Judgment:
ORDER
A.S. Godara, J.
1. This Criminal Misc. Petition has been filed Under Section 482, Cr.P.C. by the petitioner against the impugned order dated 14-7-95 passed by the learned Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Deedwana in connection with F.I.R. No. 48/95 thereby accepting the petition of non-petitioner No. 2 Govind Prasad alias Bhagirath and thereby releasing the disputed jeep on his 'supurdginama' in the sum of Rs. 1,50,000/-.
2. At the very out set, it may be stated that, admittedly, the present petitioner lodged a complaint in the Court of the Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Deedwana, where from the same was forwarded to the Police Station, Bardawa Under Section 156(3), Cr.P.C. for registration and investigation of a case and, accordingly, F.I.R. No. 48/95 Under Section 379, I.P.C. was registered and, during the investigation of the same, the disputed jeep was seized from the possession of non petitioners No. 2 and 3 and taken into police custody and, lastly, holding that the dispute between the present parties was of a civil nature and so a final report (negative) was filed in the said Court.
3. Similarly, though quite belatedly, on 3-6-95 Govind Prasad, from the non-petitioner's side is alleged to have lodged a complaint Under Sections 406/420, I.P.C. etc., against the petitioner but nothing appears to have come out positively, even after the same was ordered to be retunred to the non-petitioner No. 2 vide order of the Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate Deedwana dated 26-7-95.
4. However, both sides moved applications before the Court of the Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Deedwana each claiming custody of the Jeep No. NLA 9256 (old) and newly registered with the D.T.O., Nagaur allotting fresh Registration No. RJ-21C/1715 (to be referred as the Jeep) in the name of the petitioner.
5. The learned Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, vide his impugned order dated 14-7-95, purporting to have been passed in exercise of power Under Section 451, Cr.P.C., while accepting the petition of the present non-petitioner No. 2, ordered that the Jeep be delivered on 'supurdginama' of Rs. 1,50,000/- either to the non-petitioners No. 2 or No. 3 with a stipulation to produce the same before the Court as and when so directed. The same was released accordingly. The petitioner lost his claim.
6. Being aggrieved, the purchaser-petitioner has preferred this petition invoking inherent jurisdiction of the Court.
7. The learned counsel for non-petitioners No. 2 and 3 took a preliminary objection that since, admittedly, after investigation of F.I.R. No. 48/95 lodged by Umaram, the police submitted Final Report and, accordingly, the same having been accepted, the order of the learned Magistrate since did not amount to a judicial order and, accordingly, the same could not be a subject matter of challenge by way of a criminal revision, the same being barred under the provisions of Section 397, Cr.P.C. He has also cited the decisions rendered in Jawahara Ram v. State 1989 Cr LR (Raj) 29 in support of his contention.
8. It may be mentioned that, presently either acceptance or non-acceptance of the Final Report submitted by the S.H.O. of P.S. Baradwa is not under adjudication or challenge in this petition. The impugned order is not challenged by way of a criminal revision and, instead, the same is being challenged under the provisions of Section 482, Cr.P.C., alleging that the impugned order is nothing but a gross abuse of process of the Court and the same having resulted in gross injustice to the present petitioner and with a view to secure the ends of justice, the inherent powers of this Court are being invoked. As a result, the preliminary objection so taken by the learned contesting non-petitioner is bereft of any substance and the same is rejected.
9. 1 have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the learned counsel for the non petitioners No. 2 and 3, perused the impugned order and pondered over its propriety, regularity and legality besides the fact whether the impugned order amounts to abuse of process of the Court and hence to secure the ends of justice, it is liable to be set aside.
10. The learned counsel for the petitioner relying on the decision rendered in Tara Chand v. Gyanendra Tiwari 1990 (2) RLW 105 urged that, admittedly, the vehicle was sold to the petitioner by the non-petitioner No. 2 to the petitioner in March, 1995 and, lastly, because of passing a sale letter in favour of the latter, the Jeep was registered in the name of the petitioner and new Registration Number as RJ-21C-1715 were allotted. So, as per the provisions of Sec. 50 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for Short the M.V. Act), since with the execution of a sale letter and on receipt of a part payment in lieu of the agreed price of Rs. 45,000/-, if so assumed and the balance agreed to be paid in future, the proprietary right in the Jeep stood duly transferred to the petitioner. He was also simultaneously delivered possession of the vehicle which he also produced before the D.T.O., Nagaur in compliance of Section 44 of the M.V. Act before its registration as per the provisions of Sections 40 and 41 of the M.V. Act. The same was duly registered and so, after execution of sale letter enabling the Registering Authority to register the transfer of ownership and issuing Registration Certificate in the name of the petitioner.
11. Section 146 of the M.V. Act required that no person should use, except a passenger, or cause or allow any other person to use, a motor vehicle in a public place, unless there is in force in relation to use of the vehicle by that person or that other person, as the case may be, a policy of insurance complying with the Chapter XI of the M.V. Act. Accordingly, the petitioner also took insurance policy covering third party risk. This is not disputed by the non-petitioner. So, it is undeniable that a part payment against the agreed price of the Jeep was paid by the petitioner and the balance was agreed to be deferred. The vehicle was delivered to the petitioner and a sale letter was also executed and, consequencely, the petitioner got it registered in his own name and, accordingly, an Insurance Certificate was also obtained in the name of the petitioner. This left no proprietary right of the non-petitioners No. 2 or even 3, if any, in the vehicle thereafter. They could only have resorted to have recourse to legal procedure thereby taking steps by instituting a regular civil suit for recovery of balance amount of price of the vehicle against the petitioner. They could not have taken law into their own hand by forcibly taking away the Jeep from the village well whereat the same was parked by the driver of the petitioner Chandra Ram. The police did not hold liable the petitioner for cheating as well.
12. Once the vehicle was legally sold and the possession was delivered resulting in registration of the vehicle in the name of the petitioner, as above, besides its being insured in his name, he became absolute owner of the vehicle. He was in its possession and legal custody at the time when the non-petitioner No. 3 took away the same unauthorisedly. When the vehicle was legally sold and possession transferred and the ownership, as defined Under Section 2(30) of the M.V. Act stood vested in the petitioner, neither non-petitioner No. 2 nor No. 3 could have taken the vehicle without the consent of the petitioner, without recourse to a Court of law by initiation of legal proceedings. There was none. A belated counter F.I.R. was also lodged which too ex facie was nothing but an abuse of process of law to illegally obtain possession of the vehicle. Therefore, on the face of admitted facts, the non-petitioners were not in legal and rightful custody and possession of the vehicle but they had illegally taken possession of the vehicle which was neither registered nor insured in their names, at the time of passing of the impugned order and so they were disqualified from possession and operating the Vehicle in any public place. Once it was transferred, by way of sale, to the petitioner, the same procedure is required to be followed for re-sale and re-registration in the name of the non-petitioners. In its absence, the custody and possession, illegally acquired by them, does not hold valid in the eye of law.
13. This is not the illegal and forcible possession, bereft of legal authority and right to possession, which is to be protected as opposed to the rightful title, claim and possession immediately preceding the alleged wrongful act of forcible deprivation of custody/possession of the petitioner but it is the legal and rightful possession even if the nice question of title is left apart though, in the instant case, the title of the petitioner is perfect.
14. The learned counsel for the non-petitioners No. 2 and 3, while relying on the decisions rendered in Chagan Lal v. Shyam Lal 1987 Cr LR (Raj) 195 and Banne Singh v. The State of Raj 1985 Cr LR (Raj) 504 further contended that this Court and so also the lower Court are not concerned directly with the title of the disputed Jeep and, instead, the only relevant consideration for delivery of the vehicle is as to which party is the best entitled to the possession of the vehicle and, therefore, it is further contended that since, admittedly, the Jeep was in possession of the non-petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 at the time of its seizure during the course of investigation of F.I.R. No. 48/95 and, therefore, once the police investigated into the allegations of the F.I.R. and, subsequently, holding that no offence was committed and the dispute between the contesting parties was of a civil nature, gave a final report the lower Court was left with no option but to have released the vehicle in favour of the non-petitioners No. 2 and 3 and, therefore, the impugned order suffers from no illegality nor the same can be termed to have occasioned a failure of justice, therefore, warranting any interference with the same.
15. On consideration of both the citations, firstly, it may be observed that both these petitions were entertained and disposed of in exercise of powers vested in the trial Court Under Section 451, Cr.P.C. since in both the cases, after investigation, the same were not finalized in the manner the present case has been closed. Presently, though, the learned Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate appears to have harboured under a wrong notion that even after submission of a Final Report (negative), the Jeep could be ordered to be disposed of by way of passing an order Under Section 451, Cr.P.C. The application moved by the rival contesting parties could have only been entertained under the provisions of Section 457, Cr.P.C. and not otherwise. As a result, any order substantially purporting to have been passed under the provisions of Section 457, Cr.P.C., could be a subject matter of challenge by way of filing such petition.
16. Even if facts of the aforesaid cases are looked into, as regards Chagan Lal's ease (supra), the tractor was, lastly, in possession of Shyam Lal and the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jhalawar also ordered for giving the possession of the tractor and trolly in the custody of Shyam Lal pending the conclusion of the enquiry and trial and the same was upheld mainly on the ground that it was Shyam Lal non petitioner who was, lastly, entitled to the possession of the vehicle and its trolly.
17. As regards Benne Singh's case (supra), lastly, before he was deprived of the possession by the accused Abdul Rehman to whom possession of the bus was ordered by the lower Court to be handed over, the same order was set aside and since the bus was lastly taken from the possession of Banne Singh and, therefore, the same was ordered to be handed over to Benne Singh on his furnishing 'supurdginama' as ordered therein.
18. As a result, at the cost of repetition, it may be stated that the Jeep stood transferred to and registered in the name of the present petitioner and he was in possession of the vehicle and the same was being operated by him through his driver Chandra Ram when, at last, non-petitioners No. 2 and 3 unauthorisedly and illegally deprived Umaram of the possession of the vehicle and, accordingly, in the aforesaid circumstances, both the cases relied upon by the learned counsel for non-petitioners No. 2 and 3 do not come to the rescue of the non-petitioners.
19. As a result, the learned Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate grossly mis-applied and misinterpreted the legal provisions of Section 451, Cr.P.C. also since the provisions of Section 451, Cr.P.C. are applicable in respect of property seized, for its disposal in matters pending trial while Section 452, Cr.P.C. is applicable for disposal of such property at the conclusion of the trial, if any. In the case in hand, since an F.R. (negative) was given and hence neither Section 451 nor Section 452, Cr.P.C. was applicable. Instead, it was Section 457, Cr.P.C. which inter alia provides for procedure for disposal of property seized by any police officer, not produced before a criminal Court during any inquiry or trial, to be exercised by the Magistrate for delivery of the seized property, the claimants being known, the person entitled to its possession.
20. Therefore, there is no dispute that the Jeep was legally sold and transferred to the petitioner and, lastly, the petitioner became registered and insured owner of the same. He was in its legal custody, possession and operation through his driver Chandra Ram from whose possession the non-petitioner No. 3 look away surreptitiously. He had had no legal right or claim over the vehicle itself. In case a part of agreed price of the vehicle was still outstanding, he could only have resorted for its realisation by instituting a civil action in a competent Court but the law did not permit him to take away or remove the vehicle which was the property of the petitioner who also spent about Rs. 30,000/- over its maintenance etc. in addition to the part price already paid.
21. The law and equity lean in favour of the one who obeys and himself does equity to others and not those who subvert and flout it. The non-petitioners have been allowed to reap fruits of their illegal acts by the learned Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate and it has occasioned a failure of justice which also warrants its reversal to secure the ends of justice. It is an abuse of process of Court as well as hence the impugned order is liable to be quashed. The petitioner has established his own better right and claim in respect of the possession of the vehicle.
22. Therefore, on the basis of aforesaid facts and circumstances, this petition is accepted and the impugned order dated 14-7-95 is quashed and set aside resulting in dismissal of the application of the non-petitioners. Instead, application dated 14-6-95 filed by the petitioner Umaram is accepted.
23. As a result, the non-petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 are directed to produce the said Jeep in the same condition in which they took on 'supurdaginama' from the lower Court within 15 days from today in the same Court failing which the lower Court shall direct the police concerned to help in seizure and return of the same to the Court. The same shall be delivered to the petitioner on a 'supurdginama' of Rs. 50,000/- with one surety bond in addition thereto to produce the vehicle before the same Court, as and when required pursuant to any judicial order, if any. The non-petitioners shall be at liberty to take any appropriate legal action for realisation of balance amount of price of the Jeep, if any.
24. The Misc. Petition is, accordingly, disposed of in the aforesaid terms.