Judgment:
ORDER
R. Balia, J.
1. Short question raised in this petition is what is the effect of amendment in Section 30 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 which has been brought into effect w.e.f. 25-1-1994, by excluding the jurisdiction of Central Govt. to entertain revision in respect of Minor Mineral, in respect of such petitions which are already pending on the commencement of amending Ordinance.
2. The petitioner was granted lease for aperiod of 10 years commencing from 4-7-1980 and ending on 3-7-1990. Before the expiry ofthe lease the petitioner applied for renewal of the lease on 19-12-1989. The renewal application was rejected by the State Govt. on 17-12-1990. The petitioner also filed representation which was also replied on 9-4-1992. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a revision petition before the Central Govt. under Section 30 of the Act on 27-4-1992, the Central Govt. entertained the revision petition and passed the interim order in favour of the petitioner, on 25-1-1994 by the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Amendment Ordinance No. 2 of the 1994 published in the Gazette of India Extraordinary dated 25-1-1994 certain amendments were made in the Act of 1957. For the present purposes by Section 11 of the Ordinance Section 30 of the Principal Act was amended by inserting the following words at the end of the existing provision:--
'with respect to any mineral other than a minor mineral'.
3. Before the amendment, Section 30 of the Act of 1957 reads as under:--
'Power of revision of Central Government: The Central Government may of its own motion on application made within the prescribed time by an aggrieved party, revise any order made by a State Government or other authority in exercise of the powers conferred on it by or under this Act.'
4. There is no dispute about the fact that under the aforesaid provision a revision lay before the Central Govt. in respect of Minor Mineral as well. The Court in Champalal v. the State of Rajasthan, AIR 1975 Raj 182, observed as under:--
'Section 30 is couched in wider terms and its operation cannot be restricted with reference to Rule 54 of the Central Rules and State Rules framed under Section 15 of the Act. There is nothing in Section 30 to show that the powers of revision conferred under the Act were confined to orders in regard to the major minerals only and not to minor mineral. The Rules cannot limit the scope of the express provisions of Section 30.'
This view has been reiterated by the DivisionBench in Ishwar Lal v. State of Rajasthan, 1988 (2) RLR 384 by making reference to earlier decision of this court.
5. The effect of the aforesaid amendments was to exclude the orders relating to minor minerals from the purview of revisional powers Central Govt. under Section 30. However, the provisions have not been made effective retrospectively so as to take away right of any person to avail the remedy under Section 30 which is vested in him before the commencement of Ordinance. Law in this regard is well settled that the right to remedy of appeal or revision for getting the order of a subordinate authority reviewed by the higher authority is subsiantive right which vests in the person on the date the proceedings are instituted out of which the question of availing the remedy of appeal or revision arise. Such right is not affected by subsequent amendment.
6. The leading case on the point is decision in the Colonial Sugar Refining Company, Ltd. v. Irving reported in (1905) Appeal Cases page 369 which reads as under:--
'The Judiciary Act is not retrospective by express enactment or by necessary intend-ment. And therefore the only question is, was the appeal to His Magisty in Council a right vested in the appellants at the date of the passing of the Act, or was it a mere matter of procedure? It seems to their Lordships that, the question that not admit of doubt. To deprive a suitor in a pending action of an appeal to a superior tribunal which belonged to him as of right is a very different thing from regulating procedure. In principle, their Lordships see no difference between abolishing an appeal altogether and transferring the appeal to a new tribunal. In either case there is an inference with existing rights contrary to the well known general principles that statutes are not to be held to act retrospectively unless a clear intention to that effect is manifested.'
The principle enunciated by the Privy Council was approved by the Supreme Court in Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbaiah Chou-dhary, AIR 1957 SC 540 which reads as under:--
'From the decisions cited above the following principles clearly emerge:
(i) That the legal pursuit of a remedy, suit, appeal and second appeal are really but steps in a series of proceedings all connected by an intrinsic unity and are to be regarded as one legal proceeding.
(ii) The right of appeal is not a mere matter of procedure but is a substantive right.
(iii) The institution of the suit carries with it the implication that all rights of appeal then in force are preserved to the parties thereto till the rest of career of the suit.
(iv) The right of appeal is a vested right and such a right to enter the superior court accrues to the litigant and exists as on and from the date the lis commences and although it may be actually exercised when the adverse judgment is pronounced such right is to be governed by the law prevailing at the date of the institution of the suit or proceeding and not by the law that prevails at the date of its decision or at the date of the filing of the appeal.
(v) This vested right of appeal can be taken away only by a subsequent enactment, if it so provides expressly or by necessary intend-ment and not otherwise.'
7. These principles have further been reiterated in Mukund Deo (Dead) represented by his legal representtive Kasibai v. Mahadu, AIR 1965 SC 703 as under:--
'It is true that as a general rule, alterations, in the law of procedure are retrospective, but a right of appeal to -a particular forum is a substantive right and is not lost by alteration in the law, unless provision is made expressly in that behalf, or a necessary implication arises.'
8. The Supreme Court again said in Jose Da Costa v. Bascora Sadashiv Sanai Narcornin, AIR 1975 SC 1843, as under:
'The right of appeal being a substantive right, the institution of a suit carries with it the implication that all successive appeals available under the law then in force would bepreserved to the parties to the suit throughout the rest of the career of the suit.'
9. It is also well settled that right to appeal or revision is a substantive right and is not a matter of procedure. Reference in this connection may be made to 1953 SC 221, AIR 1960 SC 980 and AIR 1968 SC 18. It is apparent that the amendment in the Act of 1957 is prospective and affects the right of parties only in respect of proceedings which have come to be instituted or initiated after the commencement of Ordinance and does not affect the right of parties to avail the remedy under Section 30 arising out of the proceedings instituted before 25th January, 1994 and does not denude the Central Govt. from its jurisdiction to entertain and decide the revision application in respect of minor mineral arising out of such proceedings instituted prior to the commencement of the Ordinance.
10. From the perusal of the facts it is apparent that on the date when the Ordinance came into force the petitioner has already filed revision petition way back in 1992 which has been entertained and an interim order was also passed in his favour which was continuing. In these circumstances, the Central Govt. could not have refused to exercise its jurisdiction by communicating that the revision has become redundant vide Annex. 13 dated 11-2-1994, The Central Govt. is under an obligation to dispose of the revision already pending before it in respect of minor minerals also as on the date the Ordinance came into force without taking into consideration the amendment in Section 30. Accordingly, the petition is allowed. Annexure 13 is quashed and Central Govt. is directed to decide the revision application on merit and in accordance with law. It is further directed that interim order which was passed by the Central Govt. on the revision petition of the petitioner shall continue to remain in force notwithstanding its communication Annex. 13 which has been quashed.
11. No order as to costs.