Judgment:
ORDER
K.P. Sivasubramaniam, J.
1. In these two writ petitions, though the cause of action and the facts leading to the filing of the respective writ petitions are different, I propose to deal and dispose of both the writ petitions by a common judgment, in view of an important common legal issue which arises for consideration. In order to appreciate the correctness or otherwise of the stand taken by the respondent/police Department, it would be of considerable relevance to deal with both the writ petitions by a common judgment. The common issue is that the petitioners are aggrieved by the rejection of their request to conduct a protest meeting and the issue involves as to how far the police can refuse to grant permission to hold such meetings.
2. W.P. No. 3210 of 2005 (hereinafter referred to as the first writ petition):
In this writ petition, the petitioner claims to be the Founder President of the Indian People's Party. Their aims are stated to be inter alia to fight for the rights and welfare of the minorities and the down-trodden members of the Society. Elders of his community established the Quaide Milleth College at Chennai. According to the petitioner, one Dawood Mia Khan took over as the Secretary and Correspondent. It is alleged that he was attempting to convert the said public institution as a private institution of his own. He is alleged to have expelled many elders who were members of the community and have inducted many of his own family people as members of the society. He was collecting compulsory donations from the poor students and was also indulging in several irregularities. The parents and the general public have taken several steps before the authorities and sent representations to all political parties. As the petitioner found substantial basis for the charges, he proposed to organise a Dharna in front of Government Guest House at Chepauk on 5.1.2005 from 11.00 a.m. to 5.00 p.m. A representation was forwarded to the respondent. The petitioner had to postpone the date in view of the Tsunami tragedy and permission to hold the meeting on a subsequent date was pursued. The request was, however, rejected by the impugned letter dated 17.1.2005. Hence, the writ petition praying a Certiorarified Mandamus to quash the order and to direct the respondent to permit the petitioner to organise the protest at any place at Chennai.
3. Mr. Sirajudeen, learned counsel for the petitioner, contends that the refusal on the part of the police was arbitrary and unreasonable. The reasons given for rejection were not sustainable. The reason that holding the protest would result in traffic congestion is without any basis. The place where the meeting was to be held was one of the specific places identified and earmarked by the police themselves to hold such protests and public meetings. The situation of the place is such that it would not result in any traffic congestion. The second reason that there was possibility of the rival groups creating law and order situation was only invented for the purpose of denying the request of the petitioner and was not at all bona fide. It was a part of democracy to air rival views and the fact that there are rival groups cannot be a reason for denying permission. The right to express grievances in public is a fundamental right and cannot be denied by the police in an arbitrary manner. The further ground that the petitioner may approach the Court or other authorities for redressal of the grievances is also not a matter for the police and is not an excuse for refusing permission.
4. Mr. A.L. Somayaji, learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the Commissioner of Police, contended that the petitioner has to satisfactorily show that he has pursued all remedies open to him otherwise than to make a public demonstration. The petitioner had not shown that he had taken any earlier efforts to bring the issue/ grievances before the appropriate authorities. The right to hold the demonstration cannot be stated to be unconditional. Any demonstration is sure to result in inconvenience to the public and unless the petitioner shows that he had a justifiable grievance and that he had pursued all lawful remedies open to him, it is not open to the petitioner to come to the streets and thereby create problems to the traffic. The right of freedom of expression was subject to reasonable restriction. If there was an apprehension of law and order situation, it was certainly open to the police to refuse permission.
5. Mr. Sirajudeen, learned counsel for the petitioner, in reply, contended that the petitioner had made it clear in the first affidavit itself that the aggrieved persons have made representations to several authorities and political parties even earlier and only as a result of there being no enquiry or any improvement in the situation, the petitioner had to resort to the protest. It is also incorrect for the police to demand that they should be satisfied about the justifiability or otherwise of the grievance before they give permission to hold a meeting.
6. An additional affidavit has also been filed by the petitioner. In the context of the submission made by the respondent that the writ petitioner has not forwarded any application for permission or any complaint to the authorities concerned, the petitioner has stated that one Abdullah was a member of his political party. On his advise, Abdullah had sent a report to the police on 17.7.2004 by registered post, which was received by the Inspector of Police on 21.7.2004. He had also met the Inspector of Police in person. In his report to the police, Abdullah had specifically complained about the receipt of capitation fees by the persons in charge of Quaide Milleth College and had requested the authorities to register the First Information Report and investigate the same. As the police failed to take action, Abdullah had filed Crl. O.P. No. 29067 of 2004 for a direction to the Inspector to register the First Information Report. The said petition had been admitted by this Court and notice has been ordered and till date, the complaint has not been taken on file by the police. He thereafter also complained to the Secretary to Government, Department of Higher Education, by representation dated 30.7.2004. The representation was sent by registered post and on failure to take action, he filed W.P. No. 29576 of 2004, which was admitted on 13.10.2004. Till date, the authorities have not considered the representation nor have they taken any action. It is further stated that the parents and students also complained to the Education Department about the illegal collection of donation by the College. The Joint Director of Collegiate Education came to the college and enquired into the complaint. However, thereafter, nothing was heard from the authorities. In fact, as a result of such a complaint, the college deliberately refused to issue hall tickets for four students and had failed to distribute scholarships. They were permitted to write the examination only after filing a writ petition. The petitioner further contends that the parents and students also organised a demonstration in front of the college on 1 7.6.2004. Even after such repeated protests, the Management has not changed itself and instead, it has initiated enquiry against those students with a pre-determined aim of terminating them from the college. The petitioner further claims that the Founder Members of the college including Mr. Mia Khan had sent complaints of mismanagement to the Hon'ble Chief Minister, Education Minister and other authorities.
7. In the said background, learned counsel for the petitioner contends that there is absolutely no basis for the contention that the petitioner had not taken any earlier efforts before he has sought to give vent his grievances in public.
8. W.P. No. 4657 of 2005: (hereinafter referred to as the second writ petition)
In this writ petition, the petitioner is a functionary of the Congress Party and also a Member of the Legislative Assembly, representing Ranipet Constituency. A public meeting was organised to be held on 12 .2.2005 at 6.00 p.m. near Wallajahpet Bus Stand, where, according to the petitioner, a permanent provision for erecting a stage for meeting of all political parties was available and all party meetings were regularly held only in that place. The petitioner has stated that the ruling party in the State had criticized the Union Finance Minister with reference to the relief works for the Tsunami victims and therefore, the Congress Party has the right and duty to explain to the public regarding the relief work provided by the Central Government. In the course of his submissions, Mr. V. Selvaraj, learned counsel for the petitioner, also stated that one of the issues to be addressed in the meeting was also as regards how the ruling party in the State had allegedly mismanaged the distribution of Tsunami relief funds and certain allegations specifically against Tmt. Suganya Mohanram, Chairman of the Wallajahpet Municipality, belonging to the AIADMK party of having allegedly misappropriated Tsunami relief funds. The poster issued by the petitioner for the conduct of the meeting to be held on 12.2.2005 also refers to the said issue. But, by the impugned order dated 9.2.2005, the Inspector of Police rejected the request on the following three grounds:
(i) The proposed place of meeting is likely to cause traffic congestion;
(ii) Likelihood of clash between Congress and AIADMK workers which would give rise to law and order situation; and
(iii) The allegations relating to Tsunami Relief work is opposed to the perception of the general public.
In the typed set, the petitioner had filed copies of the posters of meetings held in the same place by all the political parties, including the ruling party, in order to disprove the first objection. As regards the second objection, learned counsel for the petitioner states that it is the duty of the police to maintain law and order. It is further contended that the third ground exposes clear mala fides on the part of the police. Learned counsel contends that it is not the business of the police to comment what is right and wrong and reject permission on that ground. The fact that the local police is at the beck and call of the ruling party, and the Chairman of the Municipality in particular, is clearly established by the third objection.
9. Mr. A.L. Somayaji, learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the police, contends that the issues relating to Tsunami funds had given rise to sharp differences between various political parties and the police had to take note of the acrimonious atmosphere which was being created by all the political parties. The police was not concerned about the veracity of the allegations against each other. Moreover, in this case, the aim of the petitioner group was only to scandalise the Chairman of the Municipality by making indirect reference to the name of the Chairman which amounted to an innuendo. A complaint has been filed by the Chairman, referring to the poster which had appeared in the Town, making frivolous and indecent allegations against her in an attempt to tarnish her image and unless action was taken against the persons who are responsible for the same (writ petitioner and others), the issue would result in clashes between the members of the Congress and AIADMK. Pursuant to the complaint, a First Information Report has been lodged as No. 99 of 2005 dated 9.2.2005 and investigation was pending. Therefore, at this stage, to permit the meeting to be conducted by one of the rival parties was likely to result in a serious law and order situation. Reliance is placed on the following two judgments in support of the contention that the right to freedom of expression was subject to a reasonable restriction:
(i) T. THANGARASU v. SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, CUDDALORE AND ORS. and
(ii) RAMA MUTHURAMALINGAM v. DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, MANNARGUDI (Division Bench).
10. Mr. V. Selvaraj, learned counsel for the petitioner, in reply, contends that the poster, which is the subject matter of the First Information Report, has nothing to do with the meeting to be conducted. Such a complaint has also been given only to prevent criticism of swindling of Tsunami funds by the Chairman. At any rate, they are prepared to face the charges relating to that poster and the First Information Report.
11. Holding of a meeting to reply to the charges against the leaders of the Congress Party by the AIADMK was a different issue and the right to be exercised by the petitioner to put forth their views in a democratic manner. Such a right cannot be curtailed by the police. The judgment of the Division Bench does not contemplate or vest arbitrary powers on the police to act in a partisan, arbitrary and motivated manner. The reference to the Chairman in the other poster was nothing more than a punning on the words of Tsunami which rhymes with the name of the Chairman. There was neither any indecent comment nor defamatory innuendo. Indecency is only in their imagination. This is apart from the fact that the poster has nothing to do with the meeting, for which there was a separate poster. The mala fides on the part of the police is made glaring by the third ground stated by the respondent for rejecting the permission for holding the meeting.
12. I have considered the submissions of both sides.
13. The reason why I have clubbed both the writ petitions together is to show how the police had chosen to react in two different types of cases and issues of the petitioners seeking to express their grievances. The first writ petition is filed by a person aggrieved against a private society which is a smaller group and another concerning a large forum of two different political parties. While in the first writ petition the grievance of the petitioner is as regards the functioning of an educational institution, in the second, the dispute is between two political parties relating to a public issue of alleged irregularities in the distribution of the Tsunami Relief Fund. In both cases, the respondent/police appear to have adopted an attitude of super authority which no Governmental authority can exercise in a democracy, as though they are the conscience keepers of the entire society. Such an attitude cannot be sustained for the following reasons.
14. Two of the grounds mentioned in both the impugned orders are common, namely, (i) traffic congestion and (ii) law and order.
15. As regards location, in W.P. No. 3210 of 2005, the petitioners have sought for conducting their dharna/ demonstration in front of the Government Guest House at Chepauk. There can be no dispute over the fact that the said place is earmarked by the police themselves for holding demonstrations usually. The demonstrators are allowed to occupy only a large platform and are never permitted to occupy any portion of the road. It is further to be noted that the grievance of the petitioners in W.P. No. 3210 of 2005 is related to an issue relating to an educational institution and their alleged improper functioning and of demanding of capitation fee. The issue will not attract any interest or dissent by the public and therefore, there is absolutely no possibility of any traffic congestion.
16. In the second case, enough materials have been filed by the petitioner showing that it is in the very same location all political parties are generally permitted to conduct political meetings, namely, near Wallajah Bus Stand. A series of xerox copies of the posters disclose that it is only in the same place all political parties, including the ruling party, are permitted regularly to conduct the meetings. Therefore, I am inclined to hold that the reason of traffic congestion, as stated in both the writ petitions as a ground for objection, cannot be sustained.
17. As regards law and order, the fact that there are two rival groups can never be a reason for rejection of permission to any citizen for airing his views in public. In democracy, rival opinions are common. The very idea of protest meeting visualises rival group or groups. It is impossible and unimaginable to spell out any issue over which there would be consensus between all citizens and different sections of the society. There cannot be any consensus ad idem between all political parties or social groups. Dissent is one of the essential features of democracy and the fact that there is dissent or a rival group holding the opposite view and likely to cause any problem, cannot at all be a reason for denying the right of a citizen under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. Right of freedom of expression has been recognised as one of the essential ingredients of democracy.
18. In LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA v. PROF. MANUBHAI D. SHAH , the Supreme Court has expressed very categorically the need to give utmost importance to freedom of speech and expression, as follows:
'8. The words 'freedom of speech and expression' must, therefore, be broadly construed to include the freedom to circulate one's views by words of mouth or in writing or through audio-visual instrumentalities. It, therefore, includes the right to propagate one's views through the print media or through any other communication channel e.g. the radio and the television. Every citizen of this free country, therefore, has the right to air his or her views through the printing and/or the electronic media subject of course to permissible restrictions imposed under Article 19(2) of the Constitution. The print media, the radio and the tiny screen play the role of public educators, so vital to the growth of a healthy democracy. Freedom to air one's views is the lifeline of any democratic institution and any attempt to stifle, suffocate or gag this right would sound a death-knell to democracy and would help usher in autocracy or dictatorship. It cannot be gainsaid that modern communication mediums advance public interest by informing the public of the events and developments that have taken place and thereby educating the voters, a role considered significant for the vibrant functioning of a democracy. Therefore, in any setup, more so in a democratic set-up like ours, dissemination of news and views for popular consumption is a must and any attempt to deny the same must be frowned upon unless it falls within the mischief of Article 19(2) of the Constitution. It follows that a citizen for propagation of his or her ideas has a right to publish for circulation his views in periodicals, magazines and journals or through the electronic media since it is well known that these communication channels are great purveyors of news and views and make considerable impact on the minds of the readers and viewers and are known to mould public opinion on vital issues of national importance. Once it is conceded, and it cannot indeed be disputed, that freedom of speech and expression includes freedom of circulation and propagation of ideas, there can be no doubt that the right extends to the citizen being permitted to use the media to answer the criticism levelled against the view propagated by him. Every free citizen has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid this, except to the extent permitted by Article 19(2), would be an inroad on this freedom. This freedom must, however, be exercised with circumspection and care must be taken not to trench on the rights of other citizens or to jeopardise public interest. It is manifest from Article 19(2) that the right conferred by Article 19(1)(a) is subject to imposition of reasonable restrictions in the interest of, amongst others, public order, decency or morality or in relation to defamation or incitement to an offence. It is, therefore, obvious that subject to reasonable restrictions placed under Article 19(2) a citizen has a right to publish, circulate and disseminate his views and any attempt to thwart or deny the same would offend Article 19(1)(a). '
19. Even in the matter of imposition of tax on newspapers, the Supreme Court has held that it is intermingled with the freedom of expression and that the Government should be cautious in imposing tax on newspapers vide INDIAN EXPRESS NEWSPAPERS PRIVATE LTD. v. UNION OF INDIA :
'68. ... Freedom of expression, as learned writers have observed, has four broad social purposes to serve: (i) it helps an individual to attain self fulfilment, (ii) it assists in the discovery of truth, ( iii) it strengthens the capacity of an individual in participating in decision-making and (iv) it provides a mechanism by which it would be possible to establish a reasonable balance between stability and social change. All members of society should be able to form their own beliefs and communicate them freely to others. In sum, the fundamental principle involved here is the people's right to know. Freedom of speech and expression should, therefore, receive a generous support from all those who believe in the participation of people in the administration. It is on account of this special interest which society has in the freedom of speech and expression that the approach of the Government should be more cautious while levying taxes on matters concerning newspaper industry than while levying taxes on other matters. It is true that this Court has adopted a liberal approach while dealing with fiscal measures and has upheld different kinds of taxes levied on property, business, trade and industry as they were found to be in the public interest. But in the cases before us the Court is called upon to reconcile the social interest involved in the freedom of speech and expression with the public interest involved in the fiscal levies imposed by the Government specially because newsprint constitutes the body, if expression happens to be the soul. '
20. That being so, it is not desirable for the police to curtail the freedom of speech by simply citing the reason that the rival group may create law and order problem. It is their duty to maintain law and order and mere apprehension of the rival group being displeased by the holding of a meeting by another rival group cannot result in the police refusing permission on the ground of law and order situation.
21. It is true that there may be issues of very sensitive nature which may require reasonable restriction being imposed in the conduct of any meeting or procession such as processions being conducted during Vinayagar Chathurthi during which, the police has been given the discretion by this Court to allow the procession to go through only in specified routes chosen by the police in order to avoid clash between two communal groups. Such examples are very rare and cannot be imported blindly with reference to the request which is made by a political party which feels duty bound to project its views and also to reply to some of the allegations which are said to have been made against the petitioner political party.
22. It is essential to bear in mind that though it is true that the fundamental right of freedom of speech is subject to certain reasonable restrictions, it has been repeatedly held by the Supreme Court that the scope of reasonable restriction has to be limited to the exceptions specifically provided under Article 19(2). It would be appropriate to extract both Articles 19(1) and 19(2) in the said context:
'19. Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech, etc. --
(1) All citizens shall have the right --
(a) to freedom of speech and expression;
(b) to assemble peaceably and without arms;
(c) to form associations or unions;
(d) to move freely throughout the territory of India;
(e) to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India; and
(f) omitted by the Constitution (Forth-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978 Sec. 2 w.e.f.20.6.1979;
(g) to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business.
(2) Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with Foreign States, public order, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of Court, defamation or incitement to an offence. '
23. A perusal of Article 19(2) would disclose that the State can impose reasonable restriction only on the following grounds:
(i) Interests of sovereignty and integrity of India;
(ii) Security of the State;
(iii) Friendly relations with Foreign States;
(iv) Public order, decency or morality;
(v) In relation to contempt of Court, defamation or incitement to an offence.
24. It is settled proposition that the restrictions thus enumerated are exhaustive and any restriction to be imposed can relate to only one of the grounds specified under Article 19(2). They have to be strictly construed and the right of the citizen cannot be curtailed on any ground outside the grounds enumerated under Article 19(2).
25. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, in SAKAL PAPERS (P) LTD. v. UNION OF INDIA held that the only restriction which may be imposed on the rights of an individual under Article 19(1)(a) are those which Clause (2) of Article 19 permits and no other. Therefore, a political party seeking to express their views on the alleged misuse of Tsunami Relief Fund cannot fall under any of the restrictive clauses. The right of a citizen or a political party to project their political views or criticism of another party regarding the alleged misuse of Tsunami Relief Fund cannot be brought under the restrictive clause of 'public order'. The expression 'public order' must have proximate and direct connection with the specific restrictions as contemplated under the Constitution. The apprehension of public order cannot be on the basis of a remote and indirect cause or apprehension. The connection contemplated between the restriction and public order must be real and proximate, not far-fetched or problematic. The following observations in the judgment of a Constitution Bench in O.K. GHOSH v. E.X. JOSEPH will be relevant:
'9. ... This clause again cannot be interpreted to mean that even if the connection between the restriction and the public order is remote and indirect the restriction can be said to be in the interests of public order. A restriction can be said to be in the interests of public order only if the connection between the restriction and the public order is proximate and direct. Indirect or far-fetched or unreal connection between the restriction and public order would not fall within the purview of the expression 'in the interests of public order'. This interpretation is strengthened by the other requirement of cl.(4) that, by itself, the restriction ought to be reasonable. It would be difficult to hold that a restriction which does not directly relate to public order can be said to be reasonable on the ground that its connection with public order is remote or far-fetched. There is another consideration which is relevant. Therefore, reading the two requirements of cl(4), it follows that the impugned restriction can be said to satisfy the test of cl.(4) only if its connection with public order is shown to be rationally proximate and direct. That is the view taken by this Court in Superintendent, Central Prison, Fetehgarh v. Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia . In the words of Patanjali Sastri J. in Rex v. Basudev, 1949 FCR 657: AIR 1950 FC 67 'the connection contemplated between the restriction and public order must be real and proximate, not far-fetched or problematical.' It is in the light of this legal position that the validity of the impugned rule must be determined.'
26. Therefore, I am inclined to hold that the mere fact that there are two different groups professing opposite views cannot lead to a presumption that there will be violation of public order. It is the duty of the police to maintain law and order. The only fact of the existence of a dissent or opposite group cannot amount to an apprehension of violation of public order. Any such assertion to the contrary would only mean that political parties could address meetings only on issues over which there is no controversy, which is an impossible expectation.
27. In the above background of constitutional importance given to the right of freedom of expression, the further reason given in both the cases on the merits of the views/causes which are sought to be dealt with by the petitioners, is shocking and appalling.
28. In the first case, the respondents have taken a stand as though the petitioners ought to have approached the authorities concerned and they are trying to hold the protest meeting without approaching the concerned authorities and are airing their grievance in the public. It is not for the police to raise such an objection as though it is obligatory on the part of the petitioner to exhaust all the alternate remedies before he could hold a public meeting. That apart, the facts stated in the additional affidavit, as extracted above, clearly bring out that the petitioner was knocking at the doors of all the relevant and plausible executive authorities, including of filing a complaint before the police. The police does not condescend even to register the case, thus driving the petitioner to file a Criminal O.P. before this Court. Only after finding that no authority was prepared to act, they are now desperately driven to the streets as the last remedy. Now even the right to hold a demonstration is denied. It is unfortunate that such unacceptable defences should be taken by the police, that too without regard to the actual facts, namely, that the petitioner had approached all the authorities. The advise of the police that the petitioner should approach the concerned Department and should find a solution before the Court is not at all warranted.
29. In the second case, the attitude of the police is glaringly partisan. The police officer takes it upon himself to state that the issue which the petitioner seeks to take up in the public meeting, according to the police, is not consistent with the general perception of the public. It is not for the police to state whether the view point sought to be propagated by the applicant is correct or not. Neither the police nor even this Court can be concerned with the truth or merits of the issues which each of the political groups want to project in their respective meetings. We may even assume that the view point which the petitioner seeks to propagate in the meeting, namely, that the Chairman of the municipality is guilty of manipulat ion of Tsunami Relief Fund is wholly false, untenable and contrary to truth. It is always open to the opposite group to hold their own meetings and to disprove the same and to project their point of view. But it is not for the police to take such a stand and refuse permission. If this reason could be held as valid, it should follow that the police can take action against any press publishing their opinion on any issue, which, according to the police, is not consistent with the perception of the general public. Therefore, this third reason thus stated by the police betrays that the police is openly acting in support of and on the dictates of the person against whom allegations are sought to be made by the petitioners, namely, the Chairman of the Municipality. The level to which some of the police office rs are prepared to go to please the local leaders as in this case, would only bring disrepute to the police force which is a vital organ of the State as well as reflect badly on the Government.
30. In the first case also, the reason cited by the police that the applicant should have approached all the authorities before they had chosen to demonstrate does not appear to be bona fide. The police will not even receive a complaint and take it on file and a writ petition had to be filed and will not also permit the aggrieved parties to hold a demonstration.
31. The above two cases bring forth an unpleasant recent trend by the police trying to behave in an undemocratic and arbitrary manner. In fact, there are few other writ petitions also which had come up recently for admission in which I had ordered notice. Permitting this trend to continue unchecked would result in death-knell to democracy and would help usher in autocracy or dictatorship, borrowing the expression of the Supreme Court. Every political party has the experience of sitting alternatively in the opposition and they should realise the value of freedom of expression and speech and the untenable nature of the police telling them that they should not express themselves in any matter which is bound to be controversial.
32. Strong reliance was sought to be placed on some of the observations contained in the judgment of the Division Bench in RAMA MUTHURAMALINGAM v. DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, MANNARGUDI by the police in support of their undemocratic action, without realising the background and the context in which such observations were made. The Division Bench was concerned with the order of the learned single Judge laying down certain conditions. The Division Bench felt that the police should be free to decide the conditions under which a meeting should be permitted to be conducted. The issue raised in that writ petition was also with reference to a sensitive issue of the arrest of a religious head and on the perception of larger sensitive issues. The observations of the Bench relating to the restraint to be exercised in the exercise of judicial power, should be understood in the context of the facts pertaining to that case and cannot be interpreted as a blanket licence to the police to act in a dictatorial and arbitrary fashion, as in these two writ petitions.
33. The following observations in the order of the Division Bench in Paragraphs 11 and 16 in RAMA MUTHURAMALINGAM v. DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, MANNARGUDI are sought to be conveniently ignored by the respondents, while placing reliance on the said judgment:
'11. This Court should not ordinarily interfere in administrative matters, since the administrative authorities are specialists in matters relating to the administration. The Court does not have the expertise in such matters, and ordinarily should leave such matters to the discretion of the administrative authorities. It is only in rare and exceptional cases, where the Wednesbury principle applies, that the Court should interfere, vide Tata Cellular v. Union of India, ; Om Kumar v. Union of India, 2001 (2) SCC 386, etc.
16. In our opinion the administrative authorities must be given freedom to do experimentations in exercising powers, provided of course they do not transgress the legal limits or act arbitrarily. '
34. The fact that a complaint had been lodged by the Chairman of the Municipality before the police objecting to the posters against her cannot have any relevance to the right of a political party to express their point of view of the Tsunami Relief works and how the funds have been utilised by the Chairman of the Municipality in their perception. It is also stated that the petitioners have to explain the charges made against their own party men in the context of Tsunami Relief Fund.
35. In the criminal case, the complainant is entitled to pursue her action against the accused, inclusive of her rights to take action in the civil Court for damages and the writ petitioner is bound to face the proceedings in the civil and criminal Courts, which is totally a different issue.
36. With the result, I am inclined to set aside the two impugned orders under challenge in both the writ petitions. The petitioners are at liberty to apply afresh and the respondents shall confine only to the strict limitations contained under Article 19(2) of the Constitution and not to act arbitrarily. In view of the fact that in both cases the refusal to permit the petitioners to hold the meeting is solely based on frivolous, callous and arbitrary reasons, I would have awarded heavy costs. I refrain from doing so with the hope that the police would not act further in the same manner.
The writ petitions are ordered subject to the above observations. W.P.M.P. Nos. 5146 and 5147 of 2005 are closed.