Prakash Tatia, J.
1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.
2. The Rajasthan State Financial Corporation has challenged the order dated 19th Dec, 2002 passed by the court of Addl. District Judge NO.l, Chittorgarh in Misc. Application Case No.67/1995 by which the learned Civil court rejected the appellant's-applicant's application filed Under Section 31 of the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1951) on the ground of bar of limitation. It will be worthwhile to mention here that the appellant's application under Section 31 of the Act of 1951 was rejected as barred by time that too by accepting the period of limitation as 12 years from the loan amount becoming due after 12 months from the date of disbursement of loan by RFC to the borrower because, of the reason that there was condition that the loan will become due after 12 months from the date of disbursement of loan to the borrower. However, the respondents have raised yet another objection that the trial court committed error of law by accepting the 12 years as period of limitation for entertaining the appellant's application filed under Section 31 of the Act of 1951.
3. Brief facts of the case are that loan to the respondent-borrower was sanctioned in the month of Feb., 1982 for amount of Rs.l ,35,000/-. The loan facility was availed by the borrower to the extent of only Rs.l,27,000/-, It is alleged that certain amount were paid by the respondent-borrower to the appellant-financier and ultimately as on 1st Oct., 1994 total due amount of the appellant in the respondent reached to Rs. 4,74,991/- after adjusting the payment made by the respondent to the appellant-financier. After giving due notice, the proceedings under Section 31 of the Act of 1951 was instituted in the trial court on 26th April, 1995. The trial court observed that first installment of loan paid to the borrower by the financier-appellant on 26.2.1982 and remaining amounf was paid latter on. The first installment become due for payment after 12 months from 26.2.1982 which comes to 26.2.1983. According to the trial court, the application under Section 31 could have been filed within 12 years from 26.2.1983 and that comes to 26.2.1995, whereas the appellant submitted the application in the court on 26.4.1995, hence, it is barred by time.
4. Learned Counsel for the appellant vehemently submitted that the trial court has committed serious error of law as the trial court ignored the payment made by the borrower against the debt which has been proved by the appellant by various receipts referred in the impugned order but while determining the question of limitation the court below failed to note the fact that period, of limitation extended by part payment made by the respondent towards the loan amount. Learned Counsel for the appellant also relied upon the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court delivered in Jagdish Rai v. Haryana Financial Corporation reported in wherein a judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court delivered in the case of Maharashtra State Financial Corporation v. Ashok K. Agarwal and Ors reported in : AIR2006SC1584 was distinguished and it has been held that period of limitation for application under Section 31 is 12 years and not three years, as stated by counsel for respondent. Therefore, argument of learned Counsel for the appellant is two fold, one is that period of limitation for instituting the proceedings under Section 31 of the Act of 1951 is 12 years and further in the present case, the court below committed error of law by ignoring the part payment against the loan amount made by the respondent, which extended period of limitation.
5. Learned Counsel for the respondents vehemently submitted that the issues remains no more res-integra in view of the authoritative decision of the Hon'ble Apex court delivered in the case of Maharashtra State Financial Corporation v. Ashok K. Agarwal and Ors reported in AIR 2006 SC 1584 wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court had pronounced that the Section 31 contains special provisions for enforcement of claims by State Financial Corporations and for making any application under Section 31 and 32 under the Act of 1951. The applications are governed by the Article 136 of the Indian Limitation Act, which prescribes maximum period of limitation as 3 years. In either case, the trial court's order is in accordance with law and the trial court rightly rejected the petition of the appellant.
6. I considered the rival contentions. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Maharashtra State Financial Corporation v. Ashok K, Agarwal (supra) has clearly laid down the proposition that:
Section 31 contains special provisions for enforcement of claims by State Financial Corporations. It is by way of a legal fiction that the procedure akin to execution of decrees under the Code of Civil Procedure has been permitted to be invoked. But the fact is that there is no decree or order of a civil Court while dealing with applications under Section 31 of the Act. The legal fiction at best refers to a procedure to be followed. It does not mean that a decree or order of a civil Court is being executed, which is a since qua non for invoking Article 136, Article 126 specially uses the words 'decree or order of any civil Court'. The application under Sections 31 and 32 is not by way of execution of a decree or order of any civil Court. Article 136, therefore, is not applicable. To such an application Article 137 applies....
7. Therefore, the period of limitation for making an application under Section 31 of the Act of 1951 can be only three years and the Hon'ble Supreme Court has already laid down that for proceedings under Section 31, there is no decree in existence, which is sought to be executed and, therefore, the period of limitation can be which is provided for any application, which may be moved before the civil court.
8. In view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Maharashtra State Financial Corporation (supra), the present application, which was filed by the appellant in the court on 26th April, 1995 for the recovery of loan amount of the year 1982 and first installment of which was paid to the borrower on 26.2.1982 and for which notices were issued long ago and as per the finding recorded by the trial court while deciding issue no.4, the appellant could prove the loan payment against loan which on 28th Oct., 1984 from 28th Oct., 1984 the period of limitation was available to the appellant upto three years i.e., upto 28th Oct., 1987 whereas the application under Section 31 of the Act was submitted on 25th April, 1995 which was barred by time.
9. In view of the above, no illegality has been committed by the court below in dismissing the application of the appellant. Ultimate decision is uphold it on different reasons.
10. At this juncture, it will be worthwhile to mention here that the Indian Limitation Act, which was amended from time to time and lastly by the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 provides various limitations for different subject matters and as per the schedule appended to the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1963) the first division of the schedule to Limitation Act, 1963 prescribes the limitation for filing the various types of suits and different suits have been covered as far as possible in one or another head by making parts under the first division of the schedule of the Act of 1963. For all suits relating to accounts, relating to declarations and relating to decrees and instruments, period of limitation has been given as three years obviously from the time of accrual of cause of action for filing the suits. Then, in the first schedule itself, in part V, limitation has been prescribed for suits relating to immovable property. Under this head limitation 12 years to 30 years for the suits relating to the mortgages have been given.
11. Then comes part VI, which also provides period of limitation for filing suits relating to movable property. Under Part VI period of limitation is three years. Part VII prescribes limitation for suits relating to tort for which period of limitation is from one year to three years only. Then comes Part VIII, suits relating to trusts and trust property and period of limitation for the suit covered by various Articles, the period of three years to period of limitation is 12 years has been allowed. Then comes part IX which deals with the suits relating to miscellaneous matters which prescribes period of limitation from one year to three years as well as period of limitation from 12 years to 13 years under Articles no.106 to 112.
12. The second division of the schedule appended to the Limitation Act deals with the limitation for appeals having period of limitation of 30 days, 60 days and 90 days. Third division of the schedule provides limitation for; part I, limitation for specified cases, which gives limitation from 10 days to 90 days for certain matters.
13. All above provisions show that different period of limitations have been prescribed for different suits, appeals, applications. Important is that different limitations for filing different suits are prescribed, but long period of 12 years has been allowed for submitting execution petition for any decree (other than a decree granting a mandatory injunction or order of any civil court) by Article 136.
14. It is right time to re-consider that whether long period of 12 years is justified for initiating proceedings of execution of decrees passed by the courts irrespective of the reason for obtaining the decree and reason for passing the decree by the courts and irrespective of nature of dispute' which necessitated filing of the suit by the plaintiffs and irrespective of the fact that what highhandedness was of the defendant against whom decree was passed as well as irrespective of the fact that the litigation in suit itself was fought upto the highest court and where the decree has become final because of non-preferring appeal etc. It is notoriously known that the delay causes injustice. Then how that can be only applicable when the matter is before the court only and that cannot be applied to the dispute, which is allowed to remain alive by the law for long 12 years after the court passes the decree. Therefore, there may not be any justification for providing long period of 12 years for execution of the decree in the cases where the suit has been filed for possession of immovable properties, there may not be any justification for allowing 12 years long period for execution of the decree passed against the tenants, there may not be any justification for long period of limitation of 12 years where the creditor is seeking enforcement of money decree against the debtor, there may not be any justification for allowing long period of 12 years for execution of the decree for recovery of those Government loans for which the parties have already approached the court and obtained the decree and, therefore, they may not be any justification for allowing the Government authorities and public bodies to sit over the decrees obtained by themselves for long period of 12 years and give relief to those persons from whom Government's and local body's money can be recovered, there may not be any justification for providing long period of 12 years of limitation for execution of the decree in a case of partition as well as in the cases of dissolution of partnership firm.
15. Permitting the trespasser over the property encroached upon by him against the authority of law and permitting that person to enter into court at his own whim and wish at any point of time in a 12 years time may or may not have justification which required to be considered by the law commission and the law framers. It is not unknown now that the actual litigation starts after the decree and because of prescribing longer period of limitation of 12 years for execution of the decree it adds a fuel in the agony of the litigants also as well as burden upon the courts. Not only this, but at this juncture, it will be relevant to mention here that every litigant pays the court fees for the relief and not for a dormant decree which can be said to be a still-bom child which needs injection of life by injecting execution in it. The litigant pays the court fees for the relief and not for the decree only. It is also right time to think over the matter where a suit can be closed without giving relief to the litigant, who has paid the court fees for the relief. What can be necessity of execution and logic behind keeping the chapter of execution as provided under Order 21 in the Code of Civil Procedure. Why there cannot be burden on the judgment-debtor to apply to the court and obtain the certificate of satisfaction of the decree passed by the court directing the judgment-debtor to do something as per the decree.
16. In the matter of loan advanced by the financial institutions, the laws have been amended and new laws have been enacted like Secularization Act, 2001 giving huge power to the financial institution in the matter of recovery of the loan on the ground that it is in the public interest, but so far as execution of the decree, a decree obtained by any including bank and financial institution from the civil court, there is a provision of giving 12 long years limitation for its execution. The matter requires serious consideration by the law framers and the law commission.
17. The list cannot be exhaustively prepared because providing such a long period of limitation for execution of the decrees, several executions are filed after delay of several years in the matters where the decree has been passed in favour of the plaintiff with the finding that the plaintiff has suffered a lot because of highhandedness of the defendant and because of late filing of the execution several complications arises in the execution of the decrees.
18. The complete justice to the public cannot be by only passing decrees, but the dispute must end once the matter has come to the court. The party either is required to be granted 'relief' or his 'relief' can be rejected. As per the Court Fees Act, 1870, the court fees is leviable under Chapter III of the Act of 1870 and how it is to be valued and computed is provided thereunder. A meaningful reading of these provisions made under Chapter III clearly shows that the parties are required to pay the court fees for the relief claimed and different court fees as per the different reliefs. As per the Rajasthan Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act, 1961 also the parties are required to pay the court fees for the relief claimed by them and as per Section 6 of the Act of 1961 if separate and distinct reliefs are sought then the parties are required to pay the fee of aggregate value of the reliefs and if relief sought is only ancillary then to pay the court fees for the main relief and where more than one reliefs then one based on the same cause of action are sought in the alternative in any suit, the fees is payable the highest of the fees leviable on the reliefs and further where a suit embraces two or more distinct and different causes of action and separate reliefs are sought based on them, either alternatively or cumulatively, the parties are required to pay the fees on the basis of aggregate amount of valuation of the suit. Therefore, the parties required to pay the court fees 'for the reliefs' claimed by them then whether there can be justification for closing a filing of suit by passing the decree only and without giving actual relief to the litigant and whether there can be justification for keeping the chapter of execution as provided under Order 21 CPC causing duty upon the person who paid the court fees 'for the relief' and asking him to inject life in the 'decree in comma' and whether there can be justification for allowing the judgment-debtor to ignore the direction given in the decree, which is dictated the court and has not been satisfied by the judgment-debtor. Why it cannot be the duty of the judgment-debtor to apply before the same court which passes the decree and compliance of the court's order? The law is existing since century may be correct at relevant time but now requires a reconsideration.
19. All above has been observed because of the reason that there are cases where allegation is against the judiciary for not giving actual relief to the litigants and there is old saying that 'litigation starts after one obtains the decree'.
The appeal of the appellant is hereby dismissed.