good or valid reason such committee or smaller body of Judges should be appointed every time in respect of each Judicial Officer. It is also not shown to us how any prejudice would be caused in case such committees are not appointed specifically to deal with a specific case of each individual judicial officer every time. Further for the very reasons stated in Tripathi's case : 1978CriLJ839 of the Apex Court, that if the High Court comprising of the entire body of Judges is to consider every one of the matters, the exercise of the control instead of becoming effective will tend to cause delay and confusion in the administration of justice in the state and will frustrate the very object of the salient provisions contained in Article 235.
48. The Division Bench itself, in Sankaranarayan's case, 1994 W.L.R. 484, has referred to the decision in the case of Krishna Kumar v. Union of India : (1991)ILLJ191SC and has quoted the following passage:
The ratio decidendi has to be ascertained by an analysis of the facts of the case and the process of reasoning involving the major premise consisting of a pre-existing rule of law, either statutory or judge-made, and a minor premise consisting of the material facts of the case under immediate consideration. If it is not clear, it is not the duty of the court to spell it out with difficulty, in order to be bound by it.
49. The Supreme Court in Amar Nath Om Prakash and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Ors. : [1985]2SCR72 has stated that the judgments of curts are not to be construed as statutes. Judges interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statute. In paragraph 11 of the said judgment it is stated:
We consider it proper to say, as we have already said in other cases that judgements of Courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words,, phrases and provision of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define,Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgement.[Italics supplied]
In the same paragraph, the statement of Lord Morris in Herrington v. British Railways Board (1972) 2 W.L.R. 537 is extracted thus:
There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in the sei ting of the facts of a particular case.
50. The Apex Court in one more decision in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Sun Engineering Worts (P) Limited : [1992]198ITR297(SC) in paragraph 39 has stated thus:
It is neither desirable nor permissible to pick out a word or a sentence from the judgment of this Court, divorced from the context of the question under consideration and treat it to be the complete 'Law' declared by this Court. The judgment must be read as a whole and the observations from the judgment have to be considered in the light of the questions which were before this Court. A decision of this Court takes its colour from the questions involved in the case in which it is rendered and while applying the decision to a later case, the courts must carefully try to ascertain the true principle laid down by the decision of this Court and not to pick out words or sentences from the judgment, divorced from the context of the questions under consideration by this Court, to support their reasonings. In Madhav Rao Scindia v. Union of India : [1971]3SCR9 this Court cautioned:
It is not proper to regard a word, a clause or a sentence occurring in a judgment of the Supreme Court, divorced from its context, as containing a full exposition of the law on a question when the question did not even full to be answered in that judgment.
[Italics supplied]
51. If the Division Bench judgment in Sankaranarayan 's case 1994 Writ L.R. 484 is properly read and understood in the context of the facts of the case and the points that arose for consideration, coupled with the order made in the Review Application, we do not find any comflict in the Division Bench decisions of this Cour t. At any rate, to remove doubt if any, we make it clear that the administrative committees constituted by the Full Court arc quite competent to initiate disciplinary proceedings against subordinate Judicial officers in the light of the procedure; adopted by the Full Court on 19.7.1993 as to 'the manner of exercise of power under Article 235 of the Constitute of India. Thus we have no hesitatior.i to hold that the Administrative Committee No. l was competent to issue the impugned order frajning charges against the respondent, and the sai i order is valid.
52. The learned Additional Government Pleader urged that we may also express our opinion that the Honourable Chief Justice is competent to appoint a committee or smaller body of Judges to deal with such administrative matters, coming within the purview of Article 235 of the Constitution. In support of this submission he drew our attention to paragraph 23 of the judgment of the Apex Court in Rajaiah's case, 1996 W.L.R. 273, already extracted above. The observation in the said paragraph made by a Division Bench of the Apex Court consisting of two Honourable Judges incidentally, cannot be taken as the law laid down after considering the facts of the case and that such a question had not come up for consideration, particularly so when the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Tripathi's case : 1978CriLJ839 has specifically stated that such a power vests with the Full Court as stated in para.11 of the order in Sankaranarayan's case, 1994 W.L.R. 484. In view of the law laid down by the Constitution bench of the Supreme Court in Tripathi's case and the other judgments directly on the point that the control over the District Courts and Courts subordinate thereto is vested in the High Court by virtue of Article 235, and that the High Court consists of the Chief Justice and all other Judges, i.e., the entire body of Judges of the High Court according to Article 216 of the ('(institution, we find it difficult to agree with the submission of the learned Additional Government Pleader in this regard when he wants us to say that the Honourable Chief Justice alone is also competent to appoint a committee or a smaller body of Judges. But we add that smaller body of Judges or committees can be appointed by the Honourable Chief Justice if so authorised by the Full Court in that regard. In the proceedings of the Full Court dated 19.7.1993 we see that Chief Justice is authorised to nominate three Honourable Judges to each of the Administrative Committee Nos.l to 3. Hence we reject the contention of the learned Additional Government Pleader urged in this regard.
53. The learned senior counsel for the respondent while supporting the order of the learned single Judge urged that the impugned charge memo is bad as it is hit by the doctrine of 'Bias' and also on account of non application of mind. He submitted that one of the learned Judges who found the respondent guilty earlier has participated in issuing the impugned charge memo; the element of bias is a matter of apprehension of the individual concerned; there may not be need for any prejudice in the mind of the honourable Judge; the doctrine of bias could be invoked even at the stage of framing charge as there is an apprehension in the mind of the person. Further the impugned charge memo being verbatim reproduction of the entire charge memo issued earlier, which was quashed, and ever including one of the charges which was dropped on the basis of the findings recorded earlier, is bad for non-application of mind. We find neither merit nor substance in these submissions.
54. The Division Bench in Sankaranarayanan 's case 1994 Writ L.R. 484 had quashed the entire disciplinary proceedings as vitiated on the ground that the constitution of the Honourable enquiring Judges itself was invalid. It was not disputed that disciplinary proceedings could be taken de novo in the light of the said order of the Division Bench read with the Review Order dated 11.8.1994 made in Review Application No. 14 of 1994. When the earlier disciplinary proceedings were quashed in entirety, the respondent cannot rely on the finding relating to one charge which was dropped. There was nothing wrong in repeating the charges framed earlier assuming it to be verbtaim reproduction.
55. Administrative Committee No. 1 is comprised of the Honourable Chief Justice and three other Honourable Judges. The impugned order was issued by the Administrative Committee No. l and not by one learned Judge who one of the enquiring Judges on the earlier occasion. Apart from that, the apprehension of bias in the mind of the person concerned should not be a mere apprehension. It must be a reasonable apprehension as judged by ordinary prudent man. Apprehension of bias in the mind of the respondent in this regard, in our opinion, cannot be said to be a reasonable apprehension, particularly so when it is alleged on account of the participation of one of the Honourable Judges in the earlier enquiry proceedings.
56. Constitutional functionaries like the honourable Judges engaged in the administration of justice cannot be said to be biased merely because one of the Judges has participated in the earlier disciplinary proceedings as one of the enquiring Judges. The Honourable Judges are credited for judicious and unbiased approach in relation to the matters that come up for their consideration and decision, be it on judicial side or administrative side, as the judicial minds are trained in that way by reason of the background, knowledge, experience, and the nature of the duties and functions they perform. It is not uncommon that Judges taking one view tentatively are persuaded to take a different view; even on review applications there are occasions where the honourable Judges revise their orders and even correct errors without hesitation in accordance with law and in the interest of justice. This indicates the openness of the mind of the honourable Judges negativing the apprehensions'of bias. If the argument relating to bias is to be accepted, the, none of the Judges of this Court will be able to hold enquiry into the charges framed against the respondent and take further action in the matter, inasmuch as on earlier occasion based on the findings of the enquiring judges, the matter was placed before the Full Court and it is the Full Court which took a final decision to impose a minor penalty of stoppage of two increments without cumulative effect on the respondent. Hence the argument of the learned senior counsel on this aspect cannot be accepted.
57. One of the submissions of the learned Additional Government Pleader is that the order under appeal is, in any event, bad in law inasmuch it has foreclosed the right of the competent authority to initiate disciplinary action against the respondent. A submission was made on behalf of the respondent that the order under appeal in that regard is quite justified having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the suffering undergone by the respondent. As noticed already, in the light of the Division Bench judgment in Sankaranarayan 's case, 1994 W.L.R. 484 read with the order dated 11.8.1994 made in Review Application No. 14 of 1994, it was open to hold a de novo enquiry in the disciplinary proceedings against the respondent. Even in the arguments to the learned senior counsel for the respondent did fairly submit that such a de novo enquiry was permissible, but he only submitted that having regard to the agony and sufferings already undergone by the respondent, for the past few years, the learned single Judge was right and justified in foreclosing the right of the competent authority to initiate disciplinary action again.
58. The reasons for this conclusion of the learned single Judge are to be found in paragraphs 35 to 39 of the order under appeal. The learned Judge has referred to the previous proceedings. He has stated that keeping the judicial officer under charges of corruption and disputed integrity would cause unbearable mental agony; the litigant public would have looked at the respondent with suspicion whether they would get justice from him; such position that too for a long time itself is a rigorous punishment; therefore protracted disciplinary enquiry against a judicial officer should be avoided; the respondent had raised, at the earliest point of time, the preliminary issue relating to the constitutional validity of the appointment of the committee by the Honourable Chief Justice which was over-ruled; this issue was taken up before the Division Bench of this Court in W.P. No. 22696 of 1993; his objections were upheld by thejudgment of the Division Bench dated 8.3.1994 passed in the said writ petition once again the same charges including charge No. 18 which was dropped were reframed by the impugned order dated 30.11.1994; once again on the technical ground that the observations and findings of the Division Bench have not been adhered to by the High Court before framing of the charges, and as such the charges so framed for the second time also are vitiated; hence it would not be just and proper to subject the petitioner to yet another charge in future after rectifying the error; the respondent has been put to enormous mental agony and sufferings on account of the protracted disciplinary proceedings for no fault of his; hence he ought not to be subjected to endless disciplinary proceedings; if the disciplinary proceedings are re-commenced the petitioner would be put to great prejudice as he would be compelled to face another enquiry; the petitioner had been made to close his defence and substance of cross examination of the witnesses during the earlier enquiry; in this fact situation he would not be able to effectively cross examine witnesses and it will give room for the witnesses to improve their versions. The learned Judge has further stated that for the repeated mistakes committed by the High Court in the procedure for initiating the disciplinary proceedings the petitioner should not be made to suffer; even assuming that enquiry proceedings are re-commenced, the ultimate punishment that may be imposed on the petitioner may not be more onerous than the stoppage of two increments without cumulative effect i.e., the punishment imposed on Ihe previous occasion.
59. We are unable to persuade ourselves to accept the reasons given by the learned single Judge to draw the curtain and to put an end to the enquiry. The judgment of the Division Bench in Sankaranarayana 's case, 1994 W.LR. 484 read with the Review order in Review Application No. 14 of 1994 dated 11.8.1994 did not stop the de novo enquiry. On the other hand the de novo enquiry, as held above by us, is permissible. This being the position, we are of the opinion that the learned single Judge could not foreclose the right of the competent authority to hold enquiry. It is for the High Court, exercising power under Article 235 of the Constitution, to take a final decision in the light of the procedure to be followed as adopted by the Full Court in the resolutions dated 19.7.1993 aforementioned. The earlier enquiry proceedings were commenced on 18.2.1991. The respondent filed Writ Petition No. 22696 of 1993 which was disposed of by the Division Bench on 8.3.1994. Having regard to the legal issues that arose for consideration before the Division Bench it cannot be said that there was want on mistake on the part of the appellant; thereafter Review Application No. 14 of 1994 was filed which was disposed on 11.8.1994. The impugned charge memo is dated 30.11.1994. The present writ petition is filed on 20.2.1995, challenging the very charge memo. The said writ petition was disposed of on 20.6.1996. Thereafter the matter is taken up in the present writ appeal. Hence it cannot be said that the High Court repeatedly committed mistakes and that the respondent should not suffer for no fault of his.
60. The learned single Judge has also stated that even assuming that the enquiry proceedings are to be recommenced the ultimate punishment that may be imposed on the respondent may not be more onerous than the stoppage of two increments without cumulative effect, and for imposing this minor penalty the petitioner need not be subjected to yet another enquiry. Since the Division Bench of this Court in Sankaranarayan's case 1994 W.L.R. 484 has held that the entire disciplinary proceedings initiated earlier culminating in the imposition of minor penalty of stoppage of two increments without cumulative effect on the respondent were vitiated, there would be no material on record on which even the minor punishment could be imposed on the respondent. Further whether the punishment is to be imposed or not depends on the enquiry and the final decision of the Full Court. The imposition of penalty may or may not be necessary depending on the findings. For this reason also holding of enquiry has become necessary.
61. We agree with the learned single Judge that having regard to the fact that the disciplinary proceedings were initiated on 18.2.1991 relating to the allegations against the respondent for the period from 1987 to 1989, the disciplinary proceedings should not be kept pending for long, to avoid mental agony and hardship of the respondent. This aspect can be taken care of by fixing a time frame within which the disciplinary proceedings against the respondent could be completed.
62. The learned Additional Government Pleader pressed into service the de facto doctrine alternatively to support the impugned charge memo. In the view we have taken that the administrative committee No. 1 was competent to issue the impugned charge memo, discussion on this point becomes unnecessary.
63. The argument advanced on behalf of the respondent that assuming that the Division Bench judgment in Sankaranarayan 's case, 1994 W.LR. 484 is termed as per-incuriam as per the decision reported in K.Ramaraj v. The State of Tamil Nadu/Registrar, High Court 1996 W.L.R. 273 and P.T. Loganaihan v. The High Court of Judicature at Madras 1996 W.L.R. 286, and is against the spirit of the judgment in Tripathi's case : 1978CriLJ839 , the judgment rendered in W.P. No. 22696 of 1993 (Sankaranarayan's case 1994 W.L.R. 484) being judgment inter-parties, is binding, and consequently the direction contained in the inter-parties judgment ought to have been followed, in our view, does not advance the case of the respondent any further, as we have explained about the said judgment already above and in the view we have taken.
64. In view of the what is stated above, we are unable to subscribe to the views taken and conclusions reached by the learned single Judge as indicated in the order under appeal and to sustain the said order. In the result, for the reasons stated and discussion made above, we allow this Writ Appeal, set aside the order of the learned single Judge, and dismiss the writ petition, but with no order as to costs. However, we direct that the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the respondent shall be completed and final orders are passed as expedi-tiously as possible, at any rate within a period not later than four months.