ORDER
1. The petitioner is a sitting M.L.A. of the Legislative Assembly of Tamil Nadu. He has been elected from the Pantuti Assembly Constituency as a Pattalai Makkalkatchi (hereinafter referred to as P.M.K.) candidate in the general elections held in June 1991. The petitioner was the only member of the P.M.K. party elected to the Assembly and he had been representing the said party in the Assembly since June 1991. According to the petitioner, an extraordinary General Meeting of the P.M.K. party was held at Panruti on 5-12-1993 wherein the nominated office bearers were removed and the petitioner was elected unanimously as the President of the party and Thiru Nellikuppam Krishnamoorthy was unanimously elected as the General Secretary of the P.M.K. Party. On 6-12-1993, the newly elected office-bearers sent a communication to the Hon'ble Speaker of the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, the first respondent herein informing him of the change of office-bearers of the P.M.K. Party also with a request to have the correspondence with the new set of office-bearers and not to entertain any correspondence from the removed officebearers of the PMK Party. The communication dated 6-12-1993 reads thus:
Phone 8255941
PATTALI MAKKAL KATCHI
Head Office
629, Anna Salai, Madras-600006.
__________________________________________________________________
President: General Secretary:
Panruti Nellikupapam
Ramachandran, Ve. Krishnamoorthi,
MLA. MABL.
(all in Tamil)
Dated 6-12-1993.
To,
The Honourable Speaker,
Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly,
Fort St. George,
Madras-600009.
Honoured Sir,
I wish to place before the Honourable Speaker, the following information for notice and further action, if necessary.
In a extra-ordinary General Body Meeting held at Panruti on 5-12-1993, it was unanimously decided to withdraw the nominated President Thiru. Theoran, nominated General Secretary Thiru Thalith Ezhilmalai, nominated Treasurer Thiru Hanif and nominated Head Quarters Secretary Thiru Rama Muthukumar and in their places, Thiru Panruti S. Ramachandran, B.E. (Hons.), MLA, has been elected as the President and Thiru Nellikuppam V. Krishnamurthy, MABL, has been elected as the General Secretary of the Pattali Makkal Katchi (PMK).
I, therefore, request your honour that any correspondence emanating from the expelled office bearers need not be given credence to.
Any communication intended for the Pattali Makkal Katchi, may please be sent to the above address by the Assembly Secretariat.
Thanking you,
Yours sincerely,
Sd/-
(V. Krishnamurthy)
General Secretary.
On the very same date, the petitioner sent intimation to the Chief Election Commissioner of India, New Delhi, the 3rd respondent herein under Section 29A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 regarding the change of the office bearers. The said communication reads thus:
Phone : 8255941
Pattali Makkal Katchi
Head Office
629, Anna Salai, Madras-600006.
Panruti Nellikuppam,
S. Ramachandran, V. Krishnamoorthi,.
B.E. (Hons.) F.I.E., MABL,
MLA, President General Secretary
6th December, 1993.
To,
The Chief Election Commissioner,
Election Commission of India,
Nirvachan Sadan, Ashok Road,
New Delhi-110001.
Sub: Intimation under Section 29-A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951-- regarding change of office bearers.
We hereby intimate the Election Commission of India, the following changes in the office bearers and also, the change of address of our party, i.e., Pattali Makkal Katchi, as envisaged in Section 29-A of the R. P. Act, 1951.
In an extra-ordinary Body Meeting of the General Council all members who have paid subscriptions and have become members of the party, namely Pattali Makkal Katchi, held al Panruti on 5-12-1993, the following steps were taken:
(a) The said members unanimously resolved to withdraw (i) erstwhile nominated President Thiru Thceran; (ii) erstwhile nominated General Secretary Thiru Thalith Ezhilmalai; (iii) erstwhile nominated Treasurer Thiru Manifa; and (iv) erstwhile nominated Head Quarters Secretary Thiru Rama Muthukumar, and removed them from their respective offices.
(b) In their place, Panruti S. Ramachandran, B.E., (Hons.) MLA (only MLA ofthe PMK) of the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly elected on the ticket of Pattali, Makkal Katchi, has been elected as the President; (ii) Thiru Nellikuppam V. Krishna-murthy, MABL (former MP of Lok Sabha) has been elected as the General Secretary of the Party.
The above two steps have been taken, as already stated, at the meeting of the party held on 5-12-1993.
In the above circumstances, we both, as duly elected and occupying office bearers as the President and General Secretary, do hereby inform the Commission that the above changes may be taken note of and effected in your records.
Any future communications intended for the PMK may kindly be sent to the above address to which the party has shifted.
Thanking you,
Yours faithfully,
Sd/- Sd/-
(President) (General Secretary)
Copy to the Chief Electoral Officer, Tamil Nadu, Public (Elections) Fort, St. George, Madras-600009, for information and record.
2. As directed by the first respondent, the 2nd respondent viz., the Secretary to Government, sent a reply on 9-12-1993 to the General Secretary of the P.M.K. whereby intimating that as per Section 29-A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 the changes in the name of a political party, its Head Office, office-bearers, address or any other material matters also tests with the Election Commission which is the; competent authority for taking decision thereon. On the above reasoning, the General Secretary was requested to comply with the provisions of the Representation of the People Act and then send details for taking further action. It will be useful to reproduce the letter in full which is as follows:---
By Special Messenger
EMBLEM
Secretariat,
Madras-600009.
Legislative Assembly Secretariat,
Letter No. 26905/93-1, T.N.L.A.S. (B.L)
Dated : 9-12-1993.
From
Thiru C. S. Janakiraman, B.A.B.L.,
Secretary.
To
Thiru V. Krishnanioorthy,
629, Anna Salai,
Madras-600006.
Sir,
Ref.: Your letter dated 6-12-1993 addressed to the Hon. Speaker, Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly.
While acknowledging the receipt of the letter cited, I am directed by the Hon. Speaker to state that under S. 29-A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 of Part IV-A, the Registration of Political Parties rests with the Election Commission of India and, hence any subsequent changes in the name of a political party, its head office, officebearers, address or any other material matters also rests with the Election Commissioner which is the competent authority for taking a decision thereon.
I am, therefore, directed to request you to kindly comply with the above provisions of the Representation of the People Act and then send details for taking further action in this regard.
Yours faithfully,
Sd/-
(C. S. Janakiraman)
It appears that on 8-12-1993, the 4th respondent had informed the 1 st respondent that the petitioner had been removed from the primary membership of the Pattali MakkalKatchi. On this, on 9-12-1993, the 1st respondent had called upon the petitioner to send reply to the communication dated 8-12-1993 of the 4th respondent. Accordingly, the petitioner sent a reply to the second respondent on 20-12-1993. By the impugned communication dated 29-12-1993, the second respondent as directed by the first respondent had stated that they have withdrawn the recognition accorded to the petitioner as a P.M.K.. Legislative member by declaring him as unattached member, and allotted a different seat than the one occupied by him earlier. The petitioner was allotted seat No. 127 in Block No. 4 under Rule 6 of the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly Rules. Challenging the said communication, the petitioner has filed the above writ petition for the following prayer:
' .... to issue a writ of certiorarified mandamus, or any other appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of a writ of certiorarified mandamus, for the proceedings of the second respondent made in Nay Mu Ka No. 26005/93-2 T.N.L.A. (Sa Mu Va 1) dt. 29-12-1993 and quash the said proceedings dt. 29-12-1993 and consequently direct the first and 2nd respondents to continue to recognise the petitioner as a PMK party member in the Legislative Assembly of Tamil Nadu and pass further or other orders. . . . '
On 28-1-1994 I admitted the writ petition and ordered notice to the respondents returnable by two weeks in the main writ petition as well as in WMP 2290/94 which is to stay the operation of the proceedings of the 2nd respondent made in Nay Mu Ka No. 26905/93 T.N.L.A. (Sa Mu Va 1) dt. 29-12-1993. On service of notice Mr. G. Raja-gopalan entered appearance on behalf of the 3rd respondent and Mr. A. Kulasekaran for the 4th icapondent. D.O. Letter No. 2088/ 94-3 TNLAS (BI) dated 17-2-1994 was addressed to Mr. P. Thangavel, B.Sc., B.L. Additional Registrar (Judicial) High Court, Madras had been sent by the 2nd respondent stating as follows: ---
'With reference to your letter cited, I am directed by the Hon. Speaker, Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly to inform you thataccording to the existing practice, the Speaker does not place himself or the House into the jurisdiction of Judicial Adjudication in regard to any matter concerning the regulation of procedure or the conduct of business or for maintaining order in the Legislature. However, the High Court will be apprised of the constitutional and legal aspects of the matter and the required information will be furnished through the Legal Officers of the Government, to the High Court'.
Even though it is stated that the High Court will be apprised of the constitutional and legal aspects of the matter and the required information will be furnished through the Legal Officers of the Government, to the High Court. No one appeared or apprised of the constitutional and legal aspects of the matter on behalf of the respondents 1 and 2. Mr. V. Raghupathy, learned Addl. Govt. Pleader (Wrists) who was present at the time of hearing has also informed the Court that he has not received any instructions from respondents 1 and 2 appear on their behalf or apprise of the constitutional and legal aspects of the matter.
3. I have heard Mr. R. Krishnamoorthy, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Mr. G. Rajagopalan for the 3rd respondent and Mr. A. Kulasekaran for the 4th respondent. All the learned counsel have argued the matter at great length and also cited authorities and invited my attention to the pleadings and the documents filed in the form of typed set. Learned counsel for the Election Commissioner has also produced before the Court the representations made by the petitioner and the 4th respondent to the Election Commissioner and other records.
4. According to Mr. R. Krishmoorthy, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, the action of the first respondent in de-recognising the petitioner as P.M.K. Party Legislative member on the basis of the letter written by the 4th respondent is absolutely arbitrary and it is submitted that the petitioner is the lone member of P.M.K. party in the Legislative Assembly and the question as to the changes in the name of a political party or its office bearers or any other materialmatters in respect of a recognised political party rests only with the third respondent and therefore it is submitted that when the 3rd respondent is seized of the matter, the decision of the first respondent contained in the impugned notification dated 29-12-1993 is wholly without jurisdiction and liable to be set aside. It is also pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the first respondent Hon'ble Speaker himself has rightly understood the legal position and sent a communication dated 9-12-93 stating that the change in the name of a political party, office bearers etc., has to be decided only by the Election Commissioner of India under S. 29-A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 of Part IV-A, there is no justification for the first respondent to go back on his own decision. Mr. A. Kulasekaran, learned counsel appearing for the 4th respondent made elaborate submission stating that the impugned order is part of the Assembly procedure and conduct of business as defined under Art. 212 of the Constitution and as such the decision of the first respondent is not amenable to the writ jurisdiction. It was further submitted that the impugned order is not the one under Schedule X of the Constitution because there is no definition about 'unattached'. Unattached is not a disqualification. The learned counsel has also placed heavy reliance on the decision reported in Kailash Nath Singh Yadav v. Speaker, Vidhan Sabha, Lucknow, : AIR1993All334 and Shri Kihota Hollohon v. Zachilhu, : [1992]1SCR686 . The main points urged by Mr. Kulasekaran, learned counsel for the 4th respondents are:
1. The impugned order is part of Assembly procedure and conduct of business as defined under Art 212 of the Constitution, which includes the business of the House both inside and outside the House.
2. The order passed by the Speaker is within the jurisdiction of Art. 208 of the Constitution and the Rules framed thereunder vide AIR 1980 Mad 248, Palray case.
3. Article 226 of the Constitution is incorporated to fulfil the purpose of Art. 208 vide : AIR1993All334 .
4. The order passed by the Speaker is not one under Schedule X of the Constitution because there is no definition about 'Unattached'. The definition in respect of 'discretion and disqualification' is available. There is no definition in respect of unattached. Unattached is not a disqualification.
5. Admittedly, the impugned order was not passed in exercise of para 8(1)(d) of Schedule X.
6. Unattachment is not a disqualification as such. The 4th respondent has not made any reference invoking Schedule X to the Speaker and it is not the case of the petitioner that the order is passed invoking Schedule X.
7. The order passed by the 1st respondent is based on convention and practice.
8. Recognition of party or group inside the House is the conduct of the business of the House, which is supported by AIR 1993 AH 334 .
9. Nowhere in the affidavit of the petitioner is stated, what is the provision of the Constitution or what Act was violated by the 1st respondent while passing the order.
10. Mere allegation of mala fide is not sufficient AIR 1992 SC 359 .
11. : [1992]1SCR686 specifically prohibits judicial review prior to making of decision under Schedule X in flimsy matters especially when the Speaker exercises his prerogative right under the Rules framed under Art. 208. Such an order is not amenable to judicial review.
12. The names of the office bearers of the 4th respondent will find a place in the 3rd respondent records. As such, they need not comply with S. 29A and Symbol Order 15.
13. Already submitted a report of the Committee published by Parliament citing the decision of AIR 1993 SC (sic) and clearly made a demarcation between Judiciary and Parliament or Assembly. The petitioner has not made out any case to invoke the jurisdiction of Art. 226 of Constitution. : AIR1993All334 .
5. Mr. R. Krishnamoorthy, learned senior counsel in reply to the above submissions would submit that it is incorrect to say that the impugned order is part of the Assembly procedure and conduct of business and that the order passed by the Speaker is within the jurisdiction of Art. 208 and as such it is not amenable to writ jurisdiction. The question whether the petitioner is the leader of the party elected as President or the 4th respondent is the leader of the party, are matters which are now pending before the 3rd respondent and that is precisely the reason why it cannot be said to relate to the proceedings of the House or procedure within the meaning of Art. 212 or the business rule of the Legislative Assembly. He further submitted that the nature of the order which has to be passed by the Election Commission under Cl. 15 of the Election Symbols (Reservation and Election Symbols (Reservation and Allotment) Order, 1968 is final and it can (sic) note of by the Speaker deciding the question of title of property and reliance was placed on the decision of the Kerala High Court reported in T. P. Peethambaran v. T.N. Musthafa, : AIR1990Ker171 and the learned counsel further submitted that the impugned proceedings cannot come within the purview of Art. 212 because it is not a matter relating to the proceedings of the legislature. It is a question, which is a rival group and who belongs to the political party. He would also submit that the petitioner is not complaining any irregularity in the procedure and his complaint is, that the impugned order is subject to judicial scrutiny under Art. 226. Referring to the decision cited by the 4th respondent viz., Kailash Nath Singh Yadav v. Speaker, Vidhan Sabha, Lucknow, : AIR1993All334 , the learned senior counsel would submit that this decision relates to recognition of the leader of the opposition. Even with regard to convention and repugnant, it is stated in the decision, that it is open to judicial secrutiny. The petitioner is now treated as not belonging to any party and treated as an unattached member, which is totally inconsistent with the statutory provisions of the Symbol Rules. He concluded his argument by stating that till the Election Commission decides the matter inone way or the other, the respondents 1 and 2 have no right to decide having regard to the constitutional provisions and S. 29A.
6. In the present WMP. this Court is concerned with the question as to whether the petitioner has made out a prima facie case and whether the balance of convenience lies in his favour to grant ad interim order of stay of operation of the communication of the 2nd respondent dated 29-12-1993. The points raised by the learned counsel appearing on either side have to be decided only in the main writ petition. In view of the elaborate arguments advanced by the learned counsel appearing on either side, I am considering only whether prima facie case is made out for the grant of interim stay of the operation of the proceedings of the second respondent dated 29-12-1993 pending final adjudication of the rights of the parties in the main writ petition. I make it clear that the writ petition will be disposed of finally without having any regard to the prima facie opinion expressed by me hereinbelow.
7. Admittedly, Mr. S. Ramachandran who is popularly known as Panruti Ram-chandran is the lone member of the P.M.K. Party in the Legislative Assembly. According to him, the nominated President and General Secretary, the 4th respondent herein were removed along with certain other nominated office bearers in an extraordinary general body meeting held on 5-12-1993. When this was intimated to the 1st respondent he has taken a decision that the change in the office bearers of a political party has to be resolved only by the Election Commission which according to the first respondent is the competent authority. As a matter of fact the petitioner and the General Secretary of the P.M.K. Party has sent an intimation dated 6th December, 1993 to the 3rd respondent under S. 29A of the representation of the People Act pertaining to the change of office bearers. The learned counsel appearing for the 3rd respondent would submit that the Election Commission is seized of the matter and they are yet to decide on the said representation made by both the parties. While so, the 1st respondent has passed theimpugned order on the basis of the communication dated 8-12-1993 said to have been received from the 4th respondent who according to the petitioner has been removed in the extraordinary general meeting held on 5-12-1993.
8. In my view, the question as to whether the 4th respondent has been removed from the office of General Secretary of P.M.K. party and as to whether the petitioner has been duly elected as the Presidents and Mr. Nellikuppam Krishnamurthi as the General Secretary of the P.M.K. party are matters which cannot be decided by the first respondent. The Hon'ble Speaker very rightly took a decision on 9-12-1993 that the change in the office bearers of a political party cannot be decided by him and he therefore directed the petitioner to approach the Election Commission. It is not known as to why the same yardstick was not applied when the 4th respondent sent a communication on 8-12-1993 intimating that the petitioner has been removed from the primary membership of the P.M.K. party. The Hon'ble Speaker has passed the impugned order withdrawing the recognition of the petitioner as P.M.K. party member in the Legislative Assembly and has declared the petitioner as 'unattached member.' By using the expression 'unattached' member, the first respondent has meant that the petitioner does not belong to any recognised political party.
9. On a careful consideration of the matter, I am of the prima facie opinion that the first respondent cannot decide as to whether the petitioner has been removed from the primary membership of the P.M.K. party and whether the 4th respondent who was nominated General Secretary of the party has been removed from the said office. The issues raised by the petitioner and the 4th respondent before the 1st respondent are matters which are to be agitated before the Election Commission and to be resolved by the said commission. The first respondent cannot, in my view decide these disputed questions relating to the removal of a person from the primary membership of a party or removing of a person from the office of the GeneralSecretary of a party. I am unable to agree with the learned counsel Mr. Kulasekaran appearing for the 4th respondent that the impugned order made by the Hon'ble Speaker is part of the Assembly procedure and conduct of business as envisaged under Art. 212 of the Constitution of India and therefore, the impugned order is not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court. Admittedly, the petitioner has gone before the Election Commission with regard to the removal of some of the nominated office-bearers of the P.M.K. party and the said Election Commission is seized of the matter. Admittedly, it is for the Election Commission to decide the matter that as to what action should be taken on the communication dated 6-12-1993 of the petitioner. I am also of the opinion that the Hon'ble Speaker has adopted two different yardsticks in dealing with the representation made by the petitioner on 6-12-1993 and the representation made by the 4th respondent on 8-12-1993. If according to the first respondent the question of change of office bearers of a political party has to be resolved only by the Election Commission then there is no justification for arriving at a decision that the petitioner has been removed from the primary membership of P.M.K. party on the basis of the representation dated 8-12-1993 of the 4th respondent, and that he will be treated as 'unattached member'. There is much force in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the decision taken by the Hon'ble Speaker is arbitrary and unreasonable.
10. Learned counsel for the 4th respondent placed heavy reliance on the decision reported in Kailash, Nath Singh Yadav v. Speaker, Vidhan Sabha, Lucknow, : AIR1993All334 . That was a case relating to the recognition when two persons claimed as leaders of the opposite party. The Speaker of the U.P. Assembly accepted as leader the person who had the largest numerical strength. In that content the Allahabad High Court took the view that the decision of the Speaker was well within the jurisdiction. In my view, this judgment does not help the 4th respondent or lend support to his contention. The learned counsel for the 4th respondentalso cited a decision of the Apex Court reported in Kihota v. Zachilhu, : [1992]1SCR686 and would submit that the Speaker is immune from judicial scrutiny under Articles 122 and 212 of the Constitution of India. That was a case relating to the political defection. The Supreme Court has said that the statutory finality to the decision of the Speakers and Chairman does not detract or abbrogate the judicial review under Arts. 136 and 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India in so far as infirmities based on violations or constitutional mandates, mala fides failure in compliance of the rules of natural justice and privilege are concerned. The Supreme Court of India has observed as follows in para 41 at page 451.
'In the light of the decisions referred to above and the nature of function that is exercised by the Speaker/Chairman under paragraph 6, the scope of judicial review under Arts. 126 and 226 and 227 of the Constitution in respect of an order passed by the Speaker/Chairman under paragraph 6 would be confined to jurisdictional errors only viz., infirmities based on violation of constitutional mandate, mala fides, non-compliance with rules of natural justice and perversity.'
This judgment also in my view does not lend any support to the contention of the learned counsel for the 4th respondent. On the contrary, the Apex Court has found that the decision of the Speaker or Chairman does not enjoy absolute immunity and the same is subject to judicial review under the circumstances specified above.
11. Mr. R. Krishnamoorthy, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that the decision of the first respondent treating the petitioner as 'unattached member' is inconsistent with Cl. 15 of the Election Symbols (Reservation and Allotment) Order, 1968 and that the 3rd respondent is the competent authority to decide the issue raised by the petitioner as well as the 4th respondent with regard to the change in the office bearers of P.M.K. political party. Since the third respondent is seized of the matter, I don't propose toexpress any opinion on this question. Reliance was placed on the Full Bench decision reported in A. M. Paulraj v. Speaker, T. N. Legislative Assembly, : AIR1986Mad248 in support of the contention that the decision of the lirst respondent is immune from the judicial review. I do not agree with such contention. In that case, the Full Bench was concerned with the committal to civil prison of the editor of a Tamil Magazine by the Legislature for breach of privilege. One of the objections raised was pertaining to the jurisdiction of the Court. While dealing with the same; the Full Bench has observed in para 9 at page 252 as follows:
'It is, therefore, settled law for more than twenty years now, that where a petitioner approaches a Court contending that as a result of a committal to civil prison by the Legislature for breach of privilege his fundamental right under Art. 21 has been violated such a petition cannot be thrown out at the very threshold merely on the ground that the decision of a House of Legislature on an issue of privilege is being challenged. There is nothing in the Constitution which disabled a citizen who complains of a violation of his fundamental right under Art. 21 of the Constitution from filing a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The entertaining of a petition under Art. 226 in such a case or entertaining of an appeal against an order dismissing such a petition need not, therefore, be taken as an affront either to the Speaker of ihe Legislative Assembly or the Legislative Assembly itself.'
This decision again does not support the contention of the 4th respondent that this Court has no jurisdiction to judicially review the decision of the 1st respondent.
12. In the decision reported in In Re, under Art. 143, Constitution of India : AIR1965SC745 , the Apex Court of the land has held that Art. 226 of the Constitution of India confers very wide powers on every High Court throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, within those territories, directions orders or writs includingwrits in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto, cer-tiorari, or any of them 'for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose.' The Supreme Court has further held that it is hardly necessary to emphasise that the language used by Art. 226 in conferring power on the High Courts is very wide. Art. 12 defined the 'State' as including the Legislature of such State, and so, prima facie, the power conferred on the High Court under Art. 226(1) can, in a proper case, be exercised even against the legislature.
13. A Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in the decision reported in State v. Sudarshan Babu, : AIR1984Ker1 has held that a petition under Art. 226 of the Con-stitution of India would be maintainable even against the Legislature of the State as such Legislature is within the definition of the term 'State' in Art. 12 of the Constitution.
14. I have to also mention that neither the first respondent nor the second respondent has chosen to appear before this Court. The communication received from the 2nd respondent has also been extracted above. Unfortunately nobody made any representation or furnished any details. Had the respondents 1 and 2 present and made their submissions, it would have been of assistance to the Court.
15. With regard to the balance of convenience, I am of the view that the same lies in favour of granting a stay of operation of the order of the 2nd respondent dt. 29-12-1993 pending disposal of the main writ petition. Admittedly, the petitioner is the lone member of the P.M.K. Party in the Legislative Assembly. All along he has been recognised as lone member belonging to that party. If he is treated as 'Unattached Member', it would affect his rights. Therefore, the balance of convenience lies in granting stay till the disposal of the main writ petition. For the foregoing reasons, I am of the opinion that an interim stay has to be granted and accordingly the same is granted. The learned counsel for the Election Commission has also assured the Court that the representations made by the petitioner and the 4th respondent will bedisposed of as early as possible. Hence, I also direct the 3rd respondent to dispose of the matter on merits as expeditiously as possible.
16. I have expressed my views only on a prima facie consideration of the matter. The W.M.P is ordered accordingly.
17. Order accordingly.