Judgment:
K.P. Sivasubramaniam, J.
1. In this writ petition, the petitioner prays for a writ of certiorari to call for the records of P.C. Appeal No. 20 of 1994 on the file of the Appellate Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act/Deputy Commissioner of Labour, Salem, and to quash, the same.
2. According to the petitioner, the Tiruchengode Agricultural Producers Co-operative Marketing Society Ltd., the third respondent filed P.G. Case No. 71 of 1993 before the Assistant Commissioner of Labour under the Payment of Gratuity Act. The said proceedings were initiated under Section 7 of the Payment of Gratuity Act claiming Rs. 12,000 from the petitioner-society as due towards the third respondent as though he was employed for about 40 years with the wages of Rs. 1,200 per month. It was also stated that the third respondent had resigned with effect from June 28, 1993.
3. Considering the nature of the disposal of the writ petition, I do not propose to take into account the various claims made by the petitioner or the third respondent or the merits of the claims of the third respondent as done by the Appellate Authority. It is sufficient to point out that an order was passed by the Controlling Authority to the second respondent on April 28, 1994. The Controlling Authority held that though the third respondent appears to have been employed by the petitioner, since he was not continuously employed, he was not entitled to the gratuity. With the result, the claim was rejected by the second respondent. However, the Appellate Authority by virtue of the impugned order dated November 11, 1994, remanded the proceedings to the Controlling Authority to follow the guidelines and to rehear the case afresh. According to the Appellate Authority, though there was no agreement, it was only on implied terms of contract between the parties based on which, charges have to be calculated. According to him, piece rate or daily wages shall be taken into account on the basis of the average of total wages received by the workman over a period of three months immediately preceding the termination of the employment for the purpose of determination of wages as warranted under the proviso to Section 4(2) of the Act.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner is questioning the power of the Appellate Authority to remand the proceedings to the Controlling Authority. According to him, there is no specific power vested under the statute to the Appellate Authority to remand the matter to the Controlling Authority. Learned counsel relies on Section 7(8) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, which is as follows:
'The appropriate Government or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, may, after giving the parties to the appeal a reasonable opportunity of being heard, confirm, modify or reverse the decision of the Controlling Authority.'
5. According to learned counsel, the Appellate Authority has only powers to hear the appeal, confirm, modify or reverse the, decision of the Controlling Authority. Being a statutory authority, the Appellate Authority has no other powers beyond those mentioned under the section itself. In this context, the learned counsel relies on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Rangasami Naidu v. Second Judge, Court of Small Causes, Madras 1949 1 MLJ (SN) 24. The Division Bench on analysis of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, held that the Appellate Authority has got the power to make such further enquiry before deciding the appeal. But the Appellate Authority can only dispose of the appeal on the basis of the materials on record. If there is any further material on record, he can make further enquiry personally or through the controller. But eventually, the Appellate Authority shall decide the appeal and has no power to remand the case for fresh disposal.
6. With reference to the subsequent Act, namely, the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, the same question arose and a learned single judge of this court in C. Kuttappa Nair v. S.S.A. Shahul Hameed, : also took the same view as in the earlier judgment. The learned judge, after considering Section 23(3) of Act 28 of 1960, held that the only power conferred on the Appellate Authority was to make a further enquiry by himself personally or to ask the controller to make such further enquiry. But the decision can be only by the Appellate Authority.
7. I am inclined to agree with the contentions raised by learned counsel. Inasmuch as the statutory provision, namely, Section 7(8) of the Payment of Gratuity Act does not confer any specific power on the Appellate Authority to remand the matter, the order of remand of the Appellate Authority is liable to be set aside. However, if in the opinion of the Appellate Authority any further materials are required for evidence, it is open to the Appellate Authority to himself call upon the parties to adduce further evidence and to dispose of the appeal in accordance with law on the basis of the further materials placed.
8. With the above observations, the impugned order is set aside and remitted to the Appellate Authority for disposal, in accordance with law, and as mentioned above. With the above observations, the writ petition is allowed. No costs. W.M.P. Nos. 6369 and 18717 of 1995 are closed.