Judgment:
Shiv Kumar Sharma, J.
1. After a gross delay of about 18 years, the petitioner has approached this Court with a prayer to quash the order dated December 20, 1974 whereby his services were terminated.
2. The petitioner averred in the writ petition that since he was led in a trap case, impugned order of termination came to be passed by the respondents Vide order dated March 26, 1984 the petitioner was convicted by the Special Judge (CBI Cases) Rajasthan, Jaipur but the High Court acquitted him on January 31, 1992. An appeal thereafter was preferred by the petitioner before the respondent No. 2 seeking relief of reinstatement on May 19, 1992 but no need was paid to it. After filing supplementary appeal the petitioner served notice for demand of justice and thereafter preferred instant writ petition.
3. A preliminary objection in respect of maintainability of writ petition was raised by the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents. It was urged that the impugned order of termination had no bearing with the criminal case registered against the petitioner and as the writ petition was filed after a long delay of 18 years unaccompanied by any reasonable explanation, it should be dismissed on the ground of laches. Reliance was placed on Naib Subedar Lachman Das v. U.O.I. : 1977CriLJ1574 .
4. Learned Counsel for the petitioner canvassed that this Court directed the respondents to produce the service record of the petitioner but the record was not produced therefore, adverse inference may be drawn against them. It was contended that impugned order of termination had a definite bearing with the criminal case and after the order of the High Court the petitioner was entitled to be reinstated. As soon as the High Court acquitted the petitioner, writ petition was filed. In support of the contentions learned Counsel placed reliance on A.S. Chauhan v. RSEB 1993 (2) WLC (Raj.) 681, Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines 1999(2) SLR 338, Central Inland Water Transport Corporation v. Brojo Nath Ganguly : (1986)IILLJ171SC , Babu Lal v. The State of Haryana JT 1991(1) SCC 211.
5. I have pondered over the rival submissions and carefully weighted the material on record.
6. Before proceeding further, I deem it necessary to examine the nature of the impugned letter of termination. The Assistant General Manager of the Hindustan Copper Project wrote the petitioner on December 20, 1974 thus-
Dear Sir,
As per terms and conditions of your appointment, your services are hereby terminated with immediate effect. You will be paid a sum equal to three months pay in lieu of the requisite notice.
Your final dues, if any, will be paid to you in the usual manner and you are advised to contact Manager (Finance) in this connection. Yours faithfullysd/-(R.C. Bahree)Asst. General Manager cum M.S.
The respondents in the reply pleaded that the petitioner had accepted the termination order without any protest and in turn wrote to the respondent No. 2 vide his letter dated September 21, 1975 that he had no objection to the decision of termination and payment of arrears be made.
7. As the respondents have not produced the alleged letter dated September 21, 1975 and other record relating to payment of outstanding amount to the petitioner, I am unable to accept this contention that the petitioner is estopped from challenging the impugned order. The only question that requires consideration now is as to whether the delay of 18 years in filing the writ petition in the facts and circumstances of the case is fatal or not?
8. A bare look at the impugned order of termination demonstrates that it is based on terms and conditions of the appointment of the petitioner. It does not bear even a slight reference of the criminal case. The petitioner has not stated in the writ petition as to whether he submitted reply of the said letter or not? or Had the petitioner ever contacted Manager (Finance) in pursuance to the said letter? Be that as it may, the only explanation of the petitioner in respect of delay in filing the writ petition is that after his acquittal in criminal case by the High Court he prayed the respondents to reinstate him back in service and therefore, delay of 18 years in filing the writ petition is not fatal in the facts and circumstances of the case.
9. Article 226 of the Constitution prescribes no period of limitation, but ordinarily no application under it will be entertained unless it is made soon after the right sought to be protected is infringed. A time lag that can be explained does not spell laches. 'Laches' is such negligence or omission to assert a right as, taken in conjunction with the lapse of time. It operates as a bar in a court of equity. 'No relief is ordinarily granted to a person who does not seek his remedy with due diligence. Whether there is delay or not, must be decided with respect to the facts of each particular case. The aggrieved person must be very vigilant and seek relief at the earliest date, if he fails to do so and has no satisfactory explanation of the delay, then his petition is liable to be thrown out. The proposition that the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution must be sought as soon as an injury is caused or threatened is merely an application of the equitable doctrine that delay defeats equity and the longer the injured person sleeps over his rights without any reasonable excuse, his chances of success in a writ petition became more slender. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in G.C. Gupta v. N.K. Pandey AIR 1988 SC 654, indicated that 'inordinate delay is not merely a factor for the court to refuse appropriate relief but also a relevant consideration not to unsettled settled things.' in Naib Subedar Lachman Das v. U.O.I., (supra) writ petition was filed challenging the order of discharge passed against army servant after four years and no satisfactory explanation was available for the delay. Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the High Court was justified in dismissing the writ petition. In A.S. Chauhan v. RSEB (supra) the petitioner A.S. Chauhan sought appointment against the vacant post of Assistant Personnel Officer caused by one K.L. Bachhani, claiming that his name stood in the merit list. The candidature of the petitioner was supported by the Director of Personnel of the Board. The Dy. Secretary (Recruitment) also sought approval for appointment of the petitioner but his appointment order was not issued, therefore, the petitioner made representations and the Dy. Secretary (Recruitment) again recommended the case of the petitioner but the petitioner was not appointed. The petitioner again made many representations and finally served a notice for demand of justice. The petitioner filed writ petition after four years and six months claiming that he had a right to be appointed as he was included in the merit list and his case for appointment was recommended by the functionaries of the Board. Under these circumstances learned Single Judge of this Court allowed the writ petition and held that while dealing with an objection regarding delay and laches in filing of the petition, facts of each case will have to be considered independently and no strait jacket formula can be applied for entertaining or for refusing to entertain a petition filed after lapse of some time.
10. I am not satisfied with the explanation given by the petitioner in the case on hand in respect of late filing of the petition. As already stated the impugned order of termination did not have any reference of criminal case. It was based on terms and conditions of the appointment of the petitioner and if the petitioner was aggrieved with the said order, he ought to have approached this Court at the earliest but he slept over his rights without reasonable excuse and in my considered opinion he is not entitled to any relief. I hold that gross delay of 18 years in filing the writ petition is fatal in the facts and circumstances of this case. Taking up old matters like the present one after a long time is likely to result in administrative complications and difficulties. It would therefore, appear to be in the interest of smoothness and efficiency of service that such matters should be given a quietus after lapse of some time.
11. In view of what I have discussed hereinabove the writ petition has no merit, it is accordingly dismissed without any order as to costs.