B.R. Arora, J.
1. The learned single Judge of this Court has referred the following question of law for adjudication by the Larger Bench :-
'Whether the view taken by this Court in Dharampal's case is to be followed or the view taken by this Court in Raju's case be followed.'
2. The view taken by the single Bench of this Court in Dharmapal's case is that 'in view of the statutory bar of filing second revision laid down by the Code of Criminal Procedure under Section 397(3) Cr. P. C, the party cannot be allowed to take recourse of Section 482 Cr. P. C. and thereby circumvent the provisions of Section 397(3) Cr. P. C. particularly when none of the conditions required for the exercise of inherent powers is present.' While in Raju's case, another single Bench of this Court has taken the view as under :-
'It appears that this three Judges Bench decision was not brought to the notice of Their Lordships, who decided Rajan Kumar's case, (1990 Cri LR (SC) 602). Hence in spite of Rajan Kumar's case, I am bound to follow the principle enunciated in Madhu Limaye's case, 1978 Cri LJ 165 (SC), which is a decision of the Larger Bench of the Apex Court and following the same, I hold that even though a second revision by the petitioners was not competent before this Court yet this Court is not precluded from preventing abuse of the process of the Court and is competent to see that the ends of justice are secured.'
3. In order to appreciate the controversy involved in the present case it is necessary to state in brief the events disclosed in the prosecution case which culminated in taking the cognizance against the petitioners. Complainant Smt. Usha Rani w/o Neeraj Kumar, on 11-10-89, filed a complaint in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Sri Ganganagar against Neeraj Kumar, his father Om Prakash, mother Smt. Laxmi Devi brother Raj Kumar and Raj Kumar's wife Smt. Saroj Gupta, under Sections 406 and 498A of the Indian Penal Code. The allegations made in the complaint are that her marriage was solemnised with Neeraj Kumar on 5-7-87, and after her marriage she was subjected to cruelty and harassment by the accused-petitioners and a demand of dowry was made on various occasions. It has, also, been alleged in the complaint that on 20-9-87, she was turned out from the house after giving beatings to her and the accused kept her Istri Dhan' with them and refused to return the same. The compalint filed by complainant Smt. Usha Rani was sent to Police Station, Kotwali, Sri Ganganagar, under Section 156(3) Cr. P. C. for investigation. An F. I. R. was registered against the accused-petitioners and the police, after necessary investigation, presented the Final Report. A protest petition was filed by the complainant and the learned Judicial Magistrate treated this protest petition as a 'complaint' and clubbed both these cases, recorded the statements of the complainant and her witnesses under Sections 200 and 202 Cr. P. C. and by his order dated 12-2-91, took cognizance against the petitioners. Dissatisfied with the order dated 12-2-91, passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Sri Ganganagar, taking cognizance against the petitioners, the petitioners preferred a revision before the learned Sessions Judge, Sri Ganganagar, who, by his judgment dated 8-5-91, dismissed the revision petition filed by the petitioner and held that the congnizance was taken against the petitioners behind their back and, therefore, they may appear before the learned Judicial Magistrate and raise their objections against the order taking cognizanceagainst them. The petitioners, dissatisfied with the Order dated 8-5-91, passed by the learned Sessions Judge dismissing the revision petition filed by them, preferred a miscellaneous petition in the High Court. At the time of arguments, an objection was taken regarding maintainability of the miscellaneous petition and in view of the conflicting views taken by the Single Benches of this Court, the learned single Judge made the present reference for adjudication to the Larger Bench.
4. The point which requires consideration in the present case is: whether in view of the specific bar put in Sub-section (3) of Section 397 Cr. P. C. regarding maintainability of the second revision petition by the same person, the powers can be exercised under Section 482 Cr. P. C. and the order taking cognizance can be set aside by the High Court in its inherent jurisdiction.
5. Section 482 Cr. P. C. provides that every Court has inherent power to do real and substantial justice and make such orders in order to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The Supreme Court, in Amar Nath v. The State of Haryana, : 1977CriLJ1891 , laid down the principle in relation to the use of inherent powers of the High Court and held that 'Section 482 Cr. P. C. contains the inherent powers of the Court and does not confer any new power but preserves the powers which the High Court already possesses. A harmonious construction of Sections 397 and 482 would lead to the irresistible conclusion that where a particular order is expressly barred under Section 397(3) and cannot be subjected to revision by the High Court then in such a case the provisions of Section 482 Cr. P. C. would not apply. It well settled that the inherent powers of the Court can ordinarily be exercised when there is no express provision on the subject matter. Where there is an express provision barring a particular remedy, the Court cannot resort to the exercise of the inherent powers.'
6. The same view was reiterated by the Three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court in: Kurukshetra University v. State of Haryana, : 1977CriLJ1900 , and it has been held that 'the inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the High Court to act according to its whim or caprice. That statutory power has to be exercised sparingly with circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases.' In Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, : 1978CriLJ165 , the Apex Court laid down the following three principles in relation to the exercise of the inherent powers of the High Court:-
'(1) that the power is not to be resorted to, if there is a specific provision in the Code for the redress of the grievances of the aggrieved party;
(2) that it should be exercised very sparingly to prevent the abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice; and
(3) that it should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code.'
In Raj Kapoor v. State (Delhi Administration), : 1980CriLJ202 , dealing with the inherent powers, the Apex Court held that 'the inherent powers of High Court under Section 482 Cr. P. C. do not stand repelled when the revisional power under Section 397 overlaps. Nothing in this Code, not even Section 397, can affect the amplitude of the inherent powers preserved in so many terms. by the language of Section 482. Even so, when a specific provision is made, easy resort to inherent power is not right except under compelling circumstances. Not that there is absence of the jurisdiction but that inherent power should not invade an area set apart for specific power under the same Code. There is no total baron the exercise of the inherent power where abuse of the process of the Court or other extraordinary situation excites the Court's jurisdiction. The limitation is self-restraint, nothing more.'
Similarly, in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi, : 1983CriLJ159 , it has been held by the Apex Court that 'Section 482 has a different parameter and is a provision independent of Section 397(3) while Section 397(3) applies to the exercise of the revisional power of the High Court, Section 482 regulates the inherent powers of the Court to pass an order necessary in order to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court, xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx It is well settled that the inherent power under Section 482 of the present Code can be exercised only when no other remedy is available to the litigant and not where a specific remedy has been provided by the Statute. Further, the power being an extraordinary one, it has to be exercised sparingly. If this considerations are kept in mind, there will be no inconsistency between Sections 482 and 397(3) of the present Code.'
In Rajan Kumar Machananda v. State of Karnataka, 1990 Cri LR (SC) 602, the revision petition, filed by the State, was dismissed by the learned Sessions Judge. The State filed a petition under Section 482 Cr. P. C. invoking the inherent powers of the Court where the High Court reverses the order of the Magistrate as affirmed by the Sessions Judge. The question for consideration before the Supreme Court was whether the bar under Section 397(3) Cr. P. C. should have been taken note of by the High Court to reject the second revision petition filed by the State? The Supreme Court held that 'the petition under Section 482 Cr. P. C, filed by the State before the High Court, was really an application for revision of the order of the Magistrate releasing the truck. That is exactly what is prohibited. Merely by saying that the jurisdiction of the High Court for exercise of its inherent powers was being invoked, the statutory bar could not have been overcome. If that was to be permitted, every revision petition facing the bar of Section 397(3) of the Code would be labelled as one under Section 482 Cr. P. C.' The Supreme Court, therefore, set aside the order passed by the High Court and restored the order of the Magistrate as affirmed by the Sessions Judge.
In Dharampal v. Smt. Ramshri, : 1993CriLJ1049 , the Supreme Court held that 'Section 397(3) bars a second revision application by the same party. It is now well settled that the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code cannot be utilised for exercising the powers which are expressly barred by the Code of Criminal Procedure hence the High Court has clearly erred in entertaining the second revision at the instance of the first respondent.'
In Ganesh Nargan Hedge v. S. Bangarappa, 1995 AIR SCW 2364, the Supreme Court held that 'it is true that availing of the remedy of revision to the Sessions Judge under Section 399 does not bar the person from invoking the power of the High Court under Section 482. It is equally true that the High Court should not act as a Second Revisional Court under the garb of exercising the inherent powers. While exercising its inherent powers in such a matter, it must be conscious of the fact that the learned Sessions Judge has declined to exercise his revisory power in the matter. The High Court should interfere only where it is satisfied that if the complaint is allowed to be proceeded with, it would amount to the abuse of the process of the Court or that the interest of justice otherwise call for quashing the charges.'
7. Section 397 Cr. P. C. deals with the revisory powers of the High Court and of Sessions Judge while Section 482 Cr. P. C. deals with the inherent powers of the High Court. Sub-section (3) of Section 397 bars revisional Court to entertain second revision filed by the same person. The object for enacting Sub-section (3) of Section 397 in barring the entertainment of second revision and other like provisions is to eliminate all possible avenues of delay or means of adopting delaying tactics and to plug other possible loop-holes in the Act by which the disposal of the case may be delayed. This provision is in consonance with the dominant purpose of the Code of Criminal Procedure to expedite investigation, enquiry or trial of the criminal cases and to achieve the determination of the cases with despatch. The exclusion of second revision is deliberate. Section 482 Cr. P. C. is a provision independent of Section 397(3) of the Code. It regulates the inherent powers of the High Court to pass orders necessary in order to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice while Section 397 deals with the revisional powers of the Court meant to be exercised against the order passed by the subordinate Courts. The scope and ambit of Section 482 Cr. P. C. is quite different from the powers conferred under Section 397 though they may overlap in some cases. The power under Section 397(3) will operate only in exercise of revisional powers of the High Court, but Section 482, confers upon the High Court the separate and independent power to pass order in a case where the impugned order clearly brings about the situation which is an abuse of the process of the Court or for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, the interference by the High Court is absolutely necessary, then nothing contained in Section 397(3) can limit or affect the exercise of the inherent powers of the High Court. Though Section 397(3) does not limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court but to say that the bar of Section 397(3) is not applicable in any case, will amount to setting at naught the limitation imposed by Sub-section (3) of Section 397 Cr. P. C. Looking to the object, with which Section 397(3) has been enacted, the powers under Section 482 Cr. P. C. cannot be invoked to neutralise the bar of Section 397(3) Cr. P. C. by styling the petition under Section 482 Cr. P. C. to do something which is expressly barred under the Code. Merely by changing the nomenclature of the petition and mentioning it as a petition under Section 482 Cr. P. C. instead of a revision under Section 397, the nature of the petition will not change where the relief prayed is for quashing of the order and it remains pure and simple a revision against the order passed by the lower Court. Though there is neither any falters nor limitation of the powers of the High Court nor is there an absence of jurisdiction but the inherent powers cannot be used to invade the area setapart for the exercise of the specific power by the Courts. In the present case, the petitioners have merely changed the nomenclature and filed the petition under Section 482 Cr. P. C. challenging the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge, which is nothing but a second revision which is not maintainable being barred by Section 397(3) Cr. P. C. We, therefore, agree with the view taken by the learned single Judge, In Dharmapal's case, wherein it has been held that 'in view of the statutory bar of filing second revision laid down by the Code of Criminal Procedure under Section 397(3) Cr. P. C, the party cannot be allowed to take recourse of Section 482 Cr. P. C. and thereby circumvent the provisions of Section 397(3) Cr. P. C. particularly when none of the conditions required for the exercise of the inherent powers is present.'
8. We have answered above the question referred by the learned single Judge though in the facts and circumstances of the case the question referred does not arise because the learned Sessions Judge dismissed the revision petition filed by the petitioners on the ground that the learned trial Court has only taken cognizance against the petitioners and if the petitioners have any grievance against the order taking cognizance then they may approach the learned trial Court and show to the trial Court that no case for taking cognizance against them has been made out and the learned trial Court will pass an appropriate order in accordance with law after hearing the learned counsel for the parties.
9. Taking cognizance means: taking notice of the offence and a decision to proceed against the person accused of having committed that offence if prima facie there is evidence of facts showing all the ingredients of offence against him. Prima facie evidence means: the evidence that is sufficient to establish a fact or to raise a presumption of the truth of the fact unless controverted. The order taking cognizance is an interlocutory order passed without giving any opportunity of hearing to the accused-petitioners. It can be varied or recalled as it is not a judgment and bar of Section 362 Cr. P. C. will not be attracted. The petitioners, if they have any grievance against the order issuing process against them can appear before the learned Magistrate and show to the Court that the allegations made in the complaint and the evidence collected by the investigating agency or the evidence produced before the Court do not constitute any crime involving them and satisfy the Court that if the relevant material would have been taken into consideration, the process against them could not have been issued, if such thing is brought to the notice of the Court and the Court, if after reconsideration of the evidence available on record is satisfied that no offence is made out against the petitioners for which the process has been issued then it can drop the proceedings because no person can be tried without a prima facie case against him. The issue of the process by the trial Court will not act as a bar for reconsideration of the case of the petitioners by it for dropping the proceedings. It has been held by the Supreme Court in : K.M. Methew v. The State of Kerala. : 1992CriLJ3779 that:-
'It is open to the accused to plead before the Magistrate that the process against him ought not to have been issued. The Magistrate may drop the proceedings if he is satisfied on reconsideration of the complaint that there is no offence for which the accused could be tried. It is his judicial discretion. No specific provision is required for the Magistrate to drop the proceedings or rescind the process. The order issuing the process is an interim order and not a judgment. It can be varied or recalled. The fact that the process has already been issued is no bar to drop the proceedings if the compalint on the very face of it does not disclose any offence against the accused.'
10. In view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in K.M. Methew's case, (1992 Cri LJ 3779), the miscellaneous petition, filed by the petitioners, deserves to be dismissed. The petitioners may, therefore, appear before the learned trial Court, raise their grievances before it and satisfy the Court that the evidence produced by the complainant before the trial Court as well as the evidence collected by the investigating officer, on the very face of it, do not disclose any case against the petitioners for which the cognizance has been taken against them and the learned trial Court will consider the case of the petitioners in accordance with law and pass an appropriate order.
11. In the result, we do not find any merit in this miscellaneous petition and the same is hereby dismissed.