.....made absolute - section 2(k), 2(1), 7 & 40 & juvenile justice (care
and protection of children) rules, 2007, rule 12 & 98 & juvenile justice act, 1986, section 2(h): [altamas kabir & cyriac joseph, jj] determination as to juvenile - appellant was found to have completed the age of 16 years and 13 days on the date of alleged occurrence - appellant was arrested on
30.11.1998 when the 1986 act was in force and under clause (h) of section 2 a juvenile was described to mean a child who had not attained the age of sixteen years or a girl who had not attained the age of eighteen years - it is with the enactment
of the juvenile justice act, 2000, that in section 2(k) a juvenile or child was defined to mean a child who had not completed eighteen years of a ge which was given prospective prospect - appellant was about sixteen years of age on the date of commission of the alleged offence and had not completed eighteen years of age
when the juvenile justice act, 2000, came into force - juvenile act, of 2000 has been given retrospective effect by rule 12 of juvenile justice rule, 2007 - as such, accused has to be treated as
juvenile under the said act. - under the..........in the
present case,
admittedly, the
application was made on 17-7-1p67 and it was
allowed in 1973 when, there
was admittedly no stay order restraining the grant of mining lease to any of the
parties and it was so
granted to the
petitioner,
lease deed
executed in accordance with law and
possession to the
petitioner and
renewals were
granted delivered pending hearing of the rule. in that view of the
matter, in
cancellation of the deed of
lease granted in 1973 on the
ground that he applied
between the
prohibited
period on 17-7-67
cannot be
sustained and must be
set aside, which
there by do. the rule is made absolute and the order of application of lease of the
petitioner dated march 20, 1976 is
set aside.
there will be no order as to costs. P.K. Banerjee, C.J.
1. In this rule, the petiotioner has challenged the order passed by the respondent No. 1 in second appeal at the instance of bansilal chanllenging the grant of lease of a quarry in favour of the petitioner. The only ground on which the second Appeal succeeded is that the petitioner. Applied for quarry lease on 17-7-1967 when there was an order of stay between that date between the prohibited date but the question remains, these applications for allotment on July 17,1967 were considered by the competent authority only in 1972 and allotment order was effected soon thereafter. In my opinion, under the rule, applications can be made by any person who is otherwise entitled for the lease of mines. Under the Mineral Concession Rules, application for mining lease is considered if other conditions are satisfied about the propriety of the application if other conditions are equal. In the present case, admittedly, the application was made on 17-7-1P67 and it was allowed in 1973 when, there was admittedly no stay order restraining the grant of mining lease to any of the parties and it was so granted to the petitioner, lease deed executed in accordance with law and possession to the petitioner and renewals were granted delivered pending hearing of the rule. In that view of the matter, in cancellation of the deed of lease granted in 1973 on the ground that he applied between the prohibited period on 17-7-67 cannot be sustained and must be set aside, which there by do. The rule is made absolute and the order of application of lease of the petitioner dated March 20, 1976 is set aside. There will be no order as to costs.