ORDER
D. Raju, J.
1. The respondents Authorities of the Food Corporation of India, Madras, in W.P. No. 7863 of 1986 are the appellants in the above Writ Appeal which has been filed against the order of the learned single Judge dated April 26, 1996 allowing the Writ Petition and granting certain specified reliefs in the light or the subsequent development in the case.
2. The facts leading to the filing of the writ petition are that one late Varadhan who was working as a Picker under the second appellant died on October 13, 1984 and thereafter the writ petitioner, said to be the wife of late Varadhan claimed for the settlement of the terminal benefits due to her deceased husband by sending a notice dated November 6, 1984 to the first appellant herein through her counsel. The writ petitioner was referred by the first appellant to the second appellant for further course of action and the second appellant by his communication dated February 7, 1985 called upon the writ petitioner to produce a legal heir certificate. Since some other lady was also staking her claim by causing the issuance of the lawyer's notice to be the wife of the deceased, the writ petitioner was advised to obtain a succession certificate. On the production of the necessary materials and fact that the deceased Varadhan has disclosed in the family declaration that the writ petitioner was his wife and adverting to the conflicting claim made by another lady by name Muniammal, the second appellant has submitted the papers to the third appellant for appropriate orders settling the confliciting claims. It is in the above circumstances that the first appellant has informed both the writ petitioner and the other lady viz., Muniammal as also their respective counsel to submit a succession certificate and death certificate to enable the authorities to finalise the terminal benefits to the legally wedded wife by a letter dated April 6, 1983.
3. While matters stood thus, the writ petitioner also applied to the first appellant on February 1, 1986 for compassionate employment to any one of the Class IV posts in the Food Corporation of India offices in Madras City, in view of the sudden death of her husband and the dire and distress condition in which she was placed for her livelihood, marking copies of the same to the Zonal Manager and also the second and third appellants, The third appellant, by his communication, dated February 14, 1986 called upon the writ petitioner to produce certain particulars and records on February 14, 1986. Immediately thereafter, a communication dated February 26, 1986 was sent from the third appellant rejecting the request for compassionate appointment made by the writ petitioner on the ground that it was time barred when it was sent and it appears that the same was with reference to the proceedings of the first appellant dated February 7, 1986. At this stage the writ petitioner has filed W.P.No.7863 of 1986 for a writ of certiorarified mandamus to call for and quash the proceedings of the third respondent therein dated February 26, 1986 and for a consequential direction to direct the respondents in the writ petition (appellants in the above appeal) to appoint the writ petitioner as a Class IV employee under the DDE quota. For the sake of completeness of the factual details, it may be also stated that counsel for the writ petitioner initiated steps and, obtained succession certificate in C.A.No. 20 of 1986 dated April 8, 1986 in favour of the writ petitioner and by a letter dated June 4, 1986 the said succession certificate was also forwarded in continuation of the earlier records submitted. The first appellant, by his communication dated June 20, 1986 forwarded all these papers and submitted proposals to the Regional Director of Food Corporation of India Chennai House. Esplanade, Madras for finalising the terminal benefits due to the deceased worker to be paid in favour of the writ petitioner. The writ petitioner was also pursuing simultaneously the claim for family pension. The other woman by name Muniammal also moved the Administrator General of Tamil Nadu who issued the succession certificate in favour of the writ petitioner to cancel the same but, after enquiry, the same came to be dismissed by the Administrator General of Tamil Nadu by his order dated July 25, 1989 declining to interfere with the succession certificate already granted in favour of the writ petitioner. It is seen from the communication dated February 10, 1994, a copy which has been marked to the counsel for the writ petitioner, that the claim in respect of the terminal benefit was pending to be finalised and amount released for disbursement even as on that date.
4. In the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, the writ petitioner claims that she was the only heir of the deceased and having regard to the dire circumstances in which she was placed, she was entitled to compassionate appointment and in view of the conflicting claims and the need for obtaining succession certificate, the claim made on February 1, 1986 cannot be said to be time barred and that as a matter of fact in the case of one Smt. S. Rani, wife of M.N. Subramani, who died on February 28, 1983, employment was given without adhering to any time limit as such, and she being an ignorant lady, maybe accorded employment on compassionate grounds to alleviate her difficulties. The third respondent filed a counter affidavit stating the time limit was stipulated by the Circular orders of the Food Corportion of India, Head Office, New Delhi, dated May 11, 1977 which obliges any one making a claim for compassionate employment to stake their claim soon after the death of the employees concerned and in no case later than one year after the death and that the fact that succession certificate had to be obtained cannot be ground to ignore the period of time limit fixed for making a claim for compassionate employment and therefore the claim of the writ petitioner was rightly turned down
5. The learned single Judge, under the order which is the subject matter of appeal before us, was of the view that the rejection on the ground that the claim for compassionate employment was time barred was not correct and consequently issued certain directions, directing the respondents to appoint the writ petitioner from the date of her application filed before the third appellant, that in case, the writ petitioner attained the age of superannuation, the respondents should pay the wages together with attendant benefits and all monetary benefits in terms of money till she attains the age of retirement, that the respondents shall calculate the annual benefits from time to time and fix the pension according to the rules and that the petitioner must be deemed as if she worked all these years with consequent liability for the Corporation to pay all the wages in terms of money within 60 days from the date of that order. It is aggrieved against the said order that the above appeal came to be filed.
6. The learned counsel for the appellant contended before us by placing reliance upon certain decisions of the Apex Court to which a reference will be made hereinafter that the High Court, exercising its writ jurisdiction cannot, straightway direct the employer to appoint any person in its service on compassionate grounds and there could have been only a direction to consider the claims of the writ petitioner in accordance with law. While contending that the filling up of the vacancies in the Corporation is to be made in accordance with the relevant rules, instructions and standing orders, the learned counsel also submitted that appointment of a person on compassionate grounds is not a matter of right and in as much as the writ petitioner has since been recognised to be entitled to all terminal benefits etc., there is no justification for countenancing her claim for compassionate employment also. The learned counsel for the appellants so contended that the object of according compassionate employment was to relieve the family of the deceased employee from economic distress caused by his sudden demise in harness and in view of the subsequent developments, it cannot be said that the family is in economic distress and that at any rate the application, having been made for compassionate employment beyond the period of one year from the date of the death, was rightly rejected and no exception cold be taken to the same.
7. Per contra, Ms. R.Vaigai, learned counsel appearing for the respondent /writ petitioner, who has entered caveat, contended that in the peculiar facts of the case where the appellants themselves were insisting upon the production of certain certificates including the succession certificate to substantiate the respondent's claim that she was the legally wedded wife and successor of the deceased worker, the time spent for securing such succession certificate cannot be included in computing the time limit stipulated while considering a claim for compassionate appointment and that therefore the rejection of the claim was not only illegal but was rightly interfered with by the learned single Judge and since the illegal order passed by the appellants only resulted in the denial of employment to the writ petitioner and as such the denial was found to be irregular and illegal, the learned single Judge was well within his powers and it was necessary for the learned single Judge to issue the directions of the nature in question to pay the writ petitioner her wages for the period during which she would have otherwise worked, if the appointment was given as claimed by her. The learned counsel for the respondent /writ petitioner also invited our attention to some of the decisions to impress upon us the submission that wherever necessary the Courts have always interfered with the orders passed declining the claim for a compassionate appointment and the case on hand was an appropriate one for such interference in exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court and consequently, no exception could be taken to the order passed by the learned single Judge.
8. The learned counsel for the appellant Corporation relied upon certain decisions in support of his submissions to which a reference will be made hereinafter. The decision reported in : (1994)IILLJ173SC L.I.C v. Asha Ramachandra Ambedkar : (1994)IILLJ173SC wherein the Apex Court ^considered the nature and purpose as also the extent to which Courts can intervene at the instance of a person claiming such appointment The L.I.C. Act, 1956 also under Section 49 enabled the Corporation to make regulations with prior approval of the Central Government Regulations and the L.I.C. (Staff) Regulations, 1960, under Regulation No. 4 empowered the Chairman of the Corporation to issue such instruction or directions as may be necessary to give effect and carry out instructions of the Corporation and the Chairman in his turn, with the approval of the Board, issued L.I.C. Recruitment (Class III and Class IV Staff) instructions containing provisions for the appointment of staff on compassionate ground upon demise of a member of the staff of the Corporation while in service. Dealing with nature of such instructions, it was held that they are statutory in character and, therefore, they have the force of law and consequently no one can claim or can be directed to be appointed even by Courts by putting aside or de hors the statutory provisions governing the same. The case before the Supreme Court was one wherein the claim made for such appointment came to be rejected by the Corporation on the ground that the claimant exceeded the upper age limit of 45 years but the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, directed such appointment and when the matter was taken up before the Apex Court by the L.I.C: It was held mere pitiable situations alone are no consideration to put aside statutory provisions and direct any appointment disregardful of law. The Apex Court also did not approve of the manner of direction issued to appoint the claimant himself instead of directing the competent authority to consider the claim in accordance with law.
9. In State of Haryana v. Naresh Kumar Bali : (1995)IILLJ108SC , it was held that the High Court can only direct consideration of the claim of a person for compassionate appointment in accordance with rules and not direct the appointment itself, more so when the post for which appointment was sought was exclusively a promotional one. As a matter of fact, in that case, the claim made was complied with by according appointment as a clerk but subsequently, a claim for appointment as Teacher came to be made after one year of such earlier appointment and that too when the claimant was not selected by the concerned Board as a Teacher on the ground that he lacked qualifications. The other claim for appointment as Inspector of Police came to be rejected on the ground that no such claim was made before coming to Court. In Umesh Kumar Nagpal v. State of Haryana and Ors. 1995 I LLJ 798, the Apex Court while holding that compassionate employment cannot be granted after a lapse of reasonable period specified in the rules, the consideration for such employment being in the view of their Lordships of the Supreme Court, not any vested right which can be exercised at any time in future but only a provision devised with the object of enabling the family to get over the financial crisis which it faces at the time of the death of the sole breadwinner. It was also held therein that the whole object of generating compassionate employment is to enable the family to tide over the sudden crisis and to give a member of such family a post, much less a post held by the deceased and that too cannot be claimed as a matter of normal or routine entitlement, and offered whatever the lapse of time even after the crisis in the family was over. To emphasise the position that such appointments are meant to take care only of an immediate need, certain other decisions have also been referred to, vide: Auditor General of India v. Anantha Rajeswar Rao : (1994)IILLJ812SC and Jagadish Prasad v. State of Bihar : (1996)ILLJ1105SC .
10. The learned counsel for the respondent/ writ petitioner invited our attention to some of the decisions to show that Courts have actually interfered with the orders of the competent authorities declining to grant compassionate employment even on merits wherever necessitated and we consider it unnecessary to refer to all such cases except the one about which special mention has been made by the learned counsel. In Jethi Devi v. Bhakra Beets Management Board and Anr. : (1996)ILLJ1118SC the widow of a deceased Government servant, living with her husband's brother as man and woman even giving birth to a child without legally solemnised marriage was held entitled to compassionate employment.
11. We have carefully considered that submissions of the learned counsel appearing on either side in the light of the principles laid down in the various decisions relied upon by them. In view of the above, there can be hardly any doubt in upholding the claim of the Corporation that the Circular orders of the Head office of the Food Corporation of India have statutory force and effect and must be satisfied to secure compassionate employment. Whether the period of one year from the date of death of an employee in service stipulated for making a claim for compassionate employment is to be treated as a period of limitation or a condition, the same cannot be enforced in a wooden like manner, de hors the laudable object and purpose of the scheme unmindful of the fact that such a course would defeat the very object of the scheme and lead to absurd consequences, unintended while making the scheme. So far as the case on hand is concerned, the worker died in service on October 13, 1984, the even on November 6, 1984 the writ petitioner claimed for settling the terminal benefits due to her husband, that though she produced relevant particulars and records in support of her claim, she had been asked even on April 16, 1985 to produce a succession certificate to show that she is the legally wedded wife of the deceased worker in view of the conflicting claim made by another woman named Muniammal to be the lawful wife of the deceased worker and, therefore, the writ petitioner at that stage not only was constrained to take steps but face other litigation to vindicate her status and position as the legally wedded wife of the deceased worker and she could get such declaration by means of a succession certificate before the competent authority only on April 8, 1986 and even by then she applied for seeking compassionate employment. The fact that her claims for terminal benefits being determined and disbursed also was pending even as late as 1994 show that there can be no doubt that she was in distress and dire circumstances. In such a case where the very status of the writ petitioner as the wife of the deceased worker was under challenge and the Corporation also insisted upon production of a succession certificate to prove her status and relationship, the very authorities could not have pressed into serve the point of delay against her when as a matter of fact she applied even before such declaration could be obtained. The fact that nothing precluded her from making a formal application, within the stipulated time inspite of the disputes raised about her status vis-a-vis the deceased worker is not to be, in our view pressed too much since, the claim could not have been even entertained for active consideration till the dispute about her position and status was settled or decided. The peculiar facts and circumstances of the case before us present an extraordinary situation in which it would be harsh and unreasonable to overstress the period of one year stipulated in this case to defeat the claims of the writ petitioner for compassionate employment. Interests of justice, in our view, require this case to be treated as a special one needing a reasonable approach and consideration and not to be treated as a precedent
12. In the above circumstances, though we are satisfied that the rejection of the claim for compassionate employment made by the writ petitioner on the ground that it was time barred may not be justified, we are unable to share the view taken by the learned single Judge in respect of the manner of relief to be granted in the case, de hors the subsequent developments of the case. Though the fact remains that the writ petitioner approached this Court by means of a writ petition immediately after the rejection of her claims for compassionate employment, the further fact arising out of the lapse of time that the writ petitioner became over-aged and could not be given any employment in the Food Corporation of India cannot be completely lost sight of. Issuing of any direction to give her employment in the appellant corporation has since become impossible. In view of the above, the further question that requires to be considered is as to whether she is entitled to any relief and if so to what relief, attracts our attention for decision.
13. The Apex Court has held in unmistakable terms the provision as also the claim for compassionate employment is not as a matter of any vested right or entitlement which could be enforced at any time. The writ petitioner is a stranger to the service of the appellant-Corporation and it is not as though she was given appointment, and thereafter prevented from discharging her duties and earning her wages or salary, or claim came to be rejected as time barred, at the threshold, summarily. It is not that in every case of non selection or refusal of employment, though made in wrongfully, that Courts can deem as though the person denied of employment was appointed with retrospective effect and on that basis order for computation of wages or salary which otherwise would have been earned and payment to the person ordered. It is on factual and actual working that one earns his/her wages or salary and a person who has never been in the employment could not be considered or deemed to have been appointed and served and thereby earned his/her salary or wages to entitle such person to be paid the same, as a matter of course. To this extent, the relief granted by the learned single Judge cannot be approved or upheld by us. On the other hand, taking into account the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, dire and distressing conditions under which the writ petitioner was made to struggle for her rights without even finalising her claim for the benefits due to her as the widow of the deceased worker, the pendency of the writ petition for nearly a decade and the inability on that account to be given any employment at this stage, we are of the view that interests of justice would be better served if we award some lump-sum compensation only without throwing her out of this Court with no relief whatsoever. Keeping in view all these aspects, we direct an ex-gratia payment of compensation of Rs. 25,000/- (Rupees Twenty five Thousand Only) to the respondent/writ petitioner and to that extent the Writ Appeal is allowed and the order of the learned single Judge is set aside and the writ petition is allowed in the aforesaid terms only, Compliance one month.
14. In view of the final orders passed in the writ Appeal, no further or separate order is necessary in C.M.P. No. 7863 of 1996 and hence the same is closed.