ORDER
1. The above revision petitions are dealt with in common, since they concern a common property and have been dealt with at all relevant points of time in common.
2. The petitioner herein has filed two suits, O.S. Nos. 6070 and 6071 of 1971 on the file of the City Civil Court, Madras, O.S. No. 6070 of 1971 was filed for a declaration that the first defendant (Pandurangan) was a tenant under the plaintiff in respect of the suit land for recovery of possession of the same from the defendants and also for recovery of a sum of Rs. 430/- towards arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation and also for future damages. O.S. No. 6071 of 1971 was filed for a declaration that the first defendant (Parthasarathy alias Govindasamy) was atenant under the plaintiff of the suit land and also for recovery of Rs. 430/- being the arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation and for recovery of future damages at Re. 1/- per day from 1-6-1971. It is not necessary at this stage to dwell into the details of the claims of parties on merits. Suffice it to state that on 22-3-1974 (a) O.S. No. 6070 of 1971 was decreed with a declaration ihat the first defendant was a tenant under the plaintiff of the plaint schedule land marked in red colour in the plan and for recovery of possession of the same from the defendants and (b) O.S. No. 6071 of 1971 was also decreed granting a declaration that the first defendant was a tenant under the plaintiff of the plaint schedule land marked in red colour in the plan and for recovery of possession of the same from the defendants. In both the suits, the decrees also granted means profits, past and future. As against the same, the respective first defendants filed A. S. Nos. 18 and 34 of 1975 and by a judgment and decree dated 18-9-1976, the appeals came to be dismissed. It appears that the second appeals filed thereafter also failed and were rejected.
3. While matters stood thus, it appears that a declaration was made under S. 3 of the Tamil Nadu Slum Area (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1971 declaring the suit property as a slum area. When execution petition petitions were filed to execute the decree in the year 1977, objections were raised that the decrees are not executable in view of the said notification and having regard to the provisions contained in S. No. 29 of the said Act, which inhibited such dispossession unless the decree-holder obtained the permission of the prescribed authority under the Act as notified by the Government. The objections were overruled and the execution of the decree was ordered to go on further. The first defendant in each of the suit filed CRP Nos. 309 and 334 of 1979 before this Court and a Division Bench of this Court, in its decision made on 17-10-1979 : (reported in : AIR1980Mad246 ), set aside the order of the executing Court directing delivery of the property holding at the same time 'It is however, made clear that the respondent can levy execution of the decree obtained by him after obtaining the requisite permission of the prescribed authority as required under S. 29. With these observations, both the Civil revision petitions are allowed. No costs.'
4. While so, W.P. No. 1230 of 1982 was filed in this Court by One Naziruddin, Muthavalli of the Diwan Sahib Burrial Ground, the owner of the property, implead-ing the State of Tamil Nadu and the Chairman. Tamil Nadu Slum Clearance Board as respondents praying for the issue of a writ of Certiorari to call for and quash the proceedings in G.O.Ms. 378, Housing dated 2-11-1972, in so far as the petitioner was concerned. It may be noticed that this was the notification which made the provisions of the Slum Clearance applicable to the case and rendered the decrees in executable without obtaining the permission of the prescribed authority. Criginally by an order dated 8-6-1982, the Court passed an order as follows :--
'It is ordered that interim suspension granted by the order of this Court, dated 19-2-1982 and made herein by and is hereby made absolute and that the operation of the notification G.O.Ms. No. 378, Housing dated 2-11-1972 on the file of the 1st respondent do continue to be suspended pending W.P. No. 1230 of 1982 on the file of this Court.'
Taking advantage of the said orders, E.P. Nos. 948 of 1982 in O.S. No. 6071 of 1971 and 649 of 1982 in O.S. No. 6070 of 1971 were filed for effecting delivery of possession in execution of the decrees in O.S. Nos. 6070 and 6071 of 1971. The first respondent in the execution applications filed their counter affidavit opposing the claim of the petitioners on several grounds. The Court below, by its common order dated 27-4-1983, dismissed the execution petitions. In substance, the view taken by the Court below was that in view of the earlier orders in C.R.P. Nos. 309 and 334 of 1979 (since reported in : AIR1980Mad246 ). Without complying with the provisions of S. 29 of the Slum Clearance Act by obtaining the permission of the prescribed authority, the decrees could not be executed and possession recovered and the Court below also reserved the right of the petitioner to comply with the requirement of S. 29 and proceed thereafter. Aggrieved, the petitioner has filed C.R.P. No. 2642 of 1984 against E.P. No. 948 of 1982 in O.S. No. 6071 of 1971 and C.R.P. No. 2643 of 1984 against E.P. No. 949 of 1982 in O.S. No. 6070 of 1971.
5. For purpose of completion of the facts and subsequent developments, it is necessary to point out also that the main writ petition No. 1230 of 1982 itself came up for final disposal before a learned single Judge of this Court and by an order dated 17-9-1988, S. Ramalingam, J., alllowed the writ petition and thereby quashed the Government Order in G.O.Ms. No. 378, Housing dated 2-11-1972. The learned Judge of course gave liberty to the Government to follow the prescribed statutory procedure and proceed afresh, if so desired. There is no claim before this Court at this stage that any such notification came to be issued afresh or that the order of the learned single Judge in W.P. No. 1230 of 1982 has been superseded in any manner known to law.
6. Mr. N. Kannadasan, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner contended that the order of the Court below cannot be sustained, in that, it has ignored the legal consquenccs of an order of saty granted by the High Court which has direct bearing on the matter in issue. That apart, it was contended that this Court ultimately allowed W.P. No. 1230 of 1982 thereby quashing the notification in question as an inevitable consequences of which the provisions of the Slum Clearance Act ceased to have application any longer and no more governed the rights of parties in relation to the property in question. Consequently, according to the learned Counsel, having regard to the subsequent event which requires to be taken into account in order to render effective justice as well as to avoid multiplicity of future proceedings, the order of the Court below requires to be set aside and the Court below should be ordered to proceed with the execution. In controverting the plea of absence of knowledge on the part of the respondents, it was submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the pendency of the proceedings have been disclosed with sufficient details in the Court below and the pretended ignorance cannot in any manner help the respondents to get over the legal effect of the order passed in the writ petition.
7. On behalf of the respondent, Mr. P. Venkatachalapathy, learned counsel submitted that (a) it is not open to the petitioner to ignore the effect of the judgment rendered in : AIR1980Mad246 binding between the Panics; (b) the decision of this Court in W.P. No. 1230 of 1982 cannot be pressed into service as a subsequent event since the decision rendered therein is not between the parties to the present proceedings: (c) the decision in question cannot be considered to be a subsequent event in the pending revision proceedings by taking the parties by surprise; (d) in any event having regard to the ratio of the decision reported in AIR 1954 TC 526 the point in question cannot be taken into account in the pending revision and that the points raised to not fall within the scope of S. 115 C.P.C.
8. I shall now refer to the verious case law referred to by the counsel on either side before taking up for consideration the points raised for determination in the above proceedings. In Pasupuleti v. Motor Traders : [1975]3SCR958 , the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the question as to whether it can mould reliefs in an appeal by taking into account the facts subsequent to the institution of proceedigns. The Apex Court expressed the view that for making the right or remedy, claimed by the party just and meaningful as also legally and factually in accord with the current realities, the Court can, and in many cases, must take cautious cognisance of events and developments subsequent to the institution of the proceedings of course observing the rules of fairness to both sides. In Bai Dosabai v. Mathurdas : [1980]3SCR762 , the Apex Court held that while it is true that events and changes in the law occurringduring the pendency of an appeal require to be taken into consideration in order to do complete justice between parties and emphasised the necessity to mould the decree so as to accord with the changed statutory situation, at the same time, the Court observed that the right obtained by a party under a decree cannot be allowed to be defeated by delay in the disposal of the appeal against the decree, if it is possible to save the decree by moulding it to confirm to the statutes subsequently coming into force.
9. In M. M. Quasim v. Manohar Lal Sharma : [1981]3SCR367 , the Apex Court once again considered the question regarding the taking into account of the subsequent events, and after referring to the case law on the subject, held as follows (at p. 1119 of AIR):--
'To sum up, there was a proper and regular application to meet with the requirements of Order 41, Rule 27, C.P.C. for additional evidence inviting the Court's attention to a subsequent event of vital importance cutting at the root of the plaintiff's right to continue the action. Coupled with it, there was evidence in the form of a certified copy of the decree showing that the plaintiff, even if they had some shade of title to commence action, they having lost all interest in the property and the property having become one of exclusive ownership of a person not a party to the proceedings, were not more entitled to continue the proceedings for their own benefit.'
In Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad : [1981]3SCR605 , the Apex Court once again emphasised the necessity as well as justification for taking into account the subsequent events to mould the trial Court's decree.
10. In Suryaprakash Gupta v. The Madras Piece Goods Merchants Charitable Trust, (1980) 93 MLW 132, a Division Bench of this Court had an occasion to consider the effect of a Government Order issued under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, I960 on the exe-cutability of a Civil Court's decree for eviction. That was a case in which on the date when the suit for eviction was filed before the Civil Court, the building under consideration was outside the scope of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. The suit case decreed on the basis of a compromise between the parties. But by the time execution proceedings came to he initiated to execute the decree, by virtue of an amendement introduced by the Tamil Nadu Act 11 of 1964 the building came within the subject matter of the Rent Control Act. The execution petition came to be rejected on the ground that the decree became inexcutable by virtue of the amended provision of law. Subsequent to this, the Government passed G.O.Ms. No. 1998, Home, dated 12-8-1974 in exercise of its powers under S. 29 of the Rent Control Act, exempting the buildings owned by Charitable Trusts without reference to any religion. Thereupon, execution proceedings were instituted afresh. In that context, the Division Bench held that the moment the building in question was exempted from the provisions of the Act, the decree, which continued to exist, became executable and, therefore, the proceedings instituted for executing the decree was not only justifiable but maintainable.
11. In Vineet Kumar v. Mangal Sain : [1984]2SCR333 , the Supreme Court was considering the question of introducing new fact by means of an amendment petition and held that the premises which was not of 10 years old on the date of the suit and, therefore, was exempted from the operation of the Rent Act, can be held to be governed by the Rent Act on account of subsequent lapse of time and such a fact can be brought on record irrespective of the period of limitaton provided therefor.
12. Learned Counsel for the respondents referred to paragraphs 4 and 5 of the decision reported in : [1975]3SCR958 (supra), and submitted that the Court was exercising powers under the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Rent Control Act and not under S. 115 CPC Placing reliance upon the decision reported in Rameshwarv. Jot Ram : [1976]1SCR847 , it was contended that where rights have already vested in a party, they cannot be nullified or negated by subsequent events save where there is a change in law and it is made applicable at any stage. This case,which is based upon a well-accepted principle that vested rights cannot be divested except where there is specific intention of law so expressed in clear terms have no relevance or application to the case on hand. Here, the question is whether there still exists any impediment in executing the decree of the competent civil Court which is rendered in-executible except with the permission of the prescribed authority by virtue of S. 29 of the Slum Clearance Act as a consequence of the notification issued thereunder. Where the said notification itself has been set at naught and nullified, the impediment has been once and for all cleared and the decision in (1980) 93 MLW 143 : MR 1980 Mad 246 which equally reserved the right of the plaintiff to secure permission and proceed further, if so permitted, does not help the respondents to preserve the notification notwithstanding the indisputable fact that the same has been set aside by a competent Court.
13. The decision in (M. I. G. Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. v. Ajit Prasad Tawary : (1972)ILLJ170SC , has been next referred to. That was a case where pending a challenge to an order of suspension pending enquiry interim orders of stay sought for was refused by the trial Court but granted on appeal by the appellate Court. When such an interlocutory order was challenged. The Apex Court held that so long as the first appellate Court had jurisdiction in the matter the interlocutory order passed, be it in accordance with or not in accordance with law, does not call for interference in exercise of powers under S. 115 C. P. C. There is no comparison between the case decided by the Supreme Court and the present case and this Court can on the facts and circumstances of the case, interfere in exercise of its powers under S. 115. C. P. C. In Pappathi Animal v. Sivagannam AIR 1954 Trav-Co 526, a Full Bench of the Travancorc-Cochin High Court expressed the view that sitting in revision the Court is concerned with the correctness of the order when it was passed. This view is to he confined to the peculiar type of the case under consideration before that Court, and it cannot be said as an invariable proposition of law that in no case can the subsequent event be taken into account in a revision petition to mould the relief. If such were to be the ratio of the said decision, it will be running counter to the several decisions of the Apex Court as well as this Court referred to above and consequently cannot be of any assistance to the respondents in this case. It has since been repeatedly held that it is not only for any error of jurisdiction but also for such exercise of jurisdiction with material irregularity as well as for the rectification of any error of the Court below occasioning failure of justice or causing irrepable injury, the powers under S. 115 CPC can be resorted to. That being the position, the objection raised on behalf of the respondents does not carry much weight of significance and I am not persuded to sustain the same.
14. Learned counsel for the respondents vehemently contended that the order of this Court in finally disposing of W.P. No. 1230 of 1982 cannot be pressed into service or relied upon against the respondents, inasmuch as none of the respondents or their predessor-in-inlerest were parties to the said judgment. In other words, learned counsel submitted that it cannot be said to be a judgment in rem so as to bind the whole world. It is the plea of the learned counsel that at best it is a judgment in personam and, therefore, it may be binding between parties thereto and not otherwise. No doubt the general principle is REC Inter Alias Judigate Rullum Inter Alios Prejudigate Facit (A matter adjudicate upon between one set of persons does not in any way prejudice another act of persons.) But having regard to the scheme of the provisions contained in sections 40 to 44 of the Indian Evidence Act, Courts have often considered the efficacy as well as the relevance of judgments not Tnter Partcs in several cases. It has been often held that the law attributes an unerring verity to the substantive as opposed to the judicial portions of the record. All judgments are conclusive of their existence as distinguished from their truth; so every judgment conclusive evidence for or against all persons whether parties, privies or strangers of its legal effect as distinguished from the accuracy of the decision rendered. If the object was merely to prove the existence of thejudgment, its date or legal consequences, the production of the record or a certified copy of the said judgment is conclusive evidence of the facts against the whole world, the reason being that a judgment as a public transaction of solemn nature must be presumed to be faithfully recorded.
15. In Ramji Bapanji v. Manohar : AIR1961Bom169 , a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court had an occasion to consider the matter at length and Raju, J. speaking for the Bench, declared the position as hereunder (at p. 174 of AIR):--
'A judgment in another suit which is not Inter Partes may be evidence for certain purposes, namely, to prove the fact of the judgment; to show who the parlies to the suit were; to show what was the subject-matter of the suit; to show what was decided or declared by the judgment; to show what documents had been filed by the parties in the proceedings to establish the transaction referred to in the judgment; as evidence to show the conduct of the parties or particular instances of the exercise of a right or assertion of title (vide Harihar Prasad Singh v. Deonarain Prasad : [1956]1SCR1 , or to identify property; or to show how property had been previously dealt with; to establish a particular transaction in which a right is asserted and the name of the person, if any, who is declared in the judgment as entitled to possession; but the judgment is not evidence to establish the truth of the matters decided in that judgment. In State of Bihar v. Radha-krishna Singh : [1983]2SCR808 , the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the position and declared the law in the following terms;
'A judgment in rem e.g. judgments or orders passed in admiralty, probate proceed-ingsetc., would always be admissible irrespective of whether they are inter partes or not. A judgment which is not inter partes is inadmissible in evidence except for the limited purpose of proving as to 'who the parties were and what was the decree passed and' the properties which were the subject matter of the suit. The recitals in a judgment like findings given in appreciation of evidence made or arguments or generalogy referred in the judgment would be wholly inadmissible in a case where neither the plaintiff nor the defendant were parties.' The said view was expressed in respect of matter relating to decision rendered in regular civil proceedings.
16. So far as the decision rendered on a writ petition is concerned, a Division Bench of the Orissa High Court in decision reported in Bhupendra Kumar v. State of Orissa : AIR1960Ori46 , had an occasion to directly consider the extent of the binding nature or the relevancy of such a judgment. The Court ultimately came to the following conclusion:
'(13). A judgment of a superior court or record like a High Court has effect on two classes of persons. Firstly, as between the parties to the judgment had their privies It is binding and conclusive unless reversed by a superior Court of appeal or amended by the Court itself, according to law. Moreover, the original cause of action on the basis of which the action commenced, is merged in the judgment and its place is taken by the rights created between the parties by virtue of the judgment. (See Halsbury,) Third edition, Vol. 22 pages 780 and 781). But as regards persons, who are not parties to the judgment, it becomes a valuable precedent on any disputed point of law, not merely as a guide but as an authority to be followed by all Courts or co-ordinate or inferior jurisdiction administering the same system until it is overruled by a Court of superior jurisdiction or by a validly enacted statute. As pointed out in Halsbury, Third Edition, Volume 22 at p. 796, 'the enunciation of the reason or principle on which the question before a Court has been decided, is alone binding as a president. This underlying principle is often termed the 'ratio decidendi', that is to say, the general reasons given for the decision or the general grounds on which it is based, detached or abstracted from the specific peculiarities of a particular case which gives rise to the decision. The correct decision alone is binding between the parties to it, but it is the abstract ratiodecidendi, ascertained on a consideration of the judgment in relation to the subject-matter of the decision which alone has the force oflaw.'
Thus, this Court's judgment in Bhupendra Kumar Bose v. The State, O. J. C. No. 72 of 1958 reported in ILR (1959) Cut 189 is binding as between the parties, namely, the petitioner Sri Bhupendrakumar Bosc on the one hand and the State of Orissa and the elected Councillors of Cuttack Municipality on the other and new rights as between them were created by the judgment itself. This is irrespective of the ratio decidendi of the judgment. But the judgment in also an authority to be followed by all Courts in Orissa on the disputed points of law decided therein if and when they arise in any pending or future litigation.' It was further held by the said Court as hereunder :--
'(14) A half-hearted attempt was made to show that the aforesaid observations in Hatsbury apply to 'Judgments' where the rights to property are involved and not to judgments of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. In fact, the learned Advocate-General went to the extent of saying that the petitioner obtained no rights whatsoever by virtue of the decision in O. J. C. No. 72 of 1958 : reported in ILR (1959) Cut 189. But at page 740 of Halsbury (cited above) it was pointed out that the term 'judgment' or 'order' in its widest sense may be said to include any decision given by a Court on a question or questions at issue between the parties in a proceeding properly before it, and at page 741 it was further pointed out that judgments and orders considered in that title were those of the Queen's Bench and Chancery Division of the High Court and orders of the Court of Appeal.'
I am in respectful agreement with the views expressed by the Bombay High Court and the Orissa High Court in the decisions referred to above. In the light of the statement of law referred to above, I am not persuaded to countenance the plea on behalf of the respondent that the order in W. P. No. 1230 of 1982 cannot be pressed into service in the present case. Having regard to what has been stated above, in my view, the judgment can be relied upon both as a precedent and also as a document to show that this Court in a proceeding instituted challenging the Government Order, which has been the basis of the claim of defence of the respondents in the Court below, came to set aside (he order of the Government and consequently the said order no longer survives to enure to the respondents the benefits of the Slum Clearance Act. Consequently, the Court is not only entitled to take into account the said judgment but also has to decide the case having regard to the legal consequences flowing from the said judgment.
17. Coming to the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the view that the revisions have to be accepted and allowed. Having regard to the emphatic statement of law declared by the Supreme Court, the decision in W.P. No. 1230 of 1982 becomes relevant and required to be taken into account for the purpose of noticing the vital and essential fact that G. O. Ms. No. 378, Housing, dated, 2-11-1972 stood abrogated and does not any longer grant to the property in question the coverage or protection of the provisions of the Slum Clearance Act, including the one contained in S. 29 of the said Act, since the notification issued by the Government covers other properties also, the order in the writ petition has to be necessarily restricted to the petitioner meaning thereby the properties in respect of which the petitioner sought relief. It is also to be noticed that the said writ petition seems to have been filed by the petitioner therein, as the Muthavalli of the Burial Ground in question. Not only the fact regarding the pendency of the writ petition was brought to the notice of the respondents even in the Court below, but before the hearing of the case, the copy of the order in the writ petition was also furnished to the counsel for the respondents and sufficient opportunity was accorded to the respondents to meet the situation after it was informed that the petitioner would place reliance upon the said decision of this Court, in furtherance of their claim in the revision petitions before me. Therefore, it could not be said that any real or genuine prejudice has been caused tothe respondents in meeting the case projected before me af the time of hearing. The fact that there was an abortive attempt on the part of the Wakf Board also to evict the respondents does not undermine the decree obtained by the petitioner or their cxeculability. As noticed supra, the only impediment which stood in the way of the execution of the decree was S. 29 of the Slum Clearance Act, which contemplated the obtaining of a prior permission from the prescribed authority. This contingency which was necessitated by the issue of a notification in G. 0. Ms. No. 578, Housing, dated 2-11-1972. Ceased the moment the High Court granted orders of suspension of the said notification. That apart, after the writ petition has been finally disposed of and the notification itself was struck down, the question of obtaining any prior permission did not arise, since the authorities under the said Act themselves lost their control or powers contemplated under S. 29 of the Act on account of the supervening fact that the Government's notification itself has since been struck down. The reasoning of the Court below that notwithstanding the orders of this Court which suspended the operation of the notification of the Government, the execution proceedings cannot be pursued except with the permission under S. 29 of the Act and such a consequence was the result of the decision of this Court in : AIR1980Mad246 itself is neither correct in law nor appropriate but is wholly unsustainable. By virtue of the supervening fact, the obtaining of prior permission under S. 29 of the Slum Clearance Act became necessary and rendered superfluous. Be that as it may, now that the writ petition challenging the notification itself has since been allowed and the notification has been abrogated, there is no obstacle whatsoever in pursuing the execution proceedings on account of S. 29 or any other provision of the Slum Clearance Act. The orders of the Court below, therefore, require to be set aside.
18. For what has been stated above, the objections on behalf of the respondents do not merit my acceptance and the orders of the Court below are set aside and the Court below is directed to restore the execution petitions to its file and proceed further in accordance with law. The civil revision petition consequently shall stand allowed; but in the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.
19. Revision allowed.