ORDER
N.V. Balasubramanian, J.
1. The writ petition has been filed challenging the notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, in G.O.R. No. 125, Housing dated 8.5.1975 published on 11.6.1975 and declaration under Section 6 of the Act in G.O. Ms. No. 980 Housing dated 7.6.1978 published on 9.6.1978 by quashing the said notification under Section 4(1) and the declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act in respect of the land of the petitioner bearing Survey No. 99/1,99/2 and 9/2 of an total extent of 2.23 acres in Valasaravakkam village, Saidapet taluk.
2. The subject matter of the land covered in the writ petition belongs to the writ petitioners. Government of Tamil Nadu by a notification dated 8.5.1975 under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') proposed to acquire lands of a large extent of 303.05 acres in Valasaravakkam village including the petitioners' land referred to above, for Karunanidhi Nagar Part-II Scheme at the instance of the Chairman, Tamil Nadu Housing Board Schemes. The notification was published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazetec on 11.6.1975 and the declaration under Section 6 was published and the draft declaration and direction under Sections 6 and 7 were approved in G.O. Ms. 980, Housing and Urban Development Department, dated 7.6.1978 and published in Tamil Nadu Government Gazette dated 9.6.1978. The petitioners' father raised an objection against the proposed acquisition. According to the petitioners, enquiry as contemplated under Section 5A of the Act read with Rule 3(b) of the Tamil Nadu Land Acquisition Rules was not held. According to the petitioners, the lands were cultivable lands and in accordance with the directions issued by the Government, cultivable lands should not be acquired and hence, the land acquisition proceedings arc illegal.
3. The main grounds of challenge against the Land acquisition proceedings are: (1) The remarks of the requisitioning body on the objection were not communicated to the petitioners or to their father. (2) The lands are agricultural lands and hence, according to the Government Notification dated 21.4.1979, the lands should be excluded from the acquisition. (3) The award was not passed till 22.9.1976 with reference to survey Nos. 99/1,99/2 and with reference to survey No. 9/2, no award has been passed till the date of filling of the writ petition. According to the petitioners, the inordinate delay in passing the award results in lapse of the entire land acquisition proceedings,
4. The petitioners have also filed a petition to raise additional grounds stating that the petitioners have filed early a petition W.P. No. 6488 of 1986 challenging the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act in respect of other items of lands owned by the petitioners in Valasaravakkam village, proposed to be acquired for the said scheme. According to the petitioners, by inadvertence, the lands in Survey Nos. 99/1, 99/2 and 9/2 were omitted to be included. The case of the petitioners in under Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act, the award should have been passed within two years from the commencement of the Land Acquisition Amendment Act, i.e. on or before 24.9.1986. The petitioners contend that since the award was-passed within two years from the date of commencement of the Land Acquisition Amendment Act, 1984, the entire land acquisition proceedings in respect of Survey No. 9/2 in Valasaravakkam village has lapsed. In so far as other two survey Numbers 99/1 and 99/2 are concerned, according to the petitioners though the award is stated to have been passed on 23.9.1986, the same was communicated to the petitioners only on 5.10.1986. Therefore, according to the petitioners the award was not passed before 24.9.1986 even with reference to the lands in survey Nos. 99/1 and 99/2. Hence, according to the petitioners, the date of award means the date of communication of the award and in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Raja Harishchandra v. Deputy Land Acquisition Officer, : [1962]1SCR676 , the date of the award should be taken as 5.10.1986 which fell beyond the period of two years and hence, the entire land acquisition proceedings have lapsed. In view of the legal contentions raised, I allow the miscellaneous petition and permit the petitioners to raise the additional grounds.
5. The respondents have filed a counter-affidavit denying various averments made in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition. According to the respondents, the notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act was published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette on 11.6.1975. The enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act was conducted after observing the usual formalities. Individual notices were also served on the land owners as prescribed under the Rules framed under Section 55(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 on 28.8.1975. The land owners and other interested persons appeared in person and filed written objections and also gave statements in writing recorded by the Land Acquisition Officer. The objections raised by the land- owners were tabulated and communicated to the requisitioning body viz., the Chairman, Tamil Nadu Housing Board, Madras for offering his remarks. The chairman, Tamil Nadu Housing Board has considered the objections and sent a communication by a letter dated 29.4.1978 requesting to over-rule the objections made by the land owners. The decision of the Chairman had also been communicated to the land-owners on 18.5.1978 which was acknowledged by them. In so far as the lands in Survey Nos. 9/2,99/1 and 99/2 are concerned, they fell within the Blocks No. III of the acquisition proceedings. Government of Tamil Nadu has approved the draft declaration under Section 6 and direction under Section 7 of the Act and the declaration under Section 6 was published in Tamil Nadu Government Gazette dated 9.6.1978. The award enquiry was also conducted on 28.6.1986 to 30.6.1986 after serving individual notices and the award was passed for all the lands on 23.9.1986 as per the award No. 19/86 and the possession was also handed over to the Tamil Nadu Housing Board on 23.9.1986. In the counter-affidavit, it has been specifically denied that the award was not passed for survey No. 9/2 and it has been stated that the award was passed for all of the lands on 23.9.1986, The delay in communicating the proceedings was due to administrative reasons while processing the land acquisition proceedings. According to the respondents, all the formalities like the publication in the village of the substance of Section 4(1) Notification and compliance with the Rule 3(b) of the Rules have been fully complied with on the facts of the case. The respondents' case is that the Government has notified to acquire 303.9 acres and the declaration made under Section 6 of the Act for 254.45 acres only. In so far as the area excluded is concerned, it is occupied by built-up areas and brick kiln and they were found unsuitable to the scheme. The respondents, therefore, submitted that the award passed on 23.9.1986 is within the period contemplated under Section 11A of the Act and hence, it is prayed that the writ petition may be dismissed.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the notification is vague in particulars. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, the statement of public purpose viz., creation of new K.K. Nagar Part-II Schemes in vague and on that account the entire notification is liable to be struck down. Learned counsel for the petitioners raised an objection that the remarks of the requisitioning body were not communicated to the petitioners' father or to the petitioners. Learned counsel stressed a point that the lands proposed for acquisition are agricultural lands and hence, as per the Tamil Nadu Government Notification in G.O.Ms.No.2135, Revenue Department dated 21.4.1979, petitioners' lands should be excluded. Learned counsel for the petitioners further contended that the award was passed for survey Nos. 99/1 and 99/2 only on 5.10.1986 and the award was passed beyond two years which is against the provisions contemplated under Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act and no award was passed as regards Survey No. 9/2, and since the award was not passed within two years from the date of commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, (he entire acquisition proceedings would lapse).
7. Learned Government Advocate produced before me the file and contended that the award was passed on 23.9.1986 in all cases. Learned Government Advocate pointed out that the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 came into effect on 24.9.1984 and the award passed on 23.9.1986 was well within the time. According to the learned Government Advocate the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Raja Harichandra v. Deputy Land Acquisition Officer, : [1962]1SCR676 has no application to the facts of the case and that case dealt with a case of computation of time limit for the purpose of limitation to file an appeal. Learned Government Advocate also refers to a decision of Delhi High Court in the case of Roshanara Begum v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1996 Delhi 206. He submitted that the individual notices have been served on all the persons interested in the lands and all the formalities relating to the land acquisition have been complied with. He also produced the relevant file showing the acknowledgment of receipt of the notice by the petitioners and their father. He also submitted that the award was passed for all the land including survey No. 9/2 and it is incorrect to state that the lands covered in Survey 9/2 were excluded. According to the Government Advocate, the file would clearly show that survey 92 has been reclassified as survey Nos. 9/2A,9/2B,9/2C,9/2D,9/2E and 9/2F and the entire extent covered under survey 9/2 has been acquired and the award has been passed. He, therefore, submitted that the land acquisition proceedings were conducted in accordance with rules and there is no impediment in the land acquisition proceedings.
8. I have carefully considered the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners. The first question that has to be considered is whether the public purpose stated in the notification is vague or not. Tile notification issued under Section 4 of the Act has specified the public purpose, to wit, for the creation of new housing scheme known as 'K.K. Nagar Part- II Scheme'. In the declaration made under Section 6 of the Act, the public purpose is stated to be, 'for the creation of new neighbourhood scheme known as, 'K.K.Nagar Part-II Scheme'. It is relevant to note that an extent of 303,09 acres in Valasaravakkam village was sought to be acquired by the notification. The notification, for the creation of new neighbourhood known as 'K.K. Nagar Part-II Schemes' was the subject matter of the challenge before the Supreme Court in the case of State of Tamil Nadu v. L. Krishnan, : (1996)1SCC250 and the Supreme Court held that it would not be proper to insist upon the Government particularly, to use each and every bit of land to be notified, The Supreme Court also noticed that the notifications concerned peertain in to about 400 acres. After considering the notifications, the Supreme Court held that where large extent of land was sought to be acquired, it would not be possible to specify as to how each and every bit of the land to be used and to what purpose. The Supreme Court held that the notification cannot be struck down on the ground that the public purpose concerned is vague. Respectfully following the decision of the Supreme Court in the abovesaid decision, I reject the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the public purpose stated in the notification is vague. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court, it is unnecessary to consider other decisions cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned Government Advocate. 9.. The second contention that was urged was that the petitioners were not supplied with the remarks of the requisitioning body and hence, for the non-compliance of Rule-3(b) of the Tamil Nadu Land Acquisition Rules, the entire proceedings should be held to be illegal. A similar contention was also raised before the Supreme Court in the case of State of Tamil Nadu v. L. Krishnan's Case, : (1996)1SCC250 and the Supreme Court held that if the petitioner has raised an objection at the proper time and it was found to be true and acceptable, opportunity should have been given to the Government to comply with the said requirements. The Supreme Court also held that the petitioner cannot raise a contention in the writ petition filed in a case where award was about to be passed. On the facts of the case, it is clear, the objection raised by the owners of the land was communicated to the requisitioning body viz., the Chairman, Tamil Nadu Housing Board for offering remarks. The Chairman, Tamil Nadu Housing Board by a letter dated 29.4.1978 has requested to over- rule the objection raised by the land-owners. The remarks of the Chairman, Tamil Nadu Housing Board were communicated to the landowners on 18.5.1978. The award was passed on 23.9.1986 and the possession was also handed over to the Tamil Nadu Housing Board on 23.9.1986. The writ petition has been filed on 16.2.1987. The decision of the Supreme Court, cited supra, squarely applies to this case, because, it is not open to the petitioners to raise objection as regards non-compliance of provisions of Rule 3(b) of the Rules after having kept quiet for a number of years. The petitioners cannot raise objection after the award was passed in this case. Hence, the second contention raised by the petitioner does not deserve any acceptance and it is also rejected.
10. The petitioners next contended that certain lands were excluded from acquisition proceedings on the ground that the lands were used for cultivation purposes, but the petitioners' lands which were utilised for cultivation purposes were not excluded from acquisition proceedings. In the counter-affidavit, it has been stated that out of 303.09 acres, notified under Section 4(I) of the Act, the declaration was confined to 254.45 acres only. It has been pointed out that the area excluded were occupied by laid out built up areas, brick kiln, etc. and they were found unsuitable for the scheme. Further, it is too late to raise such an objection, because the possession has already been taken over and it has also been handed over to the requisitioning body on 23.1.1987. Hence, it cannot be stated that the agricultural land of the petitioners should be excluded from the acquisition proceedings.
11. Then, the petitioners contended that there were a delay in passing the award. Learned counsel for the petitioners referring to Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act contended that the declaration under Section 6 of the Act was published on 7.6.1978, i.e., before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act. 1984. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, since the declaration under Section 6 if the Act was published before commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, the award should have been within a period of two years from the date of commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the amendment Act came into force on 24.9.1984 and since the award was served on the petitioners on 5.10.1986, the award itself was passed after the period of two years from the date of commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 and hence, the entire land acquisition proceedings shall stand lapsed, because the award was not made within two years from the date of commencement of the amendment Act. On the other hand, learned Government Advocate brought to my notice that the award was passed on 23.9.1986 and it was served on the petitioners on 5.10,1986. According to the respondents, the award has been passed within two years from the date of commencement of the amendment Act and hence, the statutory condition regarding the passing of the award has been fully complied with on the facts of the case. Learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Raja Harishchandra v. Deputy Land Acquisition Officer, : [1962]1SCR676 and contended that the date of award must be taken to be the date of communication of the award to be the date of communication of the award to the parties. The declaration under Section 6 of the Act was Made on 17.6.1978. The Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 came into effect on 24.9.1984. Under the provisions of Section 11A of the Act, the award should be made within the period of two years from 24.9.1984. A perusal of the file makes it clear that the award was passed on 23.9.1986.1 do not accept the contention of the petitioners that the date of service of the award should be taken as the date of award. The provisions of Section 11A of the Act postulates that the award should be made within a period of two years from the date of commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984. The Collector passed the award on 23.9.1986, and that would satisfy the requirements of the proviso made to Section 11A of the Act, The fact that the award was communicated and served on the petitioner later would not render that the award was passed on the date of service. Under Section 12 of the Act, as soon as the award is made, the Collector is required to give immediately notice of the award and by virtue of the provisions of Section 12, the award was communicated and served on the petitioners on 5.10.1986 and the date of service of the award cannot be taken as the date of making award for the purpose of Section 11A of the Act. In the decision in Raja Harishchandra's case, : [1962]1SCR676 , the Supreme Court held that the date of award is the date of service of the award. But, the decision of the Supreme Court was made with reference to the computation of the limitation for filing an appeal or a revision. The decision is founded on the principle that when a person is given a right to resort to a remedy to get rid of an adverse order within a prescribed time, the limitation commenced from the date of service of the order. But, that principle has no application to determine the question when the award was passed by the Collector under Section 11 of the Act. The date of signature of the Collector and the date of seal would be the date of making of the award under Section 11 of the Act. The passing of an award is distinct and different from the service of the award. From the Scheme of the Act, it is clear that the Act has made a clear distinction between the passing of award and the service of the award. The Supreme Court in S.G. Muley v. State of Maharashtra, : AIR1996SC61 has taken the view that the date of signing and putting seal on award is the date of making the award and from the fact that a copy was received on a subsequent date, it cannot be held that the award was made on that date. Hence, I am not able to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the award was passed beyond the period of two years under Section 11A of the Act.
12. The notification made under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act was dated 8.5.1975 and published on 11.6.1975. The declaration under Section 6 of the Act dated 7.6.1978 was published on 9.6.1978. The award was passed on 23.9.1986 and the possession was handed over on 23.9.1986. The writ petitioners approached this Court only on 16.2.1987 after the possession of the lands was taken from the land owners. The Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. Krishnan's case, : (1996)1SCC250 has already upheld that the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act dated 8.5.1975,29.8.1975 mid , 19.2.1975. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court upholding the notification dated 8,5.1975 under Section 4(1) of the Act, it is not possible to accept the plea of the petitioners that the entire land acquisition proceedings stand lapsed. Further, there is delay on the part of the petitioners in approaching this Court seeking to quash the notification. The Supreme Court in the abovesaid case taken a view that it is not open to the petitioner to raise the contention that the land acquisition proceedings stand lapsed when an award was proposed to be passed. On the facts of the case, it is seen that the award was already passed and the possession was also taken over. In view of the long delay in approaching the Court, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed and accordingly, it is dismissed. No costs.