In Re: Thommeni Nadar and ors. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
.....proceedings initiated either on the basis of conduct which let to the conviction or on pure questions of misconduct, did not amount to double jeopardy. since the concept of acquittal is an acquittal, is an off shoot of the principle of double jeopardy underlying section 300(1) of the code, it cannot be imported into service law, where the principle of double jeopardy itself is looked down upon. therefore, the explanation 1 to rule 14(b) of the impugned rules, treating a person acquitted on benefit of doubt, as a person involved in a criminal case, is only in tune with well settled principles applicable to service jurisprudence. a person discharged does not even have protection under section 300 of cr.p.c. and hence such a person cannot assail the explanation 1 to the impugned rule..........for the petitioners is that the ingredient of section 159 of the indian penal code, namely, 'public place' has not been proved by the prosecution in the light of the contents of ex. d-3 relied on by the b party. the learned additional district judge has elaborately discussed the entire evidence adduced on the question, whether the pathway was a public pathway or not, and arrived at the finding that the a party (who were plaintiffs in the civil suit) could have no right in the pathway as an easement of necessity; nor could they have any right over the said portion even on the basis of user of the pathway by them, on some occasions. the learned judge further found that the portion in question was a private pathway and not a public pathway.3. the criminal court is not charged with the.....

Judgment:
ORDER

K.N. Mudaliyar, J.

1. Thommeni Nadar and 24 others were B party before the learned trial Magistrate and Pandy and 21 others were A party. They were convicted of an offence under Section 160 of the Indian Penal Code.

2. The principal argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that the ingredient of Section 159 of the Indian Penal Code, namely, 'public place' has not been proved by the prosecution in the light of the contents of Ex. D-3 relied on by the B party. The learned Additional District Judge has elaborately discussed the entire evidence adduced on the question, whether the pathway was a public pathway or not, and arrived at the finding that the A party (who were plaintiffs in the civil suit) could have no right in the pathway as an easement of necessity; nor could they have any right over the said portion even on the basis of user of the pathway by them, on some occasions. The learned Judge further found that the portion in question was a private pathway and not a public pathway.

3. The criminal Court is not charged with the task of evaluating the comparative claims of the parties as to the public user of the site in question. Its finding must be distinct and clear that the scene of occurrence is a public place. The findings of the learned Additional District Judge embodied in Ex. D-3 would at least create a doubt that the scene of offence was a public place. In this view, I am constrained to hold that the ingredient of 'public place' has not been made out. I, therefore, give the benefit of doubt to the petitioners in Cr.P.C. Nos. 274 of 1972 and 165 of 1973 and acquit all the petitioners of the offence punishable under Section 160 of the Indian Penal Code.

4. The fines, if paid, shall be refunded to the petitioners.