ORDER
Shethna, J.
(1). This special appeal is directed against the judgment dated 18.10.2000 passed by the learned Single Judge in S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 670/2000 whereby the learned Single Judge has upheld the judgment and order dated 26.7.2000 passed by the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Chittorgarh dismissing the claim petition No. 21/99 filed by the claimants only on the technical ground of limitation.
(2). From the impugned judgment and order dated 26.7.2000 passed by the learned Tribunal, it is clear that a technical ground of limitation raised by the Insurance Company was accepted by the learned Tribunal and it dismissed the claim petition on the ground that though Sec. 166, which provided limitation, was done away from the Statute by Amending Act of 1994 with effect ffom 14.11.1994, the general law of limitation would apply and thai the claim petition was not filed within a period of three years from the date of accident, therefore, it was time barred. The learned Tribunalhas also held that along with the claim petition, no application to condone the delay in filing the claim petition late was filed nor any sufficient cause was shown, therefore, it dismissed the claim petition only on the ground of limitation.
(3). In case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag vs. Mst. Katiji(1), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that when substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred and the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of delay.
(4). It is time and again held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as this Court that the Slate or its agencies or the Insurance Company etc. should not raise plea of limitation so as to frustrate the genuine claim of a person on merits, if such plea is raised, then the Court should not entertain such pleas.
(5). Unfortunately, it seems trial the learned Tribunal not only allowed the Insurance Company to raise this plea but also accepted It in complete ignorance of the well known principle of law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court as well as this Court in umpteen number of cases.
(6). Learned counsel Mr. Pitliya submitted that once sub-section 3 of Sec. 166 has been omitted by Sec. 153 of the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1994 which came into force with effect from 14.11.1994, then the learned Tribunal ought not to have rejected the claim petition of the claimants on the ground that it was filed after the expiry of period of limitation provided under the Limitation Act.
(7). There is a lot of force and substance in this submission raised by the learned counsel Mr. Pilliya. The effect of the Amending Act is from 14.11.1994, there was no limitation for filing claims before the Tribunal in respect of any accident after 14.11.1994.
(8). In case of Dhannalal vs. D.P. Vijayvargiya and ors. (2), the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under:-
'It can be said that Parliament realised the grave injustice and injury which was being caused to the heirs and legal representatives of the victims who died in accidents by rejecting their claims petitions only on ground of limitation. It is a mailer of common knowledge that majority of the claimants for such compensation are ignorant about the period during which such claims should be preferred. After the death due to the accident of the bread earner of the family, in many cases such claimants are virtually on the streets. Even in cases where the victims escape death some of such victims are hospitalised for months if not for years.'
(9). After making the aforesaid observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that in its wisdom the Parliament rightly thought that prescribing a period of limitation and restricting the power of Tribunal to entertain any claim petition beyond the period of limitation was harsh, inequitable and in many cases was likely to cause injustice to the claimants, therefore, the sub-section was omitted from the Statute.
(10). It is clear from the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act. 1994 that Section 166(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act has been deleted retrospectively.
(11). In Dhannalal's case (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that when Sec. 166(3) has been omitted from the Statute, then the Tribunal has to entertain the claim petition without taking note of the dale on which such accident had taken place. It has further held that the claim petitions cannot be thrown out on the ground that such claim petitions were barred by the period of limitation.
(12). Thus, we are of the opinion that the benefit of the Amending Act must also be extended to pending cases where a plea of limitation has been raised.
(13). The Motor Vehicles Act is a special Slatule in which earlier, there was a provision of limitation u/S. 166 of the Act. Once that has been omitted from the Statute, then in our considered opinion, the learned Tribunal was wholly in error in applying the general law of limitation under the Limitation Act. If the view taken by the learned Tribunal is upheld, then the very purpose of Parliament in deleting the provisions of Sec. 166(3) of the Act from the Statute would stand totally frustrated.
(14). Another judgment was cited by the learned counsel Mr. Pitliya in support of his submission reporled as Ravindra Kumar Kapoor vs. VII Addl. Dist. and Sessions Judge/Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Kanpur Nagar and Ors. (3), which also supports the case of fhe appellant/claimants.
(15). The next queslion is what course should be adopted by this Court? Rightly Or wrongly the order was passed by the learned Tribunal in favour of the Insurance Company on such a frivolous plea raised by it and the same was upheld by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the absence of the aforesaid judgments cited by learned counsel Mr. Pitliya for the claimants before him.
(16). Before upsetting the orders passed by the Tribunal and not interfered by the learned Single Judge in misc. appeal, in ordinary course we were required to first issue notice to the other side and after hearing them, the aforesaid orders would have been set aside but the learned counsel Mr. Piiliya submitted that by issuing notice to Ihe other side and then quashing the orders passed by the Tribunal and the learned Single Judge, would result into further delay which would add to the misery of the claimants. He submitted that in almost identical case, the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court has straightaway allowed the appeal without issuing nolice to the other side. In support of his submission, he has relied upon the case of Janaky vs. Achuthan Nair (4).
(17). Hon'ble Justice Dr. AR, Lakshmanan, J. (presently Hon'ble Chief Justice of this Court) speaking for Ihe bench held in Janaky's case (supra) that, 'the appeal has to be straight away allowed, in view of the amendment to Sec. 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 as Sub-section 3 of Sec. 166 was deleted by amendment Act No. 54 of 1994 which came inlo force on 14.11.94.'
(18). In view of the Dhannalal's case (supra), his Lordship further held that the benefit of the Amending Act must also to be extended to pending cases where Ihe plea of limitation has been raised.
(19). In view of the above submission raised by the young and upcoming lawyer Mr. Piiliya we requested Mr. H.R. Panwar, who usually appears in claim petitions, to assist this Court.
(20). We have asked both Mr. Panwar as well as Mr. Pitliya as to whether any other view has been taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter or not? To this, they stated that no other contrary view is taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter.
(21). In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that to issue notice to the other side and then set aside the orders passed by the learned Tribunal as well as the learned Single Judge, would be an exercise in futility. Therefore, we are of the opinion that in this case, this special appeal should be straight away allowed as it was done by the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in Janaky's case (supra).
(22). Before parting, we must also add that the plea of limitation was not open to the Insurance Company. We fail to understand that how the learned Tribunal has permitted the Insurance Company to raise this plea before it. It is unfortunate that the learned Tribunal has not only permitted the Insurance Company to raise such plea but also accepted it with complete ignorance of Ihe lalest law.
(23). We must record our appreciation to the young and upcoming lawyer Shri Pitliya, who has hardly 5 months experience at the bar, for working very hard in Ihe matter and making detailed research and citing the judgments of not only the Hon'bleSupreme Court but also of various High Courts like Kerala, Allahabad etc. We also record our appreciation to learned counsel Mr. H.R. Panwar for rendering valuable assistance to the Court in correct adjudication of the matter.
(24). In view of the above discussion, this special appeal is allowed, the judgment and order dated 18.10.2000 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court dismissing S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 670/2006 is set aside, the judgment and order dated 26.7.2000 passed by the learned Tribunal dismissing the claim petition no. 21/99 of the claimants/appellants on the ground of limitation is also hereby quashed and set aside.
(25). Now, the matter will go back to the learned Tribunal, which shall decide the matter on merits in accordance with law as early as possible preferably within six monlhs from the date of receipt of papers.
(26). The office shall sent down a copy of this order forthwith to the learned Tribunal.