ORDER
K.M. Natarajan, J.
1. This revision is directed against the order passed in M.P. 1226 of 1981 in Distress Application No. 135 of 1981 by the Registrar of Small Causes Court, Madras. Tie facts which are necessary for the disposal of this revision are briefly as follows The revision petitioner is the tenant occupying door No. 1, Artisan Shanmugham St., Anderson Road, Ayyanavaram, Madras 23. According to the respondent-landlord, the tenant has committed wilful default in payment of rent. Hence, she filed Dist. Appn. No. 135 of 1981 before the Registrar of Small Causes Court, Madras, for issuing a warrant to distress the movables in the possession of the revision petitioner in the above premises for recovery of Rs. 2,800 being the arrears of rent at Rs. 400 per mensem from December, 1980 till the end of June, 1981, and obtained an order of attachment of the movables belonging to the revision petitioner. In execution of the said order, the Bailiff who was accompanied by the husband of the respondent-landlady distrained 18 items of articles, whose value has been fixed at Rs. 1,925. The revision petitioner filed a petition in M.P. 1225 of 1981, under Section 60 of the Presidency Small Causes Courts Act, for discharge of the warrant of distress, and another petition in M.P. 1226 of 1981, under Section 62 of the Presidency Small Causes Courts Act for awarding compensation of Rs. 15,000. The Registrar of Small Causes Court allowed the application M.P. 1225 of 1981, holding that the respondent-landlady had suppressed the facts and obtained Ex Parte order of distress stating that the revision petitioner-tenant has fallen into arrears ammounting to Rs. 2,800 and in the circumstances of the case the warrant of distress is not called for and hence it is liable to be discharged. However, the Registrar of Small Causes Court dismissed the application M.P. 1226 of 1981 for claiming compensation of Rs. 15,000 by the tenant on the ground that though the revision petitioner has been put to loss of reputation and mental agony and is entitled to claim compensation, yet, considering the fact thatthe pecuniary jurisdiction of the said court is only Rs. 20, the said Court is unable to award compensation in a sum of Rs. 15,000. C.R.P. 3782 of 1982 filed by the landlady against the order passed in M.P. 1225 of 1981 was dismissed by M.A. Sathar Sayed, J.
2. The present C.R.P. is filed by the tenant against the order passed in M.P. 126 of 1981. According to the learned Counsel for the revision-petitioner-tenant, when the Registrar of Small Causes Court is competent to issue a distress warrant for unlimited amount, the Registrar ought to have awarded compensation and erred in dismissing the application on the ground that he has got pecuniary jurisdiction only to Rs. 20 and dismissed the petition on that score. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the respondent landlord would submit that under Section 14 of the Presidency Small Causes Courts Act, it is specifically provided that the Registrar may be invested with the powers of a Judge in suits not exceeding Rs. 20 by the State Government and as such the order passed by the Registrar of Small Causes Court in this case is perfectly legal and in accordance with the provision of the said Act and no interference is called for. Now the question that arises for determination in this revision is whether the Registrar of Small Causes Court, who is competent to issue distress warrant for any amount which accrued for a particular period, is empowered to award compensation in connection with the distress warrant made by him of only Rs. 20. In this connection, it is submitted by the learned Counsel on either side that there is no precedent on this question by this Court and any of the other High Courts to the best of knowledge.
3. It is not in dispute that under Section 53 of the Presidency Small Causes Courts Act, 1882 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), any person claiming to be entitled to arrears of rent of any house may apply to any Judge of the Small Causes Court or Registrar for such warrant as is referred to in the Act. Section 54 deals with the issue of distress warrant by the Judge or the Registrar. Sections 56 and 57 deal with the execution of the warrant, Section 60 deals with the application to discharge or suspend the warrant. Section 63 deals with the power to award compensation. Section 63 deals with the power to transfer to High Court suits involving more than Rs. l,000 under See. 60 or 61, while Section 14 of the Act deals with the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Small Causes Court, regarding the trial of the suits.
4. It is worth while to extract Sections 14 and 63 of the said Act, in this regard for proper appreciation of the contentions of both parties. Section 14 reads as follows:
Registrar may be invested with powers of a Judge in suits not exceeding twenty rupees; The State Government may invest the Registrar with the powers of a Judge under this Act for the trial of suits in which the amount or value of the subjectmatter does not exceed twenty rupees. And, subject to the orders of the Chief Judge, the Judge of the Small Causes Court may, whenever he thinks fit transfer from his own file to the file of the Registrar any suit which the latter is competent to try.
Section 63 of the Act reads as follows:
Power to transfer to High Court case involving more than one thousand rupees: In any case, under Section 60 and Section 61, if the value of the subjectmatter in dispute exceeds one thousand rupees, the applicant or claimant may apply to the High Court to transfer the case to itself, and the High Court, on being satisfied that it is expedient that the case should be disposed of by itself may direct the case to be transferred accordingly, and may thereupon alter or set aside any order passed in the case by a Judge of the Small Causes Court, and make such order therein as the High Court thinks fit.
Every application under this Section shall be made within seven days from the date of the seizure of the subjectmatter in dispute.
In granting applications under this Section the High Court may impose such terms as to payment of, or giving security for, cost or otherwise as it thinks' fit.
The procedure in cases transferred under this Section shall conform, as far as may be, to the procedure in suits before the High Court in the exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction; and orders made under this Section may be executed as if they were made in the exercise of such jurisdiction, and every such order awarding or refusing compensation shall bar any suit for the recovery of compensation for any damage caused by the distress which gave rise to the case wherein such order was made.
On going through the above provision, namely. Section 14 of the Act, it is seen that the said provision deals with the vesting of powers of a Judge with the Registrar for trial of suits not exceeding twenty rupees. That Section is not applicable to a case for awarding compensation. The relevant provisions which deal with the power to award compensation to debtor or claimant are in Section 62 and Section 63 of the Act. Section 62 deals with the power to award compensation to debtor or claimant which provides that in any case under Section 60 or Section 61 the Judge by whom the case is heard may award such compensation by way of damages to the applicant or claimant (as the case may be) as the Judge thinks fit. Section 60 deals with the application to discharge or suspend warrant. Section 61 deals with the claim to goods distrained made by a stranger. In the instant case, the petition filed by the revision petitioner in M.P. 1225 of 1981 for discharge of distress warrant issued under Dist. Appn. No. 135 of 1981, was allowed and the revision against the said order was also dismissed. That petition was filed under Section 60 of the Act. M.P. 1226 of 1981, which is the subjectmatter of this revision, is a petition under Section 62 of the Act for awarding compensation of Rs. 15,000, by way of damages. The said application was dismissed on the ground that the Registrar has no pecuniary jurisdiction to award such compensation even though the revision petitioner has been put to loss of reputation and mental agony and Is entitled to compensation.
5. The question raised relates to the consequence of levy of distress under Ch. 8 of the Act which lays down the substantive as well as procedural law on levy of distress. It has been held in Nasiruddin v. Umerji Adam and Co : AIR1941Bom286 of the Act is exhaustive on all points relating to the issue of the distress warrant. In Bhala Singh v. Gosto Behari : AIR1966Cal199 , it has been held:
The Small Causes Court Procedure for distress under Ch. 8 of the Act is a summary remedy by which a person seeks an immediate redress to take into his possession the movables of any person to be held as almost a pledge to compel the performance or the satisfaction of a debt.
The scope of jurisdiction under this Chapter has been considered in Balakrishnan v. Ikbal : AIR1966Cal199 , A. Division Bench of the said High Court consisting of S.H. Sheth and C.V. Rane, JJ. held:
Whereas Sections 53 and 54 confer power both on a Judge as well as the Registrar, Section 60 confers power only upon the judge. Therefore, if an application for discharge of a distress warrant which the tenant alleges to be illegal or unlawful is to be made; It must be made to a Judge. Nasiruddin Karim Mohamed v. Umerji Adam & Co A.I.R. 1941 Bom. 288 , relied on.
The above conclusion has been reached in view of the opinion of the Division bench that the Registrar has no Jurisdiction to modify the distress warrant, because the modification of distress warrant presupposes a contest between the parties and determination by him, and he has no jurisdiction to decide the contest between the parties. Further, no section empowers him to decide the contest between the parties with a view to modifying the distress warrant, Section 62 of the Small Cause Coasts Act also refersonly to a 'Judge' who is competent to award such compensation by way of damages to the applicant. It is no doubt true that a wrongful distraint is actionable at law. The affected person has a remedy both under the general law and also under Section 62 of the Act which provides summary remedy to the affected person. As already observed, the levy of distress starts with an application under Section 53. The affected person is given certain rights to avoid wrongful distress. One such is the award of compensation for wrongful distress as provided under Section 62 of the Act. Section 62 is interrelated to Sections 60 and 61 which are, in turn, related to Section 62. No application can be filed under Section 62 of the Act in the absence of an application under Sections 60 or 61 of the Act. In all cases of applications under Section 60 or 61 of the Act, provision is made for trial of cases, the subjectmatter of which exceeds Rs.l,000. Under Section 63 of the Act, it is open to the applicant to apply to the Court to transfer the matter or apply to the High Court for a decision. The significance of such provision is that the Act contemplates that in all cases where the subjectmatter of the scheme exceeds Rs. 1,000, the case may have to be removed to the High Court, which has sufficient pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain and try such claim.
6. Generally, a suit for award of compensation for wrongful distraint wherein the claim exceeds the pecuniary limits of the jurisdiction of the court of Small Causes, cannot be entertained by the court of Small Cause, since Section l8 places a bar on such a suit In Bhola Singh v. Gosto Behari : AIR1966Cal199 , the scope of Section 53 had been considered and It has been held as follows:
On a review of the scheme and relevant. Sections of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, three broad indisputable propositions emerge:
(1) That the Court is essentially a summary court trying 'small causes';
(2) That no regular suit for the recovery of immovable property which raises primarily questions of disputed title can be entertained by this court; and
(3) That the distress procedure in Chap. VIII cannot deal with complicated questions of title, when regular suits for the same cannot be entertained.
In the above quoted case, it was also held:
Held on facts of the case, that the case raised highly intricate and controversial questions of title, company law and liquidation, and that therefore the distress proceedings were entirely misconceived.
However, where a regular suit seeking the same relief cannot be entertained by the Court of Small Causes, the distress procedure for the same relief cannot be availed of. Now, we have to dispose of the contention raised by the learned Counsel for the revision petitioner whether under Section 53 of the Act the court is empowered to issue distress warrant for a claim of amount exceeding the pecuniary Jurisdiction of the Court of Small Causes, if It is not empowered to grant award of compensation for the amount exceeding the said pecuniary jurisdiction. In this connection, it is worthwhile to refer to para 10 of the above quoted Judgment in Bhola Singh v. Gosto Behari : AIR1966Cal199 , where the Court considered the basic limitation on the jurisdiction of the Presidency Small Causes Court and in effect concluded that Chap. VII and VIII of the Act are subject to such basic limitation. It should be noted that under Chap. VIII, a distress proceeding is initiated on an application by the person claiming to be entitled to arrears of rent of any house or premises which application should be supported by an affidavit or affirmation to the effect in the form marked 'As in III' Schedule to the Act. The proceedings start Ex Parte and the distress warrant is also issued Ex Parte. Hence, there is. no adjudication involved in this process. It is only after the seizure of the movable property found in and upon the houses mentioned in the warrant. the affected person can come forward with an application either under Section 60 or 61 of the Act. As between the applicant and the debtor, the Act does not contemplate adjudication of any disputed question as between them. In Nasiruddin v. Umerji Adam and Co. : AIR1941Bom286 , it was held:
Applications under Section 60 are generally made on the ground that the debtor is not justly indebted for the rent claimed from him, or that the rent claimed is excessive, or that it has not become due and payable, or that it was not payable for the period for which it was claimed.
In Balakrishna v. Mohd. Ikbal : AIR1966Cal199 , it was observed:
If there is a pending dispute between the landlord and a tenant in regard to the rent which the tenant is liable to pay to the landlord, no distress warrant can be issued and levied for recovery of rent. It can be levied only to recover such rent as was due and payable on the basis of the rent paid by the tenant to the landlord and accepted by the landlord in respect of the month preceding the period for which the landlord makes an application for issue of distress warrant to recover it. If a landlord snakes an application for levy of distress upon the movables of his tenant to recover rent at a rate different from one which is agreed between them or at a rate different from one at which the tenant paid to the landlord for the month proceeding the period of issue of distress warrant, no distress warrant can be issued.
It is clear from the above decision that if the Court finds that the distress was levied for an excess amount, the only course open to the court is to discharge the distress warrant in its entirety on the ground of illegality under Section 60 of the Act. Thus it is clear that the proceedings under Chap, VIII of the Act are sui generis and are of the nature of an execution proceedings to recover arrears of rent on accepted facts. Further, under Chap. VIII of the Act, the court does not adjudicate upon the liability to pay rent nor on the question of rent payable. If these are disputed the court ceases to have jurisdiction over the matter. As such, it cannot be said that in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 53, the Court of Small Causes exercises a jurisdiction beyond its pecuniary limits prescribed under Section 18 of the Act. Thus the proceedings under Chap. VIII of the Act are special proceedings in the nature of execution. In view of the above analysis, it has to be held that the Registrar of the Court of Small Causes has no pecuniary jurisdiction to try a claim has no pecuniary jurisdiction to try a claim made under Section 63 of the Act for a sum of Rs. 15,000 for compensation as and by way of damages suffered on account of wrongful distraint of the movable properties of the claimant. The procedure followed by the court of Small Causes is illegal. As already found, under Section 62 of the Act, it is Judge of the Court of Small Causes who is empowered to deal with the applications under Section 62 of the Act. In this regard, it is also worthwhile to refer to Or. VI of the Rules of the Small Causes Court which deals with the procedure for filing applications. Under R.l(3), Sub-rule (a), an application under Sections 53 and 60 of the principal Act shall ordinarily be presented to the Registrar or to such officer as the Judge appoints. What the rules contemplated is the presenting of an application to the Registrar and that has been done in the present case. But, after presentation of the application, the matter has got to be dealt with by the Judge under Section 62 of the Act, the Registrar instead of so placing the matter before the Judge himself has disposed of the matter which is not legal. Hence the said order is to be set aside. In view of the above reasoning that the Court of Small Causes has no jurisdiction to dispose of the matter, as it goes beyond its pecuniary jurisdiction, the Court of Small Causes has to return the application to the applicant for presentation before the proper court or transfer the same for disposal before this Court if any application is filed by the revision petitioner in this regard as contemplated under Section 63 of the Act.
7. In the result, the revision is allowed, the order passed by the Registrar of the Court of Small Causes is set aside and the matter is remitted back to the Court of Small Causes which is directedto restore the petition and dispose of the same according to law and in the light of the observations made in this order. However, in the circumstances of the case, there is no order as to costs.
8. Before parting with the case, I wish to place on record my deep appreciation of the assistance rendered to this Court by Mr. K.T. Paulpandian, advocate, who acted as amicus curiae and enlightened the subjectmatter by citing number of authorities.