ORDER
B.S. Chauhan, J.
1. The Instant writ petition has been filed for quashing the Notification/Office order dated 31-3-97/29-1-99 issued by the respondents Nos. 2 and 3, which provides for charging the road tax from the motor vehicles having authorisation under the Motor Vehicles (All India Permit for Tourist Transport Operators) Rules, 1993 (for short, 'the Rules, 1993') and restrain them to charge the road tax under the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1951 (for short, 'the Act, 1951') and the Rules framed thereunder.
2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that the Act, 1951 provides for imposition of road tax on the vehicles used or kept for use in the State of Rajasthan. Section 4 of the said Act is a charging section and provides for imposition of road tax on the vehicles at such rate, not exceeding that specified in the Schedule, as may be fixed by the State Government by notification in the official gazette. Amount of tax is fixed and prescribed under the Rules and the notification issued by the Government from time to time under the Act of 1951. Petitioner claims to have an authorisation from other State under the said Rules, 1993, and as it has the authorisation even to ply its vehicles in the territory of Rajasthan, it is contended that the tax cannot be levied under the Act of 1951 for the reason that a meeting was held on 24-4-92 under the auspices of Ministry off ransport, which considered the grievances of the tourist permit-holders regarding the delay and inconvenience caused by checking at every stage and to develop the tourism in the country and it resolved that a separate category of authorisation be allowed throughout the country only on recognised tour circuits and a fixed composite fee may be charged from the vehicles covered by the Scheme. It also recommended for re-defining the term 'authorisation' and recommended that the Draft Scheme -- prepared be circulated along with the minutes of the meeting to the States for further consideration. In the said meeting, the various representatives of the States, Including the Additional Transport Commissioner of Rajasthan, participated and in consequence of the Minutes of the meeting, the said Rules, 1993 came into existence and the further communication dated 3-8-93 (An-nexure-5) provided that a fixed composite fee was to be charged according to the seating capacity of the vehicle. It has been contended on behalf of the petitioner that as the State of Rajasthan had been a signatory to the Minutes of the meeting and has agreed to charge the said composite fee which is Rupees 12,000/- per quarter per State, other than the home State, for a omnibus of 14 to 35 seats, it should be restrained from charging the tax under the Act, 1951.
3. Mr. Kothari, learned counsel for the respondents, has most vociferously opposed the said averment contending that the State of Rajasthan has not accepted the said recommendations and unless the Act of 1951 orthe Rules framed thereunder are amended giving effect to the said Minutes, the question of charging something less than the amount provided under the Act/Rules/Notification does not arise and petitioner is not entitled to maintain the writ petition.
4. Undoubtedly, the provisions of Section 4 of the Act, 1951 provide for a charging section which is in consonance with the legislative power of the State, as imposing the tax on motor vehicles for passengers or goods is within the competence of the State being a subject-matter of Entries Nos. 56 and 57 of List II of Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. The 'transport vehicles', as defined under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, coverall transport vehicles plying for hire or reward for carrying passengers or goods Irrespective of the fact whether the vehicle is operated on temporary or on non-temporary permit and whether It is used or kept for use.
5. The 1993 Rules provide for 'authorisation certificate', which means a certificate issued by an 'appropriate authority' to a recognised tourist transport operator authorising him to operate throughout the territory of India, or in those contiguous State not being less than three in number including the State in which the permit is Issued, on recognised tourist circuits as are specified in the All India Permits for a tourist vehicle granted to him.
6. It is difficult to Imagine that If the imposition of tax on vehicles is a subject matter of State List, how the Central Government can frame the Rules regarding Imposition of tax in this respect.
7. It is evident from the record that whatever may be the sanctity of the Minutes of meeting dated 24-4-92 (Annexure-4), the State of Rajasthan has not amended the provisions of the Act. 1951 or the Rules framed thereunder to bring It in consonance with the said Minutes and provided to charge the said composite fee in lieu of all taxes. Letter dated 30-8-93 (Annexure 5) written by the Joint Secretary to the Government of India (Transport Department) to the States was merely a request 'to take necessary action to Incorporate its provisions relating to composite fee in the State's Motor Vehicles Taxation Act/Rules and also to issue necessary instructions/guidelines to the State Transport Authorities'. Instead of providing for a composite fee in relation to such permits, the State of Rajasthan amended the said Act of 1951 vide Act No. 9 of 1995, bywhich the fee has been revised. Order dated 29-1-99 (Annexure-10) makes it clear that though the Rules of 1993 were framed to develop the tourism and It also provided for 'composite fee', the State of Rajasthan has not yet accepted the same and the Act of 1951 has not been amended accordingly. Order dated 31-3-97 (Annexure-11) also reveals that notification issued in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 4-B of the Act, 1951 prescribed the rate of tax on transport vehicles of other States used or kept for use in the State of Rajasthan is also not according to the said minutes. Therefore, it is evident that the State of Rajasthan has not yet incorporated the concept of 'composite fee' in lieu of all kinds of taxes on the vehicles having authorisation under the said Scheme from other States, used or kept for use in Rajasthan.
8. More so, as referred to above, there can, be no dispute regarding the legal proposition that as the tax on such vehicles is leviable only by the State Government, the Central Government cannot frame the Rules for Imposition of such tax. (Vide Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority v. Sharadkur Jayantikumar Pasawalla & Co., AIR 1992 SC 2038). It can merely persuade the State Government to amend its Act/Rules/notification prescribing the said 'composite fee' for vehicles covered by the said Scheme. But unless the State accepts it, the concept of composite fee remains unenforceable.
9. In Inter National Tourlst Corporation v. State of Haryana. AIR 1981 SC 774. the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that imposition of tax on vehicles was within the legislative competence of the State under Entry 56 of List II and such a tax was in the nature of regulatory and compensatory measures. Said tax can also be imposed under Entry 57 of List II. The Court explained the distinction between 'fee' and 'tax' and held that in case of regulatory and compensatory tax, It would ordinarily be well nigh Impossible to Identify and measure with any exactitude, benefit received and expenditure Incurred and levy the tax according to the benefits received and expenditure incurred. The Court further observed as under:--
'What is necessary to uphold a regulatory and compensatory tax is the existence of a specific identifiable object behind the levy and a nexus between the subject and object of tax. ..... There can be no bar as to anintermingling of revenue realised from regulatory and compensatory tax and from other tax of general character, nor can there be any objection to more or less expenses being incurred on the object behind the compensatory and regulatory levy than the realisation from the levy.'
10. Similar view has been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Kerala v. Arvind Ramakant Modawdakar, 1999 JT (5) SC 588 : (AIR 1999 SC 2970).
11. Thus, the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner on this count are untenable.
12. There is also no force in the contention raised by Mr. Maheshwari that respondents can be restrained from charging the tax under the Act, 1951 by application of the doctrine of 'promissory estoppel' for the reason that estoppel is a principle of equity. In Madamanchi Ramappa v. Muthunuru Bojjappa, AIR 1963 SC 1633. the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that 'It is necessary to remember that what is administered in Court is Justice according to law and consideration of fair play and equity, however important they may be, must yield to clear and express provisions of the law.'
13. Similar view has been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gauri Shankar Gaur v. U. P. Avas Vikas, AIR 1994 SC 169; Union of India v. Kirloskar Pneunmatic Co. Ltd., (1996) 4 SCC 453 : (AIR 1996SC 3285); V. S. Palanichamy Chettiar Firm v. C. Alagappan (1999) 4 SCC 702 : (AIR 1999 SC 918); K. Narendrav. Riviera Apartments (P) Ltd., (1999) 5 SCC 77 : (AIR 1999 SC 2309) and Raghunath G. Panhale v. Chaganlal Sunderji & Co. (1999) 8 SCC 1: (AIR 1999 SC 3864).
14. Similarly, in M, Jalkumarv. State of Tamil Nadu (1996) 10 SCC 524 : (AIR 1996 SC 148). the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that Court 'cannot avoid correct interpretation and supplant equity to sway over statutory Rules.
15. In M/s. Saraswati Sugar Mills v. Haryana State Board of Pollution, AIR 1992 SC 224, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that there can be no room for any Intendment, nor is there equity about a tax. Nothing is to be read in and nothing can be implied, and while Interpreting the taxing statute, one has to look fairly at the language used therein. The fiscal statute must, therefore, be strictlyconstrued in order to find out the extent of liability fastened on a particular subject and while doing so, the fiscal statute mustberead according to its natural construction of words. While deciding the said case, the Apex Court placed reliance upon large number of its earlier Judgments, particularly, in Gursahai Saigalv. C. I. T., AIR 1963 SC 1062; Controller of Estate Duty v. Kantilal Trikamlal, AIR 1976 SC 1935; A. V. Farnandez v. State of Kerala, AIR 1957 SC 657; and C.I.T. v. Mr. P. Firm Muar, AIR 1965 SC 1216.
16. In Martand Dairy & Farm v. Union of India. AIR 1975 SC 1492 : (1975 Tax LR 1773), the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that law is not always logic and taxation considerations may stem from administrative experience and other factors of life and not artistic visualisation and neat logic and so 'the literal, though pedestrian, interpretation must prevail.' Same view has been reiterated in Member Secretary, A.P.S.B. for Prevention and Control of Water Pollution v. A. P. Rayons Ltd., AIR 1989 SC 611. As a very wide latitude is available to the legislature in fiscal matters the same require strict Interpretation.
17. Mr. Maheshwari has placed reliance on a Division Bench judgment of Punjab & Haryana High Court in Indo-Canadian Transport Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1999 P & H 130, wherein the Court has issued directions to the States of Punjab and Haryana to charge only the composite fee and not the tax as per their statutory provisions relating to tax etc. on vehicles having authorisation under the Scheme on the basis of promissory estoppel.
18. It is settled proposition of law that estoppel does not lie against the statute, (Vide Delhi Development Authority v. Ravindra Mohan Aggarwal, (1999) 3 SCC 172 : (AIR 1999 SC 1256) and M.I. Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. Radhey Shyam Sahu (1999) 6 SCC464: (AIR 1999 SC 2468). Nor the Court has a power to issue any direction contrary to law. (vide Union of India v. Kirloskar Pneumatic Co. Ltd. (supra) State of U. P. v. Harish Chandra, (1996) 9 SCC 309 : (AIR 1996 SC 2173) and Vice-Chancellor, University of Allahabad v. Dr. Anand Prakash MIshra, (1997) 10 SCC 264.
19. A Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Dr. H. S. Rikhy etc. v. The New Delhi Municipal Committee, AIR 1962 SC 554, has categorically held that question of estoppel does not arise against statute.and the Court placed reliance upon paragraph 427 of Volume XV. Ill-Edition of the Halsbury's Laws of England, wherein it has been observed as under :--
'Results must not be ultra vires--A party cannot, by representation, any more than by other means, raise against himself an estoppel so as to create a state of things which he is legally disabled from creating. Thus, a corporate or statutory body cannot be estopped from denying that it has entered into a contract which it was ultra vires for It to make. No corporate body can be bound by estoppel to do something beyond its powers, or to refrain from doing what it is its duty to do. ..........'
20. Similar view has been reiterated by the Apex Court in Bengal Iron Corporation v. Commercial Taxes Officer, AIR 1993 SC 2414.
21. Thus, in view of the above, the question of application of estoppel against statute/pub lie policy does not arise. I, with due respect, am of the candid view that the Judgment in M/s. Indo-Canadian Transport Co. (supra) has not been decided by the Punjab & Haryana High Court in correct perspective.
22. In the last, it has been submitted by Mr. Maheshwari that this Court may issue direction to respondents Nos. 2 and 3 to implement the Scheme provided under the Rules, 1993. I am afraid, this Court does not have any power to issue such a direction for the reason that the writ Court has no power, even indirectly, to require the executive to exercise its law-making power. It is neither legal nor proper for the Court to issue direction or advisory sermons to the executive in respect of the sphere which is exclusively 'within its domain under the Constitution. The power conferred upon the executive by the Constitution can be exercised only by the executive Independently without any transgression or advice from the Court. The Courts cannot usurp the functions assigned to the executive under the Constitution and cannot even indirectly require the executive to exercise its law-making power in any manner. The Court cannot assume to itself a supervisory role over law-making power of the executive conferred by the Constitution, nor the Court can examine the wisdom, merit or efficiency of the policy of the Legislature to see whether it effectuates the purpose of the Act. The Court can simply examine the validity of a subordinate legislation on the touchstone of competence and reasonableness. (Vide K. Jagadeesan v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1072 : (1990 Lab IC 839); Mullikarjuna Rao etc. etc. v. State of AndhraPradesh. AIR 1990 SC 1251 : (1990 Lab IC 1019); Narender Chand Hem Rai v. Lt. Governor, Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1971 SC 2399; State of Himachal Pradesh v. The Parents of a student of Medical College. Shimla, AIR 1985 SC 910; Ashif Hamid v. State of J. & K., AIR 1989 SC 1899; Afzal Ullah v. State of U. P., AIR 1964 SC 264; Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Education v. Paritosh B. Sheth, (1984) 4 SCC 27 : (AIR 1984 SC 1543); State of Mysore v. P. Narasing Rao, AIR 1968 SC 349; State of Orissav. N. N. Swami, AIR 1977 SC 1237; V.K. Sood v. Secretary, Civil Aviation, AIR 1993 SC 2285 ; (1993 Lab IC 135); State of J. & K. v. Triloki Nath Khose, AIR 1974 SC l ; and S. S. Bola v. B. D. Sardana, (1997) 8 SCC 522.
23. In view of the above, the petition is devoid of any merit and is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.