Sharma, J.
1. The petitioner, an ex-serviceman while serving as a security guard at the branch office of the respondent bank, was involved in a criminal case under Sections 307 IPC and 30 of the Arms Act. The learned Trial Court acquitted the petitioner of the charge under Section 307 IPC but found the petitioner guilty of the offence under Section 30 of Arms Act and granted the benefit of Probation of Offenders Act, 1954. The High Court vide order dated February 9, 1998 disposed of the Criminal Appeal No. 100/98, preferred by the petitioner, observing that in view of Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1954, disqualification attached with the conviction shall not adversely affect the services of the petitioner. The respondent Bank thereafter on May 13, 1998 initiated departmental enquiry and served a charge sheet on the petitioner charging him as under:-
'(i) Your action of firing upon Shri Bhanwar Singh, Peon on 24.5.96 at around 3.20 PM from the licensed gun provided to you by the Bank with an intention to physically hurt him, amounts to riotous and disorderly behaviour in the premises of the Bank, which constitutes Gross Misconduct under Sub-clause (c) of Clause 19.5 of Chapter XIX of the Bipartite Settlement 1966.
(ii) By firing upon Shri Bhanwar Singh, Peon on 24.5.96 at around 3.20 PM from the licensed gun provided to you by the Bank with an intention to physically hurt him, you have committed act Grossly Subversive of Discipline, which prejudicial to the interest of the Bank and thus constitutes 'Gross Misconduct' within the meaning of Sub-clause (c) of clause 19.5 of Chapter XIX of the Bipartite Settlement 1966.'
2. The Disciplinary Authority vide order dated October 17, 1998 found the petitioner guilty of misconduct and removed him from the services. The departmental appeal preferred against the order was also dismissed on December 14, 1999. The Single Bench of this Court vide order dated November 18, 2002 partly allowed the writ petition, preferred by the petitioner against the said orders and after observing that the penalty of removal from service was shockingly disproportionate substituted the penalty of removal from service by withholding of four grade increments with cumulative effect of the petitioner. The Division Bench of this Court allowed the Special Appeal, preferred by the respondent Bank, vide order dated October 20, 2003 and set aside the order of the. Single Bench. The case has been remanded back for decision in accordance with law.
3. The Division Bench in the order dated October 20, 2003 observed as under:-
'In this case the learned Single Judge has not given any ground-good, bad or indifferent as to how this penalty imposed upon the delinquent employee is disproportionate to the guilt proved against the petitioner respondent No. 1 in the department enquiry. The learned Single Judge also not gave any reason what to say cogent and justified reason as to how the penalty imposed upon the delinquent employee shaken the conscience of the Court. No ground has been recorded in support of the conclusion reached that the penalty imposed in the present case upon the delinquent employee is shockingly disproportionate to the guilt proved against him.
That apart the learned Single Judge has not recorded any finding that this is an exceptional or rare case where he may himself impose appropriate punishment upon the delinquent employee for the charges proved against him in the departmental enquiry.
In our considered opinion the impugned order passed by learned Single Judge can not be allowed to stand.'
4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner canvassed that the penalty imposed on the petitioner is disproportionate to the charges and this Court can in order to shorten the litigation itself impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof. Reliance is placed on Kailash Nath Gupta v. Enquiry Officer (1), U.O.I. v. Ex. Sepoy Chander Singh (2), State of Rajasthan v. Duli Chand (3).
5. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent Bank contended that the quantum of punishment in disciplinary matters is primarily for the Disciplinary Authority to decide and the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is limited and confined to the applicability of one or other the well-known principles known as Wednesbury Principles.
6. I have pondered over the submissions and scanned the record.
7. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India (4), while quashing the punishment of dismissal of service imposed on Ranjit Thakur in Court-martial indicated thus:- (Para 25)
'25. The question of the choice and quantum of punishment is within the jurisdiction and discretion of the Court martial. But the sentence has to suit the offence and the offender. It should not be vindicative or unduly harsh. It should not be so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive evidence of bias. The doctrine of proportionately, as part of the concert of judicial review, would ensure that even on an aspect which is, otherwise, within the exclusive province of the Court-martial, if the decision of the Court even as to sentence is an outrageous defiance of logic, then the sentence would not be immune from correction. Irrationality and perversity are recognised grounds of judicial review.'
8. B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India (6), was the case wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court propounded that if the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the Disciplinary/Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof.
9. In Kailash Nath Gupta v. Enquiry Officer (6), where Disciplinary and Appellate Authorities of the Allahabad Bank after holding enquiry found Kailash Nath Gupta (Manager of Allahabad Bank) guilty of misappropriating money and ordered his removal from service and the Allahabad High Court refused to interfere with the quantum of punishment. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the High Court and remitted the case to the High Court to consider afresh the aspect of the quantum of punishment. Their Lordships indicated in para 11 as under:-
'11. In the back ground or what has been stated above, one thing is clean that the power of interference with the quantum of punishment is extremely limited. But when relevant factors are not taken note of, which have same bearing on the quantum of punishment, certainly the Court can direct reconsideration or in an appropriate case to shorten litigation, indicate the punishment to be awarded'
10. LORD GREEN said in 1948 in the WEDNESBURY CASE, that when a statute gave discretion to an administrator to take a decision, the scope of judicial review would remain limited. He said that interference was not permissible unless one or the other of the following condition was satisfied, namely the order was contrary to law, or relevant factors were not considered or irrelevant factors were considered, or the decision was one which no reasonable person could have taken. These principles were consistently followed in the UK and in India to judge the validity of administrative action.
11. That takes me to the fact situation of the instant case which may be .summarised as under:-
(i) The petitioner was Ex-service man and after serving the country faithfully got retired and appointed as security guard at the branch office of the respondent Bank in 1987. Till April 25, 1996 there was nothing adverse against the petitioner.
(ii) On April 25, 1996 a Case under Section 307 IPC and 30 of the Arms Act was registered against the petitioner which came up for trial in due course before the Sessions Court. Learned Sessions Judge vide judgment dated January 5, 1998 acquitted the petitioner of the charge under Section 307 IPC but found the petitioner guilty under Section 30 of the Arms Act and gave him the benefit of probation.
(iii) The High Court vide order dated February 9, 1998 disposed of the criminal appeal No. 100/98 preferred by the petitioner indicating that in view of Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, disqualification attached with the conviction shall not adversely affect the services of the petitioner.
(iv) The gun which was allegedly fired by the petitioner at informant Bhanwar Singh, got seized by the police from the possession of Bhanwar Singh.
(v) Bhanwar Singh did not sustain any injury and except Bhanwar Singh no other witness did depose against the petitioner that he had seen the petitioner opening fire at Bhanwar Singh.
12. At this juncture, 1 deem it appropriate to have a look at Section 30 of the Arms Act 1959 and Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act. Section 30 of the Arms Act provide thus:-
'30. Punishment for contravention of licence or rule.- Whoever contravenes any condition of a licence or any provision of this Act or any rule made thereunder, for which no punishment is provided else- where in this Act shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees or with both.'
13. Section 12 of the Probation of offenders Act reads as under:-
'Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, a person found guilty of an offence and dealt with under the provisions of Section 3 or Section 4 shall not suffer disqualification, if any, attaching to a conviction of an offence under such law;
Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to a person who, after his release under Section 4, is subsequently sentenced for the original offence.'
14. In Aitha Chandra Rao's (7), case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court propounded that where the accused was convicted under Section 304A IPC and released on probation, the conviction would not affect his service career. Similarly in Rajbir v. State of Haryana (8), the Hon'ble Supreme Court, where a person was convicted under Section 323 IPC and released on probation, directed not to affect his service.
15. In the case on hand following relevant factors are not taken note of by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority:-
(i) That the petitioner was acquitted of the charge under Section 307 IPC and major part of the prosecution case was disbelieved.
(ii) That the petitioner was convicted for a minor offence under Section 30 of the Arms Act and was released on probation.
(iii) That the High Court in its order dated February 9, 1998 directed that the disqualification attached with the conviction shall not adversely affect the services of the petitioner.
(iv) That the intention to physically hurt peon Bhanwar Singh was not established on record.
16. Undoubtedly the question of the choice and quantum of punishment is within the jurisdiction and discretion of the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority but it appears to be vindicative and unduly harsh and it is so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience of the court, it amounts in itself to conclusive evidence of bias. It is rather strange and inexplicable that as to under what circum- stances the Disciplinary and the Appellate Authorities ignored the directions of the High Court indicated in the order dated February 9, 1998. The fact that complainant Bhanwar Singh was found in possession of gun and did not sustain any injury was not taken in to consideration while imposing punishment on the petitioner. The impugned orders of punishment are irrational and perverse and not impugned from correction. In these facts and circumstances, I find it an exceptional case, where in order to shorten the litigation this Court may itself impose appropriate punishment on the petitioner.
17. For these reasons, I allow the writ petition in part, while setting aside the impugned orders of the Disciplinary and Appellate Authorities, I substitute the penalty of removal from services by withholding of four grade increments with cumulative effect of the petitioner. The petitioner shall be reinstated in the services forthwith with continuity of service and all consequential benefits. The petitioner shall however be entitled to the 50% of the back wages. The arrears shall be paid to the petitioner within two months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order, failing which he is entitled to the interest at the rate of 18% per annum. The parties shall bear their own costs.