S.C. Agrawal, J.
1. This writ petition filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution read with Section 482 Cr.PC is for quashing of the First Information Report (in short FIR) No. 89/87 registered at the Police Station, Modak.
2. M/s Mangalam Cement Ltd., respondent No. 3 carries on business of manufacturing and sale of cement at Modak in Distt. Kota. The petitioner was appointed as handling and clearing agent of respondent No. 3 and he carries on business at Ghaziabad in the State of U.P. On 16th November, 1987 a complaint was submitted on behalf of respondent No. 3 before the Munsif and Judicial Magistrate Ramganj Mandi, where in it has been alleged that the petitioner has misapporpriated a sum of Rs. 3,75,000/-received by him on behalf of respondent No. 3 and has thereby committed offences punishable under Sections 408 and 420, IPC. On the said complaint the Judicial Magistrate passed an order under Section 156(3) CPC directing the SHO Police Station, Modak to register a case and submit the report after necessary investigation. On the basis of the said direction an FIR No. 89/87 in respect of offences under Sections 408 and 420 IPC was registered at the Police Station Modak on 22nd Nov., 1987 and the investigation was commenced by the police. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid registration of the FIR and the investigation into the same by the police, the petitioner has filed this writ petition wherein he has prayed that an appropriate writ, order or direction may be issued quashing the said FIR directing the SHO/IO Police Station, Modak not to take any further steps in respect of the said FIR.
3. A notice was issued to the respondents requiring them to show-cause as to why the writ petition may not be admitted. In response to the said notice a reply has been filed on behalf of respondent No 3. The petitioner has filed a rejoinder to the said reply.
4. We have heard Shri S.C. Agarwal, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, and Shri D.K. Soral, the learned Counsel for respondent No. 3.
5. At the outset, it may be stated that this writ petition has been filed at a stage when the matter is under investigation by the police and the petitioner is seeking intervention of this Court in preventing such investigation. The question as to whether and in what circumstances, the Court may interfere with the investigation by the police, was considered by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad AIR 1945 PC 18. In that case the High Court, in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, had quashed the FIR, which was under investigation by the police. The Privy Council set aside the said order of the High Court and held as under:
In their Lordships' opinion however, the more serious aspect of the case is to be found in the resultant interference by the Court with the duties of the police. Just as it is essential that every one accused of a crime should have free access to a Court of justice so that he may be duly acquitted if found not guilty of the offence with which he is charged, so it is of the utmost importance that the judiciary should not interfere with the police in the matters which are within their province and into which the law imposes upon them the duty of enquiry. In India as has been shown there is a statutory right on the part of the police to investigate the circumstances of an alleged cognizable crime without requiring any authority from the Judicial authorities, and it would, as their Lordships think be an unfortunate result if it should be held possible to interfere with those statutory rights by an exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary and not overlaping and the combination of individual liberty with a due observance of law and order is only to be obtained by leaving each to exercise its own function, always, of course subject to the right of the Court to interfere in an appropriate case when moved under Section 491, Criminal PC, to give directions in the nature of habeas corpus. In such a case as the present, how ever, the court's functions begin when a charge is preferred before it and not until then.
6. In State of West Bengal v. S.N. Basak : [1963]2SCR52 the Supreme Court endorsed the said view expressed by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and set aside the order of the High Court whereby the High Court had quashed the police investigation of the case holding it to be without jurisdiction.
7. In S.N. Sharma v. Bipen Kumar Tiwari and Ors. : 1970CriLJ764 the Magistrate had passed an order under Sub-section (3) of Section 156 Cr. PC to stop investigation in a case by the police. The said order of the Magistrate was set aside by the High Court and the said order of the High Court was affirmed by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court laid down that under Sub-section (3) of Section 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, the only power given to the Magistrate who can take cognizance of an offence under Section 190 is to order an investigation and there is no mention of any power to stop any investigation by the police. After examining the provisions contained in Sections 156, 157 and 159 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 the Supreme Court held that the scheme of the said sections is that the power of the police to investigate any cognizable offence is uncontrolled by the Magistrate and it is only in cases where the police decides not to investigate the case than then Magistrate can intervene and either direct an investigation or, in the alternative, himself proceed or depute a Magistrate subordinate to him to proceed or to inquire into the case and that the power of the police to investigate has been made independent of any control by the Magistrate. The Supreme Court after referring to the observations of the Privy Council in Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmed and Ors. (supra) has held that the interpretation placed by the Privy Council supports the view that the scheme of the Criminal Procedure Code is that the power of the police to investigate a cognizable offence is not to be interfered with by the judiciary. In the said case, it has, however, been observed:
It appears to us that, though the Code of Criminal Procedure gives to the police unfettered power to investigate all cases where they suspect that a cognizable offence has been committed, in appropriate cases an aggrieved person can always seek a remedy by invoking the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution under which, if the High Court could be convinced that the power of investigation has been exercised by a police officer malafide, the High Court can always issue a writ of mandamus restraining the police officer from misusing his legal powers.
8. In State of Bihar and Anr. v. J.A.C. Saldanha and Ors. : 1980CriLJ98 the High Court in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution had quashed the order passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate whereby he did not accept the final report submitted by the police and adjourned the matter to await the report of further investigation. The Supreme Court set aside the said order of the High Court on the view that the case was at a stage where further investigation into the offence was sought to be thwarted by interference in exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction. After referring to the decision of the Privy Council in Emperor v. Nazir Ahmed (supra) and the earlier decision of the Supreme Court in S.N. Sharma v. Bipen Kumar Tiwari and Ors. (supra) the Supreme Court observed that unless an extraordinary case of gross abuse of power is made out by those incharge of investigation the Court should be quite loath to interfere at the stage of investigation, a field of activity reserved for the Police and the executive.
9. Applying the principles laid down in the aforesaid decisions it is necessary to examine as to whether this is a case in which the power of investigation has been exercised by the Police Officer malafide or this is extraordinary case where there is a gross abuse of power by those incharge of investigation. In this regard, it may be mentioned that the investigation is being conducted by the Police after registering the case on the basis of the order passed by the Judicial Magistrate under Section 156(3) Cr.PC directing the SHO, P.S., Modak to register the case and to submit the report after investigation. It cannot be said that the said order of the Judicial Magistrate is vitiated by malafides and, therefore, it cannot be said that the power of investigation is being exercised by the Police malafide or this is an extraordinary case of gross abuse of power by those incharge of investigation.
10. Shri Agarwal, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, has, how ever argued that this is a fit case for the exercise of the extra-ordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the FIR registered by the Police for the reason that the Judicial Magistrate had no jurisdiction to pass the order under Section 156(3) Cr.PC directing the SHO, Police Station, Modak, to register a case and submit a report after the investigation and further that in the facts and circumstances of the present case no offence under Section 408 and 420 IPC is made out against the petitioner and that if the FIR is not quashed and the Police is not prevented from conducting investigation into the matter, the petitioner would be put to unnecessary hardship and harassment.
11. With regard to the jurisdiction of the Judicial Magistrate to pass the order under Section 156(3) Cr.PC the submission of Shri Agarwal is that according to the complaint filed by respondent No. 3 which has now been registered as the FIR No. 89/87 at the P.S. Modak the money said to be misappropriated by the petitioner was received at Ghaziabad and was to be deposited in Bank account of respondent No. 3 at Ghaziabad and, therefore, the alleged offences can be said to have been committed at Ghaziabad in the State of U.P. and the Judicial Magistrate, Ramganj Mandi in Rajasthan had no jurisdiction to pass the order under Section 156(3) Cr.PC. In support of his aforesaid submission Shri Agarwal had placed reliance on the provisions of Section 181 Cr.PC. In our opinion, the aforesaid submission of Shri Agarwal cannot be accepted. The question as to whether the Judicial Magistrate, Ramganj Mandi had the jurisdiction to pass an order in this matter involves an inquiry into questions of fact with regard to the place where the alleged misappropriation was done. The provisions of Section 181 Cr.PC, on which reliance has been placed by Shri Agarwal, relate to the place of trial in case of offences mentioned in the said section. The question as to whether the Judicial Magistrate, Ramganj Mandi has jurisdiction over the matter can be raised by the petitioner before the Judicial Magistrate when the Police submits the report after investigation. In this context, it may be mentioned that in State of West Bengal v. S.N. Basak (supra), the High Court had quashed the Police investigation in respect of offences under Section 420 IPC and Section 120B read with Section 420 IPC in the view that the statutory power of investigation given to the Police under Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 was not available in respect of an offence triable under the West Bengal Criminal Law (Amendment) (Special Courts) Act, 1949 and that the investigation concerned was without jurisdiction. The Supreme Court set aside the said decision of the High Court on the view that the High Court was in error in interfering with the Police investigation in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 567A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. In our view, therefore, the aforesaid contention raised by Shri Agarwal for quashing the FIR at this stage can not be accepted.
12. Shri Agarwal next contended that if the allegations contained in the FIR are considered in the light of other documents and other relevant circumstances the offences under Sections 408 and 420 IPC are not made out against the petitioner. In support of his aforesaid submission that this Court, at this stage, is competent to examine the material other than the allegations contained in the FIR. Shri Agarwal has placed reliance on the decisions of the Supreme Court in State of West Bengal and Ors. v. Swapan Kumar Guha and Ors. : 1982CriLJ819 and Madhavrao Jiwaji Rao Scindia and Anr. etc. v. Sambhajrao Chandrojirao Angre and Ors. AIR 1988 SC 704 and the decision of the Gujarat High Court in Harshadbhai C. Patel v. Indravadan P. Shah and Anr. 1986 (2) Crimes 185.
13. We are unable to accept the aforesaid contention. In a number of decisions, the Supreme Court has laid down that for the purpose of deciding as to whether the FIR or complaint lodged against an accused may be quashed at the stage of investigation, it is necessary to look into the allegations contained in the FIR or the complaint and if they are taken on their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged the proceedings may be quashed by the High Court. In this context reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab : 1960CriLJ1239 . In that case the appellant before the Supreme Court had filed a petition under Section 561-A of the Code of Cr.PC 1898 for quashing of proceedings initiated against him on the basis of the FIR lodged with the Police. The Supreme Court laid down that the inherent jurisdiction to quash proceedings could be exercised in the following categories of cases:
(i) Where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the criminal proceedings in respect of the offence alleged. Absence of the requisite sanction may, for instance, furnish cases under this catogory;
(ii) Where the allegations in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; in such cases no question of appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the FIR to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not:
(iii) Where the allegations made against the accused person do constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. In dealing with this class of cases it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusation made and cases where there is legal evidence which on its appreciation may or may not support the accusation in question. In exercising its jurisdiction under Section 561-A the High Court would not embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not. That is the function of the trial Magistrate, and ordinarily it would not be open to any party to invoke the High Court's inherent jurisdiction and contend that on a reasonable appreciation of the evidence the accusation made against the accused would not be sustained.
In that case the appellant sought to bring his case in category (iii) and had placed reliance on relevant correspondence and the statements and the conduct of the parties. The Supreme Court refused to express any opinion on that part of the appellant's arguments and observed that the appellant would have to satisfy the Magistrate who takes cognizance of the case that on the relevant evidence it would not be reasonably possible to sustain the charge.
14. The present case does not fall in category (i) because it is not the case of the petitioner, that there is a legal bar against the registration of the FIR and conduct of investigation by the Police. The present case also does not fall in category (iii) because matter is still at the stage of investigation and the evidence is to be collected. In order to bring the case within category (ii) it is necessary for the petitioner to make out that the allegations in the FIR if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offences alleged.
15. In Jehan Singh v. Delhi Administration (supra) the appellant had moved the High Court under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 to challenge the Police investigation in the FIR registered against him. The said petition of the appellant was dismissed by the High Court and the Supreme Court affirmed the said order of the High Court. After referring to the decisions in Emperor v. Khawaja Nazir Ahmed (supra); R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab (supra) and the State of West Bengal v. S.N. Basak (supra) the Supreme Court observed:
Prima facie, the allegations in the First Information Report, if taken as correct, did disclose the commission of a cognizable offence by the appellant and his companions. May be that further evidence to be collected by the Police in the course of investigation including the hire-purchase agreement partnership deed and the receipt, etc. could confirm or falsify the allegations made in the First Information Report but the High Court at this stage, as was pointed out by this Court in R.P. Kapur's case (supra), could not in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction, appraise that evidence or enquire as to whether it was reliable or not.
Might be, after collecting all the evidence, the Police would itself submit a cancellation report. If, however, a charge-sheet is laid before the Magistrate under Section 173 Criminal Procedure Code, then all these matters will have to be considered by the Magistrate after taking cognizance of the case. We cannot, at this stage, possibly indicate what should be done in purely hypothetical, situations which may or may not arise in this case.
Similarly in Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar and Anr. : 1985CriLJ817 , the Supreme Court has observed:
It is well settled by a long course of decisions of this Court that for the purpose of exercising its power under Section 482 Cr.PC to quash a FIR or a complaint the High Court would have to proceed entirely on the basis of the allegations made in the complaint or the documents accompanying the same per se. It has no jurisdiction to examine the correctness or otherwise of the allegations.
16. We may now examine as to whether in State of West Bengal v. Swapan Kumar Guha (supra) the Supreme Court has made a departure from the aforesaid legal position. In that case, the Commercial Taxes Officer, Bureau of Investigation had lodged a FIR with the police against M/s Sanchaita Investments, a partnership firm and its partners with regard to violation of the provisions of the Prize Chits and Money Circulation Schemes (Banning) Act, 1978. and on the basis of the said FIR investigation was commenced by the police. Writ petitions were filed in the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution by the said firm and its partners for quashing the investigation commenced against the firm. The High Court allowed the said writ petitions and issued a writ of mandamus directing the State Govt. and its officers to forthwith recall cancel and withdraw the FIR and all proceedings taken on the basis thereof. The Supreme Court, on appeal, affirmed the order of the High Court with regard to the quashing of the proceedings but modified the said order with regard to the return of the documents. In this case judgments were delivered by Chandrachud, C.J. and A.P. Sen, J., Varadarajan, J. expressed his agreement with the judgment and the final order pronounced by Chandrachud, C.J. In his judgment Chandrachud, C J. has referred to the decision of Privy Council in Emperor v. Khawaja Nazir Ahmed (supra) as well as the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court in R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab (supra) and State of West Bengal v. S.N. Basak (supra), S.N. Sharma v. Bipen Kumar Tiwari (supra) and Jehan Singh v. Delhi Adminstration (supra) and has observed that the condition precedent to the commencement of investigation under Section 157 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is that a cognizable offence has been committed and that if that condition is satisfied the investigation must go on and that rule in Khawaja Nazir Ahmed's case (supra) would apply and Court has no power to stop the investigation for to do so would be to trench upon the lawful power of the police to investigate into the cognizable offences. The learned Chief Justice further observed that if the FIR does not disclose the commission of a cognizable offence the Court would be justified in quashing the investigation on the basis of the information as laid or received. The aforesaid observations of the learned Chief Justice show that emphasis is to be laid only on the allegations contained in the FIR. The learned Chief Justice after analysing the FIR carefully and 'even liberally' held that it was impossible to hold on the basis of the allegations contained in the FIR that any offence could be said to be made out prima facie under Section 3 of the enactment in question. It appears that in answer to the writ petitions before the High Court affidavits were filed on behalf of the prosecuting agency and reliance was placed on the averments contained in those affidavits by the State Government before the Supreme Court. The learned Chief Justice found that even the said averments contained in the affidavits did not meet the requirments of Section 4 read with Section 3 and 2(C) of the Act in question.
17. Shri Agarwal has placed reliance on the following observations contained in the judgment of A P. Sen, J.
Whether an offence has been disclosed or not must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. In considering whether an offence into which an investigation is made or to be made, is disclosed or not, the court has mainly to take into consideration the complaint or the FIR and the court may in appropriate cases take into consideration the relevant facts and circumstances of the case. On consideration of all the relevant materials, the court has to come to the conclusion whether an offence is disclosed or not. If on a consideration of the relevant material the court is satisfied that an office is disclosed, the court will normally not interefere with the investigation into the offence and will generally allow the investigation into the offence to be completed for collecting materials for proving the offence. If, on the other hand, the court on consideration of the relevant materials is satisfied that no offence is disclosed it will be the duty of the court to interfere with any investigation and to stop the same to prevent any kind of uncalled for and unnecessary harassment to an individual.
18. In our view, the said observations have to be read in the context of the facts of that case wherein affidavits had been filed on behalf of the prosecuting agency before the High Court and the question was whether the averments contained in those affidavits disclosed the commission of the alleged offence. A.N. Sen, J. has also emphasised that the Court has mainly to take in to consideration the complaint or the FIR. He looked into the other material which was placed by the State and found that the said material also did not improve the position. In our opinion the said observations of A.D. Sen, J. cannot be construed to mean that in State of West Bengal v. Swapan Kumar Guha (supra) the Supreme Court has made a departure from the law laid down in earlier cases, namely, R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab (supra) and Jehan Singh v. Delhi Administration (supra). Moreover, in the subsequent decision in Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar (supra) the Supreme Court has reiterated the position as laid down in the earlier cases referred to above. For those reasons, we are of the opinion that for the purpose of deciding, as to whether a case is made out for washing the FIR, the Court has to take consideration, the averments contained in the FIR and to examine as to whether the said averments, if taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, disclose the offence alleged.
19. In Harshad Bhai C. Patel v. Indravadan P. Shah and Anr. (supra) on which reliance has been placed by Shri Agarwal, an order had been passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate under Section 156(3) Cr.PC after recording the statement of the complainant under Section 200 Cr.PC. The learned Single Judge of the Gujarat High Court, in revision, set aside the order under Section 156(3) Cr.PC. on the view that the power under Section 156(3) Cr.PC could not be exercised after cognizance had been taken and that in that case at the stage of the passing of the said order under Section 156(3) Cr.PC the Magistrate had recorded the statement of the complainant after having taken cognizance of the matter. The said decision has, therefore, no aplication to the present case.
20. We may now examine the allegations contained in the FIR filed by respondent No. 3 for the purpose of determining as to whether on the basis of the said allegations it can be said that the commission of offences under Section 408 and 420 IPC is disclosed. In the FIR it has been alleged that the complainant namely, M/s Mangalam Cement Ltd. (respondent No. 3) is having its factory and office at Aditya Nagar, Modak in Tehsil Ramganj Mandi and it is carrying on business of manufacture and sale of cement. It has also been alleged that the complainant has established a cement dump for the sale of cement at Ghaziabad and on 1-5-87, the petitioner was appointed as the Handlding and Clearing Agent and that an agreement for appointment of the petitioner as Handling and Clearing Agent was executed at the office of the complainant at Aditya Nagar at Modak. It has also been stated that the petitioner has been working as the Handling and Clearing Agent in pursuance of the said agreement. It has been further stated that apart from the conditions laid down in the agreement for appointment, a duty was imposed on the petitioner that he would collect the payments for the sale of goods of the complainant by bank drafts or cheques and that he would receive any payment in cash from any party and that the amount received by him would be sent by him immediately to the complainant. The complainant has further stated that a sum of Rs. 5,12,425/- was outstanding against the bills for cement sold to M/s Shiva Cement Corporation and that on 15th October, 1987, the complainant asked the petitioner with regard to the payment of those bills and the petitioner stated that the said party had not paid any amount against those bills and, thereupon the complainant sent its representative to the aforesaid party and the said party informed that they had made payments from time to time to the petitioner and that he had also issued recepts for the said payments. M/s Shiva Cement Corporation also informed that the petitioner had told them that the complainant had issued instructions for receiving the money in cash and for sending it directly to Modak and that acting on that representation they made the payment in cash so that the same may be sent to the complainant directly at Modak. The complainant has further alleged that M/s Shiva Cement Corporation also informed that in all they had made payment of a sum of Rs. 3,75,000/- in cash to the petitioner vide receipts Nos. 255, 293,344, 282 and 273 dated 25-9-1987, 7-10-1987 21-9-1987, 23-9-1987, 30 9-1987. It is also stated in the FIR that M/s Shiva Cement Corporation had also informed that last time when the petitioner came to receive the payment they gave an account of payments made by them in a formal letter wherein it was stated that the aforesaid payments were made for the purpose of remittance to the complainant at Modak. In the FIR it was also alleged that after coming to know these facts, the complainant called the petitioner to its Delhi office on 27th October, 1987 and he was confronted with the representatives of M/s Shiva Cement Corporation and at first the petitioner denied having received any payment from M/s Shiva Cement Corporation but when the representative of M/s Shiva Cement Corporation showed the receipts issued by him, the petitioner admitted having received the money and stated that this amount had been spent by him in his own business. In the complaint it is further stated that the representative of M/s Shiva Cement Corporation said that they have the photostat copies of the receipts given by the petitioner as well as the letter referred to in the complaint. It is also alleged in the FIR that the petitioner obtained payment in cash from M/s Shiva Cement Corporation by falsely stating that instructions were given by the complainant to this effect and after receiving the said amount in cash instead of remitting the same he misappropriated the same and the petitioner has received Rs. 3,75,000/- in cash by false pretentions and had dishonestly misappropriated the same and had thereby committed offences punishable under Section 408 and 420 IPC.
21. The aforesaid allegations contained in the FIR filed by respondent No. 3 indicate that the case of the complainants is that in defiance of the instructions given by the complainant not to receive any payment in cash from any party, the petitioner received a sum of Rs. 3,75,000/- in cash from M/s Shiva Cement Corporation by falsely representing that the complainant had directed that the payment should be obtained in cash and that after receiving the said amount of Rs. 3,75,000/- in cash from M/s Shiva Cement Corporation, the petitioner failed to remit the same to the complainant at Modak and misappropriated the same for his own use in his business. According to the allegations in the FIR the agency agreement whereby the petitioner was appointed as the Handling and Clearing Agent was executed in the office of the complainant at Modak in Rajasthan and under the said agreement the petitioner was to remit the money received by him on behalf of the complainant to the complainant and that the sum of Rs. 3,75000/- was received by the petitioner in cash by representing that it was to be remitted to the complainant at Modak and that the petitioner instead of remitting the said amount had misappropriated. On the basis of the aforesaid averments it can not be said that offences under Sections 408 and 420 IPC are not prima facie disclosed in the FIR.
22. Shri Agarwal has, how ever, arged that the aforesaid allegations in the FIR are not correct and that the petitioner has not misappropriated any amount. According to Shri Agarwal the petitioner has received an amount of nearly Rs. 9 lacs on behalf of the complainant but he is entitled to receive Rs. 10 lacs from the complainant towards the agency commission as Handling and Clearing Agent and that a sum of Rs. 1 lac is payable by the complainant to the petitioner and that the petitioner had filed a suit against the complainant for recovery of the said amount. The submission of Shri Agarwal is that the dispute between the petitioner and respondent No. 1 is purely of civil nature and no criminal offence is made out against him. In our opinion, the aforesaid question cannot be agitated by the petitioner at this stage because the matter is still under investigation. We have already referred to the allegations contained in the FIR and we are of the view that if the allegations are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety it cannot be said that they do not disclose commission of offences under Sections 408 and 420 IPC.
23. Shri Agarwal has lastly argued that the sole purpose of the criminal proceedings that have been initiated against the petitioner by respondent No. 3 is to have him arrested and thereby pressurise him and harass him. In our opinion this apprehension is groundless because adequate protection is available to the petitioner to obtain anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.PC.
24. No further contention was argued by Shri Agarwal.
25. In the result, the writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.