S. Jagadeesan, J.
1. The first defendant in O.S. No. 152 of 1989 on the file of the Sub-Court, Periyakulam, is the petitioner herein. The plaintiff/first respondent-bank filed the said suit for recovery of certain amount against the petitioner herein as well as respondents Nos. 2 to 24 herein. Originally, in paragraph 7 of the plaint it, has been stated that the partners of the ninth defendant-firm had deposited the title deeds in respect of items Nos. 1 to 4, 11 and 12 of 'A' schedule with the plaintiff-bank as security for all the amounts due from the first defendant under various accounts. It is further stated that those properties are belonging to defendants Nos. 2, 3 and one late Pandian and late V. N. Surilimani, whose legal representatives had been added as defendants Nos. 16, 17, 20 and 8, 15, 21 to 23. The title deeds have been deposited with an intention to create security. It is further stated that the first defendant-firm, through all its partners, has deposited the title deeds in respect of items Nos. 5, 6 and 7 of 'A' schedule creating an equitable mortgage. Accordingly, the fifth defendant-firm had deposited the title deeds in respect of the properties described as items Nos. 8 to 10 of 'A' schedule.
2. The first respondent herein filed an application, I.A. No. 612 of 1993, for amendment of the plaint. By way of amendment, the first respondent seeking for substitution of paragraph 7 of the plaint. In the amended plaint, it is stated that items Nos. 1 to 4 and 6 of the properties described in the schedule belong to Surulivel Nadar, Surilimani, Thanigaivel, Pandian and Jayaprakash. Items Nos. 7, 11 and 12 belong to the first defendant-firm. Item No. 5 belongs to the fifth defendant and items Nos. 8 to 10 belong to the ninth defendant. The title deeds of the said properties have been deposited with the bank for the amounts due from the first defendant-firm and the deposit was made by late Surulivel Nadar for himself and on behalf of the other co-owners and the partners of the ninth defendant as they are duly authorised agents. The third defendant, one of the partners of the fifth defendant-firm, had deposited the title deeds of item No. 5. Further, the third defendant has deposited the title deeds of items Nos. 6, 7, 11 and 12 for himself and as duly authorised agent of the partners of the fifth defendant-firm. The said application for amendment was allowed by the trial court. Aggrieved by the same, the present revision has been filed.
3. Mr. V. S. Subramaniam, learned counsel for the petitioner, contended that the amendment sought for totally changes the original pleadings and brings forth a new case. Hence, the amendment ought not to have been allowed and as such the order of the court below cannot be sustained. In support of his contention, he also refers to the judgments reported in Ganesh Trading Co. v. Moji Ram : [1978]2SCR614 , Kumaraswami v. Nanjappa, : AIR1978Mad285 , Kenchegowda v. Siddegowda : (1994)4SCC294 and Gupta and Sons Ltd. v. Damodar Valley Corporation, : [1966]1SCR796 .
4. On the contrary, counsel for the first respondent contended that the amendment sought for is only by way of explanation as to who had deposited the title deeds and as such the amendment do not change the original pleadings or the plea put forth by the first respondent. He also relied upon two judgments reported in Seshagiri v. Perumal [1983] 1 MLJ 62 and Palanisami v. Daivanaiammal [1983] 2 MLJ 547.
5. I carefully considered the contentions of both counsel. The deposit of title deeds in respect of items Nos. 1 to 12 of 'A' schedule as mentioned in paragraph 7 of the original plaint is not denied. When the deposit of title deeds has been made in order to create an equitable mortgage, now by way, of amendment the plaintiff wants to explain as to who are all the individual owners in respect of those properties and who had deposited the title deeds and whether the title deeds have been deposited in the individual capacity of the owner or on behalf of the firm and whether such deposit has been made by them as the agent of the other defendants in a representative capacity. In the original plaint, it has been specifically stated that the ninth defendant, the first defendant, and the fifth defendant-firms had deposited the title deeds. Now by way of amendment the individual partners names who had deposited the title deeds is specified and in what capacity such deposit has been made. Hence, I am of the view that the amendment sought for now will not in any way prejudice the petitioner, as it is only an explanation with regard to the deposit to title deeds. The amendment sought for does not bring out any new case nor changes the original pleadings. In view of this, there is absolutely no need to refer to the judgments cited by learned counsel, except to refer to three of the latest judgments of this court and the apex court.
6. In Akshaya Restaurant v. Anjanappa, : AIR1995SC1498 , the Supreme Court has held, where the amendment sought for in the written statement was from 'agreement of sale' to 'agreement for promotion', that the amendment can be allowed as it does not change the cause of action. It may be worth extracting the portion which is as follows (page 1499) :
'Learned counsel for the appellant vehemently contends that having made an admission that the respondents had entered into an agreement of sale and having made certain averments in support thereof, it was not open to the respondents to wriggle out from the admission. Admission is a material piece of evidence which would be in favour of the appellant and binds the respondents when the admission is sought to be withdrawn and some additional facts are sought to he introduced, it would be inconsistent and the High Court was not justified in permitting such an amendment.
We find no force in the contention. It is settled law that even the admission can be explained and even inconsistent pleas could be taken in the pleadings. It is seen that in paragraph 6 of the written statement definite stand was taken but subsequently in the application for amendment, it was sought to be modified as indicated in the petition. In that view of the matter, we find that there is no material irregularity committed by the High Court in exercising its power under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, in permitting amendment of the written statement.'
7. In another case reported in Coimbatore Seva Nilayam v. R. Narayanaswami Naidu [1993] 1 MLJ 17 (NRC) A. R. Lakshmanan J. has held as follows (page 18) :
'It is well settled by catena of decisions of this court and also of the apex court that by merely allowing an application for amendment, there is no adjudication of the merits of the amended pleas introduced, that the merits of the amended pleas have got to be adjudicated upon after allowing the opposite side to put forth additional pleadings in answer to the same and that certainly the additional pleadings may take in also the plea of bar of limitation. It is also well settled that the court may in appropriate cases allow the amendment even after the statutory period of limitation. In the instant case, the suit was originally filed by the petitioner for declaration of title and for recovery of possession of the suit property. Since the petitioner was dispossessed of the land subsequent to the filing of the suit the proposed amendment petition was filed praying for delivery of possession. To such a suit, as held by the Supreme Court in Abdul Waheed Khan v. Bhawani, : [1966]3SCR617 , only article 142 of the Limitation Act applies. By allowing the amendment, no injury or injustice is caused to the respondents herein. No jurisdictional error is also involved in this case because of the amendment being ordered.'
8. Yet another judgment reported is Muthammal v. Thamburati [1997] 1 LW 261; [1997] 1 MLJ 560. Sathasivam J. has held as follows (page 564 of [1997] 1 MLJ :
'A reading of Order 6, rule 17 of the Civil Procedure Code, at the first sight shows that at any stage of the proceedings, it is open to the parties to alter or amend his pleadings in such a manner and on such terms for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties. The decisions cited on the side of the respondents show that if the proposed amendment brings new cause of action and the same is barred by limitation, certainly the same cannot be permitted. In the light of the decisions both in favour as well as against allowing amendment one thing is clear that the general rule is that a party is not allowed by amendment to set up a new case or a new cause of action particularly when suit on new case or cause of action is barred. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Gupta and Sons Ltd. v. Damodar Valley Corporation, : [1966]1SCR796 , where the amendment does not constitute the addition of a new cause of action or raise a different case, but amounts merely to a different or additional approach to the same facts, the amendment is to be allowed even after expiry of the statutory period of limitation. In the said leading judgment, the Supreme Court has also observed :
'The object of courts and rules of procedure is to decide the rights of parties and not to punish them for their mistake. Further, a party is strictly not entitled to relief on the statute of limitation when what is sought to be brought in by the amendment can be said in substance to be already in the pleadings sought to be amended.'
Even though the decisions cited by learned counsel for the respondents clearly show that the amendment sought to be made is subject to the law of limitation, if the cause of action is not going to be changed and if anything happens after filing the suit, it is open to the affected party to take necessary steps for amendment of the plaint. No doubt, no amendment will be allowed to introduce a new set of ideas to the prejudice of any right acquired by any party of lapse of time.'
9. On the above said principles, it is clear that the amendment can be allowed at any point of time, provided the same is not barred by limitation and further provided it does not change the original cause of action or the case. As pointed out already, in this case, even as held in Gupta and Sons Ltd. v. Damodar Valley Corporation, : [1966]1SCR796 , the amendment 1. Here printed in italics. sought for is only an explanation and does not change the original case of the deposit of title deeds for the creation of the equitable mortgage. Hence there is no infirmity or illegality or any error of jurisdiction in the order of the court below.
10. The civil revision petition is dismissed as devoid of any merit.