Raju, J.
1. The above writ petition has been filed for the issue of a writ of certiorari to call for and quash the order of the second respondent in Revision Case No. Hqrs. 11/40 (133) of 1981-82, dated September 3, 1982, and for consequential directions.
2. The petitioner-company was assessed to income-tax for the assessment year 1975-76 by the Income-tax Officer, 'A' Ward, Ananthpur, on September 21, 1978, under section 143(3) read with section 144B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter called 'the Act'), on a sum of Rs. 50,14,789 and to a tax of Rs. 32,42,540. The assessee during the relevant previous year, claims to have paid advance tax of Rs. 31,76,250 under the provisions of the Act. Consequently, after giving credit to the advance tax paid and to the tax deducted at source, a sum of Rs. 60,121 was determined to be payable by the assessee. The assessee pursued the matter on appeal before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) challenging several items of disallowances and additions. The appellate authority gave relief to the assessee by deleting two sums aggregating to Rs. 10,32,245 and the order passed was also given effect to by the Income-tax Officer by a revised assessment order dated March 13, 1979. As a consequence of implementing the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), Hyderabad, refund of a sum of Rs. 5,29,832 was ordered to be made to the assessee.
3. Thereupon, both the assessee and the Revenue pursued the matter on further appeals before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Hyderabad Bench 'B', and the Appellate Tribunal, while allowing the appeal of the assessee, dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue. As a consequence of the order of the Appellate Tribunal, the assessee became entitled to further relief and the Income-tax Officer was obliged to give effect to the order of the Tribunal. While matters stood thus, the assessee filed two applications before the Income-tax Officer on January 29, 1981, inviting his attention to the orders passed by the first appellate authority and the Tribunal and claiming interest under section 214 of the Act. By an order dated February 13, 1981, the Income-tax Officer rejected the claim for view that subsequent assessment made in pursuance of any direction given in the appellate orders/court orders is immaterial so far as the claim made vis-a-vis the first appellate authority. As regards the claim made with reference to the orders of the Tribunal on further appeal, no orders appear to have been passed by the Income-tax Officer. The assessee pursued the matter by a revision to the Commissioner of Income-tax, Hyderabad, invoking the provisions of section 264 of the Act seeking for a direction to the Income-tax Officer to grant interest under section 214 of the Act as claimed by the assessee. The Commissioner of Income-tax, Andhra Pradesh-II, Hyderabad, by the impugned order, rejected the claim of the assessee preferring to follow a decision of the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court rendered in Trustees of H. E. H. Nizam's Religious Endowment Trust v. ITO : [1981]131ITR239(AP) . As could be seen from the impugned order itself, the assessee placed reliance upon a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Chloride India Ltd. v. CIT : [1977]106ITR38(Cal) , subsequently confirmed on appeal in CIT v. Chloride India Ltd. : [1990]186ITR217(Cal) and that of a Division Bench of this court in Triplicane URBAN Co-operative Society Ltd. v. CIT : [1980]126ITR125(Mad) . Aggrieved, the above writ petition has been filed.
4. Mr. G. Sarangan, learned counsel from the Bangalore Bar appearing on behalf of the petitioners, contended that the impugned order cannot be sustained and that the petitioner is entitled to the relief claimed in the light of the pronouncements of the decisions in Chloride India Ltd.'s case : [1977]106ITR38(Cal) , Triplicane Urban Co-operative Society Ltd.'s case : [1980]126ITR125(Mad) , Rayon Traders Pvt. Ltd. v. ITO : [1980]126ITR135(Mad) and Bardolia Textile Mills v. ITO : [1985]151ITR389(Guj) .
5. Mr. N. V. Balasubramanian, learned counsel appearing for the Revenue, raised a preliminary objection that the writ petition as such is not maintainable before this court since the authority which passed the impugned order is outside the territorial jurisdiction of this court at the point of time when the order came to be passed which, according to learned counsel, constituted the cause of action. So far as the merits of the claims are concerned, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions in Trustees of H. E. H. Nizam's Religious Endowment Trust : [1981]131ITR239(AP) , CIT v. G. B. Transports : [1985]155ITR548(Ker) and CIT v. Carona Sahu Co. Ltd. : [1984]146ITR452(Bom) . So far as the preliminary objections raised by learned counsel for the Revenue are concerned, reliance is placed on a Division Bench judgment of this court in Jeypore Sugar Co. Ltd. v. ITO : [1980]124ITR518(Mad) . While replaying to the plea of preliminary objection, learned counsel for the assessee relied upon the decisions in K. S. Rashid and Son v. Income-tax Investigation Commission : [1954]25ITR167(SC) , Jeypore Sugar Co. Ltd.'s case : [1980]124ITR518(Mad) and Seth Paluram Dhanania v. ITO : [1960]39ITR429(MP) .
6. After careful consideration of the respective submissions of learned counsel on either side, I am of the view that there is no substance or merit in the preliminary objection raised. In Jeypore Sugar Co. Ltd.'s case : [1980]124ITR518(Mad) , the Division Bench of this court sustained an objection on behalf of the Revenue to the jurisdiction of this court to entertain a writ petition at the instance of an assessee on the file of the Income-tax Officer, 'A' Ward, Circle-I, Kakinada, challenging the notice for reassessment issued and served at the office of the assessee at Chagallu once again within the jurisdiction of the assessing authority. As a matter of fact, the Division Bench pointed out that the petitioner, the assessee in that case, had not taken any steps for transferring its file to Madras where its administrative office was situate and as the assessing authority had territorial jurisdiction over the assessee and inasmuch as the notice was issued from Kakinada and served at a place Chagallu, no part of the cause of action arose in Madras. The Division Bench was also of the view that mere location of the administrative office was not relevant to the question of jurisdiction. Unlike the fact situation in the said case, in the case on hand, it is specifically contended that subsequent to the impugned order, the registered office of the petitioner company had been transferred to the present Commissioner having jurisdiction over the petitioner's case, the first respondent, viz., the Commissioner of Income-tax, Coimbatore. The learned counsel for the assessee argued that any order that this court may have to pass in the light of the subsequent events has to be implemented only by the first respondent within the jurisdiction of this court. The decision referred to by counsel for the assessee also lends support to the above stand of the petitioner. Consequently, in my view, the decision relied upon for the Revenue has no application to the present case. In K. S. Rashid and Son's case : [1954]25ITR167(SC) , the Supreme Court expressed the view that there are only two limitations placed on the exercise of the powers by a High Court exercising jurisdiction article 226 of the Constitution of India, viz., (i) the writs issued by the High Court cannot run beyond the territories subject to its jurisdiction and (ii) the person or authority to whom the High Court is empowered to issue writs must be amenable to its jurisdiction either by residence or location within those jurisdictions. Relying upon this, learned counsel contended that the rule is required to be issued to the first respondent only in the changed circumstances and there is no impediment for this court to entertain the writ petition and proceed to decide the same on merits. The decision in J. K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U. P. : (1957)ILLJ439All , was also relied upon to say that, when the records and files relating to the petitioner assessee have already been sent to the first respondent, a writ cannot be issued to the second respondent who is outside the jurisdiction and who has passed the order at this stage. In Seth Paluram Dhanania v. ITO : [1960]39ITR429(MP) , a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court expressed the view that even though original notices were issued by the Income-tax Officer, Special Circle-I, Nagpur, having regard to the subsequent transfer of the cases to the authorities at Calcutta and later to the authorities at New Delhi, the writ petition was held not to be maintainable before the said court. There can be no controversy over the fact that, after the insertion of article 226(2) by the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act, 1963, any High Court may also exercise its powers under article 226(1), if the cause of action wholly or in part arises for the exercise of such power in relation to the territories under its control notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such persons was not within that territory. There is no controversy or dispute over the claim made by the assessee in this case that, subsequent to the passing of the impound order, not only the registered office of the petitioner company was changed but the relevant income-tax files also stood transferred to the jurisdiction of the first respondent who is well within the territorial limits and jurisdiction to this court. As claimed by counsel for the assessee, even if the impugned order is to be set aside or any direction is to be given, it is the first respondent who has to implement the same and not the second respondent who ceased to have jurisdiction over the matter any longer. Consequently, I am of the view that the petitioner has sufficient cause of action to maintain this writ petition before this court. The preliminary objection, therefore, fails and shall stand rejected.
7. So far as the claim on merits is concerned, there is no serious dispute or controversy from the Revenue to the effect that, if the decisions of this court in Triplicane Urban Society Ltd.'s case : [1980]126ITR125(Mad) and Rayon Traders Private Ltd.'s case : [1980]126ITR135(Mad) are applied, the petitioner would be entitled to the relief claimed. On the other hand, the only submission on behalf of the Revenue is that the second respondent functioning within the State of Andhra Pradesh was right in applying the ration of the decision in Trustees of H. E. H. Nizam's Religious Endowment Trust : [1981]131ITR239(AP) of the Andhra Pradesh High Court and that no exception could be taken to the court and that no exception could be taken to the course adopted by the second respondent. It is agreed by learned counsel appearing on either side that the various High Courts in the country are divided in their opinion and views on the very issue and when the Madras High Court, the Calcutta High Court, the Karnataka High Court and the Gujarat High Court, to mention a few among others, have taken a similar view and position, the Andhra Pradesh High Court, the Kerala High Court and the Allahabad High Court, to mention a few, have taken a contrary view and the question so much now before me would be to decide the issue in the light of those judgments pressed into service by the respective learned counsel appearing before me in support of their submissions. Learned counsel appearing for the Revenue also contended that the Division Bench which decided the two cases in Triplicane Urban Co-operative Society Ltd.'s case : [1980]126ITR125(Mad) and Rayon Traders Pvt. Ltd.'s case : [1980]126ITR135(Mad) did not advert to the provisions contained in section 244 of the Act and that, consequently, the Division Bench judgments relied upon very much for the assessee require reconsideration by a larger Bench.
8. I have carefully considered the submissions of learned counsel appearing on either side. Judicial propriety requires me to follow and apply an earlier Division Bench judgment of this court which is very much binding on men sitting as a single judge of the same High Court, unless there is any binding decision rendered by a larger Bench of this court or by the Supreme Court, or a contra decision of co-ordinate jurisdiction of this court or the decision concerned suffers from any serious infirmity warranting such a reference for the consideration of a larger Bench. The apex court often administered a note of caution to the courts in this country with reference to the course to be adopted in such cases. Judicial decorum and certainty of law were held to require a single judge to follow the decision of a larger Bench and, even if, for reasons to be stated, a different view was necessitated, the matter should be only referred to the Hon'ble Chief Justice for referring the question to a larger Bench. It was also pointed out that the binding effect of a decision does not depend upon whether a particular argument was considered therein or not provided that the point with reference to which an argument was subsequently advanced was actually decided. Viewed in this manner, the earlier decisions of the Division Bench of this court do not suffer from any infirmity. Consequently, in my view, the decision of the Division Bench is very much binding on me. The reason for which learned counsel for the Revenue submits that the matter requires consideration by a larger Bench does not appeal to me. As a matter of fact, the consideration in the decisions in Triplicane Urban Co-operative Society Ltd.'s case : [1980]126ITR125(Mad) , particularly in the penultimate paragraph at pages 133 and 134 and Rayon Traders Pvt. Ltd.'s case : [1980]126ITR135(Mad) does not justify the said stand taken on behalf of the Revenue. In the latest decision of the Karnataka High Court in CIT v. Deepchand Kishanlal : [1990]183ITR299(KAR) and that of the Calcutta High Court in CIT v. Chloride India Ltd. : [1990]186ITR217(Cal) , the ratio of the Division Bench judgment of this court is applied and followed. Even the decisions which purport to take a different view than the one taken by this court do not reject the view of the Division Bench of this court on the ground that it did not take into account any relevant provision particularly section 244 of the Act. As a matter of fact, the Division Bench judgment of this court in Rayon Traders Pvt. Ltd.'s case : [1980]126ITR135(Mad) construed section 244 of the Act as not covering a case of excess payment as advance tax. The same view was also taken by the Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Bardolia Textile Mills' case : [1985]151ITR389(Guj) . On the other hand, those decisions, in my view, rest their conclusions mainly on their interpretation of the expression 'regular assessment' in section 214(1) or section 214(2).
9. Consequently, after a careful consideration of the various decisions of the several High Courts referred to before me, I am of the view that the two decisions of the Division Bench of this court have not only placed a practical and plausible interpretation on the relevant provisions but have taken a just and reasonable view of the matter with the object of doing real and substantial justice to the citizen who was obliged to part with his money and stood denied of its use. The inevitable and inescapable conclusion, therefore, would be that the words 'regular assessment' would take within them not only the order of assessment made by the Income-tax Officer initially if the matter rests at that stage, but also any order passed by the Income-tax Officer finally to give effect to the directions, if any, of the appellate or revisional authority or competent court. The scope and applicability of section 214(2) cannot, therefore, be said to have been excluded by section 240 or section 244 of Chapter XIX of the Act in cases like the one before me. I am also of the view, as observed by the Division Bench, that these provisions are supplementary in nature and give the assessee a further right and are not to be so construed as to be destructive of the rights under section 214(2) of the Act. The impugned order, therefore, is hereby quashed and the first respondent is directed to restore the matter to his file and pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as indicated in this order. No costs.