ORDER
R.R. Yadav, J.
1. The present appeal has been filed under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 against dismissal of claim petition dated 27-8-92 passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Banswara.
2. The brief facts leading up to filing of the appeal which are relevant for its just decision are that in Paragraphs 11 and 13 of the claim petition it is specifically pleaded that on 14-9-85 at about 6.30 p.m. deceased Dwarka Prasad Sharma along with other persons after performing their official work at Banswara were returning back to Gatol in a department's Jeep bearing registration No.RJB 2004. It is further pleaded that the said Jeep was being driven by respondent No. 2 Navin Chandra Suthar. When the said Jeep reached near 'Mahi Rest House' due to rash and negligent driving of respondent No. 2 it met with an accident resulting in severe injuries to the persons sitting in it, including Dwarka Prasad who was immediately taken for treatment to M. G. Hospital, Banswara where he succumbed to his injuries on 16-9-85.
3. It was also pleaded in the claim petition that at the time of accident, deceased was a young and healthy man of 35 years of age and he was drawing Rs. 1330/- per month salary being employee of RSEB on the post of Accounts Clerk. It was pleaded that the deceased used to contribute Rs. 1,000/- per month to his family members i.e. claimants. Claimant-appellants were wholly dependent on the earning of deceased. If deceased would have not died in the ill-fated accident he would have continued in service for another twenty-five years and would have earned provident fund, gratuity and grade increments. The claimant-appellants being heirs and legal representatives of deceased claimed Rupees 5,00,250/- as compensation under various counts enumerated in the claim petition in detail.
4. During the pendency of the claim petition it is revealed that the Jeep involved in accident was not insured with any of the Insurance Company.
5. The Claims Tribunal issued notices to the respondents in pursuant to which a joint written statement was filed by respondents Nos. 1 and 3. Respondent No. 2 also filed a separate written statement.
6. In the joint written statement filed by respondents Nos. 1 and 3, an evasive reply of Paragraph No. 11 to the claim petition relating to pleadings of rash and negligent driving was given without pleading of mechanical defect. For ready reference paragraph No. 11 of the written statement filed by respondents Nos. 1 and 3 is reproduced hereinbelow :
^^AA ;g fd izkFkZuk i= dh dkWyeu- 1 vLohdkj gS A uohupUn vizkFkhZ ua- 2 }kjk xkMh dks rst jQ~rkj o xQyr lspykus ls nw?kZVuk gksuk xyr gksdj vLohdkj gS A fnxj gdhdr izkFkhZ lkfcr djsa A**
In reply to paragraph No. 13 to the claim petition in paragraph 13 of the written statement it was pleaded as under :
^^13- ;g fd izkFkZuk dh dkWye ua-13 vLohdkj gS A izkFkhZ ua- 6 o 7 Lo;a viuk xqtkjk djrs Fks rFkk e`rd izlkn ijvkfJr ugha Fks A bl pj.k esa fy[ks fnxj gdhdr izkFkhZ lkfcr djsa**
7. Similarly, respondent No. 2 filed following written statement in reply to paragraph Nos. 11(8) and 13(10) of the claim petition whichreads thus :
^^8- ;g fd izkFkZuk i= dhdkWye ua- 11 vLohdkj gS nq?kZVuk uohupUn }kjk thi dh rst jQ~rkj o ykijokgh lspykus ls gksuk xyr gksdj vLohdkj gks A**
9- xx xx xxx
10-;g fd izkFkZuk i= dh dkWye ua- 73 vLohdkj gS thi uohupUn }kjk rst jQ~rkj oykijokgh ls pykuk xyr gksdj vLohdkj gS A**
8. On the basis of aforesaid pleadings of the parties, the Tribunal framed as many as four issues focusing attention of the rival parties to adduce evidence in support of their respective claims.
9. In support of their claim claimant-appellants examined Smt. Indra Sharma as PW 1, Dr. Jagdishchandra Vaisnavaas PW 2, Jagdish Prasad as PW 3, Gokul Das as PW 4, Arjun as PW 5 and Prem Raj as PW 6. In documentary evidence they produced notices served upon the respondents, claiming compensation before filing of the claim petition, its postal acknowledgment, injury report and post-mortem report of deceased Dwarka Prasad Sharma including the report of M.T.O. which were duly exhibited. In rebuttal, the respondents examined DW (1) -- Prem Raj, DW (2)-- Kailash Chandra and DW (3)-- Navin Chandra Suthar.
10. The Claims Tribunal after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, came to the conclusion that the accident was caused due to sudden breakdown of machinery and not because of rash and negligent driving of the driver respondent No. 2. It is held that speed of 30 to 40 KMP cannot said to be excessive speed. After deciding issue No. 1 in the aforesaid manner, the Claims Tribunal decided issue No. 2 holding that if the accident would not have occurred due to failure of machinery then the claimant-appellants would have been entitled for total compensation of Rs. 2,70,650/-. According to Claims Tribunal as issue No. 1 has been decided against claimants, therefore, they are not entitled for any compensation and issue No. 4 relating to relief was answered in negative. While deciding issueNo. 3, the Claims Tribunal arrived at its conclusion that payment of Rs. 56,456.26 by RSEB to the claimant-appellants towards Gratuity, Provident Fund and other payments in lieu of services rendered by deceased Dwarka Prasad Sharma to the department have no bearing on payment of compensation arising out of accident in question.
11. On the basis of aforesaid findings the claim petition of the claimant-appellants was dismissed. Aggrieved against dismissal of their claim petition the claimant-appellants have preferred this Misc. Appeal.
12. I have heard learned Counsel for both the parties and perused the evidence available on the record.
13. From the arguments of learned Counsel for the parties, the following points for determination emerge for consideration in the present appeal:--
1. WHETHER the view taken by the Claims Tribunal to the effect that accident occurred due to sudden mechanical failure of the vehicle and not from rash and negligent driving of respondent No. 2 is correct and sustainable in eye of law in absence of pleading of mechanical failure by respondents in their two sets of written statements'?
2. WHETHER it is incumbent upon the claimants to prove rash and negligent driving before the owner, driver or the Insurance Company can be held liable for compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in the fight Of doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur?
3. WHETHER while determining compensation under issue No. 2 the Claims Tribunal has applied wrong multiplicand and as such compensation assessed by it deserves to be enhanced?
14. POINT FOR DETERMINATION NOS.
1 AND 2 :-- I am of the view that points Nos. 1 and 2 are inter-linked, therefore, it would be expedient to deal them together.
15. It is urged by learned Counsel for claimant-appellants that from perusal of Paragraphs 11 and 13 of the claim petition and its evasive reply filed by respondents Nos. 1 and 3 jointly and respondent No. 2 separately it is clear that neither in their two sets of written statements plea of mechanical defect was taken nor rash and negligent driving of the Jeep has been specifically denied, therefore, the rash and negligent driving of Jeep shall bedeemed to be admitted by them within the meaning of Order VIII, Rule 5, C.P.C.
16. The aforesaid argument is vehemently opposed by learned Counsel appearing for the respondents. It is urged by him that provisions postulated under Order VIII, Rule 5, C.P.C. are not applicable to the claim petition filed for compensation arising out of a motor accident under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. According to him under Sub-section (1) of Section 110-C of the said Act in holding inquiry under Section 110-B of the Act the Claims Tribunal may subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf follow summary procedure as it thinks fit. It is further urged by him that the Claims Tribunal under Sub-section (2) of Section 110-C of the Act has further been empowered with the powers of Civil Court for purposes of taking evidence on oath and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses etc. but the Civil Procedure Code as a whole has not been made applicable to the inquiry under Section 110-B of the said Act particularly with reference to the present case which was instituted in the year 1986 relating to an accident occurred on 14th of September, 1985. Thus defence of the respondents cannot be restricted to the pleadings taken by them in their written statements.
17. 1 have given my thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions raised at the Bar. For better and deeper understanding of the controversy involved in the present case it would be expedient to survey the legal historical background of the procedure followed in a claim petition regarding compensation arising out of mojor accidents in State of Rajasthan.
18. Il is to be noticed that after establishment of Claims Tribunal in State of Rajasthan, the State Government in exercise of its powers confened under Section 110-C of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 framed the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Rules, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as Rules of 1964) wherein under Rule 20 it was provided that the provisions of first schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure shall be made applicable to the proceedings before the Claims Tribunals. The said Rule named Order V, Rules 9 lo 13 and 15 to 30; Order IX; Order XIII, Rules 3 to 10; Order XVI, Rules 2 to 21; Order XVII; and Order XVIII, Rules 1 to 3 to be made applicable to the proceedings initialed before Claims Tribunals for determination of compensation arising out ofmotor accidents. Thus the Rules of 1964 about applicability of Order VIII, Rule 5.C.P.C. regarding evasive reply was silent.
'19. It is to be imbibed that after passing of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the State Government in exercise of its statutory functions repealed the Rules of 1964 by framing Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Rules, 1990 (hereinafter referred to as Rules of 1990) wherein under Chapter 10.28, Order VIII, Rules 2 to 5 (both inclusive) along with Rules 9 and 10 has been made applicable to the proceedings initiated for determination of compensation under Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 arising out of motor accidents along with many other Rules of CPC before Claims Tribunal. Therefore, now under the new Rules of 1990 law relating to evasive reply in written statement envisaged under Order VIII, Rule 5 is made applicable in holding inquiry for determination of compensation arising out of motor accidents before Claims Tribunals.
20. I am of the view that when old Rules of 1964 was repealed by new Rules of 1990 then there should have been a saving clause in the Rules of 1990 but there is no such saving clause in these Rules. The basic question would be that if new Rules of 1990 have committed fault in not providing saving clause then whether such a situation is to be tackled by Courts, especially in procedural matters? My answer to the aforesaid legal question would be in affirmation. It goes without saying that the question relating to repeal in the present case relates to procedural matters. Therefore, it is held that fault of rule-making authority in not providing saving clause in the. new Rules of 1990 will not detract this Court from extending the applicability of principle of evasive reply envisaged under Order VIII, Rule 5, C.P.C. in the present case.
21. In my considered opinion, no one has invested right in any procedural matter unless any of the party acquired any substantial right before the change of procedure. Indisputably, in the present case before insertion of Order VIII, Rule 5, C.P.C. in the new Rules of 1990 no substantial right has accrued in favour of respondents, therefore, it is reiterated with emphasis that change of procedure by new Rules of 1990 relating to evasive reply is to be given retrospective effect in inquiry proceedings initiated before the change before Claims Tribunals and an argument contrary to it is hereby repelled. Mere absence of the provisions of evasive reply envisaged under Order VIII, Rule 5, C.P.C. in old Rules of 1964 will not confer vested right on the respondents to give an evasive reply to Paragraphs 11 and 13 of the claim petition wherein rash and negligent driving of the Jeep in question was pleaded by claimant-appellants. Mere absence of Order 8, Rule 5, C.P.C. in the old Rules of 1964 will also not detract this Court from its normal interpretation that it being procedural in character shall have to be applied to pending cases.
22. Once the provisions of Chapter 10.28 ofRules of 1990 arc given retrospective effect, theevasive reply given in the present case byrespondents shall be treated to be their admissionregarding rash and negligent driving of the Jeepin question which met with an accident resultingin tragic death of Dwarka Prasad Sharma whoselegal representatives have initiated the presentproceedings for compensation.
23. It is well settled that in a decision of a case where legal representatives of deceased' are claiming compensation arising out of motor accident, a question outside the pleadings of the owner, driver or the Insurance Co., as the case may be, cannot be raised. It is held that the written statement in a claim petition must deal specifically with each allegations and when a driver or owner denies any such fact he must not do so evasively and if it is so done then the evasive denial of facts shall be treated to be his admission as has been done in the present case with regard to rash and negligent driving. When such fact of denial is found to be evasive then no other evidence or proof is necessary. As regards Insurance Company is concerned, under the old Motor Vehicles Act as well as under the new Motor Vehicles Act its defences have been specified. It cannot be allowed to take any other defence which-is not pleaded by it.
24. It is true that now under the Rules of 1990 Order 8, Rule 5. C.P.C. has been made applicable to the claim petitions relating to compensation arising out of motor accidents, therefore, the proviso to Rule 5 can also be pressed into service on behalf of owners and drivers. The proviso of Rule 5 may be permitted to tolerate laxative pleadings by owners and drivers to prevent only obvious injustice to relieve them from results of exceptional omission but not to help them who make denial regarding rash and negligent driving deliberately and evasively. In the present case omission of the respondents in not pleading mechanical defect in their written statements is fatal. It is, therefore, held that the respondents in the present case cannot be allowed to travel beyond their pleadings.
25. It is next contended by learned counsel for the claimant-appellants that it was neither pleaded nor proved that the Jeep in question which met with accident, causing death of Dwarka Prasad Sharma was regularly maintained in a road worthy condition after taking all necessary care and precautions. It is vehemently contended by him that no evidence from the side of respondents has been produced to prove that the Jeep in question was checked before commencement of its journey. In support of his aforesaid contention he placed reliance on a decision rendered by a learned single Judge of this Court in Stale of Rajasthan v. Laxmi Sharma, 1992 Acc CJ 895, Navin Chand Naithani v. Chandra Singh rendered by Division Bench of Allahabad High Court, reported in 1989 Acc CJ 618, decision rendered by Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court in State of Madhya Pradesh through Collector, Jhabua v. Ashadevi, 1988 Ace CJ 846 and a decision rendered by the Supreme Court in Minu B. Mehta v. Balkrishna Ramchandra Nayan, 1977 Acc CJ 118: (AIR 1977 SC 1248).
26. In case of Laxmi Sharma (1992 Acc CJ 895) (supra) the learned single Judge of this Court while dealing with a claim petition where a Jeep skipped and fell in a ditch resulting in death of a passenger, the defence evidence adduced to the effect that the accident occurred due to break of tie-road was rejected on the ground that it was neither pleaded nor proved that Jeep was regularly maintained in a road worthy condition by taking all necessary care and precautions. It was found by learned single Judge that no evidence was adduced that vehicle was checked before commencement of its journey. therefore, after applying the principle of Res Ipsa Loquitur the driver was found to be rash and negligent in causing accident in that case and the appeal was dismissed.
27. In case of Navin Chand Naithani (1989 Acc CJ 618) (All) (supra) the finding of the Claims Tribunal that the accident was caused due to breakdown of machinery and there was nothingto show that the defect was so latent that the bus should not have been put on the road was reversed by learned Judges constituting Division Bench of Allahabad High Court in appeal and it was held that the vehicle was not roadworthy and the accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the bus.
28. In case of Ashadevi (1988 Acc CJ 846) (supra) it was found by learned Judges constituting Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court that opposite parties neither pleaded mechanical breakdown nor led evidence of any mechanical expert about day to day maintenance of the vehicle. Inspection report of the mechanical expert after the accident was also not produced. It was held that accident was caused due to rash and negligent driving of the vehicle in the aforesaid case. The appeal filed by State was dismissed and cross-objection filed by claimants was allowed.
29. In case of Minu B. Mehta (AIR 1977 SC 1248) (supra) the Supreme Court authoritatively ruled that in order to sustain a plea that the accident was due to mechanical defect, the owner must raise a plea that the defect was latent and not discoverable by the use of reasonable care. The burden of proof in such cases held to be on the owner of the vehicle to prove that accident took place due to mechanical defect.
30. In the present case the respondents have not pleaded mechanical breakdown in their two sets of written statements. In fact, no evidence has been adduced by respondents to show in what manner the Jeep in question was maintained. Whether it was periodically checked or whether its tic-rod-and brakes were found in working condition before commencement of its journey on the dale of accident. Even manufacturing year of the Jeep is not disclosed either in their pleadings or in their evidence. PW (4) Gokul Das M.T.O. Police Lines, Banswara who after accident carried out mechanical inspection of the Jeep involved in the accident deposed on oath before the Claims Tribunal that push tie-rod were found to be damaged due to accident. A close scrutiny of M.T.O. inspection report Ex. 12 reveals that tie-rod and brakes of the Jeep were damaged due to heavy impact of accident on the vehicle not due to its sudden mechanical failure. In these circumstances, negligence on the part of owner and its driver in causing accident in the presentcase is established beyond pale of doubt.
31. I am of the view that the plea of sudden mechanical breakdown, sudden failure of brakes or the latent defect or inevitable accidents are special pleas within the personal knowledge of the drivers and the owners therefore it should be specifically pleaded. In those eases, where these special pleas arc raised by the drivers or owners and parties are found to be at variance, the Claims Tribunals are required to frame issues. Since in the present case plea of mechanical defect within the personal knowledge of respondents was not raised, the Claims Tribunal was legally justified not to frame an issue regarding mechanical deled.
32. Once issue or issues are framed on these special pleas these issues are required to be proved by cogent, reliable and legal evidence. It should be proved by cogent and legal evidence that reasonable care in inspection and maintenance of the vehicle was properly taken before commencement of its journey, it was regularly checked and was checked on the ill-fated day of accident. It is to be established by drivers or owners that although the vehicle was found in order before commencement of its journey but even after exercise of due attention and care accident could not be avoided and occurred due to the latent defect or the sudden failure of brakes. All these evidences are lacking in the present case. In the present case the Claims Tribunal erred in law in not addressing itself on these points.
33. I am not satisfied with the contention raised by learned counsel for the respondents that claimant-appellants have to prove their case and establish that the accident took place on account of fault of the driver and his rash and negligent driving of the Jeep was responsible in causing the ill-fated accident. I am also not satisfied with the contention of the learned counsel Correspondents that as the claimant-appellants miserably failed to establish rash and negligent driving of the driver, the finding arrived at by Claims Tribunal to the effect that the accident occurred due to sudden failure of the brakes does not require interference in present appeal.
34. It is true that it is incumbent upon the claimant-appellants to prove negligence of the driver before the owner or driver can be held liable for compensation under Motor VehiclesAct. 1488 or under 1939 Act (old) being forlious liability but in those cases where mechanical breakdown is pleaded it is duty of the owner and driver to show that they have taken all reasonable care and in spite of such care the deled remained hidden. In the preceding paragraph of this judgment it has already been held that the respondents have not at all pleaded that the accident has occurred due to mechanical defect although it was within their personal knowledge. In absence of pleading and legal evidence to the effect that the Jeep was in roadworthy condition on the ill-fated day of accident before commencement of its journey and respondents have taken all reasonable care yet defect remained hidden there was no legal justification for the Claims Tribunal to arrive at a finding that accident has not occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the Jeep by the driver but it has occurred due to sudden mechanical breakdown.
35. I am further of the view that in the present case the Claims Tribunal has committed serious error of law in not extending the principle of Res Ipsa Loquitur which means accident speaks for itself or accident tells its own story. There are cases in which me accident speaks for itself therefore in such cases it is sufficient for the claimants to prove the accident and nothing more. The present case is like that where the accident speaks for itself. My aforesaid view is buttressed by a decision of Supreme Court rendered in case of Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi v. Ranjit Ginning and Pressing Co,. 1977 Acc CJ 343 (AIR 1977 SC 1735). When this principle of Res Ipsa Loquitur is applied in the present case the burden shifts upon the respondents to prove otherwise from the evidence on record which has not been done by them.
36. It is held by the learned Judges constituting Division Banch of Madhya Pradesh High Court in case of Swarnalata Kapoor v. Jogcndrapal, 1970 Acc CJ 71 : (AIR 1970 Madh Pra 86) that the prescription of negligence is not rebutted by mere fact that there was mechanical breakdown. Burden was further on the defendant to prove that there was no want of care and all reasonable care of the vehicles was taken. In case of Sushila Devi v. Ibrahim. 1974 Ace CJ 150: (AIR 1974 Madh Pra 131), the Division Bench of that Court applied the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur in almost similar circumstances, wherein the bus while crossingthe river bridge suddenly swerved to the right, dashed against the railings and fell into the river.
37. 1 am of the opinion that in the present case also the driver was rash and negligent and RSEB as master is vicariously liable to pay the compensation and a finding contrary to it recorded by Claims Tribunal on issue No. 1 is liable to be set aside.
38. The Claims Tribunal has given one of its reason in dismissing the claim petition of claimant-appellants that as speed of the Jeep involved in the accident was 30-40 KMP according to statement of P.W. 3 Jagdish Prasad Sharma who was eye-witness and was sitting in the Jeep at the time of accident therefore rash and negligent driving is not attributable to the driver. Suffice it to observe that the Claims Tribunal while exercising its quasi-judicial power in determining compensation arising out of motor accidents are not justified to pick a piece of isolated statement of a witness and start placing reliance on it without reading whole of statement on oath specially on question of speed of vehicle, ignoring road condition stated by such witness. In the case on hand the Claims Tribunal has committed serious error in appreciating the deposition of P.W. 3 Jagdish Prasad eye-witness by picking a piece of his isolated statement without going through whole of his statement on record.
39. I have critically examined the statement of P.W. 3 Jagdish Prasad Sharma available on record. He has deposed on oath that the road on which accident took place was in zigzag condition. Accident took place due to fast, rash and negligent driving of Navin Chandra Suthar. While the Jeep involved in accident was ascending to slope all of a sudden its speed was accelerated. P.W. 3 asked from Navin Chandra Sulhar (Junior Engineer) who was driving the Jeep at the time of accident as to why the speed of Jeep was accelerated. He (driver) told him to sit silently. After some time Jeep turned and ill-fated accident took place.
40. In the present case, statement of P.W. 3 regarding speed of Jeep at 30-40 KMP is to be appreciated in the light of zigzag condition of the road. It is easily inferable from the statement of P.W. 3 that the Jeep involved in the accident was not on its journey on a National Highway. It is true that speed of 30-40 KMP of motor vehicle on a well maintained National Highway cannot betermed to be fast leading to inference of rash and negligent driving but the same speed on a zigzag road having steep slope as stated by P.W. 3 can always be termed as fast speed leading to inference about rash and negligent driving of the vehicle. In the present case, road was in zigzag condition. From the statement of P.W. 3, it is evident that there were steep slopes on the road, hence, the Claims Tribunal has drawn incorrect inference from his statement regarding speed of the Jeep and its correlation with rash and negligent driving at the time of accident. As a matter of fact, speed of 30-40 KMP of motor vehicle is not a factor alone to arrive al a conclusion as to whether the driver was driving the vehicle rashly and negligently without looking into the condition of the road.
41. With the aforesaid circumspection, it is held that on zigzag roads or on narrow roads or roads where culverts exist or on hilly roads or roads full of steep slopes or where motor vehicle is passing while crossing the river, narrow bridge with small railing or on crowded roads speed of 30-40 KMP of a motor vehicle shall ordinarily be deemed to be fast speed having close nexus with rash and negligent driving.
42. POINT FOR DETERMINATION NO. 3: This point relates to assessment of quantum of compensation. The Claims Tribunal has assessed compensation to the tune of Rs. 2,70,650/- in all. The Claims Tribunal arrived at a conclusion that the deceased was drawing Rs. 1330/- per month salary as an employee of R.S.E. B. in the capacity of Accounts Clerk. The Claims Tribunal assessed personal expenses of deceased to Rs. 410/-whereas Rs. 900/- is assessed his contribution to his dependants for their maintenance. Indisputably, the age of the deceased at the time of accident was 35 years. In these circumstances, the Claims Tribunal applied 23 years multiplicand and assessed compensation of Rs. 2,48,400/-accordingly. The Claims Tribunal further rightly granted Rs.22,250/- more on other counts claimed in the claim petition.
43. I am of the view that the Claims Tribunal has committed no error in assessing the compensation to Rs. 2,70,650/-. As the claim petition itself was dismissed the interest was not awarded by it which is to be awarded now in this appeal. As I am allowing the present appeal, it would be in the interest of justice in the presentcase to grant interest at the rate of 12% per annum on the aforesaid amount of Rs. 2,70,650/- from the date of filing of the claim petition i.e. 10-3-1986 till its payment is made.
Consequently, the present appeal is allowed and the finding recorded by the Claims Tribunal on issues Nos. 2 and 3 are affirmed with modification of interest recoverable from the date of filing the claim petition till payment is made. The finding on issue No. 1 is set aside. The claimant-appellants are entitled to receive compensation of Rs. 2,70,650/- along with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of filing of claim petition i.e. 10-3-1986 till payment is made to them. The compensation together with interest is made payable from the respondents jointly and severally. Costs are made easy.