ORDER
1. This is a petition filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash the proceedings in C.C. No. 184 of 1984 on the file of the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Tiruvannamalai.
2. The Food Inspector attached to Tiruvannamalai Municipality, at 10.00 a.m. on 23-2-1984 inspected the premises at No. 3 Kammala Street, Tiruvannamalai where Gemini Tata Tea Dust was stored for sale. At that time A3 the Manager was present. A1 and A2 are partners and A4 is the selling agent and A5 is the manufacturer of Gemini Tata Tea Dust. During inspection the Food Inspector found that 150 cases of Gemini Tata Tea Dust were stored for sale in the premises. He verified the Bill issued by A4 to M/s. P.V.R.J. and Co-Tiruvannamalai. Besides, he also verified the label on the caskets. Such verification revealed the following defects :-
(1) The label found on the casket did not specify batch Number and Code number, as required by Rule 32(e) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules; 1975 (herein after referred to as the rules').
(2) The month or year of packing as specified in the label related to March 1984. The Tea Dust had been sold by A4 on 11-2-1984 and the same was received by P.V.R.J. & Co. on 14-2-1984 itself. Hence the statement given on the label specifying the month and year of packing as March, 1984 is not correct and this is a clear violation of Rule 32(f) on the Rules;
(3) There is a false and misleading statement in the label contravening Rule 37 of the Rules.
(4) The warranty as found in the Bill is not complying with the provisions of Section 14 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954, and Rule 12-A of the Rules.
3. For all these violations the Food Inspector laid a complaint before the Court below. On receipt of the process, the petitioners accused came forward with this application challenging the legality of the proceedings initiated against them in the Court below.
4. The first violation complained of against the petitioners is under Rule 32(e) of the Rules, which is couched in the following terms as below :-
'32 Contents of the label. Unless otherwise provided in these rules there shall be specified on every label -
(a) to (d) ........................
(e) a batch number or code number either in Hindi or English numerical or alphabets or in combination.'
A cursory perusal of the above clause of the Rule would unmistakably reveal that it is incumbent on the Manufacturer to specify the batch number or code number in the label in any of the languages indicated in the clause viz., either in Hindi or in English. No doubt true it is that the Manufacturer in the case on hand did not specify the batch number or the code number in the label attached to the Tea Dust as required by this clause.
5. The learned counsel for the petitioners would however contend that this Rule i.e. rule 32(e) had been struck down by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in 'Dwarka Nath v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi', : 1971CriLJ1290 and therefore it is futile for the prosecution to contend that the petitioners had violated this Rule. A cursory perusal of the judgment cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners shows that the Supreme Court has held as follows :-
'Rules 32(e) requiring batch number or code number to be stated on labels of containers without specifying the date of packing or manufacture of the article or the date before which the article is to be used is ultra vires the rule making power of the Central Government and is invalid.'
6. The learned Government Advocate would however argue that since Rule 32(f) had been introduced in the year 1980 by way of an amendment requiring the month and year in which the commodity is manufactured or packed to be specified in the label, the decision of the Supreme Court cited above can be no sketch of imagination be stated to come to the rescue of the petitioners. He would further amplify his argument by stating that the Supreme Court struck down Rule 32(e) of the Rules framed under the Act on the ground of non-specifying the date of packing or manufacturing of the article or the date before which the article is to be used, and the defect pointed out by the Supreme Court had been rectified by the introduction of clause (f) by way of amendment and therefore Rule 32(e) cannot now be stated to be not in force as having been struck down by the apex body of the Judicial Administration of the country.
7. To this argument of the learned Government Advocate on this point, I am unable to affix my seal of approval. It appears that while introducing clause (f) by way of amendment, the effect of the judgment of the Supreme Court striking down Rule 32(e) had not at all been taken into account and clause (f) had been added independently of Rule 32(e). The violation or refraction of either of the clauses viz., (e) or (f) is independent by itself and not having any sort of connection with the other. As such it cannot be stated that by the introduction of clause (f) by way of amendment, clause (e) can automatically be stated to have been revived. Therefore I am of the view that the judgment of the Supreme Court striking down Rule 32(e) is very much in force and the benefit accruing from the judgment must go to the rescue of the petitioners. Therefore the contention of the Government Advocate on this point merits little substance.
8. The second and third violations complained of against the petitioners may conveniently go together for consideration. These violations relate to giving misleading and false statements in the label contravening clause (f) of Rule 32 and Rule 37. Verification of the label would indicate the month and year of manufacture is March, 1984. Factually the Tea Dust had been sold by A4 in the month of February, 1984 itself. Further the inspection of the premises had been made by the Food Inspector in the month of February, 1984. In such circumstances, it is crystal clear that the Tea Dust manufactured and packed in the month of February, 1984 had the label affixed relating to the month of March, 1984.
9. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would contend that their action of affixing the label to the Tea Dust relating to March 1984 even during the month of February, 1984 is very well protected by the provisions of the Standards of Weights and Measures Act, 1976, (hereinafter referred to as the Act') and the rules framed thereunder viz., the Standards of Weights and Measures (Packaged Commodities) Rules, 1977. He would draw the attention of the Court to Section 3 of the Act, 1976 as well as Rule 6(B) of the Rules framed thereunder. Section 3 of the Act of 1976 reads as follows :-
'3. Provisions of this Act to override the provisions of any other law :- The Provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent there with contained in any enactment other than this Act or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any enactment other than this Act.'
Proviso (B) to Rule 6 reads as follows :-
'6. Declaration to be made on every package. - Every package shall bear thereon or on a label securely affixed thereto a definite plain and conspicuous declaration, made in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter as, to -
(a) ................ (h)
Provided that -
(A) .........................
(B) Where any packaging material bearing thereon the month in which any commodity was expected to have been pre-packed is not exhausted during that month, such packaging material may be used for prepacking the concerned commodity produced or manufactured during the next succeeding month and not thereafter, but the Central Government may, if it is satisfied that such packaging material could not be exhausted during the prior aforesaid by reason of any circumstance beyond the control of the manufacturer packer, as the case may be, extend the time during which such packaging material may be used, and, where any such packaging material is exhausted before the expiry of the month indicated thereon, the packaging material intended to be used during the next succeeding month may be used for pre-packing the concerned commodity.'
10. A cursory glance of the aforesaid provisions would make it abundantly clear that the provisions of this Act will have overriding effect on the provisions of any other Act notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any enactment other than this Act or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any enactment other than this Act. Proviso (B) to Rule 6 further makes the position clear that where any packaging material is exhausted before the expiry of the month indicated therein, the packaging material intended to be used during the next succeeding month may be used for pre-packing the concerned commodity. Basing reliance on this saving provision the learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that if the labels to be affixed to the Tea Dust for the month of February 1984 are exhausted it would be perfectly legal for them to use the labels intended for the next succeeding month viz., March, 1984 and that was the reason for the label of March 1984 having been found affixed in the Tea Dust caskets at the time when the Food Inspector made inspection in the month of February, 1984. To this argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners the learned Government Advocate is unable to repel. I am also of the view that, on a careful reading of the provisions of the Standards of Weights and Measures Act and the Rules framed thereunder and the Provisions of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and the Rules framed thereunder the basis of the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the provisions of the Standards of Weights and Measures Act, 1976 and the Rules framed thereunder alone would govern the situation with regard to the packing of commodities. As such the petitioners cannot be said to have violated Rules 32(f) and 37 of the Rules framed under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.
11. The last violation complained of against the petitioners is that the Bill issued by A4 in effecting sales of Tea Dust does not contain the warranty thereby offending the Provisions of Section 14 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and Rule 12-A of the Rules framed thereunder. Section 14 of the said Act reads as follows :-
'14. Manufacturers, distributors and dealers to give warranty. - No manufacturer or distributor of, or dealer in any article of food shall sell such article to any vendor unless he also gives a warranty in writing in the prescribed form about the nature and quality of such article to the vendor :
Provided that a bill, cash memorandum or invoice in respect of the sale of any article of food given by a manufacturer or distributor of, or dealer in, such article to the vendor thereof shall be deemed to be a warranty given by such manufacturer, distributor or dealer under this section.'
12. Rule 12-A of the Rules framed thereunder reads as follows :-
'Every manufacturer, distributor or dealer selling an article of food to a vendor shall give either separately or in the bill, cash memo or label, a warranty in Form VI-A.
13. A careful reading of the aforesaid Section and the Rule clearly indicates that it is open to the manufacturer or distributor or dealer in any such article to give a warranty in writing in the form prescribed, or in the absence of such a warranty having been given, the Bill issued shall be deemed to be a warranty given by such Manufacturer, distributor or dealer.
14. So far as the case on hand is concerned, the Manufacturer had not at all issued the warranty in the form prescribed, but he had issued only the Bill for effecting the sale of Tea Dust. A cursory perusal of the Bill would point out that the warranty clause had been adumbrated in the Bill itself as prescribed in form VI-A. The attention of the learned Government Advocate has been drawn to the Bill containing the warranty clause. The learned Government Advocate, on perusal of the Bill, has no option but to concede that the Bill issued by the Manufacturer contains a warranty clause as prescribed in Form VI-A. In such circumstances, it cannot be stated that the petitioners had violated Section 14 of the said Act and Rule 12-A of the Rules framed thereunder.
15. In view of what has been stated above, it goes without saying that the petition deserves to be allowed.
16. In the result, the petition is allowed and the proceedings initiated against the accused in the Court below are quashed.
17. Petition allowed.