Srinivasan, J.
1. The plaintiffs, who succeeded in the trial court but failed in the appellate Court, have preferred this second appeal. The suit relates to three items of properties. The first two items arc agricultural lands and the third item is a house.
2. The relationship of the parties is not in dispute. The plaintiffs are the sons of Abdul Kuthoose Rowther, son of Kader Moideen Rowther. The third defendant is the sister of Abdul Kuthoose Rowther and the daughter of Kader Moideen Rowther. The first defendant is the daughter of the third defendant. The second defendant is a stranger. For the sake of convenience, the parties will be referred to by their rank in the suit, as plaintiffs and defendants.
3. The case set out in the plaint is as follows: Kader Moideen Rowther died more than fifty years prior to suit and Abdul Kuthoose Rowther died about twenty years prior to suit. The latter was entitled to the suit properties and he was in long, continuous and open possession and enjoyment in his own right for more than fifty years and on his death, the plaintiffs became entitled thereto being his heirs. Patta was granted to the plaintiffs. They are paying kist to the Government and tax to the Panchayat through their mother. The plaintiffs have perfected their title by adverse possession also. The defendants have no right over the properties and they have not been in possession at least within twelve years prior to suit. The third defendant has been given other properties in the family arrangement and she has no right or possession in the suit properties. The second defendant is an interloper. He has instigated defendants 1 and 3 to make false claims to the suit properties and disturb the possession of the plaintiffs. The third defendant is not entitled to go behind the family arrangement. In any event, any right in the defendants has been lost by long, continuous and open hostile possession by the plaintiffs and their father. Since 10.2.1974, the defendants are interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit properties and attempting to trespass. The second defendant would appear to have brought about a sham and nominal and purposeful document dated 2.2.1974 in his favour with false recitals from defendants 1 and 3, which casts a cloud on the plaintiffs. Hence the suit for declaration of title and consequential relief of injunction.
4. The case of the defendants in the written statement is as follows: Kader Moideen Rowther died in 1931 and Abdul Kuthoose Rowther died in 1957. His brother Abdul Rowther died in 1959. The case set out in the plaint is false. Item 2 belonged originally to Kader Moideen Rowther. On 30.1.1929 he executed a registered deed styled as a partition deed, but in reality and substance it was a gift deed whereby he gifted all his properties, some in favour of his first wife's three children and some in favour of his second wife's two children. One item was given to his mother Ponnammal for her life with vested remainder in favour of all his five children. He constituted himself as guardian of his minor children during their minority. The document was accepted, acted upon and given effect to. Item 2 and Item 3 in the plaint were given absolutely under the document to the three children of his first wife in common to be taken by them equally. Abdul Kuthoose Rowther had 1/3rd share, Abdul had another 1/3rd share and the remaining 1/3rd belonged to the third defendant. Kader Mohideen had no other property than what was disposed under the document. Ten years thereafter, Abdul executed a registered sale deed and sold his 1/3rd share in item 3 to Abdul Kuthoose. He sold his 1/3rd share in item 2 to the third defendant. Thus, the plaintiffs cannot claim exclusive title to items 2 and. If at all, the plaintiffs should file a suit for partition against all co-sharers. The plaintiffs are not the only heirs of Abdul Kuthoose. The grant of patta in favour of the plaintiffs for item No. 2 is illegal and it is questioned by the third defendant in C.M.A. No. 56 of 1972, Sub Court, Tiruchy. There is no division of item 2 among the co-sharers. The third defendant has dealt with her 2/3rd share in item 2 by mortgaging the same. The plaintiffs cannot claim any title to item 1. The property was purchased in 1914 in the name of Kader Moideen Rowther benami for the benefit of his brother's wife Vellayakkal with her funds. She was the real purchaser and she was alone in possession and enjoyment of the same as owner paying melwaram rent to the temple. She was in open, continuous and exclusive possession and she acquired prescriptive title by adverse possession for over the statutory period. Even in 1929 Kader Moideen admitted that he had no right in the said item. Vellayakkal executed a will on 7-4-1952 and got it registered. Under the will she bequeathed the western half share to Abdul with a condition that if he died without issues, it should be taken by the third defendant. She died in 1970. The third defendant took possession of the entire item. 1 including the western half. The plaintiffs were never in possession of the said item. The plaintiffs cannot claim exclusive title to the said item and the grant of patta in their favour does not confer any title. The, matter is pending in C.M.A. No. 56 of 1972, Sub Court, Tiruchy. There is no cause of action for the suit. It is liable to be dismissed.
5. The plaintiffs filed a reply statement setting out the following: The document of 1929 is only a partition deed and item 2 devolved by inheritance. The partition deed takes in another item bearing survey No. 136/1. An extent of three acres in the said Survey Number was allotted to the children of first wife, described as 'B' Schedule to the partition deed. It is true that the third defendant acquired the share of Abdul in item 2. The arrangement was entered into more than 25 years prior to suit between Abdul Kuthoose and the third defendant, where under the latter became entitled to 3 acres described as item II and suit item No. 1 was allotted to Abdul Kuthoose. The third defendant was allotted an extent of 3 acres which was a valuable land in lieu of her giving up her share in item 3 and a few cents in S.F.560/8. That is how Abdul Kuthoose became entitled exclusively to the said items. The third defendant had dealt with her share in S.F.560/8, viz., her western share by mortgaging the same to the plaintiffs themselves under a registered deed dated 16.9.1968 wherein she admitted unequivocally the partition arrangement. The description of the western boundary of the property is a clear admission of the right, title and interest of the plaintiffs. The 1st item is the exclusive property of the plaintiffs.
Pattas have been rightly granted. The plaintiffs are not aware of the third defendant's dealings with the property, Item 1 was the separate properly of Kader Mohideen Rowther, purchased in 1914 and enjoyed as such. The plea of benami taken by the third defendant is an after-thought and in conflict with her case in the settlement enquiry. The third defendant has no consistent case and it is false to say that Vellayakkal provided funds for purchase of item 1. The plaintiffs do not admit the genuineness of the alleged will of Vellayakkal. They are not aware of the will. In any event, Vellayakkal had no title or possession to deal with item 1. The other heirs of Abdul Kuthoose are not necessary or proper parties to the suit. They do not claim any right to the properties. The plaintiffs and their father have been in exclusive possession and enjoyment of item 1 as their own property paying melwaram in their own right, under oral gift of father of the plaintiffs. The third defendant has no possession or right in item 1. In any event, the exclusive possession of the plaintiffs cannot be disturbed in any manner. Hence, they are entitled to a decree as prayed for by them.
6. The trial Court accepted the case of the plaintiffs in toto and decreed the suit. On appeal, the learned Subordinate Judge of Karur has reversed the conclusions of the trial Court and dismissed the suit. In this second appeal it is contended that the judgment of the lower appellate court is vitiated by its erroneous reading of the pleadings and the documents filed in the case. It was argued that the lower appellate court has also misread the evidence. It is contended that some of the propositions adumbrated in the judgment of the lower Appellate Court are erroneous in law. According to learned Counsel, the plaintiffs have established their title to the suit properties and proved their exclusive possession. It is submitted that the plaintiffs have also proved their title by prescription and that in any event they are entitled to a decree as prayed for by them on the basis of their possessory title. It is the further contention of learned Counsel that in so far as items 1 and 2 are concerned, the grant of patta in favour of the plaintiffs under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Minor Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act 30 of 1963, hereinafter called 'the Act', prevents the civil court from considering the question of title. It is submitted that the grant of pattas by the settlement authorities having been affirmed by the Special Tribunal in S.T.A. No. 33 of 1977 it is not open to the defendants to challenge the title of the plaintiffs.
7. The plaintiffs have filed C.M.P. No. 1488 of 1992 for filing the patta passbook issued to them as additional evidence in the appeal. It is argued by learned Counsel that after the filing of the second appeal, the Tamil Nadu Patta Pass Book Act (4 of 1986) has been passed by virtue of which the entries in the pass-book relating to ownership of the property will afford conclusive evidence of the plaintiffs title to the properties. It is also submitted that after the passing of Tamil Nadu Act 4 of 1986, the position in law has changed completely and it will not be open to the defendants to raise any contention which will run counter to the entries in the pass-book.
8. Learned Counsel for the defendants has submitted that the question of title to the suit properties is one of fact and the lower appellate court has, after taking into consideration the entire documentary and oral evidence on record, come to a particular conclusion, which cannot be interfered with by this Court in the second appeal in view of the limitations imposed by Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is also argued that there is no error in the judgment of the lower Appellate Court which could vitiate the conclusion on facts. Learned Counsel for the defendants places reliance on a judgment of mine in T. K. Ramanujam Kavirayar and Ors. v. Sri-la-Sri Sivaprakasa Pandora Sannadhi Avargal (1988) 2 L.W. 513, to rebut the contention that the jurisdiction of civil court to decide the question of title is ousted by the provisions of the Act. It is also argued that it is not open to the plaintiffs to question the jurisdiction, of this Court to decide the rival claims after having expressly agreed before the Special Tribunal in S.T. A. No. 33 of 1977 that the said question should be decided in this second appeal. It is submitted that the issue of Patta Pass-Book in favour of the plaintiffs during the pendency of these proceedings is of no consequence and the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Act 4 of 1986 do not have any relevance in this appeal. According to him, there is no justification for admitting additional evidence.
9. At the outset it should be pointed out that the plaintiffs are not sure of their own case....
[Discussion of facts omitted-Ed.]
12. It is seen from the evidence that the plaintiffs naturally developed their case in the course of trial. With regard to item 1, the trial Court found that it was gifted by Kader Mohideen Rowther to the plaintiffs' father in or about 1935-36. Referring to the contention of the defendants that there could not have been any such oral gift in or about 1935 or 1936 as Kader Mohideen Rowther died even in 1931, the trial Court observed that the witness. P.W.5 had spoken to the year of gift only approximately and as such mere fractional difference in the year will in no way improbabilse the case of the plaintiffs otherwise. Strangely, the trial Court has given a finding in paragraph 13 of its judgment at the end of the discussion of evidence that the gift was made in or about 1935-36. It goes without saying that the said finding is not only unsustainable, but also perverse. The date of death of Kader Mohideen Rowther has been proved by an official record marked as Ex. B-11. That has not been challenged by the plaintiffs. It is beyond one's imagination as to how the trial Court could hold that the man who died in 1931 made a gift of item No. 1 in 1935-36 to his son (plaintiffs father). On the face of it, the case put forward by the plaintiffs is absurd, to say the least. Considering the evidence adduced by the plaintiffs with regard to the alleged oral gift by their grand-father in favour of their father, in the background of the vague pleadings sought to be improved in the course of evidence, it is hardly necessary totwelve deep into the evidence for ascertaining the truth of the same. But, the final court of fact has done its duty perfectly. The learned Subordinate Judge has referred to every document on record, relevant for the purpose and considered the entire oral evidence before coming to the conclusion that the plaintiffs' claim of exclusive title to item 1 should fail.
13. The lower Appellate Court has rightly pointed out that the father of the plaintiffs was a minor at the time of his father's death and the case of gift was wholly improbable. It is also pointed out, that the second plaintiff, who had examined himself as P.W.I, was aged only about 7 at the time of his father's death and there could have been no occasion for his father to speak to him about the alleged gift. His version that he came to know of it from his father is clearly false. The lower Appellate Court has also referred to the circumstances that the case of gift was not put forward by the plaintiffs during the settlement enquiry.
14. The case of perfection of title by adverse possession is also rightly rejected by the lower appellate court. Learned Counsel for the plaintiffs refers to the observation of the learned Judge in paragraph 12 that the plaintiffs ought to have elected their case between the plea of title on the basis of gift and the plea of title on the basis of prescription. It is certainly open to the plaintiffs to prove their title by prescription, even if they had failed to prove their original title to the property. But, the learned Judge has considered the plea of the prescription fully and independently. He has discussed the entire evidence on record and he has rested his conclusion not on his statement as to the necessity for the election of the plea. He has rightly pointed out that there is no plea or evidence of ouster among co-sharers. I do not find any fallacy or infirmity in the discussion of the evidence in paragraph 12 of the judgment of the lower appellate court. I concur with its conclusion that the plaintiffs have not made out the case of prescription of title to item 1.
15. With reference to items 2 and 3, I have already adverted to the fact that the plea of family arrangement was developed in the reply statement. There is no direct evidence excepting the oral assertions of the witnesses with regard to the alleged family arrangement between the plaintiffs' father and the third defendant. The lower appellate court has analysed the oral and documentary evidence and held that the plea of the plaintiffs has not been proved. It is unnecessary for me to repeat the exercise in this judgment. It is a question of fact and I do not find any error in the judgment of the lower appellate court which would warrant interference in the second appeal. 16. Learned Counsel for the plaintiffs has argued that there are certain mistakes in the judgment of the lower appellate court, based on his erroneous understanding of the documents and mistaken impressions of the law, which have vitiated his judgment........
[Discussion of facts omitted-Ed. ]
22. Learned Counsel places reliance on the statements made by the parties in the settlement enquiry before the Tahsildar. Ex. B-72 is a statement by the second plaintiff relating to item No. 2. Ex. A-65 is a statement by the third defendant's husband, wherein a claim is made for an extent of one acre in Survey Number 560-10 and the title is traced to an earlier exchange. Ex. A-66 is again a statement by the third defendant's husband relating to some other survey number which are not subject matter of the suit. It is argued by learned Counsel that the statements prove the existence of a prior arrangement between the parties and separate possession of the properties pursuant thereto. He goes to the extent or arguing that the statements made by the third defendant's husband would amount to admission of the said arrangement. I do not agree. The statements are all made only in 1971. The suit has been filed in 1974. The statements do not contain any clear reference to any particular arrangement giving the details thereof. Even if they are taken as part of the evidence, the remaining evidence is overwhelming and the circumstances already referred to are sufficient to reject the case of the plaintiffs as to the family arrangement.
23. Learned Counsel also submits that the orders passed by the Settlement Tahsildar under Exs. A-46, A-47 and A-67 could be considered to support the case of the plaintiffs. There is no merit in this contention. It is stated only to be rejected.
24. I have no hesitation to uphold the findings of fact arrived at by the lower appellate court. The plaintiffs have miserably failed to prove their exclusive title to the suit properties.
25. Now it is necessary to consider the argument that the grant of patta in the proceedings under the Act prevents the defendants from disputing the title of the plaintiffs and oust the jurisdiction of the civil court to decide the question of title. Before considering the position in law, it is necessary to refer to a particular fact. The proceedings under the Act culminated in Special Tribunal Appeal No. 33 of 1977 in this Court. The appeal was disposed on 13.7.1982. Even before the appeal was heard, the present second appeal had been filed. The second appeal was presented in this Court on 15.3.1982 and taken on file on 16.4.1982. It was admitted on 26.4.1982. Both the parties were aware of the pendency of the second appeal at the time when the Special Tribunal Appeal was taken up for hearing. While dismissing the Special Tribunal Appeal, the Bench '(Tribunal?) 'passed the following order:
Mr. K. Sarvabhauman, learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that a title suit in respect of the very same land for which patta has been granted, has already been filed, and it is pending by way of a second appeal before this Court. Mr. Rangaswamy Iyengar, learned Counsel for the respondents submits that it is true that Second Appeal No. 433 of 1982 is pending before this Court and that appeal is pending before this Court and that appeal was filed by the respondents herein. In the suit, as far as the land in respect of which patta has been granted by the Settlement Tahsildar in favour of the respondents herein, the trial court granted a decree in favour of the respondents herein. However, on appeal by the Appellant herein, the appellate court, granted the decree in favour of the appellant herein. It is as against this judgment and decree of the appellate court,Second Appeal No. 433 of l 982 has. been filed by the respondents herein, and naturally the title as regards the land in respect of which patta has been granted by the Settlement Tahsildar, has to depend upon the decision that is to be rendered in Second Appeal No. 433 of 1982. Counsel on both sides submit that as regards title to the land, the decision in Second Appeal No. 433 of 1982 will govern and as far as the present S.T.A. is concerned, Mr. Sarvabhauman submits that the same may be allowed in favour of the appellant herein, while Mr. Ranagaswami Iyengar opposes the same stating that the tribunal has correctly dismissed the appeal since there is absolutely no particulars and evidence to reverse the finding of the Settlement Officer.
(Italics is mine).
The Bench proceeded to dismiss the appeal holding that no ground was made out for interfering with the order of the tribunal and the Settlement Tahsildar. It is seen from the underlined portion that the Special Tribunal took the view that the title as regards the land had to depend upon the decision in this second appeal. Counsel on both sides also admitted that position and proceeded to argue the S.T.A. only on that basis. Learned Counsel for the plaintiffs contends that the dismissal of the S.T.A. by the Bench was on the merits of that case and it was not based on consent. Hence, according to him, it is open to him to argue in this appeal that the question of title cannot be gone into by me.
26. I am unable to accept this contention. On the facts of this case, the said contention is not available to the plaintiffs. When both the appeals were pending in this Court and the parties agreed that the question of title could be decided in this second appeal and independent of the same, the S:T.A. could be disposed of, it is no longer open to the plaintiffs to turn round and contend that this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the question of title. If the plaintiffs had taken such a stand before the Bench, they would have posted the second appeal also along with the S.T.A. and heard them together or they would have considered the question of title without leaving it open to be decided in this second appeal.
27. Even otherwise, there is no merit in the contention that the civil court has no jurisdiction to decide the question of title in view of the provisions of the Act. I have already considered the question in detail in T.K. Ramanujain Kavirayar and Ors. v. Sri-la-Sri Sivaprakasam Pandora Sannadhi Avargal (1988) 2 L.W. 513. I have held that the ruling of the Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. Ramalinga Swamigal Madam : AIR1986SC794 , would apply with equal force to cases relating to inams under the Act. I have considered the question at length, by referring to the earlier judgments on the subject. I do not think it necessary to repeat on the exercise once again.
28. Learned Counsel for the plaintiffs submits that my judgment requires reconsideration in view of a later ruling of the Supreme Court in The Vetticharukuru Village Panchayat v. Hari Venkat aroma Deeksithulu and Ors. A.I.R. 1991 S.C.W. 303. It is also argued by him that my judgment in the earlier case proceeded on the basis that the provisions of the Act were in pan materia with the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Estates Abolition Act (26 of 1948) and Tamil Nadu Inam Estates Abolition Act (26 of 1963) to a large extent. Learned Counsel has been at pains to point out the difference between the Act and the Tamil Nadu Act 26 of 1948. There is a fallacy in the argument. It is not as if I decided the earlier case on the footing that the two Acts are inpari materia. While stating that the Acts are inpari materia to a large extent, I had myself pointed out the various differences between the provisions. I have also referred to the basic difference between Sections 11 to 14 of the Abolition Act and Section 11 of the Act In paragraph 16 of my judgment, I have pointed out that in the Act' there is no question of deciding the character of the land as such, while under the Abolition Act, the Settlement Officer has to examine the nature and history of the lands in dispute and decide the character thereof. I have also referred to the fundamental difference between the two Acts and the Division Bench Judgments rendered earlier, in which the question had been considered specifically. Learned Counsel for the plaintiffs has not been able to point out any lacuna in my judgment or omission to consider any particular aspect of the question.
29. Learned Counsel submits that the view prevalent in this Court that the pre-existing rights are not affected by the vesting of the estate in the Government under the Act or under the Abolition Act, is no longer valid. He refers to the judgment of a Division Bench in S. K. M. Muhammed Mustafa Marakayar v. Udayanachiammal and Ors. : (1968)2MLJ58 , wherein it was held that the rights of a mortgagee to proceed against the erstwhile private or pannai lands of, the mortgagor in execution of the mortgage decree after the grant of patta, stood unaffected by the provisions of the Act. He submits that the Division Bench had relied on a judgment of the Full Bench of the Patna High Court in Sidheswar Prasad Singh v. Ram Saroon Singh and Ors. : AIR1963Pat412 , and it was later overruled by the Supreme Court in Shivasankar Prasad Sah and Anr. v. Baikunth Nath Singh and Ors. : [1969]3SCR908 . Hence, according to learned Counsel, the Division Bench rulingof this Court in S.K. M. Muhammed Mustafa Marakayar v. Udayanachiammal : (1968)2MLJ58 , is no longer good law and the basic principle set out therein that the grant of patta under the Abolition Act was only in recognition of a preexisting right in the land was nullified by the Supreme Court. Learned Counsel proceeds to refer to the judgment of another Division Bench of this Court in Angappa Gounder v. Sivamalai Gounder and Ors. : (1988)2MLJ225 . In that case, an argument was advanced that in a case rising under the Act, the mortgagee's rights as against the subject matter of the mortgage came to an end with the vesting of the estate in the Government and that the ruling in S.K. M. Muhammed Mustafa Marakayar v. Udayanachiammal : (1968)2MLJ58 , was not good law in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Shivasankar Prasad Sah v. Baikunth Nath Singh : [1969]3SCR908 . The Division Bench repelled that contention holding that the principles applicable to an estate under the Abolition Act cannot be applied to an inam under the Inams Act. The Bench pointed out the distinction between the two Acts and held that the rights of the mortgagee were not affected by the vesting under the Inams Act. The Bench observed.
It will be inequitable to apply the principles mentioned by the Supreme Court in a case relating to an estate, to a minor inam. In so far as minor inams are concerned, the vesting is notional and does not affect the Kudiwaram right lawfully enjoyed or acquired as laid down in Act 30 of 1963. The vesting contemplated under Act 30 of 1963 is only to enable the Government to effect a ryotwari settlement and not extinguish the existing rights in an inam land.
30. Learned Counsel submits that the Division Bench has pointed out the difference between the two Acts and on account of the same, the ruling of the Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. Ramalinga Swamigal Madam : AIR1986SC794 , will not apply to a case under the Inam Act. It is, therefore, argued by him that the view taken by me in T. K. Ramanujam Kavirayar and Ors. v. Sri-la-Sri Sivaprakasa Pandara Sannadhi Avargal (1988) 2 L. W. 513, that the ruling in State of Tamil Nadu v. Ramalinga Swamigal Madam : AIR1986SC794 , would apply to a case of inam is incorrect. I do not agree. The Division Bench in Angappa Gounder v. Sivamalai Gounder : (1988)2MLJ225 , had no occasion to decide the question of jurisdiction of the civil Court under the provisions of the Act. The only question which the Division Bench had to consider was the effect of vesting vis-a-vis the rights of a mortgagee of an inam land. I have already referred to the factor that there are differences between the two Acts and it is not as if the entire Act is in pan mcteria with the Abolition Act. In so far as the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is concerned, the Acts are undoubtedly inparimateria and there is no error in the view taken by me that the ruling in State of Tamil Nadu v. Ramalinga Swamigal Madam : AIR1986SC794 , would apply to cases relating to inams under the Act.
31. There is no merit in the contention of learned Counsel that in view of the subsequent ruling in The Vetticharukuru Village Panchayat v. Nori Venkatarama Deeksithulu and Ors. A.I.R. 1991 S.C.W. 303, my judgment requires reconsideration. The above case arose under the Andhra Pradesh Grama Panchayat Act (2 of 1964) and Andhra Pradesh Inams Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari Act (37 of 1958). No doubt, the Bench in the above case observed that the historical perspective and the real purpose and proper scope and operation of the Estates Abolition Act was not focused to the notice of the Court in the earlier case. After referring to the earlier rulings of the Supreme Court, it was observed in paragraph 26 as follows:
Thus we have no hesitation to hold that the ratio in all these cases are clearly distinguishable and render little assistance to the Gram Panchayat.
The Bench proceeded to refer to the provisions of the Andhra Act and held that it was a self contained Code expressly providing rights and liabilities and prescribing procedure and remedies of appeal and revision, thereby excluding the jurisdiction of the civil Court. I am unable to find anything in the judgment to run counter to my reasoning inT.K. Ramanujam Kavirayar and Ors. v. Sri-la-Sri Sivaprakasa Pandara Sannadhi Avargal (1988) 2 L.W. 513. The judgment of the Supreme Court will not apply to the present case. The provisions of the Tamil Nadu Act are different from the provisions of the Andhra Act. InState of Tamil Nadu v. Ramalinga Swamigal Madam : AIR1986SC794 , the Supreme Court pointed out the distinction between the Andhra Act and the Tamil Nadu Act inasmuch as the latter did not retain Section 56, which provided for decision of a dispute between two rival claimants. The Court also placed reliances on the words 'for the purposes of the Act' found in Section 64-C of the Tamil Nadu Act which were absent in the Andhra Act. In 'the Act' in the present case Section 46 provides for finality of the orders passed under the Act. Sub-section (1) reads thus:
Any order passed by any officer the Government or other authority or any decision of the Tribunal or the Special Appellate Tribunal under this Act in respect of matters to be determined for the purposes of this Act shall subject only to any appeal or revision provided under this Act be final.
(underlining mine).
The underlined words show that it is similar to Section 64-C of the Abolition Act 26 of 1948 and the same language is employed. The reasoning of the Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. Ramalinga Swamigal Madam : AIR1986SC794 , would apply and the ruling in the later judgment of the Supreme Court in The Vetticherukuru Village Panchayat v. Hari Venkatarama Deeksithulu A.I.R. 1991 S.C.W. 303, will not apply. Hence, there is no necessity for reconsideration of my judgment in T. K. Ramanujam Kavirayar and Ors. v. Sri-la-Sri Sivaprakasa Pandara Sannadhi Avargal (1988) 2 L.W. 513.
32. The last contention of learned Counsel is based on the additional evidence sought to be adduced by him. The patta pass-book which has been produced with the C.M.P. No. 1488 of 1992 does not contain any evidence as to the date of issue. It is not the case of the plaintiffs that the pass-book was issued after the disposal of the appeal in the lower Appellate Court. The pass-book is sought to be introduced in evidence only for the purpose of invoking the provisions of Tamil Nadu Pattas Pass-Book Act (4 of 1986). For that purpose, it is not necessary to produce the pass book and mark it in evidence in the appeal. It is not in dispute in this case that palta has been granted by the Settlement Authorities in favour of the plaintiffs. It is only pursuant to the order of the Settlement Authorities, the patta pass-book has been issued to the plaintiffs. According to learned Counsel for the plaintiffs the provisions of the said Act make the pass-book conclusive evidence of the title to the property. The said Act received the assent of the President on 24th January, 1986 and was published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette dated 30th January, 1986. It shall come into force on such date as the Government may by notification appoint and different dates may be notified for different areas and for different provisions of this Act. No material has been placed before me as to whether any Notification has been issued by the Government bringing to force the provisions of this Act. However, I will proceed to dispose of the contention on the footing that this Act has come into force. Section 4 of the Act provides that entries in the patta passbook and the certified copy of entries in the patta passbook shall be presumed to be true and correct until the contrary is proved or a new entry is lawfully substituted therefor. Section 6 reads that the entries in the patta passbook issued by the Tahsildar under Section 3 shall be prima facie evidence of title of the person in whose name the patta passbook has been issued to the parcels of land entered in the patta passbook free of any prior encumbrance, unless otherwise specified therein. Section 12 thereof provides for appeal by any person aggrieved by an order made by the Tahsildar under the said Act within such period as may be prescribed. Section 13 provides for a revision by any officer of the Revenue Department not below the rank of District Revenue Officer, suo motu as well as on application by party. Section 14 is to. the effect that no suit shall lie against the Government or any officer of the Government in respect of the claim to have an entry made in any patta passbook that is maintained under the Act or to have any such entry omitted or amended. The proviso to the Section is very important. It reads thus:
Provided that if any person aggrieved as to any right of which he is in possession, by an entry made in the patta passbook under this Act, he may institute a suit for a declaration of his rights under Chapter VI of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (Central Act XLVII of 1963); and the entry in the patta passbook shall be amended in accordance with any such declaration.
33. Thus it is seen that the patta passbook is only providing prima facie evidence and it is rebuttable. The Proviso to Section 14 of this Act enables an aggrieved person to file a suit. In the present case, these proceedings are already pending in which the question of title is canvassed. The patta-pass book issued during the pendency of these proceedings will not conclude the question. Whoever wins in these proceedings ultimately, is entitled to get the entry in the patta passbook rectified in accordance with the decision. There is no substance in the argument that the only remedy of the defendants is only to file a fresh suit against the plaintiffs for declaration of their title under the Specific Relief Act. Learned Counsel submits that the burden is placed squarely on the defendants by this Act and it is for them to establish their title by so independent proceeding. I do not agree. Evidence has been let in by both the parties in the present proceedings and the question of title was already in issue. Hence, there is no necessity for the defendants to file a fresh suit to decide the question of title.
34. In the result, the second appeal fails and it is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. For the reasons stated above C.M.P. No. 14888 of 1992 is also dismissed. No costs.