Full Judgment
Shyam Sunder Byas, J.
1. The accused has filed this petition under Section 482, Cr. PC for quashing the judgment of the learned Munsif cum Judicial Magistrate, Deedwana dated November 28, 1978. By the judgment aforesaid, the learned Magistrate convicted the accused under Sections 409 and 477A of the Penal Code and sentenced him to two years' rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 500/- of the first count and one year's rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 500/- on the second count.
2. The accused did not prefer any appeal against his conviction and sentence. However, he filed this petition under Section 482, Cr. PC on October 11, 1982 i.e. after four years of the judgment of the learned Magistrate. This petition was admitted on November 11, 1982 for the limited point; whether the sentences awarded to the accused should be made to run concurrently.
3. I have heard Mr. Arora learned Counsel for the petitioner and the learned Public Prosecutor.
4. The accused was convicted under Sections 409 and 477A, IPC in respect of the same transaction. Under Section 31 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, sentences can be directed to run concurrently. Generally, where different offences are made out from the single transaction, sentences should be directed to run concurrently unless there are reasons not to do so to make the sentences to run consecutively. Here in the instant case, the offences under Sections 469 and 477A, IPC relate to the same transaction. As such, the sentences should be directed to run concurrently. This petition should, therefore, be allowed to the above extent.
5. Learned counsel for the accused also argued that the impugned judgment was not delivered and pronounced in the absence of the accused. As such, it should be set-aside. It was also argued that the accused was not heard on the question of sentence. It was incumbent on the Magistrate to hear the accused on the question of sentence and as the accused was absent, he could not be heard on this point. That also vitiates the judgment. I have examined the contention and find no force in it.
6. Section 353, Cr. PC speaks about the delivery and pronouncement of the judgment. The accused was present throughout the trial, but he absented himself only on the date on which the judgment was to be delivered and pronounced. The learned Magistrate, of course, delivered and pronounced the judgment in the absence of the accused, but that does not vitiate judgment. Sub-section (7) of Section 353, Cr. PC clearly lays down that no judgment delivered by any criminal court shall be deemed to be invalid by reason only of the absence of any party. The matter would have been otherwise if the trial was conducted in the absence of the accused. Here, the whole trial was conducted in the presence of the accused. Final arguments were heard in his presence. It was only on the date of the pronouncement of the judgment that he absented himself. On account of his absence on the date of the pronouncement of the judgment, the judgment does not become invalid in view of the provisions of Section 353 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
7. The impugned judgment shows that the learned Counsel for the accused was heard by the trial Court on the question of sentence before the sentence was awarded.
8. No other contention was raised.
9. For the reasons stated above, I find no force in this petition of the accused. It is hereby dismissed.