Judgment:
Guman Mal Lodha, J.
1. The short point involved in this revision is that delay of 10 days condoned by the trial court in depositing the amount under Section 13, Clause (3) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act was reversed by the first appellate court. It is common ground that the delay was not more than 10 days and under the law the court is competent to condone the delay of 15 days. It is also well established according to the judgment of Jagannath v. Jodha Ram 1980 RLW 42 that in matters of deposit of rent the delay upto 15 days is to be condoned normally. Para 23 read as under:
The revision deserves to be accepted, on yet another ground. When the legislature has allowed discretion to court to allow maximum 3 months time under Section 13(4) of the Act for depositing the amount of arrears of rent the court should not be conservative and strict, by depriving tenant of this benefit for doing social justice. Unless in a given case, exceptional reasons warrant it invariably and generally the court should allow maximum time by extending it on the slightest bonafide ground.
The above principle as deduced only goes to show that unless for exceptional reasons, invariably and generally the court should allow maximum time by extending it on the slightest bonafide ground.
2. In the present case the trial court from the copies of the challan inferred that the ground given by the tenant in his application was just and bonafide. The first appellate Court reversed it.
3. In the matters of deposit of rent by tenant under Section 13 where the law permits 15 days extension I am of the opinion that extension should be allowed as a matter of course on the slightest ground unless there are malafides or the party wants to over reach the other party or the court by a questionable method. In the present case when the trial court came to the conclusion that the ground was just and proper and bonafide, in beneficial legislation and making construction or interpretation the first appellate court should not have interfered. In Vimla Devi's case this court in 1977 RLW 326 took the view that normally interference should not be made unless the order of the trial court is arbitrary or perverse or capricious or is in disregard of the sound legal principles or without considering all relevant record.
4. The revision petition is therefore accepted and the order of the trial court is restored and that of the first appellate court is set aside. The parties would bear their own costs.