Raju, J.
1. The above writ appeal has been filed by the writ petitioner Management challenging the Order, dated 28.9.1993 made by the learned single Judge in Writ Petition No. 611 of 1993, whereunder the Writ Petition No. 611 of 1993 filed by the appellant challenging the order of the first respondent Labour Court, dated 28.12.1992 in I.D. No. 708 of 1992, refusing to record and pass an Award in terms of the Memorandum of Settlement, dated 14.12.1992 under Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and for a consequent direction to the first respondent- Labour Court to pass an Award in term of the Memorandum of Settlement, came to be rejected by the learned Judge.
2. The relevant facts necessary for a proper understanding and adjudication of the issues raised before us need be mentioned at the forefront. During September, 1990, the issue for payment of bonus for the year 1989-90 came up for consideration and the appellant Management appears to have furnished a copy of the profit and loss account of the Engineering Unit as well as the work sheet prepared under the Payment of Bonus Act, indicating the position and that there was no allocable surplus resulting in the absence of any scope to pay more than the minimum bonus of 8.33 per cent of the earned wages. A section of the workmen not satisfied with the above, appears to have resorted to go-slow tactics and started refusing to attend to the work assigned. As an aftermath of all these, there appeared to have been a total strike from 9.30 a.m. on 26.10.1990 with attendant deterioration of mutual and required cordiality between the management and the workmen ultimately resulting in a declaration by the management of a lock out from 6.00 a.m. on 30.10.1990 on an apprehended risk to the security of the Supervisors and Managerial Personnel. On 5.11.1990, in respect of certain alleged acts of misconduct said to have been committed by about twenty-nine workmen including respondents 3 to 14, charge sheets were issues to them. After receiving explanation from the workmen. Enquiry Officers were appointed and enquiry was also conducted during the period between 8.1.1991 and 21.8.1991 by the two retired District Judges, who were appointed as the Enquiry Officers.
3. While so, the Department of Labour and the Government intervened and initiated conciliation proceedings between the parties to bring about a settlement on all pending issues including the question of lock out. Since no settlement could be reached between parties. On 9.4.1991, a Conciliation Failure Report was said to have been submitted to the Government, as a consequence of which three Government Orders came to be passed. G.O.(D) No. 485, (Labour and Employment Department), dated 7th May, 1990, was passed referring about twenty-one claims of disputes, set out in the annexure to the said Government for the adjudication of the Industrial Tribunal Madras G.O.(D) No. 486, (Labour and Employment Department), dated 7th May, 1991 was passed declining to refer the various demands set out in the said Government Order. Government Order (D) No. (Labour and Employment Department), dated 7th May, 1991 came to be passed in exercise of the powers under Section 10-B of the Act, issuing certain directions to both the workmen and the management so as to enable the lifting of the lockout on or before 13.5.1991, to allow all workmen except the 29 workmen charge sheeted for misconduct to resume work, to call off the strike and resume work by the workmen for maintaining the status quo obtaining prior to the date of lockout in regard to the terms and conditions of workmen and to maintain normal production obtaining prior to the date of the strike and to facilitate maintenance of discipline in the factory. As for the twenty-nine workmen are concerned, a direction was issued to the management to complete the enquiry proceedings on or before 10.6.1991 and that as agreed to by the management, the abovesaid twenty-nine workmen should be paid full wages during the period of the disciplinary proceedings. The management by its notice, dated 9.10.1991 lifted the lockout. But still the workmen did not appear to have resumed the work and they continued the strike, demanding that unless all the twenty-nine workmen are allowed to resume work, they would not call off the strike.
4. Thereupon the Labour Court and the Government once again appears to have initiated concilitation proceedings to put an end to the stalmate, and a joint meeting was held on 2.9.1991 by the Joint Commissioner of Labour and as a consequence of the understanding arrived at the enquiry was said to have been expeditiously conducted and as a consequence of which after giving due opportunity to the concerned workmen orders were said to have been passed between 28.3.1991 and 1.10.1991 dismissing the twenty-nine workmen from service. A joint meeting was also said to have been held on 4.10.1991 and an agreement was said to have been reached on the quantum of increase in the wages, recoverable advance and issue of bonus for the years 1989-90 and 1990-91 and that the question of non-employment of twenty-nine workmen would be discussed separately. All the workers appeared to have agreed to resume work in a phased manner not later than 12.10.1991. At that stage, the second respondent Union appeared to have given a letter informing the appellant that the Union had called off the strike from 7.10.1991. On 30.12.1991, a settlement was said to have been arrived at between the management and the union under Section 12(3) of the Act, the terms of which came to be recorded in the said settlement and as per Clause 53 of the same it was agreed that the issue of non-employment of 29 workmen will be discussed separately during the course of the proceedings that would be initiated by the Joint Commissioner of Labour Court (conciliation proceedings) as early as possible. Consequently, the Joint Commissioner of Labour called upon the Management and the Union for conciliation on the issue of dispute relating to the 29 workmen and ultimately a Failure Report, dated 6.3.1992 came to be submitted by the Joint Commissioner to the Government, as a consequence of which the Government in G.O.(D) No. 445, (Labour and Employment Department), dated 13.3.1992 referred the question of justification or otherwise of non-employment of the 29 workmen the relief if any to which they would be entitled to and for computation of such relief also in terms of money.
5. Pursuant to the said order of reference, the first respondent herein entertained the dispute on its file as I.D. No. 708 of 1992 and issued a notice, dated 5.6.1992 to the parties to file their respective claim as well as counter statements, as stipulated in the notice. During May, 1992, it appears that there was an election to the Office bearers and a change in the incumbents in the office bearers of the Union in question. It is seen from the claims and counter claims made in the pleadings before us that the second respondent Union did not take immediate steps to file the claim statement and as a consequence of which, of the twelve workers in question, claim statements have been filed by four of them on 7.9.1992 and the rest of the eight persons on 6.11.1992 directly in the first respondent Labour Court in the Industrial, Dispute in question. At that stage, it appears that copies of a draft settlement, dated 7.11.1992 proposed to be entered into was forwarded with a covering letter dated 2.12.1992 to the respondents 3 to 14 with a request to them to indicate their consent to settle the dispute in terms thereof, so as to enable the Union to take further steps to obtain relief, informing at the same time that if the reply does not reach the union by 9.12.1992, there is no scope for taking any steps thereafter. The relevant recital in the communication, dated 2.12.1992 in vernacular reads:
In the mean time on 30.11.1992 about thirteen workers including the respondents 3 to 14 have addressed a representation, dated 30.11.1992 to the Commissioner of Labour informing him about the circumstances in which the reference in I.D. No. 708 of 1992 came to be made, about the filing of the claim statements by respondents 3 to 14 and the non-filing of the claim statements by the other seventeen workers and the action of the Union represented by its President and Office bearers trying to hold talks of settlement and informing the Commissioner of Labour that while the respondents 3 to 14 have no objection for the President of the Union and other office bearers in holding talks with the management in connection with the seventeen workers, who have given their consent letters to the President for holding such talks on their behalf and arrive at a settlement, in so far as they were concerned, since they filed their own claim statements by engaging a counsel by them, they would like to take a decision from the Court and abide by the verdict of the first respondent Labour Court in the pending I.D. No. 708 of 1992. They have also informed the Commissioner of Labour that neither the President nor the Office bearers of the Union have got any right to hold talks in respect of the claims of the respondents 3 to 14 and explaining of the same time the strained relationship between the office bearers and the union and the twelve workers in question and making it clear that any settlement that may be arrived at between the management and the union will not bind respondents 3 to 14 and that it will be ab initio void and illegal insofar as they are concerned. A request has also been made in the said representation to the Commissioner of Labour for a direction to the President and the Office bearers of the Union not to hold talks on behalf of the twelve workers in question and not to adjudicate any settlement on their behalf.
6. While matters stood thus, the management and the second respondent- Union appeared to have entered into a settlement under Section 18(1) of the Act on 14.12.1992. The actual terms of settlement which would have an ultimate bearing on the decision upon the issues raised before us and as found stated therein are as hereunder:
1. It is agreed that the workmen who were dismissed from service for various acts of misconduct committed during the period from 25.9.1990 to 29.10.1990. will on expression of regret for their conduct in writing be entitled to one of the following two reliefs:
(i) Reinstatement without backwages for the period of non-employment but with continuity of service.
(ii) A lumpsum monetary compensation of Rs. 75,000 in addition to gratuity as per the Payment of Gratuity Act, wages for unavailed leave and bonus if any payable.
(iii) The said lumpsum amount of Rs. 75,000 (Rupees seventy-five thousand only) mentiond in Clause I (ii) above will accrue as follows:
(a) Rs. 40,000 (Rupees forty thousand only) on or before 21.12.1992.
(b) Rs. 35,000 (Rupees thirty five thousand only) after 1.4.1993 and before 30.6.1993.
2. However, in the event of any of the dismissed workmen is to be reinstated, he will give a further letter to the management stating that he would acquit himself in or orderly manner and assuring that he would not give room for any misconduct and disciplinary action in future.
3. Asand when the President of the Union forwards the letter from any of the dismissed workmen agreeing to the terms of the settlement and exercising his option for one of the two reliefs, the management will act on the basis of such letter. At that time, the workmen, who is to be reinstated in service should give a letter of assurance of good conduct and maintenance of discipline referred to earlier. This shall be done within a week of the settlement.
4. With this settlement, the dispute raised by the Union relating to dismissal of workmen effected between 23.8.1991 and 1.10.1991 shall be deemed to have been fully and satisfactorily settled.
5. As the order of reference in G.O. Ms. No. 445, dated 13.5.1992 under Sec. 10(1)(c) of the I.D. Act was made on the dispute raised by the Union under Section 2(k) of the I.D. Act, a copy of this settlement will be filed in I.D. No. 708 of 1992 on the file of the I Additional Labour Court, Madras, and parties will pray for an award in terms of the settlement.
6. None of the concerned dismissed workmen shall have any claim in terms of Clause 1(i) on or after 21.12.1992.
7. Thereupon the appellant management and the second respondent union appeared to have filed a joint memo before the first respondent Labour Court praying for making an Award in terms of the settlement. The first respondent Labour Court by its order dated 28.12.1992 has recorded that the claims of the seventeen workers out of the total number of twenty-nine workers alone were found settled by the settlement entered into between parties, disclosing the names of such seventeen persons and that the dispute with reference to the other workers, who have not entered into any settlement with the management will be proceeded with further. It was to challenge the said order the first respondent Labour Court, as noticed supra Writ Petition No. 611 of 1993 come to be filed before this Court.
8. Respondents 3 to 14 have filed their counter affidavits to which the petitioner appears to have filed his reply, followed up by a rejoinder by the respondents 3 to 14. Before the learned single Judge it appears that the learned Counsel for the petitioner contended as hereunder:
(1) The dispute that has been referred for adjudication is one under Section 2(k) of the Act. In other words, it was' a collective dispute sponsored by the Union and the parties to the dispute are the Management and the second respondent Union. This has to be distinguished from an individual dispute under Section 2-A of the Act.
(2) The settlement having been singed by the various office bearers including the President and the Secretary is binding on the number of workers of the Union and it is not disputed that respondents 3 to 14 are members of the Union.
(3) Having regard to Rule 25(2) of the Tamil Nadu Industrial Disputes Rules, there is no scope for the argument that the settlement was brought about by collusive methods and suffers from lack of bona fides. It is also argued that the Union had the authority to raise the dispute and as a matter of fact has successfully secured a reference to the Labour Court and was therefore, equally entitled to settle the dispute amicably.
(4) Having regard to the observations of the Supreme Court in New Standard Engineering Company Limited v. M.L. Abhyankar : (1978)ILLJ487SC , it is not even necessary to go into the fairness or reasonableness of the settlement.
After considering the submissions of learned Counsel appearing on either side, learned single Judge was of the view that the settlement in question could not bind the rights of respondents 3 to 14 who have filed their claims before the first respondent Labour Court, on their own rights in the absence of any claim petitions by the Union and enough documents were placed before him to suggest that the settlement cannot bind respondents 3 to 14, while recording a categorical finding that the settlement dated 14.12.1992 entered into between the petitioner and the second respondent union under Section 18(1) of the Act will not bind respondents 3 to 14, who have already filed their respective claim petitions before the first respondent Labour Court. There was every justification for the Labour Court to consider the claims of the said workers and adjudicate on the dispute relating to their non-employment. Learned single Judge was therefore of the view that there is no need for remitting the matter back to the first respondent Labour Court with a direction to consider the question of fairness and reasonableness of the settlement. Hence the above appeal.
9. Mr. K. Srinivasamurthy, learned Counsel from Hyderabad appearing on behalf of the appellants, in his lucid and ingenuous submissions made with great perseverance contended that the dispute having been espoused and got referred to as a collective one under Section 2-K and not under Section 2-A of the Act can be settled by the Union with the management and the statutory settlement entered into under Section 18(1) of the Act on 14.12.1992 will govern the entire gamut of the subject matter of dispute referred to the Labour Court and there is no justification in law or otherwise to confine the settlement in question to 17 workers only so as to enable and Labour Court to proceed with the dispute for adjudication in respect of respondents 3 to 14. While contending that the settlement dated 14.12.1992 is very much binding upon the respondents 3 to 14 also, the learned Counsel contended that the fact that respondents 3 to 14 filed claim statements of their own before the Labour Court will not entitle them to have an adjudication in the case ignoring the settlement. While reiterating the stand that the Union had every right to enter into a settlement of the dispute which was the subject matter of adjudication before the Labour Court, it was contended that learned Judge ought to have gone into the fairness and reasonableness of the settlement by looking into the terms of the settlement itself or relegated the same to the Labour Court for such purpose and committed an error of law in not doing so.
10. It was also contended that the learned Judge was not right in holding that the second respondent had no authority to sign the settlement on behalf of respondents 3 to 14. it was contended that if any difficulty is found to arise as to the interpretation of any of the provisions of any settlement, the remedy open would be under Section 36-A of the Act and it is not open to the respondents 3 to 14 to contend that the settlement itself would not be binding upon them. Learned Counsel placed reliance upon some of the decisions of the Apex Court as also some of the High Courts. Reference to the same will be made at the appropriate stage.
11. Mr. R. Krishnamoorthy, learned Advocate General appearing for respondents 3 to 14 while adopting the reasoning of learned single Judge, as part of his submissions, contended that on the facts and circumstances of the case, no exception could be taken to the conclusions of the learned single Judge that the second respondent Union had no right to deal with or settle the rights of the workmen respondents 3 to 14. It was also argued on behalf of the workman before us that from its inception the dispute relating to the non-employment of 29 workers and even during the pendency of the dispute before the Labour Court, the claim pertaining to respondents 3 to 14 were treated as distinct and separate and the very conduct and approach of the Union and the contents of the communication dated 2.12.1992 sent by the second respondent to the workers and the terms of the settlement would go to show that the dispute relating to respondents 3 to 14 could not also have been the subject-matter of the settlement, dated 14.12.1992. In support of the respective submissions of learned Counsel appearing on either side, the relevant portions of the judgment under appeal as also the relevant documents and pleadings have been read over to us at considerable length. It was also argued on behalf of the workmen before us that inasmuch as the settlement, dated 14.12.1992 did not cover the dispute pertaining to the respondents 3 to 14 and was rightly held to be not a bona fide one by the learned single Judge. There was no need for justification for the learned Judge to go into the question of reasonableness or fairness of the settlement or for that matter remit the proceedings to the Labour Court. While controverting the objection taken, that the respondents 3 to 14 will have no independent status or locus standi to proceed with I.D. No. 708 of 1992 for adjudication of their rights it was contended for the respondents workers that the second respondent-Union having failed to present the claim statement in time has called upon by the Labour Court and allowed the matter to be fought by the workers themselves, necessitating the filing of the individual claim applications on their behalf. The plea of questioning the locus standi of respondents 3 to 14 has no merit.
12. Before considering the actual submissions made before us on either side, a reference will be made to the various case laws before us.
13. In State of Bihar v. D.N. Ganguly : (1958)IILLJ634SC , it was observed that the clear policy of the Act is to secure and preserve good relations between the employers and the workmen and to maintain industrial peace and harmony and it is only where the cancilication machinery fails to bring about settlement between the parties that the Act contemplates compulsory adjudication of the industrial disputes by Labour Courts and Tribunals as the last alternative.
14. In Ram Prasad Vishwakarma v. Industrial Tribunal (1960) F.J.R. 380, the Apex Court held that a dispute between an individual workman and an employer cannot be an industrial dispute as defined in Section 2(k) of the Act, unless it is taken up and sponsored by a trade union of the workmen or by a considerable number of workmen, and it follows that the individual workman is at no stage a party to the industrial dispute independently of the trade union or those who have espoused the dispute, and can not therefore, claim to have a say in the conduct of the proceedings before an Industrial Tribunal. It was also observed therein that where, a workman was represented in such proceedings by an officer of the trade union sponsoring his cause, it would not be open to him, unless there was exceptional circumstances, to contend later on that he had no faith in the officer of the trade union. It is seen from the judgment that the Court observed as hereunder:..The necessary corollary to this is that the individual workman is at no stage a party to the industrial dispute independently of the Union. The Union or those workmen who have by their sponsoring turned the individuals dispute into an industrial dispute, can therefore claim to have a say in the conduct of the proceedings before the tribunal.
It is not unreasonable to think that Section 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act recognises this position, by providing that the workman who is a party to a dispute shall be entitled to be represented by an officer of a registered trade union of which he is a member. While it will be unwise and indeed impossible to try to lay down a general rule in the matter, the ordinary rule should in our opinion, be that such representation by an officer of the trade union should continue throughout the proceedings in the absence of exceptional circumstances which may justify the Tribunal to permit other representation of the workman concerned. We are not satisfied that in the present case, there were any such exceptional circumstances.
[Italics supplied]
15. In the decision in Sirsilk Limited v. Government of Andhra Pradesh : (1963)IILLJ647SC , the Apex Court held that in a case where a settlement between the parties was arrived at with respect to a dispute, after the tribunal had sent its award adjudicating the dispute to the Government for publication before the actual publication of the award the best solution would be to withhold the publication of the award to make the settlement entered into between the parties to hold the field. It was also held therein that since the agreement was signed in the manner prescribed and a copy of the same was sent to the Government and the Conciliation Officer in the manner provided in the Rules therefor, the settlement becomes binding at once on the parties.
16. In Rastorm Manganese and Mineral v. I. T. : (1968)IILLJ817Pat , a Division Bench of Patna High Court held that when the matter was settled between the union and the management and a compromise was filed before the Tribunal, it could not have refused to record the compromise simply because the two concerned workmen objected to its being recorded. It is seen from the said decision that the individual workman in that case did not contest before the Tribunal that the settlement was vitiated on account of fraud, misrepresentation and undue influence etc., nor was there any proof of the facts to substantiate such a claim.
17. In the decisions in Herbertsons Limited v. Workmen A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 322, the Apex Court was concerned with a situation wherein a settlement was arrived at by recognised union of majority of workers pending appeal to Supreme Court. It was held that when a recognised union negotiates with an employer the workers as individuals do not come into the picture and that it is not necessary that each individual worker should know the implications of the settlement since a recognised union which is expected to protect the legitimate interests of labour, enters into a settlement in the best interests of labour. While declaring the position, thus, the learned Judges were also pleased to make it clear that the said principle would be the normal rule and there may be some exceptional cases, where there may be allegations of mala fides, fraud or even corruption or other inducements and in the absence of such allegations a settlement arrived at in the course of collective bargaining is entitled to due weight and consideration. As a matter of fact on the facts and circumstances of the case, the Apex Court thought it fit to remit the matter to the tribunal for consideration of the justness and fairness of the settlement.
18. In New Standard Engineering Company Limited v. M.L. Abhyankar : (1978)ILLJ487SC , the Apex Court was concerned with the fairness and justness of a settlement stated to have been arrived at when the matter was pending before the High Court such proceedings being directed against the award of the Tribunal. It is seen that the courts sustained the settlement in view of the, fact that the same was arrived at between the management and the union, which represented a vast majority of workmen for the company, particularly in view of the finding of the tribunal that the settlement was just and fair and that too having regard to the significant fact that the bona fides of the Union have not been challenged in that case.
19. In Amadalyalasa Co-operative Society v. Industrial Tribunal (1977)2 A.P.L.J. 404, a Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court held that in an industrial dispute sponsored by the Union, when a settlement has been arrived at between the management and the Union, some of the workman who are also members of the Union cannot be allowed to represent their individual cases before the tribunal. Adverting to some of the earlier case law on the subject it was held therein that when once the tribunal comes to the conclusion that the settlement arrived at is fair and just and is for the benefit of the majority of the workmen, the tribunal has got to accept the same and pass an award in terms thereof, and in such case, the individual workman cannot be allowed to proceed with the dispute pending before the tribunal for adjudication and passing of an award on merits of the claims in disregard of the settlement. It must also be noticed that in paragraph 11 of the said Judgment, the Court therein specifically noticed about the fact that the tribunal held that the settlement was bona fide.
20. In Life Insurance Corporation v. D. J. Bahadur : (1981)ILLJ1SC , the Apex Court was concerned with the inter se scope and applicability of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 in the matter of the Governing conditions and terms of services of the employees of the Life Insurance Corporation of India. While adverting to the object and purpose of the Industrial Disputes Act, it was observed that the law had as its predominant object the amicable settlement of the industrial dispute and that under the scheme of the Act a settlement arrived at was considered to be effective as an award so that collision between the management and Labour, which may otherwise spell chaos and impair national effort at increasing the target of production can be averted.
21. In Tata Engineering and Locamative Company Limited v. Workmen : (1981)IILLJ429SC the Apex Court laid down the criteria for testing the fairness and justness of a settlement and as to the onus of proof where coercion and fraud is alleged. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court noticed the specific factual position on record in that case that of the 564 workers, who signed the declaration no one was stated to be a fictitious one or that their signatures were forged but what really happened was that subsequently 400 out of 564 changed sides and challenged the declarations to be not correct. It was held in such circumstances that though the onus to prove the claim was heavily upon those who asserted so, no attempt was made to discharge the burden. As for the binding nature of the settlement the Court held that the conclusion of the tribunal that the settlement was not just and fair was unsustainable since the tribunal itself was found to have held that there was nothing wrong with the settlement is most of its aspects and all that was necessary was to marginally increase the additional daily wages. In that context, it was held, 'If the settlement had been arrived at by a vast majority of the concerned workers with their eyes open and was also accepted by them in its totality, it must be presumed to be just and fair and not liable to be' ignored while deciding the reference merely because a small number of workers (in that case in number 1971, 11, 18 per cent) were not parties to it or refused to accept or because the Tribunal was of the opinion that the workers deserved marginally higher emoluments than they themselves thought they did. A settlement cannot be weighed in any golden scales and the question whether it is just and fair has to be answered on the basis of the principles different from those which come into play when an industrial disputes is under adjudication.
22. In E.I.D. Parry (India) Limited T. Palli v. Labour Court and Ors. : (1992)IILLJ580AP , a learned single Judge of Andhra Pradesh has held as hereunder:
In my view, the broad preposition that a settlement supersedes the provisions of the Act cannot be supported either on principle or an authority. Much turns upon the type of the settlement. There may be cases wherein settlement puts an end to the disputes between the parties, as it ought to making it unnecessary to take any further steps as in Sirsilk Limited v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, wherein the settlement rendered the award of the tribunal infructuous and publication of the same unnecessary. But there may also be cases where the settlement otherwise than during the canciliation would settle the dispute partially or where the disputes may spring from the settlement itself, therefore, it cannot be said that once there is a settlement the disputes, if any come to an end automatically or the parties are absolved of the obligation to comply with the provisions of the Act. The question whether settlement between the parties dispenses with the requirements of the provisions of the Act, has to be answered depending upon the nature of the dispute, the settlement arrived at between the parties and the terms thereof, its binding effect having regard to Section 18 of the Act and other relevant provisions of the Act, and this has to be done on the facts of each case.
23. We have carefully considered the submissions of learned Counsel appearing on either side in the light of the principles laid down in the various decisions placed before us as also the facts and circumstances of the case as disclosed from the materials placed before us. The broad principles emanating from the various decisions referred to supra appear to be that a settlement arrived at between parties during the pendency of the adjudication proceedings or the pendency of an appeal or other proceedings against an award, covering the same dispute was binding on the parties in preference to even the award but before coming to such a conclusion or adopting the said private settlement as the basis of the award, the Adjudicating Authority under the statute had a duty and obligation to bring its judicial mind to bear upon the settlement for determining whether it is just, fair and equitable between the parties and then make its own award and once the stamp of approval is so accorded by the Adjudicating Authority the award in substance partakes the character of an award. Yet another important principle emanating from the various decisions on the subject including some of those specifically referred to above before us appears to be that when a recognised union negotiates with an employer the individual workers as individuals do not come into the picture and there is no necessity that such individual worker should be a party to it or know the implications of the same to make it binding on all workers, but the same cannot be held to be the universal or invariable rule though may be the normal rule and in exceptional cases of 'mala fides, fraud or even corruption or other wise inducement', the binding nature of it can be questioned or allow the workers concerned to proceed with the adjudication of rights of such workers. Similarly, though in a dispute espoused by the Union of the claims of individual workmen, the representation by the Union should continue throughout there may be exceptional cases which may justify the Adjudicating Authority to permit other representation of the workmen concerned. That apart there may also be cases wherein the very settlement would only partially settle the claims and that the issue would invariably depend upon the fact situation as also the peculiar circumstances prevailing or proved in a particular case on hand for consideration. As a matter of fact, a careful scanning through of the various decisions would go to show that the observations or principles laid down therein very much turned upon the peculiar facts and circumstances of the relevant cases under the consideration of the Court concerned which could also be found to have been specially noticed with sufficient emphasis as necessitating the particular view taken or principles laid down in those cases. Consequently, a mere reference to some or the other of the observations or the principles laid down therein, de hors the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case specifically noticed by the learned single Judge and reiterated before us, may not be apposite or appropriate and there shall be a specific consideration of the case before as with particular reference to and special mention of the factual position presented before us.
24. Though do us no doubt the Industrial Disputes Act is benign measure which seeks to prompt industrial tensions, provide the mechanics of dispute resolutions so that the energies of partners in production may not be discipated in avoidable battles and ensure industrial peace, harmony and good will on the basis of collective bargaining, conciliation, arbitration and failing that compulsory adjudication, leaving matters to the entire whims and fancy of a few and allowing thereby matters to take their own turn of events may at times be counter productive. Consequently interference by adjudicating authorities and courts though ought not to be as a matter of course or normal routine, the justification for their intervention and due role cannot be completely neglected or denied even in fit, proper or deserving cases. It is only in view of the above need and necessity that courts have carved out certain exceptions as already noticed by us supra.
25. The question that requires next to be considered is as to whether the Labour Court as well as the learned single Judge could be considered to have acted within their permissible peripherial limits in holding that the settlement dated 14.12.1992 did not bind or govern the claims of respondents 3 to 14, necessitating the Labour Court to proceed with the Industrial Dispute before it and to pursue the proceedings to adjudicate upon such claims.
26. Though initially the disputes between the management and workmen pertained to common issues and causes affecting the entire workmen, the one which eluded conciliation and settlement till the end was the dispute relating to the justification or otherwise of the non-employment of the 29 workers in question. The conciliation failure report, dated 9.4.1991, the Order of reference in G.O.D. No. 486, (Labour and Employment), dated 7.5.1991 particularly Clause (b) under the caption 'Demand which arose subsequently G.O.D. No. 487 (Labour and Employment), dated 7.5.1991, particularly direction No. 2, which stipulated that the workmen except the 29 workmen mentioned in the annexure will call off the strike and resume work forthwith, the minutes of discussion held on 2.9.1991 before the commissioner of Labour and Joint Commissioner (Conciliation) indicating the claim of the Union for placing the subject relating to 29 workers on the agenda for discussion and the fact that it was considered to be inappropriate to do so but that it should be left to the aggrieved workers to raise dispute before the appropriate forum, he minutes of undertaking recorded on 4.10.1991 (Clause 9) and the terms of the Memorandum of Settlement dated 30.12.1991 reached under Section 12(3) of the Act, particularly Clause 23 thereof would go to show that the claim of the 29 workers were at all times treated as separate and agreed to be left out for vindication of their rights by the workers concerned, except that the union was also espousing their cause. Similarly the conciliation failures report, dated 6.3.1992 and G.O.D. No. 445, (Labour and Employment), dated 13.5.1992 would show that the question of non employment of the 29 workers have been separately dealt with and referred to for adjudication. It is also on record that when the First Additional Labour Court, Madras, issued a notice, dated 5.6.1992 in I.D. No. 708 of 1992 calling upon the workmen and the management to file their claim and counter statements within the time schedule stipulated therein, the Union was indifferent and did not take any steps whatsoever to do so necessitating the workmen themselves to file their claim statement by engaging their own counsel and the Labour Court also permitted and allowed the same by accepting the claim statement from workers directly and the matter was adjourned to 14.12.1992 before the Labour Court.
27. That apart copies of the minutes of the meeting of the Executive Committee of the Union and the letter of the second respondent, dated 2.12.1992 and the reply dated 8.12.1992 therefor have been made available to substantiate the fact that the settlement in question could not have been with reference to the claims of respondents 3 to 14 also and that their claim remained unsettled. The copy of the minutes dated 9.11.1992 and 14.11.1992 only goes to show that the claims of the respondents were never in the contemplation or were not the subject-matter of discussion for settlement. The English translated copy of the minutes dated 14.11.1992 of the meeting of the Executive Committee Union shows that the discussion with the management though purported to be in respect of 30 workers the Management refused to discuss the case of 12 workmen (respondents 3 to 14) on the ground that they had gone to Court and therefore, in the interest of other 15 workmen who were said to have given letters of consent it was decided to discuss about the issue. The views of the Executive Committee as resolved on 14.11.1992 appear as per the minutes recorded, to be as hereunder.
(1) If the 15 workers agreed then, the Executive committee will also accept it.
(2) If any of the workmen who had gone to Court writes to the Union to discuss their issue, the Union should extend their co-operation.
(3) Union should give protection to the workmen who had gone to court.
(4) When on the basis of discussion on the issue of 15 workmen any understanding is arrived at the President and the Office bearers should sign the settlement.
The copies of the minutes dated 9.11.1992 and 14.11.1992 would go to show that there was no settlement talk or, even scope for such talk governing the claims of Respondents 3 to 14 and that the management was not also willing to deal with it and the Executive Committee did not give any authorisation to the office bearers to do so. They also militate against the claim of even any settlement on 7.11.1992 since there is no mention about any such thing in the minutes of the meetings of the Executive Committee of the Union on 9.11.1992 and 14.12.1992.
28. The matter does not stop with this. After a tentative settlement was said to have been arrived at on 7.11.1992 by a communication dated 2.12.1992, the second respondent addressed a letter to respondents 3 to 14 enclosing the draft of the proposed settlement. The said letter dated 2.1.2.1992 while enclosing the draft of the settlement calls upon the workmen concerned to convey their consent and concurrence, if they so desire to settle their claim as per the terms disclosed therein, to the Union to enable them to take steps to obtain relief and that if the reply is not received on or before 9.12.1992, it makes it clear that no further action can be taken in this regard on their behalf. Though Clause 4 of the settlement stipulates that with this settlement, the dispute raised by the Union relating to dismissal of workmen effected between 23.8.1991 and 1.10.1991 shall be deemed to have been fully and satisfactorily settled Clause 3 would provide that as and when the President of the Union forwards the letter from any of the dismissed workmen agreeing to the terms of the settlement and exercising his option for anyone of the two reliefs, the management will act on the basis of such letter. Thus, it could be seen that the letters were sought both for agreeing to the terms of the settlement and exercising option for one of the two reliefs and not merely by way of exercising the option alone for one of the two reliefs. If the Union was legitimately dealing with and settling the claims of the 12 workers in question also where was the need to enter into a draft of the settlement and seek for the consent or concurrence of the workers before finalising the same.
29. The above facts and peculiar and indisputable circumstances of the case would go to show that the settlement dated 14.12.1992 could not have been with reference to an encompassing or settling the claim of respondents 3 to 14 also. If it was merely for exercising the option for one of the two reliefs, that the consent for the workmen was required it is beyond reason or understanding as to why there was also called tentative settlement recorded in the form of a draft of a settlement on 7.11.1992 and the final settlement entered into on 14.12.1992 merely repeating the same terms with the same clause giving option, without dealing separately the claims of those who have exercised option and those who have not with specific reference to such claims.
30. Viewed in the above surrounding circumstances as also the relevant and peculiar facts of the case, we are of the view that the learned single Judge could not be said to have committed any patent error of law in arriving at the conclusion that the settlement, dated 14.12.1992 did not really or purport to settle or govern the claims of respondents 3 to 14. The appellants having invited a finding by elaborate arguments on a question of fact before the learned single Judge cannot be allowed to make a somersault when they receive an adverse Finding of fact that the learned single Judge ought not to have embarked upon such an investigation and inquiry. For the very same reasons, we are of the view that the Labour Court also cannot be considered to have committed any error in proposing to proceed further with the adjudication of the claims of respondents 3 to 14, who have already filed claim statements before it. We are of the view, without meaning or intending to make any comment adversely against the Union for what has happened, that the case on hand before us squarely falls within the category of exceptional cases wherein the adjudicating authorities as also the Courts could legitimately come to the conclusion that the settlement, dated 14.12.1992 did not really purport to and as a matter of fact cannot be said to have effected a settlement of the claims of respondents 3 to 14 so as to foreclose the right of adjudicating upon such claims in the dispute pending adjudication in I.D. No. 708 of 1992.
31. As for the plea that learned Judge ought to have remitted the matter to the Labour Court for its consideration as to the fairness and reasonableness of the settlement, dated 14.12.1992, we are of the view that on the conclusions arrived at and findings recorded by the learned Judge, which we have sustained, there is absolutely no need or necessity to undertake such an exercise. It is only in cases wherein the settlement was considered to govern and bind the workers and disputes subsisting between parties but the challenge is on the unreasonableness or arbitrariness of the terms of settlement at the instance of a section or a group of workers there will be such necessity and not in a case like the one where the settlement is claimed to be and has been also held ultimately not to concern or deal with or govern the claims of respondents 3 to i 4 for the reason that it was never so dealt with or discussed or deliberated upon or ultimately settled. Consequently we do not agree with this claim also of the learned Counsel for the appellants.
32. We are also unable to accept the plea on behalf of the appellants that the respondents 3 to 14 will have no locus standi to pursue I.D. No. 708 of 1992 even insofar as it relates to their claim for employment since the dispute was entertained not under Section 2-A of the Act but as one falling within Section 2(K) of the Act. Whatever might have been the position earlier, after the introduction of Section 2-A into the Act with effect from 1.12.1965, even if it is not a collective dispute the matter can be treated an individual dispute particularly when it is beyond controvercing that the dispute in I.D. No. 708 of 1992 only related to the dismissal of the 29 workmen. Though initially it got projected through the Union, the Labour Court is not precluded from sustaining it is relating to individual workmen also in the teeth of the failure on the part of the Union to present the claim petition in time resulting in the filing of the claim petition by the workers themselves by engaging their own counsel. The decision of a Division Bench of this Court reported in M/s. Ramakrishna Mills (Coimbatore) Limited v. The Government of Tamil Nadu and Ors. : (1984)IILLJ259Mad would squarely support our conclusion in this regard. After the introduction of Section 2-A of the Act the plea of that nature cannot in our view be held to certain to any want of jurisdiction in the Adjudicating Authority to allow the individual workers to pursue their claims in the absence of positive role played by the Union to project their claims since in matters relating to dismissal, retrenchment or termination of the individual worker, it is ultimately he who will be really affected and he cannot be ignored altogether from consideration by courts. Entertaining the plea of the nature in a case like this would really result in grave injustice and defeat the very object of the law enacted to protect the rights of workers.
33. For all the reasons stated above, we do not find any justification to interfere with the order of learned single Judge challenged in this appeal and consequently, the writ appeal fails and the same shall stand dismissed. But in the circumstances of the case there will be no orders as to costs. C.M.P. No. 14550 of 1993 also is dismissed.