Judgment:
Harbans Lal, J.
1. The instant civil revision under Section 115 CPC has been preferred against the order dated 27.2.2003 passed by the learned Addl. District Judge No. 1, Alwar in Civil Misc. Appeal No. 68/98 whereby appeal has been allowed and the order granting temporary injunction in favour of the petitioner, and against the non-petitioners Nos. 1 and 2 passed by the learned trial Court has been set aside and his application for temporary injunction under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 r/w Section 151 CPC has been dismissed.
2. The plaintiff filed a suit for specific performance of agreement for sale dated 10.8.1982 against the defendant Late Chand Singh (who is now represented by defendant Nos. 3 to 8) with the averments that he sold his khatedari land to him for Rs. 44,000/- out of which he received Rs. 11,000/- as earnest money. The petitioner further paid him Rs. 3,000/- on 22.8.1982, Rs. 22,400/- on 14.5.1983 and Rs. 400/- on 2.2.1985 against written receipts and the balance amount was to be paid at the time of execution of sale-deed which he agreed to execute on Kartik Sudi 15 Samvat 2040, but he avoided to do so. He gave him a notice in this regard and thereafter filed this suit along with an application for temporary injunction under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 CPC. The application was resisted by the non-petitioner defendants but the trial Court issued a temporary injunction on 19.4.1990 restraining them from alienating the suit property till the disposal of the suit. It is averred that the defendants deliberately in violation and disobediance of the order of the court sold the land in question to defendant Nos. 1 and 2 on 26.4.1991 knowing fully well the factum of temporary injunction having been issued against the vendors. Thereafter, the subsequent purchasers who were im-pleaded as party to the suit and relief was also amended to the effect that the sale-deed executed during the pendency of the suit inspite of temporary injunction was illegal and not binding on petitioner. It appears that the suit land was then acquired by the U.I.T. Alwar. When the subsequent purchasers tried to get the amount of compensation of the land, petitioner filed another application for temporary injunction for restraining them from receiving amount of compensation from U.I.T., Alwar. The trial Court after hearing the parties allowed the application and passed an order to the effect that the defendant non-petitioner Nos. 3 and 4 shall be entitled to receive amount of compensation on their filing a bank guarantee within a period of one month in the sum of Rs. 10 lacs and an undertaking to the effect that in the event of plaintiff petitioner's succeeding in the suit, they shall repay the amount of compensation along with interest @ 24% p.a. to the petitioner and an their failure to file the bank guarantee and undertaking, they shall not be entitled to receive the amount of compensation till disposal of the suit. Aggrieved by the said order they preferred appeal before the learned court below which was allowed and the order of the trial court was set aside vide impugned order. Hence, this revision.
3. I have heard learned counsel for the parties.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the learned court below has committed error of law in over-looking the well settled principles of law. According to him the impugned order is perfunctory and arbitrary. It does not discuss the necessary three conditions for issuing temporary injunction. It has straight-away recorded its conclusion without discussing the materials on record. It has been argued that the first appellate court could not have lightly interferred with the order of the trial Court without giving reasons for disagreement with the view taken by the learned trial Court. It has been submitted that the powers of the appellate Court in respect of interlocutory matters are not co-extensive with the trial court. The first appellate court can interfere with the order of the trial court in very exceptional cases where there is apparent error on record. Learned counsel has then argued that the court is bound to take notice of subsequent events and it can mould the relief accordingly. In this regard reliance has been placed on the case of 'Ram Niwas Gagar (dead) by L.Rs. v. Debo Jyoti Das and Ors.' (1) and 'Jagdish Singh v. Nathu Singh (2), wherein it has been held by the Apex Court that the court is bound to take notice of the subsequent events and it can mould the relief also.
5. Learned counsel for the non-petitioners has contended that the sale by the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 during the pendency of the suit and operation of order of temporary injunction is not invalidated or rendered a nullity. At the most, vendors may be held liable for penal consequences under Order 39 Rule 2-A CPC. In this regard he has relied upon the case of 'Dilbara Singh and Ors. v. Chhaja Singh and Anr.' (3), 'Lal Chand v. Sohan Lal and Ors. (4) and 'Hakim Singh' v. Wasan Singh and Ors. (5), In all these authorities it has been held that the sale does not become invalid or nullity even if it has been made in violation of the court order.
6. He has then argued on the strength of the case of 'Nagubai Ammal and Ors. v. B. Shama, Rao and Ors.' (6), that the effect of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act is not to wipe out a sale pendente lite altogether but to subordinate it to the rights based on the decree in the suit. The sale pendente lite remains operative between the parties thereto. The words 'so as to affect the rights of any other party thereto under any decree or order which may be made therein' used under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act have been explained and interpreted in this authority. Learned counsel has also argued that the sale-deed made in pursuance to agreement made earlier in time during the pendency of the suit is not hit by the doctrine of lis pendens.
7. Learned counsel has then strenuously argued that the suit property having been acquired, the agreement of sale has become void due to doctrine of frustration provided under Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act as has been held in the case of 'Piarey Lal v. Hori Lal' (7). His next contention is that the agreement for sale does not confer any title as held in the case of 'Sunil Kumar Jain v. Kishan and Ors.' (8).
8. This apart the agreement in question itself provides categorically that the purchaser would be entitled for double the amount paid in advance if he fails to execute the sale-deed. So as held in 'Dadarao and Anr. v. Ramrao and Ors.' (9), he is entitled to get double the amount paid by him. It is at best a transaction of loan and no specific performance of such an agreement can be claimed. In this regard he has referred to the case of 'Vinayakappa Suryabhanappa Dahenkar v. Dulichand Hariram Murarka' (10).
9. His last argument is that the scope of revision is very limited. There is no jurisdictional error in the order impugned and without showing any jurisdictional error the petitioner cannot succeed in this revision. Reliance has been placed on the case of Bhojraj Kunwarji Oil Mill & Ginning Factory' and Anr. v. Yograjsinha Shankersinha Parihar and Ors.' (11), and 'Manick Chandra Nandy v. Debdas Nandy and Ors.' (12).
10. I have perused the impugned order. The lower court has held that the plaintiff could be said to be entitled to relief against defendant Nos. 1 and 2, the vendors and not against the subsequent vendees who are bonafide purchasers for value without notice of the agreement for sale in his favour. The learned court below has wrongly observed that the plaintiff has not sought any relief against defendant Nos. 3 and 4 as the relief has been claimed by amendment in the suit and the application for temporary injunction. They have also been impleaded as parties to the suit and the application, but on the basis of this alone the order of the learned court below cannot be setaside. It also cannot be said that the plaintiff petitioner is entitled to relief sought for by him in this revision. The defendant Nos. 3 and 4 have come with a case that the agreement for sale in their favour was of an earlier date. The vendors have denied having executed any agreement in favour of the petitioner plaintiff. Thus, they have supported that the sale-deed has already been executed and registered in favour of defendant Nos. 3 and 4 and on its basis mutation has also been made in the revenue record. As on date they are legally entitled to receive the amount of compensation in lieu of acquisition of land purchased by them. So long as the sale-deed in their favour is not cancelled after the plaintiff proves the existence and execution of the agreement for sale in his favour, he cannot be said to be legally entitled to receive the amount of compensation. The sale-deed even if made during the pendency of the suit is not invalidated due to the doctrine of lis pendens nor the sale made is a nullity even if it has been made when the order of temporary injunction was in operation. There is nothing on record to show that the defendant vendees knew about the order of temporary injunction because they were not party to the suit. In this view of the matter, therefore, the order impugned cannot be said to be illegal or beyond jurisdiction. There is also no material irregularity or illegality in the impugned order. The scope of revisional jurisdiction is, no doubt, quite limited. Although the learned court below has not discussed all the three necessary conditions for issuance of the temporary injunction, but simply because of this it cannot be said that the order impugned has been rendered illegal or un-sustainable. In the facts as delineated above, it is obvious that till date the plaintiff has only an agreement for sale in his favour which the vendors have categorically denied, whereas they have supported the case of vendees and have stated that the sale-deed has been executed and registered in favour of vendees. Without making any observations on the merits of the case at this stage, it cannot be said that there is a prima facie case in his favour and even if it is held so it cannot be said that any irreparable injury would be caused to him because after he succeeds in the suit and is found entitled for specific performance of the contract which has been frustrated because of the acquisition of the land in question by the UIT and if a decree for damages is passed in his favour, the amount can be recovered by him from the vendees. In any case, the balance of convenience appears to be in favour of the opposite party and not in favour of the petitioner and, therefore, the order of the learned court below cannot be found fault with and it does not deserve to be varied or reversed in exercise of the revisional powers of this court.
11. Both the afore-mentioned authorities relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner are of little avail to petitioner in this case, in the case of Ram Niwas Gagar (dead) by L.Rs. (supra) tenant had alleged that during the pendency of the suit landlord had inducted new tenants but he failed to satisfy the requirement as to why attention of the trial Court was not invited to subsequent event and why application was moved belatedly for the first time in first appeal. As no explanation was furnished for not bringing subsequent events to the notice of the courts as and when they occurred, the Apex Court held that belated and half hearted efforts to introduce subsequent events cannot disentitle the landlord from decree of eviction.
12. In the case of 'Jagdish Singh v. Nathu Singh' (supra), Nathu Singh sold a plot to the appellant on 3.7.1973 for a sum of Rs. 15,000/- and further entered into another agreement with him on the same day where-under the appellant agreed to re-convey the said properties to the respondent against payment of Rs. 15,000/- within two years. The respondent instituted a suit on 2.6.1975 for specific performance which was contested by the appellant mainly on the ground that he himself was never ready and willing to perform the contract and he had himself committed breach of the terms of agreement. The suit as well as the first appeal was dismissed, but the High Court reversed the findings and allowed the appeal. On the matter being taken to the Apex Court, the decree passed by the High Court granting compensation of the properties acquired for public purposes was upheld.
13. But in the instant case as has been indicated above, the matter is not that simple and straight. Here, the land in question had been sold to defendant Nos. 1 and 2 by the vendors in pursuance to an agreement for sale executed earlier in time than the agreement for sale allegedly made in favour of the petitioner. The vendors have supported the case of the vendees and have categorically denied having executed the agreement for sale in favour of the petitioner. It is true that the court can and ought to take into account subsequent events and it can also mould the relief accordingly but in the instant case the matter is still at the stage of issuance of temporary injunction and the land in question was sold through a registered sale-deed to defendant Nos. 3 and 4 on 26.4.1991 in pursuance to an agreement for sale dated 27.3.1981 i.e. long before the notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued on 6/8.7.1995 and the mutation was also made in their favour. So, the facts of these authorities being clearly distinguishable from the facts of the instant case, these authorities do not help the petitioner.
14. In view of the fore-going discussion, this revision petition being devoid of merit and substance deserves to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed.