Nainar Sundaram, J.
1. This Letters Patent Appeal is directed against the order of the learned single Judge in Contempt Application No. 15 of 1991. That contempt application has got a sphere of factual data behind it. The 5th respondent, hereinafter referred to as the management, is the petitioner in W.P. No. 618 of 1990 with which alone we are concerned herein. That writ petition is directed against the award of the Industrial Tribunal, Madras, in I.D. No. 23 of 1984 in so far as it directed reinstatement of the workmen. Pending the writ petition, when stay was asked for by the management, the learned single Judge of this Court directed payment to the workmen full wages last drawn by them under Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, hereinafter referred to as the Act. The order of the learned single Judge has been confirmed by a Bench of this Court, to which one of us (Nainar Sundaram, J.) had been a party. Since there was non-compliance with the orders with regard to payment of the full wages as per Section 17-B of the Act, the workmen filed Contempt Application No. 158 of 1990 against the management. The learned single Judge of this Court in that contempt application found the management guilty of contempt and punished it by imposing a fine of Rs. 2,000. The learned single Judge postponed execution of the order of imposition or fine for a period of two weeks, giving a further chance to the management for compliance with the order of the court, flouted. However, the management preferred Contempt Appeal No. 8 of 1990 and that was dismissed by the First Bench of this Court. Finding no compliance with the order of the court, the workmen filed Contempt Application No. 15 of 1991 putting forth the following prayer:
For the aforesaid reasons it is prayed that this Honourable court may be pleased to punish the respondents 1-5 for the wilful disobedience of the common orders of this Hon'ble court in W.M.P. Nos. 929, 3567, 3568, 4243, 4244, 4867 and 4868 of 1990 and may be pleased to strike off W.P. No. 618 of 1990 from the records of this Honourable court and sequester the properties of the respondents set out in Schedule 'A' of this application and issue such further or other appropriate directions or orders as this Honourable court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case, award exemplary costs and render justice.
In this contempt application, apart from the management, its officers were also made party-respondents. The learned single judge, dealt with this Contempt Application No. 15 of 1991 and found no warrant to countenance the prayer projected therein and giving liberty to the workmen to move the Labour court to obtain the reliefs granted by this Court, dismissed it. As already noted, this Letters Patent Appeal is directed against the order of the learned single judge. 2. We heard Mr. V. Prakash, learned Counsel for the workmen represented by their Union. The present contempt application has got three limbs. The first limb asks for punishing the respondents for disobedience of the orders of court. The 5th respondent herein, the management, has been already punished for contempt as noted above for the disobedience. It will not be in order, on facts, for the workmen to complain once again of disobedience independently against the individual officers of the management. Apart from the fact that the individual Officers as such were not parties to the orders of court, they could not be stated to have had any separate and independent volition of theirs in the matter. Realising this position, Mr. V. Prakash confined his submissions, asking us either to strike off W.P. No. 618 of 1990 or sequester the properties as asked for in the latter two limbs of present contempt application. In support of his submission to strike off W.P. No. 618 of 1990, learned Counsel placed reliance on the following pronouncements:
Hackinson v. Hackinson (1952) 2 All E.R. 567 and Shyam Murari Lal Saxena v. The District Magistrate : AIR1977All198 .
In the first pronouncement, on a petition by the wife for dissolution of her marriage, a decree nisi was granted and it was directed that the child of the marriage should remain in the custody of his mother, but that he should not be removed out of the jurisdiction without the sanction of the court. On the decree being made absolute, the mother re-married and without the sanction of the court she removed the child to Australia. On a summon by the father, an order was made directing the mother to return the child within the jurisdiction, and on appeal by the mother against the order, the father objected that as she was in contempt, she was not entitled to be heard. The decision in that case has gone to the following effect:
It was the plain and unqualified obligation of every person against, or in respect of, whom an order was made by a court of competent jurisdiction to obey it unless and until it was discharged, and disobedience of such an order would, as a general rule, result in the person disobeying it being rn contempt and punishable by committal or attachment and in an application to the court by him not being entertained until he had purged his contempt; where an order related to a child the court would be adamant on its due observance, for such an order was made in the interests of the welfare of the child, and the court would not tolerate any interference with or disregard of its decisions on those matters, and least of all would permit disobedience of an order that a child should not be removed outside its jurisdiction; in the present case the mother was not entitled to prosecute or be heard in support of her appeal until she had taken the first and essential step towards purging her contempt of returning the child within the jurisdiction.
The guidelines as to when the court should, in its discretion, refuse to hear a party to a case, has been spoken to by Denning, L.J. in the following terms :
It is a strong thing for a court to refuse to hear a party to a cause and it is only to be justified by grave considerations of public policy. It is a step which a court will only take when the contempt itself impedes the course of justice and there is no other effective means of securing his compliance.
3. In the second pronouncement in Shyam Murari Lal Saxena v. The District Magistrate : AIR1977All198 , this rule was adverted to by a Bench of the High Court of Allahabad and on the facts of the case dealt with by the Bench, there was a decline to strike down the very writ petition. The rule that should form the guideline for the court in such matters is that it will refuse to hear a party to a cause if there is a warrant and justification therefor, on grave considerations of public policy. Such a step will be taken only when the contempt itself impedes the course of justice, and there is no other effective means of securing the compliance with the order of the court. Applying this rule to the facts of this case, we are not persuaded to hold that there is no other effective means of securing compliance with the order of this Court. We should not be understood to have for a moment commended the action on the part of the management in not obeying the order of this Court. The management as such has been already punished for contempt. Now we are on the larger question as to whether we should strike off the very writ petition itself. The considerations which should weigh with the court do not impel us on the facts of this case to resort to this extreme course of striking off the very writ petition. It is not possible for us to say that contempt itself has impeded the course of justice. Further, it is not as if the workmen are left without any remedy to secure compliance with the order passed by this Court.
4. Mr. V. Prakash, learned Counsel for the workmen, submits that the reliance placed by the learned single judge on the pronouncement of the Bench of this Court in R.T. Ramayya Servai v. R. Sama Ayyar (1946) 2 M.L.J. 200 : I.L.R. 1947 Mad. 397, is not a proper one. This submission of the learned Counsel for the workmen is not without substance. In the case dealt with by the Bench, the lower court proceeded to strike off the defence invoking the power under Order 11, Rule 21 and Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure and decreed the suit; and on appeal the Bench of this Court found that there was no scope for bringing the case within the ambit of Order 11, Rule 21 of the Code. The Bench also opined that it will not be in order to invoke Section 151 of the Code. But, our accepting this submission of the learned Counsel for the workmen does not improve the position for the workmen, and alter our approach to the main question. We have not found a warrant to say that grave considerations of public policy justify us to take the extreme course of striking off the very writ petition. Though the conduct of the management is not to be commended, with regard to non-compliance with the order of this Court, we cannot straightaway characterise the position as one impeding the course of justice. Furthermore, it is not as if there is no other effective means of securing compliance with the order of this Court. As found by the learned single judge, there is scope for the workmen to resort to the process under the Act. On the facts and circumstances of the case, we have also not found a warrant to straightaway sequester the properties of the respondents. In view of our analysis of the position as done above, we are not persuaded to interfere in this Letters Patent Appeal and accordingly, the same is dismissed.