Judgment:
Arun Madan, J.
1. Heard the learned Counsel for the parties and also perused the Impugned order dated 8th May, 1996 passed by the learned Addl. District Judge No. 4, Jaipur City, Jaipur in Civil Suit No. 165/86. A very interesting question has arisen in this case for consideration of this Court relating to the amendment which has been allowed by the learned trial court in respect of a previously instituted suit on the grounds of default in payment of rent and bonafide and reasonable persona] necessity of the previous landlords/owners of the property in dispute who have been arrayed as respondents Nos. 1 and 2 in this revision petition. Respondents Nos. 3 and 4 are the subsequent purchasers for consideration of the said property from plaintiff-respondents Nos. 1 and 2. The petitioner-defendant was admittedly a tenant in the residential premises which was previously owned by the plaintiff-respondents No. 1 and 2. Earlier dispute had arisen between the petitioner and respondents Nos. 1 and 2, on two grounds regarding default in payment of rent and bonafide personal necessity of the previous owners. It has been contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner had paid the arrears of rent to the landlords (No P. No. 1 and 2), hence the question of default did not survive in their favour. The petitioner has been residing in the suit premises as a tenant of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 for the last 13 years and the property was subsequently sold by respondents No. 1 and 2 to respondents Nos. 3 and 4 on 16.6.93. Thereafter an application was filed by respondents Nos. 3 and 4 under Order 21 Rules 10 read with Order 6 Rules 17 CPC seeking amendment of the plaint on the ground that they are the bonafide purchasers of the said property for consideration by a registered sale-deed dated 16.6.93. It was alleged in the said application by the applicants that from 16.6.93 to 28.2.94, the defendant had committed second default in payment of rent and, therefore, he was entitled to be evicted from the suit premises. Apart from the question of default, the plaintiffs had also' alleged that they will file a separate suit for ejectment of the petitioner-tenant on the ground of personal and bonafide necessity. This fact is clearly borne out from para 5 of the said application moved before the trial court on 5.3.94 wherein there is a specific averment to the said effect. Notwithstanding this plea it is very surprising to note as to how the trial court allowed the amendment of the plaintiffs by passing an order which is admittedly in excess of its jurisdiction and contrary to the pleadings of the parties. The trial court has apparently lost sight off of a fact that in para 5 of the said application, as referred to above, there is clear admission of respondents Nos. 3 and 4 regarding sale of the property in question in their favour by non-petitioners Nos. 1 and 2 and how could the trial court allow the amendment in the plaint particularly when the right of bonafide requirement cannot be passed on to a subsequent purchaser by inheritence or succession. There is no provision In law which permits such kind of a situation. In fact the proper course for the respondents Nos. 3 and 4 was to have filed a separate suit if at all the ground of personal bonafide necessity was available to them, which option, admittedly, has not been exercised by the said parties. I am of the considered opinion that whenever new plaintiffs are added to the plaint, not only the cause of action changes but also the ground of bonafide-necessity of the previous owners, who had sold the property to the subsequent purchasers, is also washed off and, therefore, the original suit cannot be substituted by the second suit on the same ground.
2. At this stage, an argument has been advanced by Mr. Ranjan, learned Counsel for the respondents that by virtue of Section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act the subsequent purchases got the right to advance the plea of bonafide requirement against the existing tenant in the suit property. This argument is wholly untenable since under the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950 (for short 'the Act') there is a specific provision under Section 13(1)(h) regarding the bonafide and personal necessity of the owner/landlord which stipulates that a suit for eviction can be filed by the landlord on the ground of bonafide necessity against the tenant and in my considered opinion the bonafide necessity should be objectively considered and analysed by the Court in each and every case. I am further of the opinion that if at all the ground of bonafide necessity was available, it was open to the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 to have filed a fresh suit on the said ground and which admittedly stood completely washed off, after the sale of the property to the subsequent purchasers viz., respondents Nos. 3 and 4.
3. In my considered opinion the trial court has thus committed a grave illegallity by allowing this amendment and the impugned order deserves to be quashed and set aside. I am fortified in my observations from the judgment of the Apex Court in the matter of Sheikh Jehangir v. Smt. S. Kaushalya Bai and Ors. reported in 1987 (supp.) SCC 630, wherein the question which had arisen for consideration of the Apex Court was as to whether in an eviction suit bonafide-requirement of the previous landlord who was the plaintiff under Section 10(iii)(c) of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1960 could survive after the plaintiff had transferred his right, title and interest in the demised premises by executing a registered sale-deed dated May 11, 1973 in favour of the subsequent purchaser. The High Court treated this as a subsequent event necessitating a remand of the suit for fresh disposal and the subsequent purchaser on remand was impleaded as a party- respondent. In appeal by Special Leave, it was held by the Apex Court that there is a clear inhibition contained in the aforesaid provision of the Act against institution of a suit by a purchaser on the ground of bonafide and personal necessity for a period of 3 months from the date of purchase and, therefore, a suit could not be brought by the purchaser till the expiry of the said period calculated from the date of the sale-deed. After the suit was remanded the only remedy available to the plaintiff was to seek liberty to withdraw it. The purchaser was to institute a fresh suit for his own personal requirement which he never did. In view of the decision of the Apex Court in the matter of Shanti Lal Thakur Das v. Chiman Lal Magan Lal Paliwal reported in : [1977]1SCR341 , the judgment and decree passed by the High Court as well as the courts below stood vacated and the suit for eviction was dismissed. The Apex Court further observed that the dismissal of the suit will not preclude the subsequent purchaser from bringing a fresh suit on the ground of his bonafide personal requirement.
4. In my considered opinion the ratio of the aforesaid judgment of the Apex Court is squarely applicable to the instant case. I am of the view that the trial court should have dismissed the application for impleadment of the subsequent purchasers of the property in question as necessary parties instead of allowing the amendment on the ground of their personal and bonafide requirement which was not created automatically soon after their purchase of property from the previous owners and the same had to be objectively considered by the trial court as against the existing tenant i.e. the petitioner herein. It is accordingly directed that the suit for eviction pending before the trial court will stand dismissed in so far as the ground of bonafide and personal requirement is concerned but/the dismissal of the suit will not preclude the subsequent purchasers from instituting a fresh suit against the petitioner on the ground of their personal and bonafide requirement on a fresh cause of action.
5. The revision petition is accordingly allowed. The impugned order dated 8.5.96 passed by the trial court is quashed and set aside and the application of respondents Nos. 3 and 4 under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC dated 16.10.95, by which the amendment was allowed by the trial court in Suit No. 165/86, is rejected. There will be no order as to costs.