Judgment:
Panwar, J.
1. Since all these petitions arise out of a common order and involve common facts and law, therefore, for convenience they are being decided by a common order.
2. These six criminal misc. petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C. are directed against the common order dated 26.6.2001 passed by Additional Sessions Judge No. 3, Udaipur in Criminal Revision Petitioners No. 15, 16, 17, 18 & 19 of 2001 filed by petitioner Rajendra Kumar Jain and Criminal Revision Petition No. 20/2001 filed by petitioners Sanjay Babel and another against the order dated 1.2.2001 passed by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Udaipur whereby the trial court framed charges of the offences under Sections 406, 420, 467, 468, 471 & 120-B I.P.C. against the petitioners and Shri I.S. Babel.
3. Brief facts of the case, which are necessary for the decision of these misc. petitions are that on 21.12.98 F.I.R. Numbers 582/99, 583/99, 584/99, 585/99 & 587/99 were lodged against the petitioners and one I.S. Babel, father of the petitioners in S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No. 480/2001, who at the relevant time was an employee of Udaipur Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as 'the Bank') on the post of Manager for the offences noticed above. The petitioner Rajendra Kumar Jain is one of the Directors of the firm M/s. Pinkcity Paper Converters Ltd., Jaipur and the petitioners Sanjay Babel and Kamlesh Babel are the sons of co-accused l.S. Babel and are partners of the family firm of the co-accused l.S. Babel M/s. Jain Divaker Agency, Jaipur and M/s. Actual Trading Co. It was alleged that by entering into conspiracy with the petitioners Rajendra Kumar Jain, Sanjay Babel and Kamlesh Babel co-accused Shri l.S. Babel, forged various documents and by deceitful means, cheated the Bank and misappropriated a huge sum of Rs. 93,83,000/-. In the aforesaid F.I.Rs., the police registered the cases and investigated the matter. After investigation, as many as five charge sheets for the offences noticed above, were filed before the trial court against the petitioners and Shri l.S. Babel.
4. The petitioners aggrieved by the order dated 1.2.2001 by which charges were framed against them and co-accused Shri l.S. Babel, filed six separate revision petitions noticed above before the learned Addl. Sessions Judge No. 3, Udaipur. Having considered the entire material and the police investigation report, the learned revi-sional court came to the conclusion that there is prima facie material on record to show that the petitioner Rajendra Kumar Jain entered into a criminal conspiracy with Shri l.S. Babel, the then Manager of the Bank and Sanjay Babel and Kamlesh Babel committed the offence of criminal conspiracy by forging valuable securities, cheating and mis- appropriating Rs. 93,83,000/-.
5. The case as set up by the prosecution is that the petitioner Rajendra Kumar Jain is director of the firm M/s. Pinkcity Paper Converters Ltd., Jaipur and he in criminal conspiracy with the main accused I.S. Babel, the then Manager of the Bank, received the following'amount by various Bank drafts as mentioned hereunder without there being any corresponding deposit of the amount for the value of the drafts. These drafts were prepared by co- accused J.S. Babel and are said to have been issued by the family firms of the accused I.S. Babel M/s. Jain Divaker Agency, Jaipur and M/s. Actual Trading Company, Jaipur. These firms are run by the petitioners Sanjay Babel and Kamlesh Babel, who are sons of the main accused I.S. Babel, the then Manager of the Bank. These drafts were drawn in favour of M/s. Pinkcity Paper Converters Ltd. of which petitioner Rajendra Kumar Jain is a Director. From the investigation, it reveals that it was the accused Shri I.S. Babel, the then Manager of the Bank, who was actually running the family firm alongwith his sons namely Sanjay Babel and Kamlesh Babel, though he was employee as Manager of the Bank and carrying on the business of said firm by entering into various transactions with various firms and the dealings of the aforesaid two firms were undertaken by the accused I.S. Babel with the petitioner Rajendra Kumar Jain, who is the recipient of various drafts for the sum noticed below. The case as set up by the Bank is that the accused I.S. Babel has utilised the Bank drafts without any corresponding deposit made with the Bank for a sum of Rs. 93,83,000/-and as such, he has forged the Bank drafts amounting to Rs. 93,83,000/- in criminal conspiracy with the petitioners and hence committed the offences as noticed above.
S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No. 417/2001
F.I.R. No. 587/99
Draft Numbers 000105 and 000106
Amount Rs. 9.75 lac + 9.90 lac, total
Rs. 19,65,000/-.
S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No. 418/2001
F.I.R. No. 583/99
Draft Numbers 000103
Amount Rs. 9,95,000/-
S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No. 419/2001
F.I.R. No. 582/99
Draft Numbers 000110
Amount Rs. 9,95,000/-
S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No. 420/2001
F.I.R. No. 585/99
Draft Numbers 000104
Amount Rs. 9,90,000/-
S.B, Criminal Misc. Petition No. 421/2001
F.I.R. No. 584/99
Draft Numbers 000101 and 000102
Amount Rs. 25,93,000/- (9,93,000/- + 9,00,000/-
M/s. Pinkcity Paper Converters Ltd. and Rs. 7,00,000/-)
6. The various drafts as noticed above for the abovementioned amount was fraudulently prepared by the accused I.S. Babel without any corresponding deposit of amount for the said drafts. The accused petitioner Rajendra Kumar Jain is the recipient of the various drafts and for the sum as noticed above. These drafts were said to have been issued by the two family firms of the accused I.S. Babel, which are being run by the petitioners Sanjay Babel and Kamlesh Babel, sons of the accused I.S. Babel, the then Manager of the Bank. Prima facie, nothing has been established that the accused petitioner.Rajendra Kumar Jain or his firm M/s. Pinkcity Paper Converters Ltd., Jaipur has supplied the material against the drafts and even if some material is supplied, it cannot be said to be that he was a bona fide recipient of the draft from the evidence collected during the investigation by the police. It is not prima facie established that any such supply was made. On the aforesaid F.I.R.s, police registered various cases as noticed above and investigated the matter and after thorough investigation, prima facie, reached to the conclusion that the offences under Sections 406, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B I.P.C. are made out against the petitioners and Shri I.S. Babel. Accordingly, five charge sheets were filed by the police against the petitioners and I.S. Babel before the trial court.
7. The learned trial Magistrate on perusal of the aforesaid charge sheets, took cognizance of the offences noticed above against the petitioners and I.S. Babel. Charges were also framed by the trial court for the offence noticed hereinabove against the petitioners and I.S. Babel.
8. 1 have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the order of the revisional court and the relevant material.
9. It is not in dispute that the accused I.S. Babel, Manager of the Bank, who carries on the Banking business and has misappropriated huge sum of Rs. 93,83,000/-by forging various Bank drafts which were drawn and issued in favour of his family firm and M/s. Pinkcity Paper Converters Ltd., Jaipur as noticed above and run in the name of his sons petitioners Sanjay Babel and Kamlesh Babel. It is also not in dispute that the petitioner Rajendra Kumar Jain is in receipt of various drafts for the sum noticed above. The learned counsel for the petitioner Rajendra Kumar Jain submitted that the petitioner is one of the directors of the firm M/s. Pinkcity Paper Converters Ltd., Jaipur and had supplied paper products to family firm of the accused I.S. Babel, the then Bank Manager, M/s. Jain Divaker Agency and M/s. Actual Trading Co. and, therefore, he submitted that the petitioner Rajendra Kumar Jain was bonafide recipient of the drafts having no knowledge of the drafts being forged and misappropriated by the accused I.S. Babel. He further submitted that there are two more firms namely, M/s. Rajasthan Breweries Ltd. and M/s. Varun Beverages Ltd., who were also recipient of the various drafts from the accused I.S. Babel, had not been arraigned as accused and, therefore, the proceedings against the petitioner Rajendra Kumar Jain, the director of M/s. Pinkcity Paper Converters Ltd., Jaipur be quashed.. The learned revisional court has considered this aspect on the basis of the police investigation papers and the charge sheets. The said supply of paper products by the firm M/s. Pinkcity Paper Converters Ltd. of which the petitioner Rajendra Kumar Jain is a Director, has not prima facie been established during the investigation and the plea taken by the petitioner Rajendra Kumar Jain with regard to supply of paper products to the family firm of the accused I.S. Babel was considered to be prima facie not established. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that there is no direct evidence of criminal conspiracy against the petitioner Rajendra Kumar Jain and, therefore, the charge of conspiracy cannot be sustained against him. He has relied on judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra, etc. etc. v. Som Nath Thapa, etc. etc. (1), and A. Jayaram and Anr. v. Stale of Andhra Pradesh (2). In State of Maharashtra, etc. etc. v. Som Nath Thapa, etc. etc. (Supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under :-
'To establish a charge of conspiracy knowledge about indulgence in either an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means is necessary. In some cases, intent of unlawful use being made of the goods or services in question may be inferred from the knowledge itself. This apart, the prosecution has not to establish that a particular unlawful use was intended, so long as the goods or services in question could not be put to any lawful use. When the ultimate offence consists of a chain of actions, it would not be necessary for the prosecution to establish, to bring home the charge of conspiracy, to bring home the charge of conspiracy, that each of the conspirators had the knowledge of what the collaborator would do, so long as it is known that the collaborator would put the goods or services to an unlawful use.'
10. It was further held by their Lordships that if there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence, a Court can justifiably say that a prima facie case against him exists, and so, frame charge against him for committing that offence. It was also held that if on the basis of materials on record, a Court could come to the conclusion that commission of the offence is a probable consequence, a case for framing of charge exists. It was held by their Lordships that at the stage of framing of charge, probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into; it would be decided at the close of the trial. Thus, in view of the above, this judgment relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner does not help him.
11. In A. Jayaram's case (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under:-
'It is true that there is no absolute standard of proof in a criminal trial and the court should not nurture fanciful doubts by exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt, but in a case of circumstantial evidence all the links in the chain of events from which irresistible conclusion about the guilt of the accused for the offence alleged can be drawn must be established beyond the pale of reasonable doubt. The court has to be watchful and avoid the danger of allowing suspicion to take the place of legal proof. Conviction cannot be based on circumstances indicating that the prosecution case is quite likely to be true. For basing the conviction in a case governed by circumstantial evidence, the facts established must rule out any likelihood of innocence of the accused.'
12. In A. Jayaram's case (supra), the accused appellants therein were convicted by the trial court and the conviction was upheld upto High Court and the conviction was challenged before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The matter came up before the Hon'ble Supreme Court after trial was concluded and the accused therein were found guilty of the offence and convicted. In the instant case, the stage before the trial court is only of framing of charge and the evidence is yet to be recorded by the trial court. The learned P.P. contents that the order of the revisional court is a well reasoned order and the trial court as well as the revisional court after having considered the material including the police investigation papers, prima facie reached to the conclusion that there is a ground to presume that the accused petitioners have committed the offences charged with and accordingly, the learned trial court framed the charges and the revisional court also affirmed the order of the trial court framing charges by holding that there is sufficient material on record to presume that the petitioners have committed the offence of criminal conspiracy.
13. The offence of criminal conspiracy under Section 120-B I.P.C. construes that there is an agreement between two or more persons charged with the offence of criminal conspiracy but it is difficult to gather the particular facts of conspiracy as disclosed in the charge sheet. What is required is some general evidence pertaining to conspiracy, which would be sufficient to form their act of conspiracy. The requirement is that there should be some connecting link or the factors in the evidence collected with the police would be good enough for framing of the charge.
14. In Hardeo Singh v. State of Bihar and Anr. (3), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that to establish the charge of conspiracy, there is required cogent evidence of meeting of two minds in the matter of commission of an offence, in the absence of which the charge cannot be sustained. This is, however, not so, in the matter of framing of charge since the incidence of the offence shall have to be investigated. Thus, there is a clear distinction that to sustain the charge of conspiracy, there must be some evidence with regard to the meeting of minds of the persons charged with criminal conspiracy and for the purpose of framing of charge, it is to be presumed from the material collected by the police during the investigation and placed before the trial court alongwith the charge sheet. What is required at the time of framing of the charge is that the court can presume at the stage of framing the charge that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person charge sheeted was involved in the commission as envisaged in Section 10 of the Evidence Act and at the stage of framing of charge, the evidence or its pros and cons cannot be weighed.
15. In Slate of T.N. v. J. Jayalalitha (4), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:-
'This is not the stage for weighting the pros and cons of all the implications of the materials nor for sifting the materials presented by the prosecution. The exercise at this stage should be confined to considering the police report and the documents to decide whether the allegations against the accused are 'groundless' or whether 'there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offences'. Presumption therein is always rebuttable by the accused for which there must be opportunity of participation in the trial.'
16. In the instant case, petitioner Rajeridra Kumar Jain is the recipient of a huge amount by various drafts as noticed above through the accused I.S. Babel without there being convincing material for supply of paper products and consequently to presume at this stage that there are reasonable grounds to believe that he in criminal conspiracy with the accused I.S. Babel has misappropriated huge amount of Rs. 93,83,000/- from the Bank of which he was Manager. So far as the petitioners Sanjay Babel and Kamlesh Babel are concerned, they are sons of the co-accused I.S. Babel, who at the relevant time was Manager of the Bank and forged the Bank drafts valued at Rs. 93,83,000/-. These forged drafts were prepared by I.S. Babel in favour of various firms without there being any deposit made with the Bank for obtaining such drafts. This act was done for the benefit and to cause wrongful gain to these petitioners, who are his sons and are partners of the firms namely, M/s. Jain Divaker Agency and M/s. Actual Trading Co. Thus, it cannot be said that there is no material to presume that the accused petitioners have committed the offences noticed above. It is settled law that at the time of framing of charge, there is no legal requirement that the trial court should discuss every material placed before it by the police alongwith the charge sheet. Not only this, at the stage of framing of charge, the Court is not expected to go deep into the probative value of the material on record. Section 227 of the Criminal Procedure Code provides that at the stage of passing the order in terms of Section 227 of the Code, the Court has merely to peruse the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is a sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. If upon consideration, the Court is satisfied that a prima facie case is made out against the accused, the Court must proceed to frame charge in terms of Section 228 of the Code.
17. In Umar Abdul Sankoor Sorathia v. Intelligence Officer, Narcotic Control Bureau (5), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that at the stage of framing charge, the Court is not expected to go deep into the probative value of the materials on record. If on the basis of materials on record the Court could come to the conclusion that the accused would have committed the offence, the Court is obliged to frame the charge and proceed to the trial.
18. In Kanti Bhadra Shah and Anr. v. State of W.B. (6), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that if the trial court decides to frame a charge, there is no legal requirement that he should pass an order specifying the reasons as to why he opts to do so. Framing of charge itself is prima facie order that the trial Judge has formed the opinion, upon considering the police report and other documents and after hearing both sides, that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence concerned. It was further held that there is no legal requirement that the trial court should write an order showing the reasons for framing a charge, why should the already burdened trial courts be further burdened with such an extra work. The time has reached to adopt all possible measures to expedite the court procedure and to chalk out measures to avert all roadblocks causing avoidable delays.
19. In State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh (7), the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under :-
'Reading the two provisions trial the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be the accused. It is not obligatory for the Judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail and weight in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at this stage of deciding the matter under Section 227 or 228 of the Code. At that stage the Court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is not in the sense of the law governing the trial of criminal cases in France where the accused is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is proved. But it is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the Court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. An exhaustive list of the circumstances to indicate as to what will lead to one conclusion or the other is neither possible nor advisable. We may just illustrate the difference of the law by one more example. If the scales of pan as to the guilt or innocence of the accused are something like even at the conclusion of the trial, then, on the theory of benefit of doubt the case is to end in his acquittal. But if, on the other hand, it is so at the initial stage of making an order under Section 227 or Section 228, then in such a situation ordinarily and generally the order which will have to be made will be one under Section 228 and not under Section 227.'
20. In Supdt. & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Anil Kumar Bhunja and Ors. (8), the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under :-
'At the initial stage of framing of charges, the prosecution evidence does not commence. The Court has, therefore, to consider the question of framing the charges on general considerations of the material placed before it by the investigating agency. At this stage, the truth, veracity and effect of the judgment which the prosecution proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. The standard of test, proof and judgment which is to be applied finally before finding an accused guilty or otherwise is not exactly to be applied at the stage of framing the charge. Even on the basis of a strong suspicion founded on materials before it, the Court can form a presumptive opinion regarding the existence of factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged and in that event be justified in framing the charges against the accused in respect of the commission of the offence alleged to have been committed by them.'
21. In Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. v. Biological E. Ltd. and Ors. (9), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that exercise of jurisdiction under the inherent power as envisaged in Section 482 of the Code to have the complaint or the charge-sheet quashed is an exception rather than a rule and the case for quashing at the initial stage must have to be treated as rarest of rare so as not to scuttle the prosecution.
22. In K. Karunakarn v. State of Kerala and Anr. (10), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the menace of corruption cannot be permitted to be hidden under the carpet of legal technicalities.
23. In Munna Devi v. State of Rajasthan and Anr. (11), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:-
'The revision power under the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be exercised in a routine and casual manner. While exercising such powers, the High Court has no authority to appreciate the evidence in the manner as the trial and the appellate courts are required to do, Revisional powers could be exercised only when it is shown that there is a legal bar against the continuance of the criminal proceedings or the framing of charge or the facts as stated in the first information report even if they are taken at the face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence for which the accused has been charged.'
24. The scope of Sub-section (3) of Section 397 Cr.P.C. and inherent powers of High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and inherent powers of High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. came to be considered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Krishnan and Anr. v. Krishnaveni and Anr. (12). The Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under :-
'Ordinarily, when revision has been barred by Section 397(3) of the Code, a person-accused/complainant-cannot be allowed to take recourse to the revision to the High Court under Section 397(1) or under inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code since it may amount to circumvention of the provisions of Section 397(3) or Section 397(2) of the Code. It is seen that the High Court has suo motu power under Section 401 and continuous supervisory jurisdiction under Section 483 of the Code. So, when the High Court on examination of the record finds that there is grave miscarriage of justice or abuse of process of the Courts or the required statutory procedure has not been complied with or there is failure of justice or order passed or sentence imposed by the Magistrate requires correction, it is but the duty of the High Court to have it corrected at the inception lest grave miscarriage of justice would ensue. It is, therefore, to meet the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process that the High Court is preserved with inherent power and would be justified, under such . circumstances, to exercise the inherent power and in an appropriate case even revisional power under Section 397(1) read with Section 401 of the Code. As stated earlier, it may be exercised sparingly so as to avoid needless multiplicity of procedure, unnecessary delay in trial and protraction of proceedings.'
25. In was further held as under :-
'The object of Section 483 and the purpose behind conferring the revisional power under Section 397 read with Section 401, upon the High Court is to invest continuous supervisory jurisdiction so as to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularity of the procedure or to meet out justice. In addition, the inherent power of the High Court is preserved by Section 482 Cr.P.C. The power of the High Court, therefore, is very wide. However, the High Court must exercise such power sparingly and cautiously when the Sessions Judge has simultane- ously exercised revisional power under Section 397(1). However, when the High Court notices that there has been failure of justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order is not correct, it is but the salutary duty of the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process or miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularities/incorrectness committed by inferior Criminal Court in its juridical process or illegality of sentence or order.'
26. In Rajinder Prasad v. Bashir and Ors. (13), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under :-
'The object of criminal trial is to render public justice and to assure punishment to the criminals keeping in view that the trial is concluded expeditiously. Delaying tactics or protracting the commencement or conclusion of the criminal trial is required to be curbed effectively, lest the interest of public justice may suffer. Though the power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code is very wide, yet the same must be exercised sparingly and cautiously, particularly in a case where the petitioner is shown to have already invoked the revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 of the Code. Only in cases where the High Court finds that there has been failure of justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order was not correct, the High Court may, in its discretion, prevent the abuse of the process or miscarriage of justice by exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code.'
27. In State of Bihar v. Rajendra Agarwal (14), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the inherent power of the Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. should be very sparingly and cautiously used only when the Court comes to the conclusion that there would be manifest injustice or there would be abuse of process of court, if such power is not exercised.
28. Apart from the bar of Section 397(3) Cr.P.C., even on merit, it cannot be said that the order framing charge would result in failure of justice.
29. In State of Karnataka v. Appa Balu Ingale and Ors. (15), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that ordinarily it is not open for the High Court to interfere with the concurrent findings of the courts below.
30. In the instant case, the two courts below concurrently found prima facie case against the petitioners and on consideration of the material before it, reached to the conclusion that there is a prima facie ground to presume that the petitioners have committed the offences noticed above. Putting the petitioner to trial does not necessarily mean harassment and in the even prosecution of this nature is allowed to be continued, it would not be in any manner viewed a travesty of justice or any undue prejudice or even otherwise prejudicial since ultimately in the event the charge is not proved, they would be acquitted and, therefore, it cannot be said that there would be manifest injustice or there would be abuse of process of any court, if such powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. are not exercised. The case in hand is not of that nature where it would result in failure of justice or abuse of process of the court in the event of non-interference. No case for quashing of proceedings is made out.
31. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I find no merit In all these petitions. Accordingly, they are dismissed.