Judgment:
Guman Mal Lodha, J.
1. The State has filed this appeal against the judgment of acquittal of respondent accused under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act.
2. The respondent accused Bhorelal is proprietor of M/s Yadav Oil Company. He was prosecuted for black marketing of kerosene and crude oil, from the period December 21, 1973 to February 26, 1974.
3. There was no factual dispute so far as the rate charged in 33 bills by the accused during this period is concerned. The trial court acquitted the accused on the ground that the Collector did not fix any rate or price during this period and, therefore, there was no offence in charging what the accused thought to be the company rate.
4. In this appeal no one has appeared on behalf of the accused although he is represented by counsel Shri Babulal Purohit.
5. I have heard the learned Public Prosecutor Dr. S.S. Bhandawat and perused the record.
6. From the record it appears that the Collector fixed the rate vide Ex. 25 which was issued on December 15, 1973 According to prosecution it came into effect from November 9, 1973.
7. I inquired from Dr. Bhandawat learned Public Prosecutor as to what is the date of issue of Ex. 25 because no date is mentioned on that particular document on record. Dr. Bhandawat frankly submitted that since the document fails to mention any date he cannot from his own information or knowledge mention the date. More over, in this document (he rates have been fixed from November 2, 1973 to November 9, 1973. Int the grounds of appeal the date of issue of this letter has been mentioned as December 15, 1973. It is surprising that it was issued on December 15, 1973, show so could the dealer know earlier the rate and in the absence of fixation of rate at the relevant date how can the dealer be made liable for charging more.
8. In my opinion, there is also a confusion created by the grounds of appeal in para No. 2 when compared with the record viz. Ex. 25 and it is difficult to find out actually when this letter was issued and how the dealer came to know of it and when.
9. In these circumstances the detailed reasons given by the trial court for acquittal of the accused calls for no interference.
10. The trial court has mentioned that at the relevant time no rate was fixed by the Collector and when the Collector failed to discharge his elementary and fundamental duty of fixation of rate, a dealer had no option but to sell the products at the company rate. Selling of the products at the company rate in the absence of fixation of rate to the contrary by the Collector cannot be termed as black marketing.
11. Black marketing presupposes that there is some specific rate fixed by the competent authority under the law and the dealer charges more than that. In that sense the offence of black marketing presupposes a bed rock of fixation of rate by a competent authority for the relevant date. Since offence has not been proved in the present case the trial court did not commit any error in acquitting the accused.
12. For the detailed reasons given by the trial court with which I am in agreement, the acquittal of the accused cannot be interfered with.
13. Consequently, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.