Judgment:
ORDER
H.R. Panwar, J.
1. By this criminal revision petition under Section 397/401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, 'the Code'), the petitioners have challenged the Order dated 5-5-2005 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Ratangarh, Camp Suratgarh (for short, 'the trial Court') in Sessions Case No. 11/2000, by which the learned trial Court dismissed the applica-% tion filed by the petitioners under Section 20 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (for short, 'the Act').
2. Petitioners are facing trial for the offences punishable under Sections 307, 325, 323, 148, 149 IPC for an incident which took place on 26-1-2000. On 21-3-2005, petitioners submitted an application under Section 20 of the Act with a prayer that they being juvenile on the date of occurrence, the case pending against them may be transferred to Juvenile Board for trial. In support of the application, the petitioners submitted the photo-stat copies of the marks sheets of Secondary Examination issued by the Board of Secondary Education, wherein the date of birth of petitioner Raju alias Rajendra has been shown as 20-3-1983 and that of petitioner Pema Ram as 5-1-1983. The application was opposed by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor on the ground that the offences were committed by the petitioners on 26-1 -2000 whereas the Act of 2000 came into force w.e.f. 1-4-2001 and the application under Section 20 of the Act has been filed for delaying the trial. The learned trial Court, vide impugned order dated 5-5-2005, dismissed the application under Section 20 of the Act filed by the petitioners.
3. I have heard learned Counsel for the petitioners and the Public Prosecutor. Perused the order impugned.
4. The application under Section 20 of the Act was filed on 21-3-2005 along with the photo stat copies of marks sheets issued by the Board of Secondary Education, Rajasthan, Ajmer. The petitioners were provided opportunity to lead evidence in support of the application and matter was posted for the evidence of petitioner in support of said application on 23-3-2005, 7-4-2005 and thereafter on 21-4-2005 but the petitioners did not lead any evidence and ultimately, on 21-4-2005, the evidence was closed on an assertion on behalf of the petitioners that they do not want to lead any evidence. Thus, except the photo stat copies of marks sheets, there was nothing on record before the trial Court for determination of age of the petitioners.
5. In Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohit, AIR 1988 SC 1796, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that to render a document admissible under Section 35 of the Evidence Act, three conditions must be satisfied, firstly, entry that is relied on must be one in a public or other official book, register or record, secondly, it must be an entry stating a fact in issue or relevant facts, and thirdly, it must be made by a public servant in discharge of his official duty, or any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by law. The Apex Court further observed that an entry relating to date of birth made in the school register is relevant . and admissible under Section 35 of the Act but the entry regarding to the age of a person in a school register is of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the person in the absence of the material on which the age was recorded. The Apex Court further held as under (Para 14) :--
'If the entry in the School register regarding date of birth is made on the basis of information given by parents, the entry would have evidentiary value but if it is given by a stranger or by someone else who had no special means of knowledge of the date of birth, such an entry will have no evidentiary value. Merely because the documents such as extract of School Register, mark list or certificate of Education Board etc. are proved, it does not mean that the contents of documents are also proved. Mere proof of such documents would not tantamount to proof of all the contents or the correctness of date of birth stated in the documents.'
6. In Richpal alias Malta v. State of Rajasthan, 2003 WLC (Raj.) (UC) 388, it has been held that an entry made in a school register by public servant in discharge of his duty is, no doubt, a relevant fact under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act but this does not mean that such entry would be sufficient proof regarding the correctness of such entry. In that case, the admission form was not submitted by the parents of the juvenile and in such a factual matrix, the Court held that there was no basis for making the entry regarding the age of the petitioner in the admission form as well as in school register and as such these documents by itself were not sufficient to prove that the petitioner was below 18 years of age.
7. In Ram Deo Chauhan alias Raj Nath Chauhan v. State of Assam, 2001 Cri LJ 2902, the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under (Para 20) :--
It is not shown that the school register was maintained by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty or by any other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law of the country in which such register is kept. Thus, the entry in the school register remains away from the range of acceptability as proof positive regarding the date of birth of the petitioner.'
The burden to prove was on the petitioners to establish that on the relevant date of occurrence, they were juvenile; however, except the photo stat copies of marks sheets, no other evidence was adduced by them despite opportunities provided by the trial Court and ultimately, the evidence was closed on the assertion that the petitioners do not want to lead evidence in support of the application under Section 20 of the Act. While dismissing the application, the trial Court considered the arrest memos,. the information furnished by petitioner Pema Ram, the remand forms and the . Vakalatnama, wherein the age of the petitioners have been shown as 18 years. In view of the law laid down in Birad Mal Singhvi's case (AIR 1988 SC 1796) (supra), Richpal alias Malta's case (2003 WLC (Raj) (UC) 388) (supra) and Ram Deo Chauhan's case (2001 Cri LJ 2902) (supra), for want of legal proof, the marks sheets produced by the petitioners cannot be treated as conclusive proof of the age of the petitioners. Therefore, the trial Court was justified in not placing reliance on the marks sheets.
8. Placing reliance on Imtiyaz v. State of Rajasthan, 2005 (4) RDD 978 (Raj) and Mukesh Kumar v. State of Rajasthan, 2005(1) Cri LR (Raj) 642, it has been contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that the trial Court has not conducted the inquiry to determine the age of the petitioners by requisitioning the academic record and getting the petitioners medically examined. In the instant case, th'e petitioners were provided opportunity to lead evidence in support of the application under Section 20 of the Act, but no evidence was produced and ultimately the petitioners closed their evidence. In the instant case, the trial Court, while dismissing the application, considered the arrest memo, the information furnished by petitioner Pema Ram, the remand forms and the Vakalatnama, in which the age of the petitioners have been shown as 18 years and these documents bear the signatures of the petitioners. It is not a case where the trial Court determined the age on the basis of physical built-up on its personal observation and, therefore, the aforesaid two decisions relied upon by the petitioners do not come to their rescue, being based on different factual matrix.
9. There is yet another aspect of the matter. The incident took place on 26-1-2000 and the Act came into force w.e.f. 1 -4-2001 vide Notification No. S. O. 177 (E) dated 28-2-2001. At the time of commission of the crime, the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 (Act No. 53 of 1986) was in operation. Petitioners filed the application under Section 20 of the Act on 21-3-2005, i.e. 5 years after the date of incident. The trial commenced in the year 2000 itself.
10. Section 20 of the Act is a special provision in respect of the pending cases and reads as under :--
'Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, all proceedings in respect of a juvenile pending in any Court in any area on the date on which this Act comes into force in that area, shall be continued in that Court as if this Act had not been passed and if the Court finds that the juvenile has committed an offence, it shall record such finding and instead of passing any sentence in respect of the juvenile, forward the juvenile to the Board which shall pass orders in respect of that juvenile in accordance with the provisions of this Act as if it had been satisfied on inquiry under this Act that a juvenile has committed the offence.'
11. In the instant case, the petitioners did not lead any evidence in support of the application under Section 20 of the Act despite afforded several opportunities and ultimately closed their evidence. Even otherwise, the wordings of the above Section are clear enough to show that if any proceeding is pending on the date of enforcement of the new Act, that shall be concluded under the provisions of the repealed Act of 1986. However, it provides that in case the Court; finds that the accused was juvenile and committed the offence, the Court shall record its finding, but shall not pass any sentence and send the juvenile to the Board for appropriate orders. The question of sending of juvenile to the Board would arise after the conclusion of the trial and finding that the juvenile accused had committed the offence. Except the said procedure, the provisions of new Act would not be applicable to the proceedings which were pending prior to commencement of the Act of 2000. In the instant case, the offence was committed when the old Act of 1986 was in force.
12. In this view of the legal position and factual matrix of the case, I do not find any error, illegality, or perversity in the impugned order requiring interference by this Court.
13. Consequently, the revision petition is dismissed. The stay petition also stands dismissed.