ORDER
Balia, J.
(1). Heard learned counsel for Ihe appellant.
(2). The appellant challenges Ihe order p|ssed by learned Single Judge rejecting his petition filed against the order pass,ed by Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court, Udaipur dated 14.3.2000 on an applicalion moved by respondenl Harish Gogna, a Medical Represeniative of the petitioner company, under Seclion 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The respondent has moved an application under Section 33-C(2) before Ihe Labour Court on 31.12.1399 for quantification and recovery of a sum of Rs. 48,553.30 alleged lo be due from the petitioner appellant as remuneration for period from July 1997 to August, 1998. The respondent alleged the petitioner to be his employer. The petitioner did nol respond to the notice issued by the Labour Court of the application moved by the respondent workman and, therefore, the court directedthe proceedings lo conlinue exparte on 6.8.1999. Prior to proceeding exparle Ihe Labour Courl has received a letter dated 7.6.1999 on 10.6.1999 from the petitioner appellant in which it was alleged (hat the respondent is not its workman within Ihe meaning of Industrial Disputes Act inasmuch as a medical representative is not a workman within the definition of 'workman' and in that light he has also placed reliance on a decision of H.R. Adyanlhaya etc. vs. Sandoz (India) Ltd. etc. (1), for taking the stand that the medical representatives are not workmen within the meaning of the Act of 1947. It was also stated in the said letter that the Labour Court under Section 33-C(2) is a recovery court of non- disputed claims and has no jurisdiction even for workmen whose matters are under dispute. It was also staled in that letter that substantively the applicant deserted his appointment when he was transferred to another territory as per the conditions of his employment contract and asked for dismissal of Ihe application.
(3). The Labour Court by taking into consideration and after referring (he aforesaid reply allowed the application of the respondent and quantified the amount payable by Ihe appellant to the respondent workman as Rs. 27,900/- and directed the same to be paid to the workmen by 14.3.2000 failing which 10% interest was awarded. This order was challenged by the appellant by way of writ petition No. 3486/2000 before this Court raising the same issues and relying on the decision of Supreme Court in H.R. Adyanthaya's case (supra) for contending that the medical representative is not a workman. Learned Single Judge on considering the aforesaid decision as well as a Bench decision on this Court rendered in Rajasthan Medical & Sales Representatives Union & Anr. vs. M/s Industrial Research Institute Private Ltd. (2), and.another Bench decision of Punjab & Haryana High Court reported in Ripu Daman-Bhanot vs. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Ludhiana & Ors. (3), rejected the contention raised by the appellant and dismissed Ihe petition.
(4). It is contended by Mr. Chauhan learned counsel for the appellant in the first instance that it has been held in the aforesaid Supreme Court decision as well as the later decision of the Supreme Court reported in Rhone-Poulenc (India) Ltd. vs. State of U.P. & Ors. (4), ihat a medical representative is not a workman.
(5). Having given our careful consideration we are unable lo sustain the said contention.
(6). It is true that in Ihe aforesaid two cases as a matter of fact Hon'ble Supreme Court has held Ihe concerned claimants in the respective cases who were medical representatives as not the workman. However, the difference that has been brought about as a matter of law on account of amendments made in Sales Promotion Employees (Condilion of Service) Act, 1976 from time to time and the amendment made in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 by amending Act of 1982 under which the amendment in Sections 2(s) and 2(rr) which has come into force w.e.f. 21.8.1984 the medical representatives without the limit of Ihe salary which they draw has been held to be falling in the definition of workmen under the Industrial Disputes Act with effect from the respective amendments.
(7). It has been noticed by the Supreme Court that Ihe definition of workman as it stood under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act only an employee discharging the duties of skilled and technical nature and unskilled employees and duties of unskilled nature were included in the definition of workman. A medical representative was held neither a skilled nor a technical employment and, therefore, on the anvil of the definition of workman given in Section 2(s) read with provisions of the SPE Act as it stood then held Ihe same not falling within the definilion of the workman. Section 6 of the Sales Promotion and Employees Condition of Service Act, 1976 made the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as in force for the time being applicable to the medical representatives by Act No. 48 of 1986 w.e.f. 6.5.1987. Both the Supreme Court decisions referred to above the relied on by the appellant related to disputesraised prior to amendment in 1987. But wilh inclusion of category of workman employed to differenl operational work in Sec. 2(s) and any commission payable on Ihe promolion of the sales or business or both in definition of wages under Sec. 2(rr) made the medical representatives as workmen depending on their wages as workmen within the meaning of Sec. 2(s) upto 6.5.1987 and without the limitation on their wages thereafter Ihe ratio is not applicable to disputes relating lo medical representatives arising thereafter. The court expressed its conclusion in this regard as under:-
'In other words, on and from 6.3.1976 Ihe provisions of the ID Act became applicable to the medical representatives depending upon their wages upto 6.5.1987 and without the limitation on their wages thereafter and upon Ihe capacity in which they were employed or engaged.'
(8). It may be noticed thai Ihe dispute which was before Hon'ble the Supreme Courl in H.R. Adyanthaya's case (supra) related to the period of termination (hat has been affected on 26.4.1976 and 9.12.1977 respectively and the employees' case was not that they were drawing salary less than the fixed in the Act as prevailing then. It is after explaining Ihe law as il stood at the relevant time governing Ihe matters relating to medical representatives under the Industrial Disputes Acl thai the court found in those cases the appellants before them were not workmen as a medical representative not falling in that calegory. In the like manner the decision in Rhone-Poulenc (India) Ltd. (supra) related to the period prior !o 6.5.19S7 wherein the medical represenlative was drawing the salary more than Ihe ceiling stated in the Induslrial Disputes Acl, 1947 at the relevant time.
(9). We are, therefore, of the opinion lhat since the present case relates to the period of alleged denial of wages after 1987 inasmuch as it is related to claim forwages for 1997-98, a medical representative irrespective of limitation on the salary which he draws has to be considered as a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the I.D. Act, 1947 read with Section 6 of the P.S.E. Act and that is the view taken by a Division Bench of this Court as well as a Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court referred lo above on considering Ihe decision of the Supreme Court in H.R. Adyan-thaya's case (supra). We are in respectful agreement with the same and find no error in Ihe judgment of learned Single Judge in thai regard.
(10). It was next contended by Ihe learned counsel for the appellant lhat since he has raised the contention in his reply that the respondent was not a workman, it is not for this court to decide and hold whether the medical representative is a workman or not and Ihe matter oughl to have been remanded back to the Labour Court for deciding Ihis issue. We are unable to accept Ihis conlention also.
(11). In the petition filed by Ihe petitioner himself and the documents placed by him it js admitted case of the petitioner that the respondent was an employee of the petitioner as a medical representative and his services have been terminated vide order dated 4.9.1998, Anx. 9. Anx. 7 dated 3.8.1998 also goes to show that the respondent was directed to report al Bangalore on 14.8.1998 at 10.30 A.M. The claim of the workman respondent for non-payment of salary related to the period only upto August, 1998 prior to the alleged dale of termination of his services. Therefore, the validity of transfer orders or termination of service orders is of little consequence on the claim of the respondent for remuneration for Ihe period during which he was undisputably, any, admittedly in the employment of the petitioner. Therefore, the question whether Ihe respondent voluntarily left the services, or whether the petitioner terminated his services validly, whelher there was good ground for terminating the services on account of closure, are all irrelevant for the purpose of claim to the wages prior to Ihe dale of termination on the basis of the petitioner's own documents placed on record. It is not the case of the petitioner even before this Court thai any amount for the period for which il has been quantified and directed to be paid by Ihe Labour Court has in fact been paid to the workman. Whal has been contended by the learned counsel forthe appellant lhat the workman had no reason to go 'and knock at the doors of the Labour Court when he was directed to collect his dues vide Anx. 9 from the Divisional Sales Officer, Delhi. We fail to understand if the appellants are so well disposed to pay Ihe legitimate dues uplo-the date of termination to Ihe workman with what intent and purpose this litigation is being persued. On the contrary, when employment upto September, 1998 is apparent from the documents produced by the petitioner himself the entitlement to the wages till that date remains undisputed fact and all questions of quantification of the amounts due to Ihe employee prior to Ihe date would fall within the ambit of execution proceedings which is the nature of the proceedings before the Labour Court under Section 33-C(2). No error otherwise has been pointed out in the order made by the Labour Court.
(12). We, therefore, find no force in this appeal and the same is hereby dismissed.