1. The plaintiff mutt known as Alangadu Immudi Aghora Siva-charya Ayira Vysia Madam, Nerinjipettai, is the appellant in this second appeal. The suit was filed for declaration that the installation of the first defendant as the Madathipathi of the plaintiff mutt is void ab-initio, or in the alternative for removal of the first defendant from his office for misconduct. The trial Court dismissed the suit as regards the main relief hut decreed as regards the alternative relief. Against that the first defendant filed an appeal and the plaintiff filed a cross objection aggrieved by the rejection of the main relief. The first appellate Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the cross objection. As against this Judgment, now, the plaintiff has filed this second appeal.
2. The necessary facts of the case may he briefly stated thus :-
The plaintiff mutt was founded by the Ayira Vysya community which is a section of the Hindu community. I he mutt owns extensive moveable and immovable properties. For administration of the mutt a scheme was framed by the Deputy Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable endowments, which was modified by the Commissioner second defendant on appeal. Subsequently a suit O.S. No. 155 of 1956 was filed in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Erode, and that Court framed a scheme on 24-12-1958 (Ex. A 73). The scheme provides for selection and installation of a Madathipathi for the plaintiff mutt. As per the terms of the schemea committee of trustees was elected and after their term of office of fivce years another committee was elected but that committee was dissolved before their term of office and therefore a third committee was elected in December, 1975. This committee selected the first defendant who was then 12 years old for the post of Madathipathi of the plaintiff mutt which was vacant, with the help of His Holiness Sankarachaiya of Kanchi Kamakoti Peetam, hereinafter referred to as His Holiness. A document was executed between the committee of trustees and the first defendant's father which was registered as an adoption deed and then the first defendant was installed as Madathipathi. To make the first defendant fit for the office of Madathipathi tutors were engaged to impart him lessons in Vedas, Agamas, Sastras etc.
3. It is the plaintiff's case that soon it was found that the first defendant had no bent of mind that would qualify him to be a spiritual head of the vast community. He refused to discipline himself to the rigours of the office and to take lessons from the tutors and training from the Gurus nominated by His Holiness. All efforts by the trustees, tutors, Gurus and even His Holiness to make the first defendant disciplined were of no avail. He would often absent himself from the Veda classes without any reason and refused to perform the daily poojas and often went away from the mutt without informing anybody. He refused to account for the receipt of Padakanickais received by him and thus he has committed breach of an obligation cast upon the Madathipathi under the terms of the scheme. Then the first defendant himself expressed his unwillingness to be a Madathipathi and on 2-7-1978 he went away with his father with the result there is no Madathipathi in the mutt. This behaviour of the first defendant amounts to misconduct as contemplated in the scheme for removal of Madathipathi. The second defendant Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments was informed at every stage about the behaviour of the first defendant. It is the further case according to the plaintiff that the selection and appointment of the first defendant as Madathipathi by the Board oftrustees was incompetent and had no legal force and hence it is void. Therefore the first defendant can never be the Madathipathi. Therefore the suit is filed for declaration that the first defendant is not the Madathipathi or in the alternative for removal of him from the post of Madathipathi.
4. When the suit was filed the first defendant was a minor and subsequently he became a major and he was declared accordingly and he filed a written statement. He denied all the allegations made against him in the plaint. He denied that he ever expressed unwillingness to be the Madathipathi and went away with his father. Further he contended that after obtaining some documents from his father by force himself and his father were taken away from the mutt and they were left at Valaya-patti in Pudukkottai District. The first defendant's father sent a telegram to His Holiness and also the second defend ant about the highhanded acts of the Chairman and trustees. The second defendant held an enquiry and passed an order that the trustees had no right to remove the first defendant from the post of Madathipathi without getting his sanction and taking proceedings in a Court of law. The first defendant would submit that he did not relinquish his office of Madathipathi. Even if his father had given any consent that would not bind him. He would further submit that he did not behave in any manner that would amount to misconduct on his part. He would submit that he conducted himself properly befitting the post of Madathipathi. Then he contends that he was appointed Madathipathi properly as per the rules and therefore his appointment is not illegal: to be questioned. He further submits that the suit is not maintainable. Therefore the suit is liable to be dismissed.
5. The second defendant in the written statement merely prayed for passing appropriate order.
6. As stated above, the trial Court dismissed the suit with regard to the main relief of declaration that the installation of the first defendant as Madathipathi is ab-initio void, but decreed with regard to the alternative relief for removal of the first defendant fromthe office of Madathipathi for misconduct. As further stated above the first appellate Court allowed the appeal filed by the first defendant and dismissed the cross objections filed by the , plaintiff. The result is: the suit stands dis-missed.
7. In this second appeal filed by the plaintiff arguments were advanced only in support of their case on which they prayed for the alternative relief that the first defendant may be removed from the office of Madathipathi for his misconduct. No argument was advanced as regards the main, relief claimed i.e., for declaration that the installation of the first defendant as Madathipathi is ab-initio void. Therefore as regards the appellant-plaintiffs case we have to see whether there is any point of law to argue as against the decision of the first appellate Court that no case has been made out against, the first defendant that he is liable to be removed from the office for misconduct.
8. On the side of the first defendant-first respondent (second defendant Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Board is the second respondent) it was not only argued that as a question of fact the first appellate Court has found that there is no misconduct on the part of the first defendant but it was also argued that the Courts below have gravely erred in rejecting the plea taken by him that the suit itself is not maintainable. We will first see whether there is any substantial question of law raised by the appellant-plaintiff in the second appeal against the Judgment of the first appellate Court.
9. From a reading of the plaint it appears that the case of the plaintiff is that the first defendant committed acts of misconduct in not attending Veda classes regularly, not doing poojas properly, not accounting for the Padakanickais received by him and by leaving the Madam and going away with his father on 2-7-1978. Though several issues have been framed by the trial Court no specific issue has been framed with regard to the allegation that the first defendant failed to attend classes regularly and failed to do poojas. It further appears that there is a general issue framed to the effect as to whether the first defendant isliable to be removed from office on the ground of his misconduct. With regard to all the aforesaid four alleged misconducts the trial Court had not given a clear finding but has just stated that it cannot be accepted that the first defendant attended the classes regularly, did poojas properly, accounted for the Padakanickais and he did not leave the mutt of his own accord. On the other hand I find from the Judgment of the first appellate Court that in respect of each of the above-said four subjects a specific and clear finding has been given. According to the first appellate Court the first defendant has not committed any of the misconduct alleged against him. These findings appear to be purely findings of fact and therefore unless any finding is perverse or of grave error that results in miscarriage of justice the second appeal cannot be 'maintained. In this context Mr. V. R. Vehkataraman, learned counsel for the first defendant strongly relies on the dictum laid down by the Supreme Court in 'Deity Pattabhiramaswamy v. S. Hanmayya, AIR 1959 SC 57 wherein it has been held that,
'The provisions of Sec. 100 are clear and unambiguous. There is no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on the ground of erroneous finding of fact, however gross the error may seem to be. Nor does the fact that the finding of the first appellate Court is based upon some documentary evidence make it any the less a finding of fact. A judge of the High Court has, therefore, no jurisdiction to interfere in second appeal with the findings of fact given by the first appellate Court based upon an appreciation of the relevant evidence.
The Suppreme Court has quoted in the Judgment a passage from the Judgment of the Privy Council in paragraph 13 which reads:
'There is no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on the ground of erroneous finding of fact, however gross the error may seem to be.'
When considered in this background of the law it does not appear to me that this Court can interfere with any of the findings arrived at by the first appellate Court. Mr. K.. Alagumalai, learned counsel for the appel-lant-plaintiff would however contend that the first appellate Court has erred in law in failing to understand the scope of the misconduct alleged. According to the learned counsel the word misconduct is a relative term and in this case it should have been considered as regards the first defendant's conduct as a Madathipathi and not his conduct as an individual divorced from his position as Madathipathi, but the first appellate Court has considered the alleged misconduct as in general terms relating to any individual and thus it has come to a wrong conclusion that there was no misconduct. 1 am afraid I find there is no substance in this submission. A reading of the Judgment of the first appellate Court would clearly show that the first appellate Court has considered the alleged misconduct one by one as the acts alleged against the first defendant in his capacity as the Madathipathi and there is absolutely no basis for the contention of the learned counsel.
As regards the alleged misconduct Mr. K. Alagumalai mainly argued on the alleged conduct of the first respondent that he did not attend the Veda classes. He would submit that two of the documents filed by the plaintiff on this point have not been considered by the first appellate Court and they are Exs. A22 and A50. Ex. A22 dated 28-11-1977 is a letter sent by the then Manager of the Madam P.W. 2 to the Chairman and Ex. A50 dated 21-2-1978 is a fortnightly report sent by P.W. 2 to all the trustees. In Ex. A22 it is stated among others that the first defendant was not properly studying and in Ex. A50 it is mentioned that he did not attend Veda classes for 15 days. Even if it is true that the first defendant did not attend Veda classes for a few days can it be said to be misconduct on his part as Madathipathi It must be remembered that he was installed as Madathipalhi when he was just 12 years old on 5-2-1977 and when he was thus 12 or 13 years old he is alleged to be guilty of misconduct. It is but natural when a boy has been separated from his parents and made to live with strangers in j austerity in mutt, he cannot be expected to behave in a manner as one would like him to behave. For a few days' absence from the Veda classes or even if he shows someaversion to study Vcdas it cannot be said he does not behave properly and he renders himself unfit to be a Madathipathiand hence he must be removed. Thus there is absolutely no merit in the plea that the first defendant did not attend Veda classes and thus he is guilty of misconduct.
10. The further allegation against him is that he has not accounted for the amounts received by him as Padakanickais. Here also it must be remembered the first defendant was in his tender age. It has not been stated as to how much amount he received and how much amount he has not accounted for. P.W. 1 Clerk in the Madam has stated that the first defendant would give the amount received by him as Padakanickais to him or to the Manager in the evening or next day morning. P.W. 2 the then Manager has stated that the first defendant used to give accounts for Padakanickais and again he has stated that the amounts received by him (P.W. 2) would be deposited in Bank. Even if the first defendant had spent some amount out of Padakanickais received by him it will not by itself amount to misconduct. In the scheme Ex. A73 itself a discretion has been given to the Madathipathi to spend Padakanickais received by him and the only prohibition is that he should not spend the same for illegal or immoral purposes. No allegation has been made anywhere that the first defendant has spent Padakanickais for any illegal or immoral purposes. No doubt it is stated that the Madathipathi can spend Padakanickais at his discretion in furtherance of any religious or charitable object or use, but in the absence of any proof that he has spent the Padakanickais for immoral or illegal purpose it must be presumed that he has spent the amount for permissible cause. Thus there is absolutely no merit in the case of the plaintiff that he was guilty of misconduct in not accounting for Padakanickais.
11. It is next said that he was not doing poojas regularly. To repeat, he was a boy of 12 or 13 years. It is not the case of the plaintiff that the first defend ant refused to do pooja. It is the evidence of P.W. 4, an employee of theMadam who used to do poojas and take classes in Vedaparayanam that the first defendant used to do poojas regularly both in the morning and evening and if the first defendant was not well he would do pooja. In this state of evidence the plaintiff's plea that the first defendant was guilty of misconduct in not doing pooja cannot be countenanced.
12. Lastly it is contended that the first defendant has on 2-7-1978 left the Madam along with his father stating his unwillingness to be the Madathipathi. First defendant denies that he ever expressed unwillingness to be the Madathipathi and he would state that by force his father's signatures were obtained in; papers and they (he and his father) were taken from the Madam to their village Valayapatt and left there. The first appellate Court has considered in detail the entire evidence touching this point and has concluded that the first defendant did not willingly leave the Madam. I do not think this point can be reconsidered in the second appeal. However I would just say that the very fact that within two days the first defendant's father has sent a telegram Ex. B13 to the second defendant stating that the trustees took him and his son from Nerinjipettai (Madam) and his sons's life was threatened and he (father) was forced to write in stamp papers and then himself and his son were taken in a car to his home at Valayapatt and the contents of the said papers will not bind them, would strongly indicate that the first defendant did not of his own accord leave the Madam. Therefore I hold that the finding of the first appellate Court that there was so voluntary leaving from the mutt of the first defendant is correct and that cannot be interfered with. Thus there is absolutely nothing to show that the first defendant was guilty of misconduct as Madathipathi and therefore he is liable to be removed from office.
13. Considering the nature of the office of Madathipathi unless there are strong grounds and not flimsy reasons for holding that he is guilty of misconduct he cannot be removed from the office. The scheme (Ex. A73) de-l scribes the Madathipathi as the religious andsecular head of the mutt. In 'The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra 'fhirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt', : [1954]1SCR1005 in-Paragraph H, it is observed by the Supreme Court that the office of a Madathipathi is generally held by an ascetic whose connection with his natural family being completely cut off. In 'Sudhindra Thirtha Swamiar v. The Commissioner for Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, Mysore, : AIR1963SC966 , in paragraph 9 it is slated that the Mahant of a Math is generally asanyasi who has renounced worldly affairs: he has no family lies either by blood or by marriage, and in a theoretical sense he has taken a vow of not owning any properly. It is clear therefore that generally once a person is appointed as Mada-thipathi he becomes an ascetic and loses all his connections with his family and the worldly affairs. From this it could be understood what would be his position in life if he is removed from the office of Madathipalhi. It would appear that he will not have any career at all. Added to this, in this particular case, the Madathipathi was a boy of just 13 years old and he was sought to be removed from his office within a short time of 17 months, as pointed out by the first appellate Court, from the time of his installation. It is not the case of the plaintiff mutt that this boy is so incorrigible that he could never be made to or never will behave properly. Therefore the first Appellate Court has rightly held that no case of misconduct has been proved against the first respond cut.
14. Now, as already said, Mr. V. R. Venkalaraman, learned counsel for the first defendant-first respondent, further argues that the suit itself is not maintainable. He would submit that the suit is incompetent for there reasons viz, (i) for removal of a Madalhipathi a suit can be filed only under Section 59 of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act 1959, hereinafter referred to as the H.R- & C.K. Act. This section deals with suit for removal of trustee of math or specific endowments attached thereto. Mr. V. R.Venkataraman submits that under thissec-tioh, a suit can be filed only by the Commissioner or any two or more persons having interest and having obtained the consent in writing of the Commissioner, but the present suit purports to have been filed by the mutt represented by the Chairman of the com- miltee of trustees; (ii) Consent from the Commissioner is said to have been obtained under Ex. A63 but the persons to whom the sanction has been given have not filed the suit; and (iii) the first defendant was a minor at the time of filing of the suit and no guardian has been appointed for him.
15. As regards the first ground that the suit should have been filed by the Commissioner or by any two or more persons having interest and having obtained the consent in writing from the Commissioner, on the side of the appellant-plaintiff Mr. K. Alagumalai would contend that the scheme itseirprovides for filing of suit and as per that the suit has been filed and hence the suit is competent. He further argues that Section 59 is applicable only to trustees, and Madathipathi is not a trustee within the meaning of Section 59. Hence the first question arises is: Whether a Madathipalhi is a trustee within the meaning of Section 59? a trustee has been defined in Clause 22 of Section 6 of the H.R.&C.E.; Act. As per this definition.
''trustee' means any person or body by whatever designation known in whom or in which the administration of a religious institution is vested, and includes any person or body who or which is liable as if such person or body were a trustee'.
This would show that the nature of ones position qua administration of the religious institution a person must be held to be a trustee and not from mere designation or appointment as such. Mr. K. Alagumalai, learned counsel for the appellant-plaintiff, however would read Section 26 which deals with the qualification of the trustees and submits that as per this Section one cannot be a trustee, except in the case of hereditary trustee, if he is less than 25 years of age and therefore the first defendant who was just 12years cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be said to be a trustee. A careful reading of this Section will show that it deals with the person who is appointed or proposed to be appointed with the designation of a trustee and therefore this Section does not cover the definition of trustee in Clause 22 of Section 6. Now, as seen above, the scheme itself describes the Madathipathi as the religious and secular head of the mutt. Under Clause 13 of the scheme the Madathipathi has right to appoint an Executive Officer to assist in the administration of the mutt and that Executive Officer will be under the control of the Madathipathi. As per Clause 18 of the Mada-thipathi will be the appellate authority in respect of any disciplinary action taken by the Chairman of the committee of trustee against any of the servants of the mutt. Clause 22 states that the committee of trustee can draw travelling allowances only after obtaining sanction from the Madathipathi. According to Clause 24 the Madathipathi is the ultimate authority who would decide as regards a question whether a person of the community of the mutt is a disciple or not. Clause 20 states that the Madathipathi is the religious spiritual head of the disciples and of the endowments and head of the secular affair of the mutt. From all these, it is manifest that the Madathipathi is the superior head of the mutt both spiritually and administratively. In The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, : [1954]1SCR1005 (supra) it has been held that the head of the mutt (Madathipathi) is the religious and secular head of the mutt, and he has to discharge the duties of a trustee and he is answerable as such. In Krishna Singh v. Mathura Ahir, : [1980]2SCR660 it is stated to the effect that:
'......a math is an institutional sanctumpresided over by a superior who combines in himself the dual office of being the religious or spiritual head of the particular cult or religious fraternity, and of the manager of the secular properties of the institution of the math.'
From all these it is apparent that the Mada-thipathi is a trustee within the definition of 'trustee' in Clause 22 of Section 6. Further of the reasons enumerated from Clauses (a) to (i) for removal of a trustee in Section 59, Clause(g) reads,
'the adoption of devices to convert the income of the institution or of the funds or properties thereof into 'pathakanika'' and Clause (h) reads,
'leading an immoral life or otherwise leading a life which is likely to bring the office of head of the math into contempt.'
There is no gain saying that these two clauses relate only to Madathipathi. Therefore Section 59 which provides for filing of a suit for removal of a trustee of a math includes a Madathipathi also as a trustee. However it is urged that Clause 25 of the scheme (Ex. A73) itself provides for filing of a suit for removal of Madathipathi. But it does not read so and it only speaks of the term of office of the Madathipathi stating that he shall hold office until death or removal for his misconduct by a decree or order of the Court. Now as above seen Section 59 provides that a suit can be filed by the Commissioner or any two or more persons having interest and having obtained the consent in writing from the Commissioner. But the present suit purports to have been filed by the mutt itself. In this connection Clause 15 of the scheme was read out and it was argued that in any civil, criminal and revenue proceedings the mutt shall be represented by the Executive Officer or Chair-man as the case may be and this would show that a suit can be filed by a mutt. But this clause in general relates to proceedings in the Court and as regards the filing of a suit as against the trustee, in the Act itself it is specifically provided in Section 59 as to how it shall be filed. Even if it can be said that there is any repugnancy between Clause 15 of the scheme and Section 59 of the Act (Old Section 52 of Act 1951) the section will prevail over the clause in the scheme. Thus the suit suffers from the defect that it has not been filed by the Commissioner or two or more persons having interest and having obtained the consent in writing from the Commissioner as required under Section 59.
16. As regards the next point raised by Mr. Venkataraman, Ex. A63 appears to be a consent letter obtained from the Commissioner for filing of a suit and in this regard Mr. Venkataraman argues that the consent has been obtained by eleven trustees of the mutt but the suit purports to have been filed by the mutt represented by the Chairman of the Board of trustees and thus the suit having not been filed by those who have obtained the consent the suit is not maintainable. This submission of the learned counsel has much force.When consent has been given to certain persons to file a suit all those persons must file the suit and not by anyone or more without all of them. In Narain Lal v. Seth-Sunderlal Tholia Jorhi, : [1967]3SCR916 the Supreme Court held that (at p. 1542),
'An authority to sue given by the Advocate-General under Section 92 (C.P.C.) to several persons is a joint authority and must be acted upon by all jointly. A suit by some of them only cannot be in conformity with the provisions of Sec. 92(1). Where, therefore, sanction is given to four persons and one of them dies before the institution of the suit, the suit by the remaining three is incompetent. In such a case a fresh sanction must be obtained by the survivors for the institution of the suit.'
In Venkatesha Malia v. Rammapalli Ramaya Hegade, AIR 19I5 Mad 127 a Division Bench of this Court dealing with the sanction obtained under Section 18 of the Religious Endowments Act (20 of 1863) ruled (as the head notes correctly read) that,
'Sanction for instituting suits against trustees of religious establishments should be construed strictly without enlarging their scope, the object of requiring sanction being to protect managers from vexatious suits.
Where a sanction is given to two persons, one of them alone cannot sue without getting the sanction amended, the sanction being a condition precedent to the exercise of the right of suit.'
It is therefore clear that Ex. A63 cannot be said to be a valid sanction by the Commissioner to file the suit.
17. As regards the third point raised,admittedly the suit has been filed only against the first defendant when he was still a minor. No guardian has been appointed. There is no doubt therefore the suit against the first defendant is not legally instituted. It follows therefore the suit cannot be maintained, against him. But the learned counsel for the appellant-plaintiff would contend that this point has not been raised either in the trial Court or in the first appellate Court. But a perusal of the written statement and the grounds of appeal filed by the first defendant in the first appellate Court would show that this point has been clearly raised in both the Courts. Even otherwise this being clearly a question of law and goes to the root of the matter even at this stage this point can be argued. In Seth Loon Karan Selhiya v. Ivan E. John, : [1969]1SCR122 the Supreme Court laid down that even in the executed stage a question of law which goes to the root of the matter can be raised.
18, Therefore for the above said three reasons, the suit itself as against the first defendant is defective and insostainable.
Bellie, J.
19. In the result the appealhas to be dismissed. I order accordingly.Considering the circumstances of the casethere will be no order as to costs.
20. Appeal dismissed.