Bellie, J.
1. Plaintiff who has filed the second appeal having died his legal representatives are prosecuting the second appeal.
2. The plaintiff was employed as Rakshak in the Railway Protection Force. On 9.6.1976 he was issued with a charge memo on the allegation that while he was on guard duty in the Carriage Works, Perambur, during the night between 8.6.1976 and 9.6.1976 a theft of copper wire in the store room had occurred and the miscreants had entered into the store room by removing the tiles in the roof and there had been fire inside the room and on account of that there was smoke coming out, but the plaintiff did not note it due to his carelessness and non-diligence. Thereafter, an enquiry was conducted and the Enquiry Officer found him guilty of the charge and the Assistant Security Officer passed an order removing the plaintiff from service. The plaintiff filed an appeal before the Security Officer which was dismissed and again he filed a revision also and that too was dismissed. Thereafter, the plaintiff has filed the present suit for declaration that the order passed by the Assistant Security Officer removing the plaintiff from service is vitiated by illegalities and it is void.
3. The defendant-Railways inter alia contended that the Enquiry Officer conducted the enquiry in accordance with the rules and the principles of natural justice and on acceptable evidence he has held the plaintiff guilty of the charge and thus there is no illegality committed during the enquiry and hence the order removing the plaintiff from service is not liable to be set aside.
4. The trial court on consideration of the evidence accepted the case of the plaintiff that the Inquiry Officer has not conducted the enquiry as per the rules and the charges against him have not been proved. He, therefore decreed the suit.
5. But in appeal filed by the defendant-Railways the appellate Judge did not accept the findings of the trial court and instead he held that the Enquiry Officer has correctly followed the procedure as per the rules and the evidence shows that the plaintiff was guilty of the charge. Therefore, the appellate judge set aside the decree passed by the trial court and dismissed the suit. Against this the plaintiff has come up with the present second appeal.
6. Mr. Fenn Walter, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant-plaintiff contends that the Enquiry Officer has not followed Rule 44(6) of the Railway Protection Force Rules, 1959 in that he has not called upon the delinquent-plaintiff to give evidence and therefore the plaintiff has not examined himself. But the said rule does not state that the Enquiry Officer should so call upon the delinquent to give evidence, and it only states that the delinquent shall be entitled to give evidence in person. It is not the case of the delinquent that he wanted to or offered to examine himself as a witness but he was not allowed to do so. After the examination of the prosecution witnesses were over the delinquent has filed a written statement and that written statement has been considered by the Enquiry Officer. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the Enquiry Officer failed to follow the procedure laid down in Rule 44(6). Only in this regard one substantial question of law has been formulated in the second appeal.
7. However, Mr. Fenn Walter further submits that in any case the punishment of removal from service is highly excessive and disproportionate to the delinquency alleged. But no point regarding this has been raised in the grounds of appeal nor any substantial question of law has been formulated in this regard and hence it follows that this argument cannot be advanced.
8. Even otherwise I find no merit in this submission also. The learned Counsel in connection with this point relied on an unreported judgment of a single Judge of this Court in J. Johnson v. The Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Government of India and another, SA. No. 1872 of 1983, dated 10.12.1987. But as against this Mr. P.B. Krishnamurthy, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent-Railways, submits that the question of adequacy of punishment is within the competence of the authorities empowered to award punishment under the Railway Protection Force Act and that shall not be interfered with by the court and in support of this contention he brings to my notice a judgment of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Parma Nanda : (1989)IILLJ57SC , wherein in paragraph 18 of the Supreme Court has held that,.in the case of proceedings transferred to the Tribunal from a civil court or High Court, the Tribunal has the jurisdiction to exercise all the powers which the civil court could in a suit or the High Court in a writ proceedings could have respectively exercised. In an original proceeding instituted before the Tribunal under Section 19, the Tribunal can exercise any of the powers of a civil court, or High Court.
Having held so the Supreme Court has further held in paragraph 27 as follows:
We must unequivocally state that the jurisdiction or the Tribunal to interfere with the disciplinary matters or punishment cannot be equated with an appellate jurisdiction. The Tribunal cannot interfere with the findings of the Inquiry Officer or competent authority where they are not arbitrary or utterly perverse. It is appropriate to remember that the power to impose penalty on a delinquent officer is conferred on the competent authority either by an Act of legislature or rules made under the Proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. If there has been an enquiry consistent with the rules and in accordance with the principles of natural justice what punishment would meet the ends of justice is a matter exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority. If the penalty can lawfully be imposed and is imposed on the proved misconduct, the Tribunal has no power to substitute its own discretion for that of the authority. The adequacy of penalty unless it is mala fide is certainly not a matter for the Tribunal to concern with. The Tribunal also cannot interfere with the penalty if the conclusion of the inquiry officer or the competent authority is based on evidence if some of it is found to be irrelevant or extraneous to the matter.
This ruling of the Supreme Court has not been brought to the notice of the learned single Judge who has rendered the abovesaid unreported decision. He has referred to some of the Supreme Court decisions which are all prior to the said Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Parma Nanda : (1989)IILLJ57SC .
9. It is not the case of the delinquent that there was any mala fide in the imposition of the penalty. Therefore, in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court this Court cannot interfere with the punishment awarded on the ground that it is not commensurate with the misconduct proved and is excessive.
10. Thus, I find no merit in the second appeal. Accordingly it is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.