Abdul Hadi, J.
1. This appeal filed by the 2nd defendant is against the judgment and decree in O.S. No. 7930 of 1975 on the file of the II Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Madras.
2. The suit by the 1st respondent herein is for recovery of Rs. 42,903/- as compensation for damage caused to the plaintiff's lorry by the 2nd defendant-appellant's bus, driven by the 1st defendant, who is the 2nd respondent herein.
3. The trial court found that the said driver drove the bus in a rash and negligent manner and caused damage to the lorry and it assessed the quantum of damages at Rs. 35,103.18 and granted a decree for the same. Further, despite the claim of the 2nd defendant-appellant that civil court has no jurisdiction to try the matter in view of Section 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the trial court held that it had jurisdiction to try the suit. It also held that non-impleading of the insurance company was not fatal to the maintainability of the suit.
4. Now, in this appeal, the learned Counsel for the appellant urged at first that the civil court had no jurisdiction to try this suit in view of the interpretation he put to the proviso to Section 110(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). Section 110(1) of the Act including the proviso runs as follows:
A State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute one or more Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals (hereinafter referred to as 'the Claims Tribunals') for such area as may be specified in the notification for the purpose of adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of, or bodily injury to, persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles, or damages to any property of a third party so arising, or both:Provided that where such claim includes a claim for compensation in respect of damage to property exceeding rupees two thousand, the claimant may, at his option, refer the claim to a civil court for adjudication, and where a reference is so made, the Claims Tribunal shall have no jurisdiction to entertain any question relating to such claim.
Section 110-F of the Act runs as follows:
Bar of Jurisdiction of Civil Courts.- Where any Claims Tribunal has been constituted for any area, no civil court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any question relating to any claim for compensation which may be adjudicated upon by the Claims Tribunal for that area, and no injunction in respect of any action taken or to be taken by or before the Claims Tribunal in respect of the claim for compensation shall be granted by the civil court.
The present case admittedly involves damage to property alone and will be covered by the expression 'damages to any property of a third party so arising' in Section 110, main part. Then, according to Section 110-F of the Act, the Tribunal constituted under the Act alone has jurisdiction to try the compensation claimed regarding the said property damage and not a civil court. But the proviso to Section 110(1) of the Act says that where the claim 'includes' a claim for compensation in respect of damage to the property exceeding Rs. 2.000/-, the claimant may, at his option, refer the claim to a civil court for adjudication and where a reference is made, Claims Tribunal shall have no jurisdiction to entertain any question relating to such claim. So, if the said proviso applies to the present case, the civil court alone will have jurisdiction and not the Tribunal. No doubt, the present claim is for a sum exceeding Rs. 2,000/-. But the learned Counsel for the appellant submits that the proviso will not apply to the present case, since according to him the word 'includes' used in the proviso would necessarily denote that the proviso would cover a case only of composite claim, that is, a claim for compensation in respect of accident involving death of, or bodily injury to, persons including a claim for compensation in respect of damage to property exceeding Rs. 2,000/- and will not cover a case of compensation for property damage simpliciter as the present one. But, this submission cannot be accepted.
5. The word 'include' has also the meaning 'confine within, contain or comprise' (vide 'Words and Phrases', Permanent Edition, Volume 20, pages 443 to 447 quoting Webster's Dictionary and Century Dictionary). Further, in S.G.R. Tiles Manufacturers v. State of Gujarat : [1977]1SCR878 , the Supreme Court had to interpret the word 'includes' in entry 22 of Part I of the Schedule to the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, which runs as follows:
Employment in Potteries Industry. Explanation.-For the purpose of this entry potteries industry includes manufacture of the following articles of pottery...
In that context, the Supreme Court observed as follows:
The Explanation says that, for the purpose of entry 22, potteries industry 'includes' manufacture of the nine articles of pottery named therein. It seems to us that the word 'includes' has been used here in the sense of 'means'; this is the only construction that the word can bear in the context. In that sense it is not a word of extension, but limitation; it is exhaustive of the meaning which must be given to potteries industry for the purpose of entry 22. The use of the word 'includes' in the restrictive sense is not unknown.
The Supreme Court also observed 'we do not think there could be any inflexible rule that the word 'include' should be read always as a word of extension without reference to the context.' The Supreme Court further illustrated the said statement by pointing out to another entry, viz., entry No. 19 in the same Schedule and concluded by saying 'though 'include' is generally used in interpretation clauses as a word of enlargement, in some cases the context might suggest a different intention.'
6. In the present case also, it is to be noted that by Central Act 66 of 1959, the compensation for damage to property was also brought within the Tribunal's jurisdiction for the first time. Then, the legislature thought in its wisdom that when the claim with reference to property damage went beyond Rs. 2,000/-, the aggrieved party should be given option to refer his claim to civil court for adjudication and when such option is exercised, the Claims Tribunal will have no jurisdiction but only the civil court. The object seems to be that where the quantum of compensation goes beyond a particular figure, it must be left to the party to decide whether he will be satisfied with the remedy provided by the Tribunal or he would like to have the remedy of the civil court. So, taking into account the context, I think the word 'includes' used in the proviso only means 'contains' or 'comprises' and the proviso will then take in both the composite claim as suggested by the counsel and also the claim for compensation for property damage simpliciter. Therefore, the plaintiff having exercised his option to have the claim settled by the civil court, that alone will have jurisdiction as per the proviso.
7. Then, on the question of negligence, the learned Counsel for the appellant could not advance any serious argument, particularly because of what is stated in Exh. B-2, the complaint which was pointed out by the trial Judge in para 7 of his judgment, showing clearly the negligence on the part of the 1st defendant, driver. There is also no appeal by the driver.
8. The argument regarding the non-impleading of the insurance company is also not very much pressed by the learned Counsel for the appellant.
9. Then, regarding the quantum of compensation awarded, he submitted that the authors of Exhs. A-9 to A-44, receipts, estimates and bills, were not examined and that the mechanic or the owner was also not examined. PW 4, the agent of the owner of the lorry, has been examined. So, the non-examination of the owner is not fatal. PW 4 has proved the abovesaid documents and, therefore, the non-examination of the authors of the said documents will not be fatal to the plaintiff.
10. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. No costs.