ORDER
1. Since all the above three writ petitions arise out of a common award in I.D. No. 52 of 1988 on the file of Industrial Tribunal, Madras, the same may be disposed of by the following common order.
2. W.P. No. 15214 of 1995 is filed by General Manager, Southern Railway, Madras, against the award of the Industrial Tribunal; Madras, in I.D. No. 52 of 1988 dated April 15, 1994, wherein the Tribunal has passed the Award holding that there exists the relationship of employer and employee between the Management and the workmen and the termination of the service of the workmen mentioned in the reference, other than S. Nos.7, 30, 35, 23, 24, 26, 27 and 29 is not justified and consequently directed that they should be reinstated into service without back wages.
3. In W.P. No. 10980 of 1996 the workmen numbering 22 filed the same before this Court in respect of the very same award which denies the backwages and continuity of service to them. In W.P. No. 13148 of 1996 one Subburayalu and seven others seek to quash the said award in so far as it went against them and consequential relief of reinstatement with back wages.
4. For the sake of convenience I shall refer the petitioners in W.P. No. 15214 of 1995 as petitioners management and respondents in that case as well as petitioners in W.P. Nos. 10980 and 13148 of 1996 as respondent/workmen.
5. The case of the petitioners/management is briefly stated hereunder : It is contended that Respondents 2 to 36 workmen were assigned piece rate contract job work of stitching terricotton uniforms for select employees of the Southern Railway. In order to ensure quality stitching and quick turn out of the products the Respondents 2 to 34 were accommodated in the premises of the third petitioner herein. These piece rate job workers were engaged after calling for applications from the public who are competent enough to the stitching job. The engagement of the respondents was on the basis of written agreement entered into with the 3rd petitioner after expressing the fact that the engagement so made is purely of a contractual nature and that the wages would be paid on the work turn out. In the affidavit they extracted the salient features of the agreement. Similar individual agreements from every one of the respondents have been executed. Thus, according to the petitioners, the respondents were only engaged as individual independent contract labourers/tailors between the period 1984 and 1986 limited to a period of one year. However, some were permitted beyond the period without renewing the said agreements.
6. It is further contended that the respondents thereafter raised a demand that they be permanently absorbed by the Railway administration. Since they were purely engaged on a contractual basis and the wages were paid to them in proportion to the actual work turned out on piece rates their demand could not be acceded. Thereafter, the contracts were stopped with effect from December 20, 1986 and on the very same date the respondents were terminated. Against the order of termination, the respondents herein raised a dispute before the, Central Government, Ministry of Labour, New Delhi, who by order dated August 2, 1988 referred the said dispute to the Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Madras under Sec. 10(2-A)(1)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act. After elaborate trial the Industrial Tribunal by order dated November 3, 1989 in I.D. No. 52 of 1988 passed an Award holding that there is no employer employee relationship, the workmen were engaged on a contract piece work job basis and dismissed the claim. The respondents thereafter filed O.A. No. 469 of 1990 before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Madras. By order dated December 10, 1991, the Central Administrative Tribunal set aside the Industrial Tribunal's Award dated November 3, 1989 in I.D. No. 52 of 1988 and gave a specific finding that an employer employee relationship existed in the present case and remitted the matter to the Tribunal for fresh disposal. On such remission, the Industrial Tribunal ultimately passed an Award dated April 15, 1994 to the effect that the respondent should be reinstated into service without back wages. Aggrieved by the impugned award dated April 15, 1994 the petitioners having no other effective remedy approached this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India to quash the said award on various grounds.
7. The contentions of the respondents/workmen as seen from the counter affidavit are as follows : The respondents herein were working under the Southern Railway as piece rate tailors. They entered service originally on individual contract basis for a period of six months. At the end of six month period, their contract was neither extended nor their appointments were terminated by the writ petitioners. They continued to do the job on piece rate basis under the petitioners without any break in service. The respondents/workmen's job is to stitch uniforms to the Railway servants and the said job is of a permanent nature. The workmen joined Socialist Workers Union in January, 1986 for a better bargaining capacity. After joining the Union, they placed a charter of demands on September 29, 1986 claiming various benefits including confirmation of their job and for regular scale of pay. This infuriated the petitioners and immediately on December 20, 1986 the petitioner terminated all the 35 workers on the ground that the period of contract has expired. The said termination was neither preceded by a notice nor the workmen were paid any compensation under Secs. 25-F and 25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act. On completion of 6 months service, the workmen are to be conferred with temporary status as contemplated under Chapter 25 of the Railway Establishment Manual. Further, under the said chapter in para 2512 it is stated that casual labourers who are accorded temporary status having worked for more than 6 months shall be considered for regular employment without having to go through Employment Exchange. Since the petitioners have not acceded to the request of the workmen inspite of their drawing attention to the Railway Manual, they raised an Industrial Dispute challenging the order of termination. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Madras, quashed the same in O.A. No. 469 of 1990 and after enquiry passed an Award holding that employer employee relationship did exist between the writ petitioners and the workmen herein and remanded the matter back to the Industrial Tribunal to verify whether all the workmen have completed 240 days or not, to claim the benefits of Secs. 25-F and 25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act. The writ petitioners fully participated in the proceedings before the Central Administrative Tribunal. It is further contended that after the remand, Industrial Tribunal after recording fresh evidence, came to the conclusion that except the workmen in Sl. Nos. 7, 30, 35 21, 23, 24, 26, 27 and 29 all the other workers have completed 240 days, hence they are entitled for reinstatement without back wages. The said Award was passed on September 15, 1994. Inspite of sending notice therein expressing willingness by the workmen, the petitioners did not send any reply. In the meanwhile, against the denial of back wages to the 22 workers, who were directed to be reinstated, filed an Original Application No. 884 of 1995 before the Central Administrative Tribunal. Since there was no response from the petitioners-management, the workmen made a representation on August 19, 1995 to the Regional Labour Commissioner and requested him to initiate action for implementing the award dated September 15, 1994 within 15 days and stated that failing which action will be initiated under Sec. 29 of the Industrial Disputes Act. After the said notice, the petitioners rushed before this Court and filed W.P. No. 15214 of 1995. In the meanwhile, original application filed before the Central Administrative Tribunal by the workmen was dismissed on April 10, 1996 in view of the judgment of Supreme Court reported in Krishnan Prasad Gupta v. Controller, Printing and Stationery : (1996)ILLJ296SC . Thereafter, all the workmen approached this Court by way of W.P. No. 10980 of 1996 against the award denying backwages. The workmen who were denied reinstatement also filed W.P. No. 13148 of 1996 challenging the said Award. It is further contended that as per the provisions of the Constitution, the Central Administrative Tribunal was constituted and the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal remanding the matter to the Tribunal is well within its power. Moreover, the petitioners herein participated in the proceedings before the Central Administrative Tribunal and it is not open to contend that the High Court has no jurisdiction to decide the matter like this. They also questioned the Award of the Tribunal rejecting the claim for back wages and dismissing the claim of some of them in its entirety.
8. In the light of the above pleadings, I have heard Mr. B. S. Gnanadesikan, learned counsel for the petitiners-management and Ms. D. Geetha, learned counsel for the respondents-workmen.
9. Mr. Gnanadesikan raised the following contentions :
(i) Inasmuch as the Central Administrative Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal against the order of the Industrial Tribunal, the order passed by it remanding the matter to the Tribunal is bad, non est consequently the order made by the Industrial Tribunal in pursuance of order of remand also cannot be sustained.
(ii) Even though the petitioner has not challenged the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal in O.A. No. 469 of 1990 in view of the fact that it has no jurisdiction to decide the same even after remand, the jurisdiction and validity of the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal can be canvassed in this proceedings.
(iii) The Industrial Tribunal committed an error in holding that the termination of some of the workmen is justified, since those persons were entrusted to work on the basis of a contract and after expiry of the period of work they ceased to be an employee of the petitioner concerned.
10. On the other hand, Ms. D. Geetha, learned counsel for the respondent-workmen raised the following submissions :
(i) On the relevant date the Central Administrative Tribunal was competent to consider the order of the Tribunal, hence the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal is valid in the eye of law.
(ii) Inasmuch as the petitioner herein has participated before the Central Administrative Tribunal without any objection and allowed the Tribunal to adjudicate the matter, it is open to the petitioner to raise such a contention and consequently, the petitioner is estopped on the principle of acquiescence. Further more even after remand by the Central Administrative Tribunal, the petitioner without any objection participated before the Industrial Tribunal hence in view of the conduct of the party the objection of the petitioner has to be rejected.
(iii) The order of termination by the petitioner is violative of Sec. 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, hence renders retrenchment void ab initio. In those circumstances, reinstatement with backwages should automatically follow.
(iv) Since all the workmen have completed the probationary period of 240 days, the Industrial Tribunal ought to have allowed the claim as prayed for.
11. First I shall consider the jurisdiction of the Central Administrative Tribunal and the attack of the learned counsel for the petitioners at this stage without raising any objection either before the Central Administrative Tribunal or before the Industrial Tribunal after remand.
12. By order dated November 3, 1989 the Industrial Tribunal has held that workmen are not Railway employees and there is no employees employer relationship, consequently held that the termination is justified and workmen are not entitled for any relief. Aggrieved by the said Award, the workmen filed O.A. No. 469 of 1990 against the Award in I.D. No. 52 of 1988 dated November 3, 1989. By order dated December 10, 1991 the Central Administrative Tribunal has held that the employer employee relationship exists and remanded the matter to the Industrial Tribunal to find out whether the management has terminated the worlanen violating the provisions of Secs. 25-F and 25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act. Mr. Gnanadesikan vehemendy contended that the Administrative Tribunals Act excludes jurisdiction of all Court except Supreme Court in dealing with Service matters, subsequently, by Amendment Act 19 of 1986 apart from other Sections, Sec. 28 was also amended. The said Amendment Act received the assent of the President on March 25, 1986 and notified in the Government Gazette dated March 27, 1996. When other amendments came into effect from January 11, 1986, the amendments to Sec. 28 came into effect retrospectively from November 1, 1985. The effect of the amendment is 'No Court except the Industrial Tribunal, Labour Court shall have or entitled to exercise any jurisdiction, powers or authority in relation to such recruitment or matters concerning recruitment or service matter.' As such, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the Central Administrative Tribunal is not empowered to deal with service matters which have to be adjudicated by the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal. Inasmuch as there is no appeal to the Central Administrative Tribunal provided under the Act against the award of the Industrial Tribunal, the Central Administrative Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal preferred by the workmen against the award of the Industrial Tribunal dated November 3, 1989. In such circumstances, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal in O.A. No. 469 of 1990 is without jurisdiction and nullity and non est in law. The Tribunal lacks inherent jurisdiction and therefore the subsequent award of the Labour Court dated April 15, 1991 passed upon the order of remand passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal which lacks inherent jurisdiction is also a nullity. In this connection, he relied on a decision of the Apex Court reported in Dhirendra Nath v. Sudhir Chandra : [1964]6SCR1001 : The following observation of the Supreme Court has been pressed into service and the same is extracted hereunder :
'Where the court acts without inherent jurisdiction, a party affected cannot by waiver confer jurisdiction on it, which it has not. Where such jurisdiction is not wanting a directory provision can obviously be waived. But a mandatory provision can only be waived if it is not conceived in the public interests, but in the interests of the party that waives it.
He also submitted that in view of the recent decision of the Apex Court in Chandrakumar's case : [1997]228ITR725(SC) , two learned Judges of this Court can scrutinise the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal. Since the judgment operates prospectively and in view of the fact that he is not canvassing the correctness of the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal on merits, the learned counsel for the petitioner fairly conceded that he is not serious in pressing the said objection. However, according to him when the Tribunal lacks inherent jurisdiction, the order has to be treated as non est and therefore this Court while scrutinising the award of the Industrial Tribunal dated April 15, 1994 and if the remand order is excluded, the subsequent order of the Industrial Tribunal has to be quashed as it lacks jurisdiction.
13. It is also submitted that even though the original order of remand was not challenged, the correctness of the same can be canvassed in the subsequent proceedings only for a limited purpose to show that even if the order is not challenged by way of an appeal it can be challenged in the subsequent proceedings. It is the definite case of the petitioner that only if the right of appeal is provided against the order of remand, then in the subsequent proceedings, it cannot be challenged as per See. 105(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. According to him, since no right of appeal is provided against the order of Central Administrative Tribunal, the same can be challenged in the subsequent proceedings. Here also in view of the fact that the principle laid down by the Apex Court in Chandrakumar's case (supra), is applicable prospectively, the petitioner is not serious in challenging the merits of the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal. On the other hand, it is the contention that when the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal is without jurisdiction, it can be ignored by this Court in the subsequent proceedings and scrutinise the award of the Industrial Tribunal dated April 15, 1994 independently. In support of his above, contention, he relied on a decision reported in Jasraj v. Hemraj : [1977]2SCR973 . The learned Counsel for the petitioner very much relied on the following observation of their Lordship in para 14 of the said judgment and the same is extracted hereunder :
'Be that as it may, in an appeal against the High Court's finding the Supreme Court is not bound by what the High Court might have held in its remand order. It is true that a subordinate Court is bound by the direction of the High Court, it is equally true that the same High Court, hearing the matter on a second occasion or any other Court of co-ordinate authority hearing the matter cannot discard the earlier holding, but a finding in a remand order cannot bind a higher Court when it comes up in appeal before it.'
14. In Kahitish Chandra v. Commissioner of Ranchi : [1981]2SCR764 , the Apex Court has observed thus :
'Where the High Court in second appeal though not having jurisdiction illegally reversed the concurrent finding of fact and ordered remand, the aggrieved party can, in an appeal to the Supreme Court from the final order of the High Court making remand, challenge even the first order of the High Court making remand and all the proceedings taken thereafter as a result of the illegal order of remand. The first judgment of the High Court ordering remand being illegal all the proceedings taken thereafter would become void ab initio.'
15. By relying on a decision reported in State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani : 2002(143)ELT249(SC) , the learned counsel submitted that there is no delay or laches on the part of the petitioner in challenging the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal on the ground of jurisdiction.
16. On merits it is seen that against the order of Industrial Tribunal in I.D. No. 52 of 1988, dated November 3, 1989, the aggrieved Workmen preferred O.A. No. 469 of 1990 before the Central Administrative Tribunal. The petitioner-management, in pursuance of notice from the Central Administrative Tribunal participated in the proceedings. Against the order of Central Administrative Tribunal remitting the matter to the Industrial Tribunal to verify whether all the workmen have completed 240 days or not to claim the benefits of Secs. 25-F and 25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act, the petitioner has not challenged the same. No doubt, the learned counsel for the petitioner points out that in the absence of any specific provision for appeal, the contention of the petitioner cannot be rejected on the basis of Sec. 105(2) of C.P.C. No doubt, the learned counsel for the workmen is unable to point out any provision regarding appeal against the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal. However, the fact remains under Art. 132 of the Constitution of India and as per the provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act, it is open to the petitioner to file an appeal before the Supreme Court if they have any grievances regarding the order of remand. The other factor is that even after remand, they did not raise any objection before the Industrial Tribunal. On the other hand, they also participated with regard to the limited question, namely, the acceptability of the claim of the workmen regarding, Secs. 25-F and 25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act. It is also worthwhile to mention the conduct of the petitioner in not taking any step against the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal dated December 10, 1991 and subsequent participation before the Industrial Tribunal after remand by the Central Administrative Tribunal. Added to it, when the matter was adjudicated by the Industrial Tribunal after remand, the Tribunal framed specific issues for determination. The verification of the Order of the Industrial Tribunal after remand clearly shows that the petitioner herein participated in the subsequent proceedings through their counsel. In those circumstances, on the principle of acquiescence, the petitioner is barred from contending that the Central Administrative Tribunal has no jurisdiction to try the same. The observation of the Supreme Court in a decision reported in AIR 1950 SC 497 supports the case of the workmen.
17. I may also point out that in the light of the provisions of Administrative Tribunals Act, Central Administrative Tribunal has jurisdiction to exercise the powers of the High Court under the principle of Alternative Institutional Mechanism. The above principle set out in S. P. Sampathkumar's case : (1987)ILLJ128SC has been once again reinforced in L. Chandrakumar's case, (supra) by the Apex Court. The only change made in Chandrakumar's case by the Apex Court is that against the order of the Tribunal, it is open to the aggrieved persons to approach the High Court. The Central Administrative Tribunal which exercises the power of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India in so far as matters relating to and disputes and complaints with respect of recruitment, conditions of service of persons appointed to public service and posts in connection with the affairs of the union or any one State or of any local or other authority within the territory of India. Art. 323-A of the Constitution of India empowers the Parliament to enact legislation for the establishment of Administrative Tribunal for the Union and the States separately. It also empowers the Parliament to exclude the jurisdiction of all Courts except the jurisdiction of Supreme Court under Art. 136 with respect to the disputes and complaints to recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public service. Based on the said constitutional provision under Art. 323-A, the Parliament enacted Central Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 and conferred the powers of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution to the Central Administrative Tribunal. Pursuant to the said Act and Art. 323-A of the Constitution, the Administrative Tribunal came into being and exercised the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution in respect of disputes and complaints relating to recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public service. The Supreme Court in S. P. Sampathkumar v. Union of India (supra) has held that Alternative Institutional Mechanism is not violative of basic structure of the Constitution. The same view was further confirmed by a Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court in the latest decision, namely, Chandrakumar's case. Based on these two decisions, the order passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal dated December 10, 1991 is valid. The same was passed by way of judicial review against the award of the Industrial Tribunal. The writ petitioner cannot now before this Court question the jurisdiction of the Central Administrative Tribunal and cannot challenge the same as nullity. I have already given reasons for the same.
18. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the workman, even on the ground of delay, laches and inaction, the contention of the petitioner has to be rejected since the Central Administrative Tribunal has passed an order of remand on December 10, 1991. After having participated in the proceedings before the Industrial Tribunal after remand in the year 1994, the contention of the petitioner cannot be countenanced. The following decisions of the Supreme Court, namely :
(i) M. S. R. T. Corporation v. B. R. M. Service : [1969]1SCR808 ; (ii) Shankar v. Krishna : 1979CriLJ13 ; (iii) State of Assam v. Amalgamated Tea Estates : AIR1970SC2072 .
support the said contention of the learned counsel for the workmen. In those circumstances, I am unable to accept the first two contentions-raised by Mr. Gnanadesikan and accordingly the same are rejected.
19. Now I shall consider the merits of the award dated April 15, 1994 passed by the Industrial Tribunal. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order of the Industrial Tribunal is liable to be quashed as there is no proof available that the workmen put in more than 240 days of work. Since there is no attendance register, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, it could not be produced. The inference of the Tribunal that a register is maintained is not correct and the only register maintained is regarding the distribution of cloth for stitching and payment particulars. It will not show the period of attendance. Even extracts of payments made and the register was produced under M-3, M-4, M-5 and M-13. In those circumstances, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the conclusion of Industrial Tribunal that all the workmen except 9 (sic.) had worked more than 240 days in a year preceding the date of termination is not based on any evidence. He also submitted that considering the peculiar circumstances of the case, the Industrial Tribunal rightly rejected the claim for backwages even for those persons granted relief with regard to reinstatement. Likewise he also submitted that the rejection of the entire claim in so far as 9 persons is perfectly in order and absolutely there is no material to modify or vary the order of the Industrial Tribunal by this Court in the writ petitions filed by the workmen. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the workmen submitted that the Industrial Tribunal has given a finding based on the evidence and thereby based on Ex. M-4 and Wage Register. According to her, it will go to show that the workmen were working continuously under the writ petitioners. The supply of uniform is a continuous process as admitted by M.W. 1 in his evidence and the same was now done by outside contractors. Inasmuch as the to petitioner-management has not issued notice nor Retrenchment compensation to the workmen, according to her, all the workmen are entitled to entire relief as claimed including back wages and other benefits. It is also submitted that the termination of 35 workmen is in violation of Sec. 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act and para 2512 in Chapter XXV of the Railway Establishment Manual. The petitioners/management failed to maintain a register of the retrenched workmen as per Sec. 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act or the Register of Casual workmen as stipulated in para 2512 in Railway Establishment Manual for their absorption in future recruitment to class IV Establishment. In these circumstances, according to her, the action of the writ petitioners clearly amounts to unfair labour practice.
20. In order to substantiate the case of the workmen, one Hayath Basha was examined as W.N. 1 who is one of the employees concerned and he deposed that he joined the service of the petitioner-management on February 15, 1984 and he was stopped from service on December 20, 1986. In his evidence he has stated that though the agreement was only for five months, even though it was not renewed, even after expiry of the agreement, he worked for 3 years, while analysing his evidence, the Industrial Tribunal has observed that not even a suggestion has been put to W.W. 1 by the management with regard to the defence that himself and other co-workers had not worked continuously till December 20, 1986. A perusal of the Annexure to the claim statement shows the names of workmen, their respective date of joining and the date of termination. No doubt it shows that the workmen had joined on different dates and different months. I have already said that on perusal of the oral evidence of W.W. 1 the Tribunal had observed that there is not even a suggestion by the management with regard to the plea of the management. It is also seen from the evidence of M.W. 1 that the Foreman was maintaining a register with regard to the number of pieces entrusted to particular workman and the quantity which he has finished. On the basis of the oral and documentary evidence coupled with the particulars furnished in the Annexure filed along with the claim petition and in the absence of any clinching contra evidence from both sides the Industrial Tribunal came to the conclusion that except Sl. No. 21-E. Jeyapal, Sl. No. 23-M. Prithiviraj, Sl. No. 24-I. K. Lazar, Sl. No. 26-G. Krishnamurthy, Sl. No. 27-M. Mohan and Sl. No. 29-M. Henry Babu have worked more than 240 days in a year preceding the date of termination. The available evidence also shows that the above mentioned persons have worked only from June, 1986. In those circumstances, I am in entire agreement with the conclusion reached by the Tribunal which is based on acceptable, oral and documentary evidence. As stated above, in the absence of any contra acceptable evidence, I am unable to accept the argument of the learned. counsel for the workmen.
21. No doubt, learned counsel for the workmen has brought to my notice the following decisions :
(i) Ponnusamy v. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court 1989 1 L I.C. 301; (ii) Daily R. C. Labour, P & T Dept. v. Union of India : (1988)ILLJ370SC ; (iii) Riaz Ahmed v. Munir Ismail Mohammed 1991 2 L.L.N. 903 (Bom.); (iv) Decision in W.P. No. 9679 of 1979 and W.M.Ps. Nos. 13876 of 1989 and 1195 of 1991 dated June 10, 1996.
In all these cases this Court as well as the Apex Court on the facts and circumstances of the case have held that if the order of termination is set aside, the aggrieved workman is entitled to reinstatement with backwages. In this case I have already explained on the basis of the materials that only because the management continued the workmen even after expiry of the termination, namely, 5 months fixed in the agreement the Industrial Tribunal ordered reinstatement except 9 persons stated in the order. I have already upheld the order of the Tribunal since the same is based on evidence. With regard to back-wages even though the Industrial Tribunal has not assigned specific reason or reasons, I am of the view that considering the whole issue namely the workmen were not paid daily wages, the rejection of the claim regarding backwages by the Industrial Tribunal is fully justified. There is no dispute that the workmen concerned were paid wages depending on their work. In other words, they were paid on the basis of the completed 'pieces''as per the agreement. In such circumstances, I am in entire agreement with the conclusion reached by the Tribunal, namely, the workmen who are ordered to be reinstated are not entitled to back wages. In the peculiar and special circumstance and factual position narrated above, I am of the view that the decisions cited above are not applicable to the present case. Regarding the rejection of the claim insofar as 9 workmen as mentioned in the impugned order of the Industrial Tribunal in the absence of any clinching evidence or material, I do not find any error in the offer of the Industrial Tribunal rejecting their claim. Further, the Industrial Tribunal has also observed that those 9 workmen were allowed to work only from June, 1986 and all the workmen were terminated with effect from December 20, 1986. In such circumstance, the rejection of the entire claim insofar as the 9 workmen by the Industrial Tribunal cannot be said to be either erroneous or unreasonable.
Net result, all the three writ petitions are dismissed. No costs.