$~5 * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI % Date of Decision: November 19, 2014 + CRL.A. 50/2014 SINGH RAJ Represented by: STATE & ORS Represented by: ..... Appellant Mr.Dinkar Verma, Advocate versus ..... Respondents Mr.Lovkesh Sawhney, APP Insp.Raman, SHO/PS Mehraulli SI Bijender Singh Mr.Neeraj Bhardwaj, Advocate for R2 and R-3 Mr.Sushil Kumar Jain, Advocate for R-4 CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP NANDRAJOG HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MUKTA GUPTA PRADEEP NANDRAJOG, J.
(Oral) Crl.M.A.No.50/2014 For the reasons stated in the application the delay in filing the appeal is condoned. The application is disposed of. Crl.A.No.50/2014 1. Complainant is the appellant and his grievance is that respondents 2 to 4 have been convicted for the offence punishable under Section 326/34 IPC. He desires that the respondents should be convicted for the offence punishable under Section 307/34 IPC.
2. Learned counsel for the appellant urges that the impugned order dated January 21, 2013 would show that the learned Trial Judge was influenced by the fact that a compromise had taken place between the complainant and the accused.
3. This is incorrect. The decision dated January 21, 2013 does not refer to any compromise being effected. The order on sentence dated January 28, 2013 does note that the parties have entered into a settlement.
4. Whilst it may be true that there may be a cause for a reasonable apprehension to form in the mind of a reasonable person that while imposing the sentence the learned Trial Judge has treated the compromise between the parties as a mitigating factor, but the same would not be true as regards the decision convicting the respondents.
5. The dispute was over a plot of land ad-measuring 50 square yards. The respondents who are sons of Jai Chand were asserting a right thereto. The appellant Singh Raj and his son were asserting a right thereto.
6. Arjun, the fourth son of Jai Chand, named as an accused was a juvenile and as regards him trial took place before the Juvenile Justice Board.
7. Believing the appellant who was an injured eye witness and his son Anil, who was also an injured eye witness, the learned Trial Judge has taken note of the MLC Ex.PW-3/A of Singh Raj and the MLC Ex.PW-6/A of Anil, to return a finding that the intention was to cause injuries using knives (dangerous weapon) and not to kill the appellant and his son.
8. MLC Ex.PW-3/A of the appellant records that the appellant had received a solitary stab wound which was 3 cm deep on the left hypochondriac region of the abdomen. The MLC Ex.PW-6/A of Anil records that he had received three stab wounds : the first in the left hypochondriac region (depth of the wound is not indicated); the second below right nipple but without any active bleeding; and the third over the sternum but without active bleeding. There is a reference to the second injury being 2 cm and the third being 3 cm; it not being indicated whether the length is the size of the injury laterally placed or vertically placed i.e. whether it represents the depth of the weapon as it entered the body. But from the fact that against the two injuries it is written that no active bleeding was seen, one can gather that the wounds were not deep, and had not even cut the epidermal skin and the tissue immediately beneath, and were probably superficial and hence not life threatening.
9. We concur with the reasoning of the learned Trial Judge that the attendant circumstances which led to the assault and the nature of injuries inflicted on the appellant and his son would make out a case of inferring intention of the accused to injure the appellant and his son and not kill them. The injuries inflicted could under no circumstances have caused death and thus neither intention nor knowledge can be attributed to the accused that by their acts they were likely to cause the death of the appellant and/or his son.
10. The appeal is accordingly dismissed because the challenge is to the order on conviction and not on the order of sentence.
11. But for sake of record we would like to observe that learned counsel for the appellant has made a verbal prayer that even the order on sentence may be permitted to be challenged.
12. We are afraid that the right of the victim to file an appeal under Section 372 Cr.P.C. does not extend to challenging the quantum of sentence. A two-fold right is available against an order acquitting an accused or convicting an accused for a lesser offence or qua the order on sentence. The first is to challenge the order of acquittal or the order convicting for a lesser offence. The second is on the adequacy of the compensation which would be an integral part of an order on sentence. In other words no appeal lies with respect to the sentence imposed; it may lie qua the order on sentence only in relation to the compensation aspect.
13. Thus, we hold that the appeal would not be maintainable as regards the order on sentence.
14. We dismiss the appeal taking note of the fact that while proceeding to adjudicate the appeal we have believed what the appellant and his son have deposed with variations, held to be minor by the learned Trial Judge. Thus, our decision would not be treated as an expression on merits as regards the respondents’ conviction for the offence punishable under Section 326/34 IPC for the reason the respondents, as we are told, have filed appeals challenging their conviction.
15. Said appeals shall be decided by the learned Single Judge uninfluenced by any observation made by us regarding the acts attributable to the respondents in so far their participate role in the assault is concerned for the reason, we make it once again clear, that in the appeal we have considered whether on the view taken by the learned Trial Judge the offence made out is that of attempting to murder or causing grievous hurt using a dangerous weapon.
16. The TCR be retained and attached with the appeals filed by the respondents. (PRADEEP NANDRAJOG) JUDGE (MUKTA GUPTA) JUDGE NOVEMBER19 2014/mamta