Judgment:
Chauhan, J.
1. Both these writ petitions have been filed agains! the same impugned award dated 25.4.2000 made by the Labour Court, Udaipur. The workman has filed it on the ground that the Labour Court ought to have reinstated him instead of granting compensation in lieu of reinstatement. The other petition has been filed by the employer on the ground that the award is nullity for want of jurisdiction and even the findings of facts recorded by the Labour Court are perverse, hence it is liable to be quashed.
2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to these cases are that the workman raised an industrial dispute that he had worked from 26.9.1979 to 28.2.1987 continuously with the employer and his services stood terminated w.e.f. 1.3.1987 withoutcomplying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, 'the Act'). The Appropriate Government made a reference, vide order dated 29.7.1995, to the Labour Court as to whether the termination of services of workman Suresh Chandra w.e.f. 1.3.1989 was justified and if not, to what relief he was entitled for. In view of the reference, the workman filed the claim that he had worked from 26.9.1979 till 28.2.1987 and his services stood terminated with effect from 1.3.1987. The employer disputed the claim of the workman on various grounds, inter alia, that he had worked in different units of the establishment, which were not inter-dependent, rather independent; he had not completed 240 days work in any of the unit in a calendar year counting backward from the date-of termination; his services had not bee terminated w.e.f. 1.3.1989 and he was not entitled for any relief. After considering the averments made by the parties and appreciating the evidence available on record, the Labour Court made the award dated 25.4.2000 recording the findings of facts that the workman had worked from 26.9.1979 to 28.2.87; he had completed 240 days in a calendar year counting backward from the date of termination; and the Establishment was the same unit and not different units. As a period of 13 years and two months had passed in between, the Labour Court, instead of granting the relief of reinstatement, awarded a sum of Rs. 38,000/- as the compensation. Hence these petitions.
3. Learned counsel for the parties have raised the same issues which had been raised before the Labour Court. Mr. H.S. Sidhu, learned counsel for the workman, has placed reliance upon a large number of judgments before this Court and submitted that the relief of reinstatement should have been granted instead of awarding the compensation in lieu thereof. On the other hand, Mr. Vinay Jain, learned counsel for the employer, has raised a large number of issues, including the issue of jurisdiction, submitting that the reference had been made as to whether the termination of services of the workman w.e.f. 1.3.1989 was justified. According to the workman himself, his services stood terminated w.e.f. 1.3.1987. The reference was in respect of termination of services w.e.f. 1.3.1989. Thus, the reference itself was bad, therefore, the award is nullity. Mr. Sidhu has submitted that undoubtedly the reference was in respect of termination w.e.f. 1.3.1989 and the workman's claim was in respect of termination of his services w.e.f. 1.3.1987. The parties led evidence knowing the controversy that the workman had been retrenched w.e.f. 1.3.1987. As both the parties were aware of the real dispute, the award cannot be held to be nullity for want of jurisdiction and as the Labour Court itself has considered this issue and came to the conclusion that though the reference was in respect of termination w.e.f. 1.3.1989 but it would proceed as if the services stood terminated w.e.f. 1.3.1987 as per the claim of the workman and while doing so, the Labour Court itself amended the reference accordingly to do justice between the parties, no interference is required on this count.
4. I have considered the rival submissions made by the parties.
5. There can be no dispute to the settled legal proposition that any order passed by any Court without jurisdiction is nullity and such order remains inexecutable and unenforceable.
6. Jurisdiction to deal with a case is a creation of statute and it cannot be created by acquiescence of the party or by the order of the Court. (Vide the Constitution Bench judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the United Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Their Workmen (1), in Kesar Singh and Ors. v. Sadhu (2), the Apex Court held that a decree without jurisdiction is a nullity and when the matter goes to root of the jurisdiction, it can be raised even in execution proceedings. The finding of a Court or a Tribunal becomes irrelevant and unenforceable/inexecuteable once the forum is found to have no jurisdiction (Vide State of Gujarat v. Rajesh Kumar Chimanlal Barot and Anr. (3).
7. Jurisdiction cannot be conferred by mere acceptance, acquiescance, consent or by any other means as it can be conferred only by the legislature. Conferring a Court or Authority with jurisdiction, is a legislative function. In Union of India v. Devki Nandan Aggarawal (4), the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that 'the Court cannot usurplegislative functions. The Court cannot re-write, recast or reframe the legislation for the very good reason that it has no power to legislate. The power to legislate has not been conferred on the Courts.'
8. In Karnal Improvement Trust v. Prakash Wanti and Anr. (5), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that acquiescence of parties cannot confer jurisdiction upon a court/authority and an erroneous interpretation equally should not be permitted to perpetuate and perpetrate defeating of legislative animation, A similar view has been taken in U.P. Rajkiya Nirman Nigam Ltd. v. Indure Pvt. Ltd. (6).
9. In Sardar Hasan Siddiqui v. Slate Transport Appellate Tribunal (7), the Allahabad High Court observed that a Court or a Tribunal cannot derive jurisdiction apart from the Statute. 'No amount of acquiescence, waiver or the like can confer jurisdiction which a Tribunal is lacking. The doctrine of nullity will come into operation and any decision taken or given by such a Tribunal will be nullity.'
10. In A.R. Antuley v. R.S. Nayak (8), the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to and relied upon the judgment of the House of Lords in Attorney General v. Herman Jamas Sillern (9), wherein it had been reiterated as under :-
'A decision touching the jurisdiction....has to be not only consistent with the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, the same cannot even be inconsistent with substantive provisions of the statutory law....Creation of a right to an appeal is an act which requires legislative authority, neither an inferior Court nor the Superior Court nor both combined, can create such a right, it being one of the limitation and extension of jurisdiction.'
11. In the Bombay Gas Company Ltd. v. Gopal Bhiva and Ors., (10), the Hon'ble Supreme Court examined the scope of jurisdiction and powers of the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court and held that the Labour Court is a Court of limited jurisdiction and it can deal with only the dispute referred to it and the matters incidental thereto, but cannot travel beyond the terms of the reference:
12. In Hochtief Gammon v. Industrial Tribunal (11), while dealing with the similar issue, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: -
'The Industrial Tribunal is a Tribunal of limited jurisdiction. Its jurisdiction is to try an industrial dispute referred to it for its adjudication by the Appropriate Government by an order of reference passed under Section 10. It is not open to the tribunal to travel materially beyond the terms of the reference, for it is well settled that the term of reference determines the scope of its power and jurisdiction from case to case.....It may, while dealing with the said point, deal with the matters incidental thereto.'
13. In Pottery Mazdoor Panchayat v. The Perfect Pottery Co. Ltd. and Anr. (12), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the Industrial Tribunal has no jurisdiction to go beyond the terms of reference and to inquire into the question which is not involved in the reference. If the Tribunal travels beyond the terms of the reference, the award is nullity and would not confer any right upon the party.
14. In Madanpa! Singh v. State of U.P. and Ors. (13), the Hon'ble Supreme Court examined the case wherein, while making the reference, name of the workman had wrongly been mentioned. The parties led the evidence knowing who was the real workman, but the I ,abour Court made the award of 'no dispute' recording its conclusion that there wa,s no workman-employee served the Establishment by the name the reference had been made and it was not possible for the Labour Court to proceed on the basis of the evidence led by the parties or treat the reference to have been made in favour of the correct person. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the award was justified as the Labour Court, being a Court of limited jurisdiction and having no powerto go beyond the terms of the reference, could not deal with the matter. However, in such an eventuality, either of the parties could make the application before the Appropriate Government to amend the reference and in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the Labour Court itself could also ask the Appropriate Government to make an amendment. In the said case, on being approached by the workman, the Appropriate Government amended the reference after the award had been made by the Labour Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court directed the Labour Court to decide the matter afresh.
15. Thus, in view of the above, I reach the inescapable conclusion that the Labour Court lackes competence to correct/modify/amend/alter the terms of the reference or correct the name or the date of termination etc. and in case it does so, the award becomes nullity, being without jurisdiction, based on the bad reference.
16. Thus, the impugned award dated 25.4.2000 is declared to be a nullity, unenforceable and inexecutable and is hereby set- aside. The workman may approach the Appropriate Government for amending the reference. As the matter is very old, if the workman makes such an application, the Appropriate Government is requested to pass appropriate order on his application expeditiously and in case the reference is made, the Labour Court is requested to dispose of the claim petition expeditiously. There shall be no order as to costs.