Shiv Kumar Sharma, J.
1. The Jaipur Development Authority in all these four revision petitions, has impugned the order dated June 1, 1990 of the learned District Judge, Jaipur City whereby learned Judge rejected the objections raised by the petitioner in execution cases No. 24/84, 19/84, 20/84 & 23/84 and directed the respondents in accordance with the decree dated August 17, 1971 of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan that if they deposit entire amount with the Jaipur Development Authority within two months, the possession of the respondents over the land in question shall be deemed to be regularised.
2. The material facts may now be briefly stated. In exercise of the powers under Section 4(1) of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953 (for short 1953 Act) the Government of Rajasthan on June 9, 1960 published a Notification to acquire 552 Bighas and 8 Biswas of land at village Bhojpura, Chak Sudershanpura and Rampura Roopa, which is now the part of Jaipur City, for the development of 'Lal Kothi Scheme'. On May 12, 1961 the declaration under Section 6 of 1953 Act came to be published and on January 9, 1964 award was passed after following the due procedure. Therein, apart from awarding compensation to the owners, the Land Acquisition Officer granted plots ranging between 1000 square yards to 2000 square yards to the owners, Sub-awardees or nominees in the scheme itself. The learned District Judge Jaipur City on reference thereafter enhanced the compensation vide decree dated March 15, 1967. Aggrieved by the order of the District Judge the Urban Improvement Trust and the State Government preferred appeal before the High Court. When the appeal came up for hearing a compromise was arrived at on August 17, 1971 in the following terms:
According to the terms of the compromise the decree of the lower Court is modified and it is ordered that the respondent shall be paid the amount of compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer in his award on the condition that the State of Rajasthan and the Urban Improvement Trust allot to the respondent a plot of land measuring 2000 square yards under the award at the rate of Rs. 8/- per square yard in terms of the said award and that the State of Rajasthan and the Urban Improvement Trust have already allotted such plot to the respondent at the aforesaid price. The respondent shall pay the said price., that is at the rate of Rs. 8/- per square yard to the Urban Improvement Trust less the amount of compensation which was awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer to him by the award. Both the parties shall bear their own costs of both the Courts.
3. On August 17, 1983 the respondents made execution application before the learned District Judge, Jaipur City who on May 17, 1984 directed that the delivery of possession be given to the decree holders. The revision petition preferred by the petitioner against the said order was dismissed by the High Court on April 4, 1986. The petitioner Jaipur Development Authority and the State of Rajasthan assailed the order of the High Court by filing Special Leave Petition before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court vide order dated February 15, 1988 allowed the Special Leave Petition and directed as under:
Special leave granted. Heard both the sides. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that the appellants should have been accorded the opportunity of being heard before the Executing Court. Under these circumstances the order under appeal is set aside. So also the order of the Executing Court rejecting the contentions raised by the appellants is set aside. The matter will go back to the Executing Court for affording a hearing to the appellants. After hearing the appellants, the Executing Court may pass an appropriate order in accordance with law. The matter may be disposed of as early as possible preferable within six months. The appeals shall stand disposed of accordingly. No costs.
4. The objections filed by the JDA thereafter were heard and rejected by the learned District Judge as indicated hereinabove.
5. Mr. G.L. Pareek, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents raised preliminary objection in respect of maintainability of the revision petitions and contended that all the four revision petitions appear to be out of time and are barred by limitation. According to learned counsel, the petitioner JDA was not diligent in obtaining the copies of the impugned order. Reliance was placed on Pramatha Nath Roy v. W.M. Arthur, AIR 1922 Privy Council 352. Alternatively it was urged that even if the time in obtaining the certified copy is excluded under Section 12 of the Limitation Act, then also the revision petitions were submitted one day after expiry of the limitation and the Registry of the High Court committed error in calculating the days consumed in obtaining the copy.
6. A close scrutiny of record demonstrates that the petitioner made applications for obtaining certified copies of the impugned order on June 2, 1990. Copies were drawn on July 5, 1990 and delivered to the petitioner on the same day. The revision petitions were filed on October 4, 1990 and the Registry of the High Court entertained the petitions by making endorsement that they were filed within limitation. The respondents did not raise any objection in regard to endorsement made by the Registry for a period of ten years and six months and now for the first time urged that the revision petitions are barred by the limitation. Calculation of the respondents appears to be correct and I find that there was a delay of one day in filing the revision petitions but at the same time it appears that the petitioner was misled by the endorsement of the Registry. Explanation appended to Section 5 of the Limitation Act provides thus:
Explanation.--The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section.
The principles on which this explanation is based is that an act of the Court or its officers shall prejudice no man the maxim being, actus curiae neminem grava bit.
Under these circumstance, the petitioner is not required to file written applications under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and I condone the delay in filing the revision petitions by accepting the oral prayer made by the petitioner in this regard.
7. Before adverting to the rival contentions I deem it appropriate to refer to some judicial pronouncements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in regard to the land which is the subject matter of dispute in the instant revision petitions.
8. Jaipur Development Authority v. Radhey Shyam : [1994]2SCR1 was the case related to land in dispute. In the award the Land Acquisition Officer deducted the value of Rs. 2131.68 towards the value of 266.6 sq. yards of land allotted to the awardees/nominees in lieu of compensation awardable to them. The possession of the acquired land was handed over to Jaipur Development Authority (for short the JDA). In reference made under Section 18, the Civil Court confirmed the award but corrected double deduction of certain amount made therein. Thereafter some persons filed writ petitions for grant of land in lieu of compensation and the awardees filed an execution to enforce the award passed by the Civil Court on the reference under Section 18. The JDA raised objection as to the executability of the award for allotment of sites made in lieu of compensation. The executing Court partly upheld that objection but on revision by the awardees the Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court held that it was not permissible for the JDA to raise the objection in execution of the awards and accordingly allowed the revision. In the appeals by Special Leave, preferred by the JDA, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in paras 7 & 8 of the judgment indicated thus:
7. A reading of Sub-section (4) of Section 31, in our considered view indicates that the Land Acquisition Officer has no power or jurisdiction to give any land under acquisition or any other land in lieu of compensation. Sub-section (4) though gives power to him in the matter of payment of compensation, it does not empower him to give any land in lieu of compensation. Sub-section (3) expressly gives power 'only to allot any other land in exchange'. In other words the land under acquisition is not liable to be allotted in lieu of compensation except under Section 31(3) that too only to a person having limited interest. If the contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents that while awarding compensation the Collector (Land Acquisition Officer) has a higher power than the limited power given under Sub-section (3) of Section 31, it would run counter to the scheme envisaged thereunder and would result in defeating the public purpose. The problem could be looked at from a different angle. under Section 4(1), the appropriate Government notifies a particular land needed for public purpose. On publication of the declaration under Section 6, the extent of the land with specified demarcation gets crystallised as the land needed for a public purpose. If the enquiry under Section 5-A was dispensed with, exercising the power under Section 17(1), the Collector on issuance of notice under Sections 17, 9 & 10 is entitled to take possession of the acquired land for use of public purpose. Even otherwise on making the award and offering to pay compensation he is empowered under Section 16 to take possession of the land. Such land vests in the Government free from all encumbrances. The only power for the Government under Section 48 is to denotify the lands before possession is taken. Thus, in the scheme of the Act, the Land Acquisition Officer has no power to create an encumbrance or right in the erstwhile owner to claim possession of a part of the acquired land in lieu of compensation. Such power of the Land Acquisition Officer if is exercised would be self defeating and subversive to public purpose.
The question then is, whether it is open to the appellant to raise the objections on the execution side as to allotment of acquired land under the award. We have already said that what is executable is only an award under Section 26(2), namely, the amount awarded or the claims of the interests determined of the respective persons in the acquired lands. Therefore, the decree cannot incorporate any matter other than the matters determined under Section 11 or those referred to and determined under Section 18 and no other. Since we have already held that the Land Acquisition Officer has no power or jurisdiction to allot land in lieu of compensation, the decree even, if any, under Section 18 to the extent of any recognition of the directions in the award for the allotment of the land given under Section 11 is a nullity. It is open to the appellant to raise the invalidity, nullity of the decree in execution in that behalf. Accordingly we hold that the execution proceedings directing delivery of possession of the land as contained in the award is, invalid, void and inexecutable. Accordingly it is set aside.'
9. In Secretary, Jaipur Development Authority v. Daulat Mal Jain : (1997)1SCC35 , land measuring 14 Bighas of Khatedar Chhote Lal were acquired and the Land Acquisition Officer awarded 2000 sq. yards to him. He entered into agreements with Daulat Mal Jain and Raj Kumar to sell 1000, 500, 250 sq. yards etc. the sale deeds came to be registered on December 14, 1970. The purchasers were described as Sub-awardees or nominees. Then came into picture the Minister-cum-Chairman who in 1978 decided to allot the lands to the Sub-awardees/nominees. Lots were drawn for allotment of the plots on December 23, 1980. They came to be questioned by way of writ petitions in the High Court. The High Court came heavily against the illegality committed by the LAO and the Minister for such allotments being obnoxious, deflecting the scheme and defeating the public purpose by abusing public office. The High Court though observed in the order dated September 2, 1993 that the allotment of land was in violation of the scheme but directed allotment of the lands to the respondents since allotment made to others had become final and denial thereof to the respondents would amount to violation of equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Secretary JDA in the appeals by Special Leave assailed the order of the High Court. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court after examining Rules 31 & 36 of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Rules, 1956 affirmed the directions issued in Radheyshyam's case (supra) and indicated in para 20 of the judgment thus:
20. That apart, these two rules merely emphasise the limited power given to the Government and to the LAO to impose the conditions and restrictions to attain the public purpose for which the land is acquired and is not intended to fritter away public property for private purposes or gain or illegal gratification.
10. It is thus evident that their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Jaipur Development Authority v. Radhey Shyam, (supra) had observed that the Land Acquisition Officer in passing the award dated January 9, 1964 was devoid of the power and jurisdiction under Section 11 to allot part of the acquired land or any land to the land owners etc. in determining compensation under Section 23(1). It was therefore held that the award allotting land was void ab initio and it conferred no right on an erstwhile Khatedar/owner to claim possession of the land in execution of the award. The award confined in the decree under Section 26, though had became final, being a nullity, it could be questioned at any stage, when it is sought to be executed/ enforced. It was therefore indicated that the execution of such a decree and delivery of the possession in furtherance of the award was invalid, void and inexecutable.
(Underlining is mine)
11. This brings me to other submissions advanced by Mr. G.L. Pareek learned Senior Counsel for the respondents. It was urged that the decree passed originally by the District Court was modified by the High Court vide order dated August 17, 1971 and the compromise decree was not challenged in any way and became final. No question of lack of jurisdiction did arise as the District Judge was executing the modified decree of the High Court in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. It was also contended that the revisional Court cannot go behind the compromise decree and the JDA who is the successor of the erstwhile UIT cannot repudiate the compromise made by the erstwhile UIT. The JDA had no right to challenge the execution proceedings based on compromise decree that became final. The Supreme Court gave a limited chance to the JDA and the executing Court provided full opportunity of hearing to the JDA before passing the impugned order. The executing Court cannot go behind the decree. Reliance was placed on AIR 1954 SC 352, AIR 1970 SC 1475 and AIR 1989 Rajasthan 43.
12. learned Counsel further contended that the ratio of Radhey Shyam's case is not in conflict with the consent decrees in favour of the respondents. Since the respondents were not the party before the Supreme Court they are not bound by the judgment in view of the legal maxim 'res inter allos acts alteri nocere not debet.' (thing done between stranger sought not to injure a party). It was next contended by the learned Counsel that validity of allotments made in favour of the respondents by the erstwhile UIT cannot be questioned by the JDA in view of Section 101 of the Jaipur Development Authority Act, 1982 and the JDA is bound by the compromise entered by the UIT with the respondents. Reliance was placed on (1985) 4 SCC 369 and 1985 (Supp (3) SCR 123.
It was further urged that legal principle of waiver applies to JDA which bars the application of Radhey Shyam's case to the respondents. Reliance was placed on AIR 1968 SC 933. It was also contended that the JDA made discrimination between the equally placed awardees and act of JDA is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Reliance was placed on 1981 (3) SCR 234.
13. learned Counsel further urged that the judicial precedent operates prospectively and it does not apply to earlier cases. The consent decree that became final cannot be now questioned. The subsequent act of the State Government in entering into compromise is tantamount to giving such permission on the principle of rectification. The provisions of Section 31(4) of the Land Acquisition Act to which the ratio of the Supreme Court case is restricted is not in conflict with the provisions of Section 60 of the Rajasthan Urban Imrovement Trust Act 1959. All the allotment under the consent decrees were made in exercise of the powers provided under Section 60 by the State Government/ UIT. In support of all contentions raised the reliance was placed on AIR 1953 SC 65, 1970 RLW 320, 1966(1) SCR 102, 1989(4) SCC 403, 1970(2) SCC 290, 1996(1) WLC 633, 1970(2) SCR 368, 1970(2) RLW 1020, 1995(2) RLR 669, 1997(1) RLR 502, 1996(2) RLR 486, 1987(2) RLR 386, 1989(1) RLR 409, 1991(2) RLR 748, 1979(1) SCR 66, 1992(4) SCC 242, 1962(2) SCR 69, 1955(1) SCR 408, II (1996) CLT 63 (SC), 1968(2) SCR 548, 1997(1) RLR 255, AIR 1986 SC 2025 and the decision of the Supreme Court dated 23.9.1996 in Civil Appeal No. 14037-14056 of 1996.
14. In respect of transfer of land made by the JDA in favour of the Rajasthan State Mines and Minerals Development Corporation Limited, who was impleaded as party in the instant revision petitions, learned counsel canvassed that it was bad in law being made flouting the legal provisions and hit by the doctrine of lis pendens.
15. Mr. Bharat Vyas, learned Counsel for the petitioner JDA urged that ratio of Daulat Mal Jain's case (supra) and Radhey Shyam's case (supra) is fully applicable in the instant revision petitions as in both these cases the award passed on January 9, 1964 was considered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court. Mr. Sagar Mal Mehta learned Advocate General supported the allotment made by JDA in favour of the Rajasthan State Mines and Minerals Development Corporation Ltd. and contended that it was a valid allotment.
16. The diverse submissions give rise the following questions:
(i) Whether the ratio indicated by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in JDA v. Radhey Shyam (supra) and Daulat Mal Jain's case (supra) is applicable to the instant matters?
(ii) Whether under revisional powers, the subsequent events can be taken note of?
17. In so far as first question regarding applicability of Radhey Shyam's case and Daulat Mal Jain's case is concerned I am of the view that their Lordships of the Supreme Court in both these cases considered the award dated January 9, 1964 of the Land Acquisition Officer. The said award is also the subject matter of the instant revision petitions. The contention raised on behalf of the respondents is that the decree passed on the basis of the said award on March 15, 1967 by the learned District Judge, Jaipur City was modified by the High Court on August 17, 1971 on the basis of compromise arrived at between the respondents and erstwhile UIT and it became final and the ratio of Radhey Shyam case is not applicable on the said compromise decree. It is therefore necessary to examine the import of the compromise decree dated August 17, 1971. As already stated that according to the terms of the compromise it was directed that the amount of the compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer in his award shall be paid by the respondent on the condition that the State of Rajasthan and the Urban Improvement Trust allot to the respondents a plot of land measuring 2000 sq. yards situated in the same scheme in which the land is acquired under the award at the rate of Rs. 8/- per sq. yard in terms of the said award. It is thus apparent that the compromise decree was based on the award dated January 9, 1964 of the Land Acquisition Officer and the State of Rajasthan and UIT had to allot the respondents a plot measuring 2000 sq. yards in the same scheme in which the land was acquired. In Radhey Shyam's case their Lordships of the Supreme Court propounded that the award allotting land was void ab initio and it conferred no right on an erstwhile Khatedar/owner to claim possession of the land in execution of the award. The award, confirmed in the decree under Section 26, though had become final, being a nullity, it could be questioned at any stage, when it is sought to be executed/enforced. It was indicated that the execution of such a decree and delivery of the possession in furtherance of the award was invalid, void and inexecutable. In view of the specific findings of their Lordships of the Supreme Court, I hold that the ratio of Radhey Shyam's case and Daulat Mal Jain's case is applicable to the instant matters.
18. The second question that arises is whether under the revisional powers provided in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, can this Court take notice of the subsequent events?
19. The cases of Radhey Shyam and Daulat Mal Jain were decided by their Lordships of the Supreme Court during the pendency of the instant revision petitions, therefore it is to be seen as to whether this Court under the revisional powers, can take cautious cognizance of events and developments subsequent to the institution of the revision petitions. In A.M.V. Jayaraman v. Murugan Bus Service : AIR1983Mad210 learned Single Judge of Madras High Court indicated thus:
But here as I have stated above, the right to sustain the application on certain stated qualifications having disappeared, can it be said that because of this High Court exercising revisional jurisdiction and because it concerned itself under Section 115 CPC with the jurisdiction exercised by the Tribunal or lower authority, it should shut its eyes? I do not think so. The power of revision is a limited one, in comparison to the appellate power. Barring that there is no point in saying that under revisional powers the subsequent events can not be taken note of. Such an extreme argument will render the revisional power absolutely nugatory.
20. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Shankar v. Krishnaji : [1970]1SCR322 observed that the power under Section 115 CPC is a valuable power which is exercised by the High Court as a superior Court. Therefore the right to sustain the application must survive at any stage of the order.
21. In P. Venkateshwarlu v. Motor and General Traders, : [1975]3SCR958 Hon'ble Supreme Court propounded thus:
We affirm the proposition that for making the right or remedy claimed by the party just and meaningful as also legally and factually in accord with the current realities, the Court can, and in many cases must, take cautious cognizance of events and developments subsequent to the institution of the proceedings provided the rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously obeyed. On both occasions the High Court in revision, correctly took the view.
22. In Jagdish Prasad v. Kapoor Chand, his Lordship A.P. Sen J. (as he then was) indicated that the High Court while exercising its revisional powers under Section 115 CPC can take note of a subsequent change in the law and grant relief to the parties on the basis of such law.
23. It is well settled that the decisions rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court laying down the position in laws are binding on all even though the party is not served any notice or was not a party to the said proceedings. Joint mandate of Articles 141 & 144 makes enforceable decisions of the Supreme Court including the interpretation of any statutory provision. Thus in view of the ratio indicated in Radhey Shyam's case and Daulat Mal Jain's case the decree of the District Judge Jaipur City as well as the compromise decree dated October 17, 1971 of the High Court is void, invalid and inexecutable and it can be interfered with under the revisional powers.
24. learned Counsel for the respondents did his best to support the impugned order dated June 1, 1990 as well as the compromise decree dated August 17, 1971 of the High Court by multiplying the case law on various issues but in view of the categorical findings of the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the award dated January 9, 1964 was void ab initio and the acquired land could not have been reallotted, I do not find any merit in the arguments of the learned Counsel. Looking to the fact that the compromise decree of the High Court has been declared inexecutable by implication, the rulings cited by the learned Counsel are of no help to the respondents. this Court is bound by the ratio indicated by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the cases of Radhey Shyam and Dault Mal Jain (supra).
25. For the reasons aforementioned the revision petitions succeed and stand allowed and the impugned order dated June 1, 1990 of the learned District Judge-Jaipur City is set aside. Costs easy.