Curgenven, J.
1. These three appeals, arising out of two suits tried by Beasley, J., as he then was, may be disposed of together since they relate to the same set of transactions. Jagannadham Pillai and one Somasundaram Chetti (now dead) carried on a hardware and machinery business in partnership from 191.3 to 1923. One of the two suits (C.S. No. 358 of 1924) was brought by Jagannadham Pillai for dissolution of this partnership and for accounts. At the trial it was agreed that the partnership was no longer subsisting so that it became a suit for accounts only. The case for the defendants, who were the sons of Somasundaram Chetti, was that the accounts had already been settled between the partners and indeed on two occasions. In 1920 there was a settlement with effect to the end of December, 1918, with the result that Jagannadham Pillai received Rs. 13,800 as his share of the profits. Again in 1923 there was a second settlement up to the termination of the partnership, and, probably because post-war conditions were, not favourable to a business of this kind, a considerable loss had to be divided and Jagannadham Pillai made himself liable, by means to which I will subsequently refer, for the share to which his partnership related. He now repudiates both these so-called settlements of account on the ground that he was in fact no party to them and that they are in fraud of his interests. If it is to be held that they did amount to settlements, his further plea is that owing to certain errors they are not binding upon him.
2. These pleas are raised in the face of a number of written admissions accepting his liability. The partnership agreement was originally an oral one. But on the 11th of June, 1920, when Jagannadharn Pillai's share was reduced from 1|4 to 1|5, the agreement Ex. A was executed. This contains a statement subscribed to by Jagannadham Pillai that accounts had been taken up to the 31st of December 1918 and that he had received the amount due to him. Again when to provide for his ultimate liability he executed the promissory note Ex. E on the 25th of May, 1923, he made a similar admission with regard to the profit due up to the end of 1918. Then as regards the second settlement, Ex. E itself is the most important piece of evidence of its acceptance by Jagannadharn Pillai, and this document was followed by what purported to be a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds; and the agreement to enter into this mortgage comprises another admission, and further such admissions are to be found in the stock books of the partnership. In all, as the plaintiff had to admit, he acknowledged a debt of Rs. 62,000 to the defendants in five different documents. Yet he has had the effrontery to state in evidence that he had no opportunities of looking into the accounts and that he signed these documents blindly trusting the honesty of Somasundaram Chetti. He can hardly pretend that he is a man without any business abilities or experience because for 20 years he was in charge of the hardware department of Messrs. Oakes & Co-drawing a salary of Rs. 100 a month and 10 per cent. commission on sales. His evidence contains a number of prevarications regarding his acquaintance with the accounts, but the admission that he makes as regards his signing some of the rough accounts proves, what is indeed only in accordance with probabilities, that as manager he was responsible for maintaining them. How far he is prepared to go will be seen from his assertion that he understood the promissory note Ex. E to be something in the way of a security bond for losses which might subsequently be incurred in the business. There is no doubt in my mind that on each occasion the plaintiff was perfectly well aware of what he was signing and that he must have given his agreement after a verification of the accounts. An attempt has been made to cast doubt upon the truth of the second settlement by reason of some discrepancy in regard to dates. In the written statement 31st July, 1920, is given as the date when accounts up to the 31st of December, 1918, were made up, while the date of Ex. A, as we have seen, is the 11th of June, 1920. How-aver such a difference may be accounted for, no reason has been given for the view that it indicates the evidence regarding the settlements to be false.
3. Accepting then the fact of these two settlements, it remains to consider whether the plaintiff is entitled to have them reopened. It is unnecessary to discuss the principles upon which such reopening should be allowed, because he has failed not only to establish any kind of fraud but any kind of error. Before us he has raised five objections to the correctness of the accounts and I will briefly deal with these seriatim.
4. [After discussing the objections as to the correctness of the accounts His Lordship concludes]
5. The suit for an account was properly dismissed and O.S.A. No. 71 of 1926 must, be dismissed with costs.
6. The remaining two appeals, O.S.A. Nos. 98 and 108 of 1926, arise out of C.S. No. 592 of 1924, which was a suit brought by Somasundaram Chetti's legal representatives against Jagannadham Pillai upon a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds. Reference has already been made to the promissory note, Ex. E, which Jagannadham Pillai executed on the 25th of May, 1923, for a sum of Rs. 62,017-13-8 due by him to the firm. This was followed on the following day (26th May) by an agreement to deposit title-deeds, Ex. IV, and on the 27th the title-deeds were sent with a letter which begins as follows:
I have the honour of herewith sending you with the intention of delivering and depositing the same with you as per the memorandum, dated the 26th May, 1923, executed by me in your favour the title-deeds and papers relating to the property....
and then follows a reference to the schedules annexed to the letter. The question the learned Judge had to decide in order to discover whether or not the mortgage was valid, was whether this letter required registration as embodying a bargain between the parties. The view which he has taken is that, since this letter makes reference to the memorandum of agreement of the previous day, the two documents must be read together, and so read they clearly embody the terms of the transaction. The Privy Council has laid down the law upon this subject in Pranjivandas Jagjivandas Mehta v. Chan Ma Phee (1916) L.R. 43 IndAp 122 : I.L.R. 43 C. 895 : 31 M.L.J. 155 (P.C.) and Subramanian v. Lutchman (1922) L.R. 50 IndAp 77 : I.L.R. 50 C. 338 : 44 M.L.J. 602 (P.C.). It had been previously stated by Lord Cairns in the leading case of Shaw v. Foster (1872) L.R. 5 H.L. 321 as follows:
Although it is a well-established rule of equity that a deposit of a document of title without more, without writing or without a word of mouth, will create in equity a charge upon the property referred to, I apprehend that that general rule will not apply when you have a deposit accompanied by an actual written charge. In that case you must refer to the terms of the written document, and any implication that might be raised, supposing there was no document, is put out of the case and reduced to silence by the documents by which alone you must be governed.
7. In the present case there is no doubt that the act of depositing was accompanied by the letter under reference, a circumstance which distinguishes this case from some others as, for instance, Krishnaiya v. Ponnuswami Aiyar I.L.R. (1923) M. 398 : 46 M.L.J. 295. Then does the letter amount to an actual written charge? It is clear that the answer to this question depends upon the degree of formality which marks the document. A mere note saying 'herewith the title-deeds' would not constitute an instrument of charge. A detailed statement containing the terms of the agreement, the amount of the debt to be secured, rate of interest, terms' of repayment, particulars of the security, on the other hand, clearly would amount to such a document. While the letter under reference does enumerate the properties intended to be mortgaged it says nothing about the other particulars in express terms; but it makes it clear that further information is to be obtained from the memorandum, dated the 26th of May; and turning to this memorandum, and reading it in its turn with the promissory note, we obtain all the particulars of the transaction. The question is whether the procedure adopted amounted to recording those terms in a document requiring registration under Section 17 of the Registration Act. Only one case has been brought to our attention relating to a document which refers to terms not expressly recited in it, and that is an unreported case decided by Madhavan Nair and Jackson, JJ. A.S. Nos. 64, 117 and 176 of 1924. But in that case it was found that the document referred to a bargain which had already been completed, and to particulars which had not previously been reduced to writing. In the present instance it is, I think, clear that if the letter, besides referring to the memorandum of agreement, had also embodied its terms, it would have been registrable as a record of the transaction; and the mere fact that some other paper, whether an agreement or any other record is immaterial, had to be read in order to ascertain those terms does not seem to me to make any difference in principle. I think that the learned Judge is clearly right in holding that the two documents, for the purpose of deciding ,this point, must be read together as the letter intends them to be, and so read they do constitute a document within the terms of Section 17. I would hold, therefore, that the mortgage is invalid for lack of registration.
8. This disposes of the plaintiff's appeal in this suit. The learned Judge, however, considered that it was open to him to give a decree upon the promissory note, and against this decree the defendant has appealed. The decree was preceded by an order allowing amendment of the plaint, so as to comprise a prayer for a personal decree upon the promissory note. This order has been attacked before us, principally on the. ground that when it was made the claim, under, the promissory note was time-barred. But I do not think we need consider whether or not the amendment should have been allowed because on the plaint as it originally stood it seems clear that a decree of this character could be granted. Apart from a general prayer 'for such further and other reliefs as to this Honourable Court may seem meet or the nature of the case may require,' paragraph 14 of the plaint asks that the defendant be directed to pay to the plaintiffs the sum named and goes on, in the ordinary terms of a mortgage suit, to ask for the sale of the properties and, if the proceeds are not sufficient, for a personal decree. It was I think clearly within the competence of the Court, upon failure of the mortgage, to give such a decree on a plaint so framed.
9. It has been held by a Full Bench of this Court in Pulaka Veetil Muthalakulangara Kunhu Moidu v. Thiruthipalli Madhavan Menon I.L.R. (1909) M. 410 : 19 M.L.J. 584 that a, personal covenant to pay may be proved by a mortgage invalid for defect of attestation, and I think it is incontestable that a Trial Court, On finding a mortgage to be invalid for this or any other reason, may give a decree on the personal covenant which it contains, provided of Course that it be not barred. The only case to the contrary cited before us is Gajadhar Mahton v. Ambika Prasad Tiwari I.L.R. (1925) A. 459 : 49 M.L.J. 238 (P.C.), where their Lordships of the Privy Council decided, clearly in the special circumstances of that case, that they should not themselves give a decree of this nature. Nor do I think that where as here the debt is embodied in a promissory note which forms the basis of the invalid mortgage the Court is any more disqualified from giving a decree upon that note. In the result I would dismiss both these appeals with costs.
Bhashyam Aiyangar, J.
10. I agree.