A.K. Mathur, J.
1. By this judgment all the cases mentioned in the Schedule appended to this order shall stand disposed off.
2. This is a special appeal directed against the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated. 29.11.1989 whereby the learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition and upheld that the scheme published Under Section 68-C of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act of 1939') for the route Kishangarh to Sarwad on 30.11.1987 is valid.
3. The brief facts giving rise to this special appeal are that a scheme for nationalisation of the route Kishangarh to Sarwad was published on November 30, 1987 Under Section 68-C of the Act of 1939. The validity of the scheme was challenged by the petitioner in the writ petition on number of grounds. But the only ground urged before us was that this scheme cannot survive by virtue of Sub-section (4) of Section 100 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (referred to hereinafter as 'the Act of 1988). Therefore, we need not to go into other questions.
4. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 came into force by the Notification dated 22.5.1989 and it was made effective with effect from 1st July, 1989. The relevant provisions with which we are concerned are Sections 100 and 217. Section 100 reads as under:
100. Objection to the proposal. -(1) On the publication of any proposal regarding a scheme in the Official Gazette and in not less than one newspaper in the regional language circulating in the area or route which is to be covered by such proposal any person may, within thirty days from the date of its publication in the official Gazette, file objections to it before the State Government.
(2) The State Government may, after considering the objection and after giving an opportunity to the objector or his representatives and the representatives of the State transport under-taking to be heard in the matter, if they so taking desire, approve on modify such proposal.
(3) The scheme relating to the proposal as approved or modified Under Sub-section (2) shall then the published in the official Gazette by the State Government making such scheme and in not less than one newspaper in the regional language circulating in the area or route covered by such scheme and the same shall thereupon become final on the date of its publication in the Official Gazette and shall be called the approved scheme and the area or route to which it relates shall be called the notified area or notified route:
Provided that no such scheme which relates to any inter State route shall be deemed to be an approved scheme unless it has the previous approval of the Central Government.(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, where a scheme is not published as an approved scheme Under Sub-section (3) in the Official Gazette within a period of one year from the date of publication of the proposal regarding the scheme in the Official Gazette Under Sub-section (1), the proposal shall be deemed to have lapsed.
Explanantion:-In computing the period of one year referred to in this Sub-section, any period or periods during which the publication of the approved scheme Under Sub-section (3) was held up on account of any stay or injunction by the order of any court shall be excluded.
Section 217 reads as under:
217. Repeal and savings--, (1) The Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and any law corresponding to that Act in force in any State immediately before the commencement of this Act in that Stae (hereinafter in this section referred to as the repealed enactments) are hereby repealed.
(2) Notwithstanding the repeal by Sub-section (1) of the repealed enactments:
(a) any notification, rule, regulation, order or notice issued, or exemption granted, or any confiscation made, or any penalty or fine imposed, any forfeiture cancellation or any other thing done, or any other action taken under the repealed enactments, and in force immediately before such commencement shall, so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of this, act be deemed to have been issued, made granted, done or taken under the corresponding provision of this Act:
(b) any certificate of fitness or registeration or licence or permit issued or granted under the repealed enactments shall continue to have effect after such commencement under the same conditions and for the same period as if this Act had not been passed;
(c) any document referring to any of the repealed enactments or the provisions thereof, shall be construed as referring to this Act or to the corresponding provision of this Act;
(d) The assignment of distinguishing marks by the registering authority and the manner of display on motor vehicles in accordance with the provision of the repealed enactments shall, after the commencement of this Act, continue to remain in force until a notification Under Sub-section (6) of Section 41 of this Act is issued.
(e) any scheme made Under Section 68C of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, or under the corresponding law, if any, in force in any State and pending immediately before the commencement of this Act shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of Section 100 of this Act.
(f) the permits issued Under Sub-section (1A) of Section 68F of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, or under the corresponding provision, if any, in force in any State immediately before the commencement of this Act shall continue to remain in force until the approved scheme under Chapter VI of this Act is published.
(3) Any penalty payable under any of the repealed enactments may be recovered in the manner provided by or under this Act, but with-out prejudice to any action already taken for the recovery of such penalty under the repealed enactments.
(4) The mention of particular matters in this section shall not be held to prejudice or affect the general application of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, with regard to the effect of repeals.
5. By virtue of Sub-section (1) of Section 217 of the Act of 1988, the Act of 1939 stands repealed. Sub-section (2) of Section 217 only save certain acts under the old Act as enumerated from Sub-section (2)(a) to (2)(f). Sub-section (4) further mentions that the general application of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 shall be applicable.
6. Mr. Vyas and Mr. Maheshwari, learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that the old scheme promulgated Under Section 68-C of the Act of 1939 have only been saved to the extent of Section 100 of the Act. Learned Counsel submitted that in clause (e) of Sub-section (2) of Section 217 clearly mentioned that the scheme promulgated Under Section 68-C of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 or any other corresponding law in force in the State pending immediately before the commencement of this Act shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of Section 100 of this Act.
7. It is urged that Section 100 has made major changes, i.e. under the old Act of 1939 the scheme was to be prepared by the Corporation but in place of that under the new Act the scheme has to be prepared by the State Government and it has to be published in the Official Gazette inviting objections within 30 days from the date of its publication in the Official Gazette. Sub-section (2) says that after considering the objections and after giving opportunity to the objector or its representatives or the representatives of the State transport undertaking, the Government, if so desire, can approve or modify such proposal. Sub-section (3) says that the scheme relating to the proposal as approved or modified Under Sub-section (2) shall then be published in the Official Gazette by the State Government in not less than one newspaper in the regional language circulating in the area or route covered by such scheme and the same shall thereupon become final on the date of its publication in the Official Gazette and shall be called the approved scheme and the area or route to which it relates shall be called the notified area or route. A proviso has also been added that no such scheme which relates to any inter State route shall be deemed to be an arrpoved scheme unless it has the previous approval of the Central Government. Sub-section (4) says that notwithstanding anything contained in this section, where a scheme is not published as an approved scheme Under Sub-section (3) in the Official Gazette within a period of one year from the date of publication of the proposal regarding the scheme in the Official Gazette Under Sub-section (1), the proposal shall be deemed to have lapsed. An explanation has also been added that for the purpose of computing the period of one year from the date of publication of the approved scheme Under Sub-section (3) the time spent on account of any stay order or injunction by a court shall be excluded.
8. It will not be necessary for us to compare the provisions of the Old Act, with the New Act, but suffice it to say that Under Section 100 now the proposal has to be emanate from the State and it has to be published by the State in the Official Gazette and after hearing the objections it has to be finalised by the Government and final scheme has to be published by the Government. The another radical Change which has been brought about by this New Act of 1988 is that the schemes which have not been published as an approved scheme Under Sub-section (3) in the Official Gazette within a period of one year from the date of publication of the proposal Under Sub-section (1) shall be deemed to have lapsed. The idea behind it is that a proposal which has been published by the Government if it does not ultimately culminate in an approved scheme within a period of one year then that scheme will lapse. It appears that the Legislature in its wisdom thought that the proposals for the schemes remained pending for years together for one reason or the other and such a lethargic attitude has been sought to be corved by Sub-section (4), meaning thereby that the proposal for a scheme should end in a final approved scheme within a period of one year then it is better to finish it rather than to hang on.
9. Mr. Vyas and Mr. Maheshwari, learned Counsel for the petitioners specially invited our attention to Onkar Singh and Ors. v. Regional Transport Authority Agra and Ors. AIR 1986 SC 1719 and submitted that it appears that the Legislature has taken into consideration the weightly observations made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Onkar Singh's case (supra). It was observed that there should be some limit for a proposal to finally culminate into an approved scheme and in that connection the learned Counsel specially invited our attention to the following observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case:
The proviso to Section 68-F(1-D) of the Act which provides that where the period of operation of a permit in relation to any area, route or portion thereof specified in a scheme published Under Section 68-C of the Act expires after such publication, such permit may be removed for a limited period but the permit so renewed shall cease to be effective on the publication of the scheme Under Sub-section (3) of Section 68-D of the Act indicates the legislative intention regarding the maximum period that may be spent on the proceedings which intervene between the date of publication of the draft scheme Under Section 68-C of the Act and the publication of the approved or modified scheme Under Section 68-D (3) of the Act. It suggests that it cannot be longer then three to five years which is usually the period during which a permit can be in force without renewal as provided in Section 58 of the Act.
10. Both the learned Counsel submitted that in this legal background the present scheme cannot survive because the draft scheme was published on 30.11.1987 and it could not be finalised within a period of one year as contemplated in Sub-section (4) of Section 100 because by virtue of clause (e) Sub-section (2) of Section 217 the Section 100 has been made applicable to such draft scheme published Under Section 68-C of the Old Act of 1939. Learned Counsel submitted that since the period of one year has elapsed, therefore, the present scheme for the route Kishangarh to Sarwad has come to an end.
11. The learned Single Judge after bestowing his consideration to the rival contentions I of the parties held that it is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 100 is applicable to the draft scheme under the Old Act. But the learned Judge held that the period of one year is to be counted from the date of publication of the draft scheme Under Section 68-C because that will amount to construe the provisions of the Act of 1988 with retrospective effect whereas it has come into effect with effect from 1st July, 1989. Therefore, the period of one year has to be counted from the date of commencement of the Act of 1988 i.e. 1st July, 1989. We are in full agreement with the view expressed by the learned Single Judge. It is true that the Act of 1988 came into force with effect from 1st July, 1989. By virtue of clause (e) of Sub-section (2) of Section 217 the draft scheme issued Under Section 68-C has to be finalised under the new corresponding provision i.e. Section 100. Chapter IV-A of the Act of 1939 has been compressed into Section 100 of the new Act of 1988 with the modification as mentioned above.
12. Now, the question before us is that by virtue of Sub-section (4) of Section 100, what should be the cut off date for counting the period of one year for the draft scheme Under Section 68-C of the Act of 1939.
13. Mr. Munshi, learned Counsel for the respondent R.S.R.T.C. has also stranuously urged before us that the New Act, will not govern the old schemes, the schemes published earlier shall continue to be governed by the Old Act as if the New Act, has not come into force and the learned Counsel for that purpose referred to Section 6 of the General Clauses Act and submitted that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act has been specially made applicable by virtue of Sub-section (4) of Section 217. Therefore, learned Counsel submitted that so far as the schemes published Under Section 68-C of the Act of 1939 shall not be affected by this New Act. Learned Counsel submitted that by virtue of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act any action taken under the repealed Act shall not affect any right, privilege, obligation, liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed. Learned Counsel further submitted that any investigation, legal proceedings or remedy instituted shall be continued or in force or any such penalty of forfeiture imposed under the repealed Act shall nto be affected. In support of his submission, learned Counsel has invited our attention to Stale of Orissa and Anr. v. Mis. M.A. Tulloch and Co. : [1964]4SCR461 . The argument of the learned Counsel cannot be countenance for the simple reason that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act clearly says that 'unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not affect.' The main section start with this reservation that if the New Act does not express a different intention, in that case all the acts and provisions of the Old Act under which any liability or investigation or legal proceedings has commenced, that will not be affected and it will be saved to that extent. But if the New Act expressesly or unequivocally express its intention and saves only limited actions under the repealed Act then the actions under the repealed Act will only be saved to that extent only. The provisions of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act will only come into play if the intention of the new Act is not clear or it docs not specifically prohibit the enquiries or investigation which have been commenced under the old Act then for that purpose Section 6 of the General Clauses Act will come to the rescue and all the investigation or legal proceedings, liability, penalties etc. shall continue to be governed by the old Act. But in case the new Act makes it clear that the provisions of the Old Act shall stand repealed and specifically saves certain actions under the repealed Act then Section 6 of the General Clauses Act cannot be resorted to, to allow the proceedings commenced under the old Act. Section 217 very categorically states that the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and any law corresponding to that Act in force in any State immediately before the commencement of this Act, in that State is repealed. That means that the Motor Vehicles Act prevalent in any State shall be deemed to have been repealed. The effect of the repeal is that the Act has been taken out from the statute books. In subsection (2) after repealing the Motor Vehicles Act 1939, it has saved certain actions under the Old Act, which has been enumerated in clauses (a) to (f) of Sub-section (2) of Section 217, that means that by one sweep the old Act of 1939 has been completely repealed but only limited actions under the repealed Act of 1939 have been saved as enumerated in clauses (a) to (f) of Sub-section (2) of Section 217. Therefore, while judging the actions under the old Act old we have to see that what actions under the old have been saved. We are concerned in the present case only with the draft schemes published Under Section 68-C and that is covered by clause (e) of Sub-section (2) of Section 217. In this connection, reference of Sub-section (3) may also be made because which also says that if any penalty is payable under the repealed enactment then the same may be recovered in the manner provided by and under this Act but without prejudice to any action already taken for the recovery of such penalty under the repealed enactment. We need not to digress because the main issue before us is only the fate of the scheme published Under Section 68-C.
14. Learned Counsel has also referred to various judgment on the question of interpretation of statute and in that connection learned Counsel has invited our attention to Mahadeolal Kanodia v. The Administrator General of West Bengal AIR 1964 SC 936 and Ratan Lal Adukia v. Union of India : AIR1990SC104 . So far as the basic canons of interpretation of statute are concerned there is no two opinion in the matter. Therefore, no unseful purpose would be served by burdening the judgment with reproducing the passage from these judgments. Suffice it to say that the provisions of the Act of 1939 have been completely repealed by virtue of Section 217 and it has only saved certain acts under the old Act as mentioned in Sub-section (2) and Sub-section (3) of Section 217. As such the argument of the learned Counsel that the schemes under the old Act will not be governed by this new Act cannot be sustained.
15. In this connection, we may refer to one more case which had been referred to by the learned Counsel i.e. State of Orissa and Anr. v. MA. Tulloch and Co. (supra). In that case the controversy was that the notices issued for the recovery under the Orissa Mining Area Development Fund Act, 1952 can be continued or not on account of the same being superseded by the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957. In this connection, their Lordships of the Supreme Court considered the implication of Section 6 and meaning of the expression 'implied repeal' and observed as under:
As the legislative intent to supersede the earlier law is the basis upon which the doctrine of implied repeal is founded there can be no incongruity in attributing to the later legislation the same intent which Section 6 persumes where the word 'repeal' expressly used. As the liability to pay the fee which was the subject of the notices of the demand made on 1.8.1960 under the Orissa Act 27 of 1952 had accrued period to June 1, 1958 where the Central Act 67 of 1957 came into force these notices were valid and the amounts due there under could be recovered notwithstanding the disappearance of the Orissa Act 27 of 1952 by virtue of the superior legislation of Act 67 of 1957 by the Union Parliament. AIR 1962 Orissa 24, Reversed.
16. This case and the case which we are having in hand is distinguishable on the ground that Under Section 217 the provisions of the old Act have been repealed but certain acts have been saved to the extent mentioned there under If there was only the fact that the provisions of Act of 1939 is repealed and there were not savings then perhaps the argument of the learned Counsel would have some substance. But after repealing the Act certain actions which have been taken under the old Act have been saved. That shows that the legislature after repealing the old Act of 1939 has categorically saved certain limited actions initiated under the repealed Act. If the savings have not been there, in that case the effect of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act would have come to the rescue of Mr. Munshi. But in view of the clear intention expressed by the legislature that they intend to repeal the Act of 1939 and save the limited actions taken under the repealed Act of 1939 then in that case any other thing which is contrary to the provisions of this Act cannot be saved by virtue of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. As a matter of fact in Sub-section (3) of Section 217 penalties have been specifically saved. Therefore, the case cited by the learned Counsel is wholly distinguishable and it cannot be of any help to him. Thus, we overrule this argument of Mr. Munshi.
17. Now, coming to the question that what should be the cut off date for counting the period of one year of the draft schemes issued Under Section 68-C of the Act of 1939. As we have already mentioned above that we are only concerned with regard to clause (e) of Sub-section (2) of Section 217 because by virtue of this the provisions of Section 100 have been made applicable mutatis mutandis to the draft schemes published Under Section 68-C of the Act of 1939. Sub-section (4) of Section 100 gives one year life to the draft scheme. Sub-section (4) of Section 100 clearly says that the scheme has to be approved or disapproved within a period of one year from the date of publication of the proposal. The Act of 1988 came into force with effect from 1st July, 1989. Now, one year is to be counted from the date of publication of the proposal/draft scheme Under Section 68-C then the effect would be that it would be over before the coming into force of the Act of 1988 itself, and it will amount to giving effect the provisions of the Act of 1988 from a retrospective date which is clearly not intended from the provisions of the Act of 1988. Sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the Act of 1988 clearly says that the Act shall come into force from the date as the Central Government may by notification in the Official Gazette appoint. This has been come into force by the notification of the Central Government with effect from 1st July, 1989. Thus, the clear intention of the Act is that it is prospective and not retrospective in character. If the argument of Mr. Vyas and Mr. Maheshwari is accepted then it would amount that we shall apply the Act from a retrospective date which is not clearly intended from the provisions of the Act. In fact, the scheme was published on 30.11.1987 and that scheme would not have been quased even if we apply the principles laid down in the case of Onkar Singh and Ors. (supra) because their Lordships have also observed that the normal currency during which the said scheme is to be finalised should be 3 to 5 years. If we quash the scheme by applying the provisions of Sub-section (4) of Section 100 that would mean that the scheme would automatically expiry prior to the coming into force of the Act itself as the scheme was published on 30.11.87 and if the principles contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 100 is made applicable then it lapsed after one year i.e. 30.10.1988. That is not the intention of the legislature. As a matter of fact, we have to construe the provisions of the Act in harmonious manner and see the real intention behind the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act of 1988. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 did save certain actions initiated under the old Act and one of the act which is save is draft scheme published Under Section 68-C of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 by virtue of clause (e) of Sub-section (2) of Section 217. The intention of the legislature is very clear that the draft scheme published Under Section 68-C of the Act of 1939 should be as far as possible completed and concluded in terms of Section 100 of the Act of 1988. Section 100 of the Act of 1988 came into force when the Act itself has come into force i.e. 1st July, 1989, as such we have to count the period of one year from the date when the Act came into force. That is the intention of the legislature, which is apparent from Sub-section (3) of Section (1) of the Act of 1988 read with clause (e) of Sub-section (2) of Section 217 of the Act 1988.
18. Thus, in this view of the matter, we do not find any merit in this appeal and the same is dismissed and all the cases mentioned in Schedule 'A' are also dismissed for the reasons mentioned above.