ORDER
Vineet Kothari, J.
1. This appeal by the State of Rajasthan through the Secretary, Medical and Health Department, Jaipur and Senior Medical Officer, Incharge, Upgraded Primary Health Centre, Jhadol, Dist. Udaipur has been filed against the claimants and owner of the vehicle against the award of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Ajmer deciding the claim petition No. 388/2006 (340/2006) on 8.9.2008 in respect of an accident which took place on 18.6.2005 at 9.30 a.m. at Jhadol, Dist. Udaipur. Since the claimants were residing at Ajmer, in accordance with the provisions of Section 166(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, they could file claim petition at the place of their residence besides the place where the accident took place and therefore, they preferred to file said claim petition before the learned MACT, Ajmer and the said claim petition came to be decided by the learned Tribnal on 8.9.2008 awarding a sum of Rs. 1 1,73,000/- in favour of the claimant for the death of one person of 43 years of age, named Homkishore. The death in question also took place in a Hospital at Udaipur when he was being taken to said hospital in ambulance belonging to State Government registered at RJ-27/E-1037. Thus, the accident and death took place at Udaipur which district falls within the territorial jurisdiction of principal seat of Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur, whereas the claim petition was decided by the Tribunal at Ajmer which is within the territorial jurisdiction of Jaipur Bench of this Court. In this context, an appeal has been filed challenging the said award at the principal seat of Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur since the place of accident giving rise to said cause of action of filing claim petition and then the State - owner of the vehicle filing present appeal arose at Udaipur, whereas the learned Counsel for the State submitted on the office objection No. 2 as to territorial jurisidction that since the Tribunal which has passed the impugned order is situated at Ajmer, therefore, this appeal would lie before the Jaipur Bench of this Court in whose jurisdiction the District Ajmer falls and therefore, this appeal may be transferred to Jaipur Bench of this Court.
2. Since the Registry has raised objection by way of a defect No. 2 about the question of territorial jurisdiction of the principal seat of the Rajasthan High Court and it was also submitted by the learned Dy. Govt. Counsel Mr. Yashpal Khileree appearing for the appellant - State that this appeal may be transferred to Jaipur Bench of this Court, this Court after hearing him and hearing the arguments of amicus curiae Mr. Anand Purohit, AAG and the President of Rajasthan High Court Lawyers' Association and Mr. M.R. Singhvi, Advocate who were called upon to assist the Court on the said issue, has considered it appropriate to decide the question of territorial jurisdiction first before dealing with the merits of appeal.
3. The question of territorial jurisdiction of the principal seat of Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur and Bench at Jaipur has come up for judicial scrutiny more often than not and despite the principles of deciding the territorial jurisdiction being well settled, choosing of forum as per convenience and filing of cases at the places other than the place where the cause of action actually arose by litigants and counsels, has kept this issue raking up again and again and therefore, this Court considers it appropriate to deal with the said question once again.
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION
4. Admittedly, in the present case, the accident took place at Udaipur and death of the person for whom the claimants approached the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Ajmer also happened at Udaipur which admittedly and undisputably falls within the territorial jurisdiction of principal seat of Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur, whereas the Tribunal which has decided the said claim petition was located at Ajmer since the claimants resided at Ajmer and they preferred to approach the said Tribunal at Ajmer in accordance with the provisions of Section 166(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and Ajmer indisputably falls within the territorial jurisdiction of Jaipur Bench of Rajasthan High Court. The question thus is whether this appeal against the said award of the MACT, Ajmer can be entertained here at principal seat of Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur or deserves to be transferred to Jaipur Bench of this Court as prayed by the learned Dy. Government Counsel appearing for the appellant - State.
5. The leading judgment dealing with jurisdiction of principal seat at Jodhpur and Bench at Jaipur for Rajasthan High Court is the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajasthan High Court Advocates Association v. Union of India and Ors. reported in AIR 2001 SC 416 and the relevant extract of the said judgment is as under:
R.C. Lahoti, J. : The present State of rajasthan came into being on November 1, 1956 in accordance with the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 (hereinafter 'the Act') consisting of the territories mentinoed in Section 10 thereof. Sub-section (2) of Section 49 mandates a High Court being established for the new State of Rajasthan as from the appointed day, i.e. November 1, 1956. On October 27, 1956, the President fo India in exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-section (1) of Section 51 of the Act, directed Jodhpur to be the principal seat of the new High Court for the State of Rajasthan. Initially the Chief Justice of the State established a temporary Bench of the High Court of Rajasthan at Jaipur but eventually exercising the power conferred by Sub-section (2) of Section 51 of the Act the President on January 31, 1977 issued an order which reads as under:
In exercise of the powers conferred by subsection (2) of Section 51 of the States Reorganization Act, 1956 (37 of 1956), the President, after consultation with the Governor of Rajasthan and the Chief Justice of the High Court of Rajasthan, is pleased to make the following order, namely:
1. Short title and commencement :- (1) This order may be called the High Court of Rajasthan (Establishment of a Permanent Bench) order, 1976.
(2) It shall come into force on the 3 1st day of January, 1977.
2. Establishment of a permanent Bench of the Rajasthan High Court at Jaipur :- There shall be established a permanent Bench of the High Court of Rajasthan, being not less than five in number, as the Chief Justice of that High Court may, from time to time nominate, shall sit at Jaipur in order to exercise the jurisdiction and power for the time being vested in that High Court in respect of cases arising in the districts of Ajmer, Alwar, Bharatpur, Bundi, Jaiupr, Jhalawar, Jhunjhunu, Kotan, Sawai Madhopur, Sikar and Tonk.
Provided that the Chief Justice of that High Court may, in his discretion, order that any case of class of cases arising in any such district shall be heard at Jodhpur.
New Delhi
December 8, 1976
Sd/-F.A. Ahmad
President
2. On 23rd December, 1976, the then Acting Chief Justice of the High Court of Rajasthan issued the following order carving out jurisdiction between the cases to be heard at Jodhpur Principal seat and the Jaipur Bench seat:
RAJ. HIGH COURT, JODHPUR
NOTIFICATION
No. 1/J.B.
Dated Dec.23, 1976
In pursuance of the High Court of Rajasthan (Establishment of a Permanent Bench at Jaipur) Order, 1976, and in exercise of the powers under Sub-section (2) of Section 44 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949, read with Ss. 54 and 57 of the States Reorganization Act, 1956, the Hon'ble the Chief Justice has been pleased to order that with effect from the 3 1st day of January, 1977:
(a) all cases arising in the revenue districts of Banswara, Barmer, Bikaner, Bhilwara, Chittorgarh, Churu, Dungarpur, Ganganagar, Jaisalmer, Jalore, Jodhpur, Nagaur, Pali, Sirohi and Udaipur (except such case or class of cases as may by special order be transferred to the Jaipur Bench) shall be disposed of by the Court at Jaipur.
Provided that a Vacation Judge, whether sitting at Jodhpur or at Jaipur may hear any case irrespective of the district in which it has arisen for the purpose of deciding any matter which in his opinion requires immediate action.
Explanation:A writ case shall be deemed to arise in the district where the first order pertaining to that case was passed by a Court, Tribunal or Authority irrespective of the district in which the appeal or revision from that order is heard and irrespective also of the fact whether or not there has been any modification or reversal of the order in appeal or revision.
Sd/- Ved Pal Tyagi
CHIEF JUSTICE
23.12.1976
3. On 12th January, 1977 the learned Acting Chief Justice issued yet another order substituting a new explanation now forming part of the order dated December 23, 1976, which reads as under:
In the above order for the Explanation the following may be substituted: Explanation:- A writ case shall be deemed to arise in the district where the cause of action for issuing the first order pertaining to that case passed by a Court, Tribunal or authority has arisen irrespective of the district in which the appeal or revision from that order is heard and irrespective also of the fact whether or not there has been any modification or reversal of the order in appeal or revision.
Sd/- Ved Pal Tyagi
CHIEF JUSTICE
12.1. 1977
4. The validity of the Presidential order dated December 8, 1976 as also of the abovesaid orders of the Acting chief Justice was put in issue on very many grounds but the same was turned down by a Division Bench of the High Court of Rajashan. See Ram Rakh v. Union of India : AIR 1977 Raj. 243. Briefly it may be stated that the grounds on which challenge was laid to the order of the Acting Chief Justice were : '(1) Unless the High Court of Rajasthan (Establishment of a Permanent Bench at Jaipur) Order, 1976 comes into force, the Acting Chief Justice could not have passed any order under its authority; (2) The Acting Chief Justice could not have passed any order for the transfer of pending cases or the cases instituted at the main seat at Jodpur upto 31.1.1977 under the authority of the Presidential Order, inasmuch as the Presidential Order is clearly prospective in operation; (3) Under the proviso to the Presidential Order, cases falling within the jurisdiction of the Jaipur Bench could be withdrawn to the main seat at Jodhpur and not vice versa ; (4) The Acting Chief Justice cannot decide, in his administrative capacity, the fact of jurisdiction for the purpose of allocation of cases to the Jaipur Bench on the basis of cause of action.
9. The Presidential order having established a permanent Bench of the High Court of Rajasthan at Jaipur and having appointed the minimum number of judges as would sit at Jaipur proceeded to declare that the permanent Bench seat at Jaipur shall exercise the jurisdiction and power for the time being vested in the High Court in respect of cases arising in the districts, 11 in number, as mentioned therein. A discretionary jurisdiction is also conferred on the Chief Justice of the High Court to order that any case or class of cases arising in any district forming part of territorial jurisdiction of the Permanent Bench at Jaipur shall be heart at Jodhpur( principal seat). The Presidential order is clear. The jurisdiction allocated to the permanent Bench at Jaipur is by reference to territory covered by the 11 specified districts. The proviso appended to para 2 of the Presidential order speaks of 'any case or class of cases' but therefrom too a power in the Chief Justice to define cause of action cannot be spelled out.
10. The nature and extent of power conferred on the President by Section 51 of the Act came up for the consideration of this Court in State of Maharashtra v. Narayan Shamrao Puranik : AIR 1983 SC 46. It was held:
It is clear upon the terms of Section 51 of the Act that undoubtedly the President has the power under Sub-section (1) to appoint the principal seat of the High Court for a new State. Likewise, the power of the President under Sub-section (2) thereof, after consultation with the Governor of a new State and the Chief Justice of the High Court for that State, pertains to the establishment of a permanent Bench or Benches of that High Court if a new State at one more more places within the State other than the place where the principal seat of the High Court is located and for any matters connected therewith clearly confer power on the President to define the territorial jurisdiction of the permanent Bench in relation to the principal seat as also for the conferment of exclusive jurisdiction to such permanent Bench to hear cases arising in districts falling within its jurisdiction. The creation of a permanent Bench under Sub-section (2) of Section 51 of the Act must therefore bring about a territorial bifurcation of the High Court. 11. The establishment of a permanent Bench at Jaipur and defining its territorial jurisdiction brought out a bifurcation of State of Rajasthan into two for the purpose of division of territorial jurisdiction of the High Court between the principal seat and the permanent Bench seat. The Chief Justice of the State cannot, thereafter, artificially or indirectly take away the jurisdiction belonging to one and confer it on the other. Conferring a discretion on the Chief Justice to order any case or class of cases arising in any district within the territorial jurisdiction of permanent Bench at Jaipur shall be heard at Jodhpur cannot spell out a power to define where the cause of action shall be deemed to have arisen in a writ case.
12. Section 44 of Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 provides as under:
44. Distribution of business and administrative control :- (1) The High Court may, by its own rules, provide as it thinks fit for the exercise by one or more Judges, or by Division Courts constituted by two or more Judges of the High Court, of its original and appellate jurisdiction.
(2) The Chief Justice shall be responsible for the distribution and conduct of the business of the High Court, and shall determine which Judge in each case will sit alone and which Judges of the Court will constitute a Bench.
(3) The administrative control of the High Court shall vest in the Chief Justice who may exercise it in such manner and after such consultation with the other Judges as he may think fit or may delegate such of his functions as he deems fit to any other Judges of the High Court.
13. Sub-section (2) aboves aid has to be read along with Sub-section (1). It entrusts the Chief Justice with responsibility for distribution and conduct of the business of the High Court and to determine which Judge shall sit singly and which in a Bench. The responsibility entrusted carries with it, as a necessary concomitant, the power needed in the Chief Justice to effectively fulfill the responsibility. The provision is what is popularly called, a power to frame a roster. This provision too does not vest the Chief Justice with power to enact an explanation as is in question. Roster is framed generally by identifying particular subject-matter or nature of cases which will be listed for hearing before different Benches consistently with the rules of business of the Court. Thereafter listing of cases is to be done by the Registrar in a routine. Power to frame a roster vests the Chief Justice with an administrative control over the distribution of judicial work of the Court. It has nothing to do with how a Judge would then judicially function in dealing with a case listed before him as per roster. A writ case when listed before a Judge for hearing as per roster may be heard or refused to be heard by him depending on his opinion formed on the judicial side on the question whether the cause of action in that case arises within the territorial jurisdiction of the Bench seat or not. Whether or not a case arisen in a district lying within the jurisdiction of Bench seat - is a question to be decided judicially, in case to case, and not by an administrative order of the Chief Justice made generally.
14. Section 54 of the Act speaks of practice and procedure in the High Court. Section 57 speaks of powers of the Chief Justice, single Judges and Division Courts of the High Court and provides that the laws in force immediately before the appointed day relating to such powers and with respect to matters ancillary to the exercise of those powers shall, with the necessary modifications, apply in relation to the High Court for a new State. None of the two provisions can spell out any legislative power having been conferred on the Chief Justice to define cause of action.
17. The expression 'cause of action' has acquired a judicially-settled meaning. In the restricted sense cause of action means the circumstances forming the Infraction of the right or the immmdiate occasion for the action. In the wider sense, it means the necessary conditions for the maintenance of the suit, including not only the infraction of the right, but the infraction coupled with the right itself. Compendiously the expression means every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court. Every fact which is necessary to be proved, as distinguished from every piece of evidence which is necessary to prove each fact, comprises in 'cause of action'. It has to be left to be determined in each individual case as to where the cause of action arises. The Chief Justice of the High Court has not been conferred with the legislative competence to define cause of action or to declare where it would be deemed to have arisen so as to lay down artificial or deeming test for determining territorial jurisdiction over an individual case or class of cases. The Permanent Bench at Jaipur has been established by the Presidential Order issued under subsection (2) of Section 51 of the Act. The territorial, jurisdiction of the permanent Bench at Jaipur is to he exercised in respect of the cases arising in the specified districts. Whether the case arises from one of the specified districts or not so as to determine the jurisdiction competence to hear by reference to territory bifurcated between the principal seat and the Bench seat, shall be an issue to be decided in an individual case by the Judge or Judges hearing the matter if a question may arise in that regard. The impugned explanation appended to the order of the Chief Justice dated 23.12.1976 runs counter to the Presidential Order and in a sense it is an inroad into the jurisdiction of the Judges hearing a particular case or cases, pre-empting a decision to be given in the facts of individual case whether it can be said to have arisen in the territory of a particular district. The High Court is right in taking the view which it has done.
18. It was submitted at the end by the learned Counsel for the appellant that the Division Bench of the High Court in its impugned order has observed that the permanent Bench at Jaipur shall have 'exclusive jurisdiction' to hear the cases arising out of the 11 specified districts and the High Court at Jodhpur shall not have jurisdiction to hear those cases which fall within the territorial jurisdiction of Jaipur Bench. He submitted that the use of word 'exclusive' prefixed to 'jurisdiction' is uncalled for. We find no substance in this contention as well. The purpose of the Presidential Order is to carve out and define territorial jurisdiction between the principal seat at Jodhpur and the permanent Bench seat at Jaipur. The cases are to be heard accordingly, unless the Chief Justice may exercise in his discretion the power vested in him by the proviso to para 2 of the Presidential Order. Clauses (1) and (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution provide how territorial jurisdiction shall be exercised by any High Court. Although the said clauses do not deal with principal seat or permanent Bench of any High Court but in our opinion, there is no reason why the principle underlying thereunder cannot be applied to the functioning of the bifurcated territorial jurisdiction between the principal a eat and permanent Bench seat of any High Court. In case of a dispute arising whether an individual case or cases should be filed and heard at Jodhpur or Jaipur, the same has to be found out by applying the test - from which district the case arises, that is, in which district the cause of action can be said to have arisen and then exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.
6. Thus this judgment dealt with the issue of territorial jurisdiction of principal seat at Jodhpur and Bench at Jaipur in detail and it was held that it would depend upon the place where the cause of action arose. The crux of the matter to decide the territorial jurisdiction as to which High Court or which Bench of a High Court can entertain and decide the case on merits is to see where the 'cause of action' arises. The word 'cause of action', is not defined in any statute, Civil Procedure Code or Constitution of India and, therefore, the judicial interpretative process over the period is the source for understanding this term.
What is 'cause of action'
7. The expression 'cause of action' is expressed in Mulla's Code of Civil Procedure as under:
the cause of action' means every fact which if traversed would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of this Court.
8. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in recent judgment in Kusum Ingots Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India and Anr. : (2004) 6 SCC 254 interpreted the word 'cause of action' as under:
Cause of action implies a right to sue. The material facts which are imperative for the suitor to allege and prove constitute the cause of action. Cause of action is not defined in any statute. It has, however, been judicially interpreted inter alia to mean every fact which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court. Negatively put, it would mean that everything which, if not proved, gives the defendant an immediate right to judgment, would be part of cause of action. Its importance is beyond any doubt. For every action, there has to be a cause of action, if not, the plaint or the writ petition, as the case may be, shall be rejected summarily. The entire bundle of facts pleaded need not constitute a cause of action as what is necessary to be proved before the petitioner can obtain a decree is the material facts. The expression material facts is also known as integral facts. All necessary facts must form an integral part of the cause of action.
9. In Bloom Dekor Limited v. Subhash Himatlal Desai and Ors. : (1994) 6 SCC 322 referring to English case laws interpreted the said term cause of action as under:
By 'cause of action' it is meant every fact, which, if traversed, it would he necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the Court. In other words, a bundle of facts which it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to succeed in the suit. This Court had occasion to refer to the case of Cooke in A.K. Gupta and Sons Ltd. v. Damodar Valley Corpn. At page 98 it is stated thus:
The expression 'cause of action1 in the present context does not mean 'every fact which it is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed' as was said in Cooke v. Gill in a different context, for if it were so, no material fact could ever be amended or added and, of course, no one would want to change or add an immaterial allegation by amendment. That expression for the present purpose only means, a new claim made on a new basis constituted by new facts. Such a view was taken in Robinson v. Unicos Property Corporation Ltd. And it seems to us to be the only possible view to take.
Any other view would make the rule futile. The words 'new case' have understood to mean 'new set of ideas'. Dorman v. J.W. Ellis and Co. Ltd. This also seems to us to be a reasonable view to take. No amendment will be allowed to introduce a new set of ideas to the prejudice of any right acquired by any party by lapse of time.
10. In Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu and Ors. : (1994) 4 SCC 711 again three Judges of Hon'ble Supreme Court dealt with the said term in the following terms:
It is well settled that the expression 'cause of action' means that bundle of facts which the petitioner must prove, if traversed, to entitle him to a judgment in his favour by his Court. In Chand Kour v. Partab Singh Lord Watson said:
the cause of action has no relation whatsoever to the defence which may be set up by the defendant, nor does it depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff. It refers entirely to the ground set forth in the plaint as the cause of action, or, in other words, to the media upon which the plaintiff asks the Court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour.
Therefore, in determining the objection of lack of territorial jurisdiction the court must take all the facts pleaded in support of the cause of action into consideration albeit without embarking upon an enquiry as to the correctness or otherwise of the said facts. In other words, the question whether a High Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition must be answered on the basis of the averments made in the petition, the truth or otherwise whereof being immaterial. To put it differently, the question of territorial jurisdiction must be decided on the facts pleaded in the petition.
In the present case even if the averments in the writ petition are taken as true, it cannot be said that a part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court. The advertisement itself mentioned that the tenders should be submitted to EIL at New Delhi; that those would be scrutinised at New Delhi and that a final decision whether or not to award the contract to the tenderer would be taken at New Delhi. Of course, the execution of the contract work was to be carried out at Hazira in Gujarat. Therefore, merely because NICCO read the advertisement at Calcutta, submitted the offer from Calcutta, made representations from Calcutta and sent fax messages from Calcutta and received a reply thereto at Calcutta would not constitute facts forming an integral part of the cause of action.
11. In State of Rajasthan and Ors. v. Swaika Properties and Anr. : AIR 1985 SC 1289 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:
The mere service in the State of West Bengal of notice under Section 52(2) of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act (35 of 1959) on the owner of a land situated in the State of Rajasthan intimating of the State Govt.'s proposal to acquire that land for public purpose does not constitute an integral part of the cause of action sufficient to invest the Calcutta High Court with jurisdiction to entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the validity of the notification acquiring the land. Cause of action is a bundle of facts which taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. The notification issued by the State Government under Section 52(1) of the Act became effective the moment it was published in the official gazette as thereupon the notified land became vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances. It was not necessary for the owner to plead the service of notice on him under Section 52(2) for the grant of an appropriate writ, direction or order under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the notification issued by the State Government under Section 52(1) of the Act.
12. In Aligarh Muslim University and Anr. v. Vinay Engineering Enterprises (P) Ltd. and Anr. : (1994) 4 SCC 710 the Hon'ble Supreme Court had to say like thus:
We are surprised, not a little, that the High Court of Calcutta should have exercised jurisdiction in a case where it had absolutely no jurisdiction. The contracts in question were executed at Aligarh, the construction work was to be carried out at Aligarh, even the contracts provided that in the event of dispute the Aligarh Court alone will have jurisdiction. The arbitrator was from Aligarh and was to function there. Merely because the respondent was a Calcutta-based firm, the High Court of Calcutta seems to have exercised jurisdiction where it had none by adopting a queer line of reasoning. We are constrained to say that this is a case of abuse of jurisdiction and we feel that the respondent deliberately moved the Calcutta High Court ignoring the fact that no part of the cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of that Court. It clearly shows that the litigation filed in the Calcutta High Court was thoroughly unsustainable.
13. In Union of India and Ors. v. Adani Exports Ltd. and Anr. : (2002) 1 SCC 567 the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 13, 14, 17 & 21 held like thus:
The respondents herein plead that as per the plea raised by them in para 16 of the special civil application, the following facts give rise to the cause of action conferring territorial jurisdiction on the Court at Ahmedabad. They are:
(i) the respondents carry on their business of export and import from Ahmedabad;
(ii) their orders of export and import are placed from and are executed at Ahmedabad;
(iii) documents and payments for export and import are sent/ made at Ahmedabad;
(iv) the credit of duty claimed in respect of exports were handled from Ahmedabad since export orders were received at Ahmedabad and payments also received at Ahmedabad;
(v) non-granting and denial of utilization of the credit in the passbook will effect the business of the respondents at Ahmedabad;
(vi) the respondents have executed a bank guarantee through their bankers at Ahmedabad as well as a bond at Ahmedabad.
Though it is also contended in para 16 of the application that the appellants have their office at Ahmedabad, that contention has not been pressed since it is clear from the records that none of these appellants have their office at Ahmedabad. Dehors this fact, if we take into consideration the other facts enumerated hereinabove in support of the cause of action pleaded by the respondents, it is seen that none of these facts is in any way connected with the relief sought for by the respondents in their civil applications so as to constitute the cause of action at Ahmedabad.
Facts which have no bearing with the lis or the dispute involved in the case, do not give rise to a cause of action so as to confer territorial jurisdiction of the court concerned. If we apply this principle then we see that none of the facts pleaded in para 16 of the petition, in our opinion, falls into the category of bundle of facts which would constitute a cause of action giving rise to a dispute which could confer territorial jurisdiction on the courts at Ahmedabad.
For the reasons stated above, these appeals succeed and the same are hereby allowed. The impugned judgment is set aside. We further direct that Special Civil Application Nos. 3282 and 3279 of 1999 filed by the respondents are hereby directed to be transferred to the High Court of Madras at Chennai forthwith and on receipt of the papers, we request the Chief Justice of the High Court of Madras to place them before an appropriate Bench for disposal in accordance with law.
14. In CBI Anti-Corruption Branch, Muiribai v. Narayan Diwakar : (1999) 4 SCC 656 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus:
0n the question of jurisdiction, the learned Single Judge held that the communication of the wireless massage to the respondent at Itanagar, Arunachal Pradesh was a part of the cause of action for filing the writ petition and, therefore, the writ petition filed in the Guwahati High Court was maintainable under Article 226(2) of the Constitution We have no hesitation to hold that the Guwahati High Court was clearly in error in deciding the question of jurisdiction in favour of the respondent. In our considered view, the writ petition filed by the respondent in the Guwahati High Court was not maintainable.
15. The Rajasthan High Court in Smt. Mohna Ramkrishanan and Anr. v. Smt. Yogam Bala Dev Raj and Anr. AIR 2003 Raj. 88 had following to observe:
A mere allegation by a plaintiff for the purpose of creating a jurisdiction should not be enforced for conferring jurisdiction. Moreso, a fact, which does not have any direct relevance with the lis but is made to occur only to defeat statutory provisions of Section 20(c) of the Code in order to deprive the Court which must have territorial jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit, the act has knowingly or purposely been performed to harass the defendant and deprive the Court which has territorial jurisdiction over the subject-matter and to try the suit.
16. Thus by the aforesaid interpretative process it is well settled that territorial jurisdiction of a Court would only depend upon the place where the cause of action arises and that has to be decided on the basis of relevant integral facts having bearing on the cause of action and relief sought. Further, the principle is same under Section 20 of CPC or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
17. In the case of Stridewell Leathers (P) Ltd. v. Bhankerpur Simbhaoli Beverages (P) Ltd. reported in : (1994) 1 SCC 34 dealing with the provisions of Section 10F of the Companies Act, 1956. the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that expression 'the High Court' occurring in Section 10F of the Companies Act means the High Court having jurisdiction in relation to the place where the registered office of the company concerned is situated and therefore, appeal from the original order passed by the Company Law Board at a different place would also lie with such High Court where the registered office of the Company is situated and not with the different High Court having territorial jurisdiction in relation to a place at which the original order was passed. The relevant portion of the said judgment is reproduced as under:
Section 10F gives no indication of substitution of the earlier forum of appeal by a new forum unless the expression 'the High Court' means only one High Court in all matters notwithstanding the fact that earlier the original jurisdiction was in different High Courts instead of in one forum now. Ordinarily, substitution of a new forum for the existing forum of appeal should not be readily inferred in the absence of a clear provision to that effect or at least any incongruity resulting from that view. There does not appear to be any incongruity in the view that the forum of appeal remains unaltered even though forum of original jurisdiction is now centralised by transfer of the same from the different High Courts to the Company Law Board alone.
Express provision would have been made in the amendment to indicate a different or substituted appellate forum that the existing appellate forum if that was the intention of the amendment or jurisdiction of the court for the purpose of appeal had been altered in any manner. The absence of any indication in the amendment to suggest any change or substitution in the appellate forum is a pointer in the direction that the same continued unaltered and the expression 'the High Court' instead of 'the Court' was used for the reason indicated by providing that the High Court concerned continued to be the form of appeal notwithstanding transfer of the original jurisdiction from the High Court concerned to the Company Law Board. It does appear that substitution of a new forum of appeal in place of the existing forum in the High Court concerned as contended by the respondents cannot be inferred merely from the transfer of the original jurisdiction to the Company Law Board in the absence of clear provision to that effect.
(Para 10)
Use of the word 'the' before the High Court is clearly intended to specify a particular High Court identified by Section 10F itself and, therefore, it cannot be a High Court indicated by the subsequent act of the Company Law Board choosing the place of its sitting for making the order under appeal. The forum of appeal indicated in Section 10F is a definite forum determined by the provisions of the Act and not by the Regulations framed by the Company Law Board under Section 10E(6) or the place of its sitting under the Regulations.
(Paras 11 and 12)
Therefore, the expression 'the High Court' in Section 10F of the Companies Act means the High Court having jurisdiction in relation to the place at which the registered office of the company concerned is situated as indicated by Section 2(11) read with Section 10(1)(a) of the Act. Accordingly, in the present case, the appeal against the order of the Company Law Board would lie in the Madras High Court which has jurisdiction in relation to the place at which the registered office of the Company concerned is situated and not the Delhi High Court merely because the order was made by the Company Law Board at Delhi.
18. In the case of Sumitomo Corporation v. CDC Financial Services (Mauritius) Ltd. and Ors. reported in : AIR 2008 SC 1594 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under:
Section 50 of Arbitration Act provides for appeal against appelable order. As regards the Forum to which appeal would lie, it uses the expression 'Court' not simpliciter, but qualified by the wording 'authorized by law to hear appeals from such order'. It is not the Court having jurisdiction as if the subject- matter is a suit where jurisdiction is determined in accordance with the provisions of Ss. 16-20 of Civil P.C. It is well settled that the right of appeal inheres in no one and therefore an appeal for its maintainability must have the clear authority of Law. In view of the same, while exercise of original jurisdiction as provided in Section 47 and other similar sections of the Arbitration Act should be by the Court within the jurisdiction of which the suit would have been filed, the appeal shall always be to the appellate forum which hears appeals from the order of the forum which passes the order. It is also clear from Section 37 of the Act dealing with appeals. Here also the appeal is to the Court which hears the appeal and not the Court which exercises original jurisdiction if the subject matter had been a suit as provided in the explanation to Section 47 or Section 2(c) of the Arbitration Act. As such Section 50 clearly suggests that an appeal shall lie from the order of the CLB to the Court authorized by law to hear the appeals from such order of the CLB. In the event, as in the present case, the order under Section 45 refusing to refer parties to arbitration is passed by the CLB, the forum which is provided under law for hearing the appeal from the order of the CLB, will be the Appellate Forum. In other words, while Section 50 of the Arbitration Act provides for the orders which can be made the subject matter of appeal, the forum to hear the appeal is to be tested with reference to the appropriate law governing the authority or forum which passed the original order, that is, in the case on hand, the CLB. Section 10F read with Section 10(1)(a) of the Companies Act provides for such forum to hear the appeal from the orders of the CLB as the High Court within the jurisdiction of which the Registered Office of the company in issue is situated.
(Para 9)
19. The Hon'ble Supreme Court on the question of jurisdiction between Lucknow Bench and Allahabad High Court at Allahabad in the case of Nasiruddin v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal reported in : AIR 1976 SC 331 dealing with the question of jurisdiction held as under:
On a construction of the United Provinces High Courts (Amalgamation) Order 1948, the following position emerges:
(1) There is no permanent seat of the High Court at Allahabad. The seats at Allahabad and at Lucknow may be changed in accordance with the provisions of the Order.
(2) The Chief Justice of the High Court has no power to increase or decrease the areas in Oudh from time to time. The areas in Oudh have been determined once by the Chief Justice and, therefore, there is no scope for changing the areas.
(3) The Chief Justice has power under the second proviso to para 14 of the Order to direct in his discretion that any case or class of cases arising in Oudh areas shall be heard at Allahabad. Any case or class of cases are those which are instituted at Lucknow. It cannot be said that the word 'heard' confers power on the Chief Justice to order that any case or class of cases arising in Oudh areas shall be instituted or filed at Allahabad, instead of Lucknow. The word 'heard' means that cases which have already been instituted or filed at Lucknow may in the discretion of the Chief Justice under the second proviso to paragraph 14 of the Order be directed to be heard at Allahabad.
(4) The expression 'cause of action' with regard to a civil matter means that it should be left to the litigant to institute cases at Lucknow Bench or at Allahabad Bench according to the cause of action arising wholly or in part within either of the areas. If the cause of action arises wholly within Oudh areas, then the Lucknow Bench will have jurisdiction. Similarly, if the cause of action arises wholly outside the specified areas in Oudh, then Allahabad will have jurisdiction. If the cause of action in part arises in the specified Oudh areas and part of the cause of action arises outside the specified areas, it will be open to the litigant to frame the case appropriately to attract the jurisdiction either at Lucknow or at Allahabad.
(5) A criminal case arises where the offence has been committed or otherwise as provided in the Criminal Procedrue Code. That will attract the jurisdiction of the Court at Allahabad or Lucknow. In some cases, depending on the facts and the provision regarding jurisdiction, it may arise in either place.
(6) Applications under Article 226 will similarly lie either at Lucknow or at Allahabad as the applicant will alleged that the whole of cause of action or part of the cause of action arose at Lucknow within the specified areas of Oudh or part of the cause of action arose at a place outside the specified Oudh areas.
(Paras 37 and 38)
20. The aforesaid decision in the case of Nasiruddin (supra) was followed again in the case of U.P. Rashtriya Chini Mill Adhikari Parishad v. State of U.P. reported in : 1995 AIR SCW 3318 : (1995) 4 SCC 738. The relevant extract of the said judgment is also reproduced hereunder:
The Division Bench of the High Court fell into a patent error in holding that the interpretation placed by the Supreme Court on Clause 14 of the Amalgamation Order in Nasiruddin case had ceased to be operative after the incorporation of the Explanation to Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Supreme Court in Nasiruddin Case did not rely on the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. In fact the Supreme Court did not even notice any of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Division Bench of the High Court took shelter behind the Explanation to Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure without any justification. It created an argument when none existed.
(para 12)
While interpreting the expression 'in respect of cases arising in' occurring in Clause 14 of the U.P. High Courts (Amalgamation) Order, the Supreme Court kept in view the plain language of the provision. No provision of the Code of Civil Procedure was noticed, referred to or taken into consideration directly or indirectly. The territorial jurisdiction of a court and the 'cause of action' are interlinked. To decide the question of territorial jurisdiction, it is necessary to find out the place where the 'cause of action' arose. So the law laid down in Nasiruddin case holds good even today despite the incorporation of an Explanation to Section 141 to the Code of Civil Procedure.
(Para 14)
There is no dispute that the Amalgamation Order is a special law which must prevail over the general law. The Supreme Court interpreted the relevant expression in Clause 14 and did not take any support from any general law. The discussion by the Division Bench of the High Court by evolving the so-called theory of 'exercise of jurisdiction revolving on the place of sitting' as compared to the theory of 'cause of action' is wholly misconceived and has no legal basis whatsoever.
21. This Court has also dealt with this controversy of territorial jurisdiction of principal seat at Jodhpur and bench at Jaipur in two recent decisions. In the case of Bhana Ram v. Rajasthan Agricultural University and Ors. reported in : RLW 2009 (1) (Raj.) 506 the learned Single Judge of this Court dealing with the controversy relating to pension payable by Rajasthan Agriculture University at Bikaner falling within the territorial jurisdiction of the Principal seat at Jodhpur, whereas the employee was serving at Agricultural Research Station, Bikaner, Fatehpur Shekhawati, Dist. Sikar before his retirement falling with the jurisdiction of Jaipur bench of this Court, upon question where the cause of action arose and where the writ petition for claiming pensionery benefits would be maintainable, held as under:
Meaning thereby, according to the above judgment, the facts of each case need be seen while exercising the territorial jurisdiction. Apparently, facts of the present case clearly speak that the pension sanctioning authority is Rajasthan Agricultural University, Bikaner and Head of department of the petitioner sits at Bikaner, therefore, the cause of action after retirement of the petitioner arises at Bikaner because the petitioner is claiming relief against the authority which is in the Bikaner district and the same falls within the territorial jurisdiction of the Principal Seat of the High Court at Jodhpur and as per the judgment of the apex Court the question of territorial jurisdiction is to be decided on the facts of each case.
8. In the other judgment cited by the learned Counsel for the respondents dated 26.7.2006 passed in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 5670/2005 Mahendra Kumar Verma and ors. v. State of Rajasthan and Ors. both the petitioner and the respondents were belonging to Ajmer and Jaipur districts, therefore, the learned Single Judge of this Court held that the Principal Seat of the High Court at Jodhpur has no jurisdiction.
9. Similarly, in the case of Anand Bardwa and ors. v. Rajasthan Financial Corporation and Ors. reported in 2005(10) RDD 4670 (Raj.) notice was issued by the Executive Director, Rajasthan Financial Corporation, Jaipur to the Branch Manager, RFC, Kota and so also, order dated 6.5.2005 was passed by the Branch Manager, RFC, Kota, therefore, the learned Single Judge of this
Court held that the Principal Seat of the High Court has no territorial jurisdiction as per the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court.
In this view of the matter, when acceptance and denial for pension is to be made by the Rajasthan Agricultural University, Bikaner and University is established in Bikaner district and is within the territorial jurisdiction of the Principal Seat of the Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur as per notification, therefore, this writ petition cannot be dismissed on the question of maintainability.
22. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Mohd. Harun and anr. v. Nissar Ahmed and Ors. reported in : RLW 2008 (4) Raj. 3286 dealing with the controversy of Rajasthan Board of Muslim Wakq where the property of Wakf was situated within the territorial jurisdiction of the principal seat at Kapasan, whereas the Wakf Tribunal which passed the impugned order was situated at Jaipur held that merely passing of an order by the Tribunal within the territorial jurisdiction of the Jaipur Bench of the Rajasthan High Court cannot be a deciding factor and since the order passed by the Tribunal has to be given effect to at the place where the Wakf property is situated at Kapasan within the territorial jurisdiction of the principal seat at Jodhpur, therefore, the writ petition challenging the said order of the Wakf Tribunal, Jaipur would properly lie before the principal seat of Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur. Paras 20, 21, 25 to 27 of the said judgment are reproduced hereunder for ready reference:
20. Challenge to jurisdiction of the Principal seat of the Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur is on the ground that order was passed by the Wakf Board at Jaipur and, therefore, could have been challenged only at Bench of the Rajasthan High Court at Jaipur. It appears that the argument has been advanced without noticing where the cause of action arose and without examining that what is cause of action. An order passed by the authority cannot be read or given effect to without noticing where the order will have its effect. This principle applies more when order is in relation to any immovable property or any benefit attached to it or where it is in relation to management of immovable property. The order passed at Jaipur by the Wakf Board or tribunal at Jaipur neither can be given effect to nor could have been enforced within the territorial jurisdiction of the bench of the Rajasthan High Court at Jaipur. The real cause and substantial cause accrues where order can be given effect to effecting the property or management of the property. The property in question is situated within the territorial jurisdiction of the Principal seat of Rajasthan High Court and order has been sought to be enforced only within the territorial jurisdiction of the Principal seat of Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur. The cause, whatever it may be, accrued at Kapasan in the District of Nagaur which is situated within the territorial jurisdiction of the principal seat of the Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur only. The order was passed at Jaipur but that was because of the reason that authority, in the opinion of the Government should sit at Jaipur irrespective of fact where the order of authority will have it's effect in the entire area of Rajasthan State. The authority was asked to sit at particular place as per convenience and in present case, not to create any cause of action in the area where cause could not have accrued. Simply because there can be one statutory authority in the State, who can pass appropriate order and that authority because of various reasons can sit only in the Capital of the State, the order passed by the said authority having direct effect on the rights and particularly, affecting the right in or relating to immovable property or its management then the substantial cause of action arises in the area where such property are situated.
21. When any court has been established to exercise jurisdiction over the cases arising in particular territories then that territorial jurisdiction is not effect nor it can be taken away by implication. The law prescribing territorial jurisdiction of a court is a law to govern the issue of territorial jurisdiction. The establishing authority having jurisdiction to administer, manage and deal with the properties in the entire State of Rajasthan gives limited jurisdiction to that authority to pass appropriate order irrespective of fact where the property is situated. That authority by virtue of power given by the statute can pass the order with respect to the property situated in entire State, but without affecting the court's territorial jurisdiction, which has been given to the court by statute. When such authority passes an order in relation to property situated within the jurisdiction given it, having effect on the properties situated in various places of the State then said authority is competent to pass order as per the law authorizing it to pass because of the order passed by such authorities, the consequence, effect and right of the parties may be effected where the properties are situated and being managed. Unless and until order has effect on the rights of the concerned party, the concerned party cannot have any grievance. Therefore, grievance arises and accrues only where the property is situated. Therefore, the cause of action in that situation arises at the place where property or properties or rights in the property or benefit of the property or its management is effected by the order passed by the authority, which may it be outside the area in which the property is situated. The cause of action is the infringement of right of the party alongwith other bundle of facts, which are required to be proved by the party approaching the Court. Jurisdiction of the court is not determined from the defence.
25. As noticed above the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that it is the bifurcated territorial jurisdiction between the principal seat and permanent Bench seat of any High Court. When the order passed under Constitution by the President of Indian has bifurcated and carved out the territorial jurisdiction of the Principal seat of the Rajasthan High Court and permanent Bench seat of the Rajasthan High Court then by giving interpretation to any law creating an authority to decide a matter cannot be interpreted so as to nullify the said order and to take away the territorial jurisdiction of the Principal seat of High Court for the territories, which are within the territorial jurisdiction of the Principal seat of High Court at Jodhpur. Otherwise also, it will be not in public interest that for dispute in their own places where the courts are established, the parties should go for redressal of their grievance in other territories.
26. So far as accrual of cause of action because of the order passed by the Board (at Ajmer) is concerned, that arose at Kapasan in the District of Nagaur within territorial jurisdiction of the (principal seat) High Court and by virtue of appellate order, the original jurisdiction and cause of action has not been and cannot be effected.
27. In view of the above, the objection raised by the learned Counsel for the respondents about the territorial jurisdiction of the Principal seat of Rajasthan High Court deserves to be rejected, hence, rejected.
23. Thus, in view of aforesaid legal position, in the considered opinion of this Court, the place where the authority passing the impugned order is located is not at all relevant and material for deciding the jurisdiction of the principal seat or Bench of the Rajasthan High Court, but it is the cause of action bereft of this factor which has to decide the territorial jurisdiction. The cause of action is bundle of facts is alright, but the place where the authority passes the impugned order as set up by the State Government on account of executive or political necessity cannot decide the jurisdiction of the High Court.
24. The cause of action which gives rise to the litigation is relevant bundle of facts and would arise at the place where impugned order or vehicle has to be given effect to and the jurisdiction of the High Court at Principal seat or at Bench would depend upon that. The cause of action in various types of cases should be determined depending upon such basic bundle of facts and cause of action would lie
(i) in Motor Accident Claims cases at the place where the accident took place or the death or injury took place;
(ii) in Central Excise matters, where the manufacturing of the goods takes place;
(iii) in Sales Tax matters where the sale of relevant transaction took place;
(iv) in Revenue matters where the land in question is situated;
(v) in Irrigation matters where the land is situated;
(vi) in State Excise matters where the excisable commodity is manufactured or sold;
(vii) in service matters where the person concerned has served or where the employer Department where he served is based,
(viii) in company law matters under Companies Act where the registered office of the Company is situated;
(ix) in contractual matters, where the work under the contract in question has to be executed. The cause of action in such cases does not arise at the place where contract has been signed or letter correspondence etc. is addressed.
(x) in residue civil matters e.g. Civil writ petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution against interlocutory orders of trial Courts, where the suit property is situated
(xi) in criminal side matters, where the offence in question took place etc. The place where the Tribunal or authority who passed the impugned order or has issued the impugned notice is not at all relevant for deciding even part of cause of action, so as to determine the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court. Such make believe pretexts for founding the cause of action has to be scrupulously avoided. The aforesaid case laws clearly support this view.
25. If the case arose within the districts falling with the jurisdiction of principal seat or the bench of the High Court, the jurisdiction of the principal seat or bench of High Court should be determined according to the cause of action as aforesaid and it cannot be dependent upon the place where the impugned order is passed and no part of cause of action can be said to be arising merely because the impugned order happens to be passed at Jaipur or at any other place within the territorial jurisdiction of Jaipur Bench of this Court. Accordingly, the said preliminary office objection or submissions of the learned Counsel for the State that the appeal should be transferred to the Jaipur Bench of this Court is liable to be rejected and the same is accordingly rejected and the appeal arising in the matter upon an accident which had taken place at Udaipur within the territorial jurisdiction of Principal Seat of this Court at Jodhpur is held to be maintainable here at Jodhpur and the question of territorial jurisdiction is decided like this.
26. Since as aforesaid, this question keeps on cropping up at both the places oft and on and more often than not at Jaipur Bench causing undesirable imbalance, it is directed that the Registry shall scrutinize all the cases filed at both the places in past 5 years and if the cause of action as explained above in para 24 falls within the domain of the principal seat or bench other than the place where such cases are filed, a defect note pointing out this question as to territorial jurisdiction as is made by the Registry in the present case, would be made and the defect side registration number of the case would also be given and such cases shall be transferred to the appropriate seat or bench, as the case may be, unless such defect or objection of Registry is determined otherwise by the concerned Bench for maintainability of the case at that place only before matter is proceeded further on merits. Such scrutiny of the cases should be completed within 6 months from today and report by the Registrar General of the Court may be placed before the Court in this file showing the number of cases so scrutinized and transferred or upon orders by the Bench, maintained at that seat or bench, as the case may be. A copy of this order may be circulated by Dy, Registrar (Judl.) and Registrar General in Stamp Reporter Section and all other Sections in the Registry at Principal seat and Bench at Jaipur immediately by way of circular particularly containing examples enumerated in para 24 of the judgment above.
ON MERITS OF THIS CASE
27. The defect No. 2 pointed out by the Registry is thus overruled as above and the appeal is held maintainable here at principal seat of this Court and other defects of Section 173 certificate and proper pagination etc. are also dispensed with for the time being. Office may register this appeal at regular number here at the principal seat of this Court at Jodhpur.
28. The learned Counsel for the State has submitted that the vehicle owned by the State, namely, ambulance was not involved in the accident at all, but only the deceased was being carried in the said ambulance for medical treatment at Udaipur while he died, therefore, the State is not liable to pay such compensation. The issue would require consideration of this Court in detail and hence this appeal is admitted.
29. Admit. Issue notice to the respondents. The Rule is made returnable within a period of four weeks. Notices be given 'Dasti'. The record of the Tribunal may be summoned.
30. Meanwhile and until further orders, the execution of the impugned award against the appellant - State shall remain stayed. The claimants - respondents shall be at liberty to apply for vacation or modification of stay when they are served with the notices.
31. Put up after service on respondents.