B.R. Arora, J.
1. These two revision petitions arise out of the judgment dated March 13, 1992 passed by the District Judge, Churu, by which the learned District Judge allowed the two appeals filed by workman Gauri Shanker and directed the employer (present petitioners) to make payment of Rs. 10,000/- to respondent Gauri Shanker for the period from July 1, 1981 to August 31, 1982 and Rs. 1000/- for the period from September 1, 1984 to December 18, 1984 and fix him in the regular pay scale admissible to the Class IV employee and after fixation, make the payment of the balance amount to Gauri Shanker within the period of three months. The learned District Judge further directed that if the payment is not made within the stipulated period then the workman will be entitled to interest @ 12% per annum on this amount. Since both the revision petitions arise out of the same judgment and raise the same controversy between the same parties, though for different period, they are, therefore, being disposed of by this common judgment.
2. The facts, in brief, which led to the present litigation, are that respondent Gauri Shanker was appointed in the Office of the Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, Doongargarh (district Churu) on May 6, 1980 on daily wages basis at he wages of Rs. 240/-per month. His services were terminated on June 30, 1981. Shri Gauri Shanker challenged this order of termination of his services before the Labour Court. The Labour Court, while adjudicating the dispute, vide its judgment dated March 30, 1984 held that the action of the Administrator cumSecretary, Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, Doongargarh (district Churu) terminating the services of Gauri Shanker with effect from June 30, 1981 was illegal and void and deserves to be quashed and set-aside. While setting aside the termination order of Gauri Shanker, the Tribunal directed the respondents to reinstate the workman with full wages and to grant him the consequential benefits.
3. The petitioner though filed a writ petitionchallenging the Award dated March 30, 1984 and, also, reinstated respondent Gauri Shanker on December 19, 1984; Shri Gauri Shanker, on September 18, 1984 moved an application under Section 15(2) of the Payment of Wages Act (forshort, 'the Act') before the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, Bikaner for the payment of Wages relating to the period between July 1, 1981 to August 31, 1984. He, also, moved another application under Section 15(2) of the Act beforethe same Authority on September 18, 1984 for the payment of wages relating to the period from September 1, 1984 to December 18, 1984. It was averred in these applications that the applicant has not been paid the wages in the regular pay scaleof Rs. 350-5-430 and the non-applicants have, thus, illegally deducted the amount of Rs, 18,552/-(for the period from July 1, 1981 to August 31, 1984) and Rs. 2160/- for the period from September 1, 1984 to April 1, 1985, which should be paid to him along with the compensation.
4. The claim petitions were opposed on behalf of the Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti on the ground that the applications under Section 15(2) of the Act are not maintainable as the applicant has prayedfor the payment of wages in accordance with the regular pay scale and for the fixation of regular pay, which claim falls within the purview of potential wages and this question cannot be determined by the Authority under the Act under Section 15(2) of the Act. The Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, Bikaner, by its two separate orders, both dated July 28, 1989, accepted the objections raised by the non-applicants and held that the dispute raised cannot be adjudicated by the Authority under Section 15(2) of the Act in the absence of any order passed by the competent Court in favour of the appl icant for the grant of wages in the regular pay scale.
5. Dissatisfied with the orders passed by the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, Bikaner, workman Gauri Shanker filed two appeals before the District Judge, Churu, who, by his judgment dated March 13, 1992, allowed both the appeals and, also, both the applications filed by Gauri Shanker under Section 15(2) of the Act. It is against this judgment that the petitioners have preferred these two revision petitions.
6. Both the revision petitions came-up for consideration before Hon'ble the Chief Justice, who, by his order dated April 18, 1994, referred the revision petitions for adjudication before the Division Bench as they involved an important question of law with regard to the scope and extent of jurisdiction of the Authority under Section 15(2) of the Act. This is how that these two revision petitions have come-up for adjudication before this Bench.
7. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the Authority, under Section 15(2) of the Act, cannot adjudicate any dispute relating to the fixation of the applicant in regular pay scale. The determination and computation of the workman's claim for computation of wages at certain rate on the principle of'equal pay for equal work' is beyond the scope of Section 15(2) and the judgment passed by the learned District Judge, Churu, therefore, deserves to be quashed and set-aside.
8. Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, has submitted that the Authority under Section 15(2) of the Act, has jurisdiction to entertain such claim and can adjudicate the matter applying the doctrine of equal pay for equal work.
9. We have considered the submission made by the learned counsel for the parties. The question which requires consideration in the present case is : whether in view of the limited jurisdiction of the Authority under Section 15(2) of the Act, the Authority was competent to deal with such question and pass an order applying the doctrine of'equal pay for equal work'?
10. Sub-section (2) of Section 15 of the Actauthorises the employee to approach the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act (i) where contrary to the provisions of the Act, any deduction has been made from the wages of an employed person; or (ii) any payment has been delayed. TheAuthority, under this Section, has jurisdiction only to determine the actual wages payable as per the terms of the employment and has no jurisdiction to decide or determine the question of entitlement of the applicant under the doctrine of 'equal payfor equal work' because that matter can be decided only by the competent forum other than the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act. The dispute concerning the wages and fixation of pay is out-side the scope of jurisdiction under Section 15(2) of the Act. Section 15(2) of the Act postulates that wages payable by a person for payment under Section 3 are certain and undisputed. The Authority, under this Section, can adjudicate the cases where the facts arising areadmitted or which cannot be disputed and which, by reason of falling the same under the definition of 'wages', the Authority must have jurisdiction to try and determine it.
11. In A. V.D' costa, Divisional Engineer, G.I.P.Railway v. B.C. Patel and Another 1955 AIR SC 412, the respondent No. 2 was employed as a carpenter on daily wages basis with the Railway Administration. The Railway Administration subsequently introduced a Scheme, which createda cadre of skilled labourers on the scale of monthly rated pay and admitted to it only those persons who passed the Test. The employee did not pass the test and continued to serve as an employee on daily wages. He filed an application under Section 15(2) of the Act before the Authority under thePayment of Wages Act to recover the additional amount of wages that would have become payable to him had he been taken on the cadre of monthly rated employee. The Supreme Court, after considering the Scheme of the Act, held :
'If the parties entered into the contract ofservice, say by correspondence and thecontract is to be determined with reference tothe letters that passed between them, it maybe open to the Authority to decide thecontroversy and find-out what the terms ofcontract with reference to these letters were.But if an employee were to say that his wageswere Rs. 100/- per month, which he actuallyreceived as and when they fall due, but that hewould be entitled to higher wages, if his claimsto be placed on the higher wages scheme hadbeen recognised and given effect to, that wouldnot, in our opinion, be a matter within the ambitof jurisdiction.'
'The Authority had the jurisdiction to decide what actually the terms of the contract between the parties were, that is to say, to determine the actual wages; but the Authority has no jurisdiction to determine the question of potential wages.
XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX The appellant is responsible to pay the respondent only such wages as are shown in the relevant Register of Wages presumably maintained by the Department under the provisions of the Act, but he cannot be directed to pay the respondent higher wages as determined by the Authority that he should have been placed on the monthly wages; Scheme'.
12. The scope of Section 15(2) of the Act again came-up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Shri Ambica Mills Co. Ltd. v. Shri S.B Bhatt and Anr. (1961-I-LLJ-l) and the; Supreme Court, after examining the Scheme of the Act, held :
'The only claims which can be entertained by the authority under Section 15 are claims arising out of deductions or delay made in payment of. wages. The jurisdiction thus conferred on the authority to deal with these two categories of claims is exclusive. In dealing with claims arising out of deductions or delay made in payment of wages the authority inevitably would have to consider questions incidental to the said matters. In determining the scope of these incidental questions care must be taken to see that under the guise of deciding incidental matters the limited jurisdiction is notunreasonably or unduly extended. Care must also be taken to see that the scope of these incidental questions is not unduly limited so as to affect or impair the limited jurisdiction conferred on the authority. It would be inexpedient to lay down any hard and fast or general rule which would afford a determining test to demarcate the field of incidental facts which can be legitimately considered by the authority and those which cannot be so considered.'
The Supreme Court, though held that the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act can consider the incidental question but declined to lay down any guideline which would afford a determining test to demarcate the field of incidental facts which could be considered by it and those which could not be so considered.
13. The scope of Section 15(2) of the Act again came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in : Payment of Wages Inspector, Ujjain v. Suraj Mal Mehta, Director. Barnagar Electric Supply and Industrial Company Limited and Anr. (1969-I-LLJ-762). The question for consideration before the Supreme Court in this case was : whether on the footing that compensation payable under Section 25FF and Section 25FFF of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, being wages within the meaning of Section 2(vi)(b) of the Act, 1947, a claim for it on the ground that the due payment was delayed by an employer, should be entertained under Section 15(2) of the Act? After considering the Scheme of the Act and, also, taking into consideration the two judgments of the Supreme Court in D'Costa'.s case as well as in Ambica Mill's case, the Supreme Court held:
'It Is true, as stated above, that the Authority has the jurisdiction to try matters which areincidental to the claim in question. Indeed Section 15(1) itself provides that the Authority has the power to determine all matters incidental to the claim arising from deductions from or delay in payment of wages. It is also true thatwhile deciding whether a particular matter is incidental to claim or not, care should he taken neither to unduly expand nor curtail the jurisdiction of the Authority. But it has at the same time to be kept in mind that the jurisdictionunder Section 15 is a special jurisdiction.'
The Supreme Court further observed that this claim cannot be entertained under Section 15(2) of the Act because (i) the claim made is not a simple case of deduction having been un-authorisedly made or payment having been delayed beyond the wage period; (ii) in view of the defence taken by the Respondent No. 1, the Authority would inevitably have to enter into the question arising under the proviso to Section 25FF of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Supreme Court further held :
'But we do not think that a claim for compensation under Section 25FF which is denied by the employer on the ground that it was defeated by the proviso to that Section, of which all the conditions were fulfilled, is one such claim which can fall within the ambit of Section 15(2). When the definition of wages was expanded to include cases of sums payable under a contract, instrument or a law it could not have been intended that such a claim for compensation which is denied on grounds which inevitably would have to be enquired into and which might entail prolonged inquiry into questions of fact as well as law was one which should be summarily determined by the Authority under Section 15. Nor could the Authority have been intended to try as matters incidental to such a claim question arising under the proviso to Section 25FF. In our view it would be the Labour Court in such cases which would be the proper forum which can determine such questions under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act which also possesses power to appoint a Commissioner to take evidence where question of facts require detailed evidence.'
The Supreme Court, in para 8 of this judgment, also, set-out the guidelines for the entertainment of application under Section 15(2) of the Act,' which reads as :
'It is explicit from, the terms of Section 15(2) that the Authority appointed under Sub-section (1) has jurisdiction to entertain applications only in two classes of cases, namely, of deductions and fines not authorised under Section 7 to 13 and of delay in payment of wages beyond the wage periods fixed under Section 4 and the time of payment laid down in Section 5. Thisis clear from the opening words of Sub-section (2) of Section 5, namely, 'where contrary to the provisions of this Act' any deduction has been made or any payment of wages has been delayed. These being the governing words in the sub-section the only applications which the Authority can entertain are those where deductions unauthorised under the Act are made from wages or there has been delay in payment beyond the wage period and the ti me of payment of wages fixed or prescribed under Sections 4 and 5 of the Act. Section 15(2) postulates that the wages payable by the person responsible for payment under Section 3 are certain and such that they cannot be disputed.'
14. In Divisional Personnel Officer, Western Railway, Ajmer v. Brij Lal Khanna and Ors. 1964 AIR Raj 66, the question for consideration before the Division Bench of this Court was : whether the question regarding fixation of the salary would fall within the scope of Section 15 The Division Bench of this Court held :
'Fixation of pay in accordance with the rules is in fact determining the terms of employment of a person and the question of fixation of pay pure and simple does not fall within he purview of Section 15. The Authority under the Payment of Wages Act has, therefore, no jurisdiction to issue directions in a case where the payment had been fixed and the arrears of excess payment were being collected by the authorities as no deductions whatsoever were being made in the wages.'
15. InKunjbehariLal v. the Regional AssistantLabour Commissioner, Jaipur and Ors. 1970 AIRRaj 265 the scope of Section 15(2) of the Act inawarding the minimum wages, came up forconsideration before a Single Judge of this Courtand the learned Single Judge, after considering theScheme of the Act, held :
'In view of the definition of wages under Section 2(vi) of the Payment of Wages Act the Authority under that Act has the jurisdiction to decide what actually the terms of the contract between the parties were, that is to say, to determine the actual wages of the employees but it had no jurisdiction to determine the question of the potential wages which the employee ought to have got.
Therefore, the authority appointed under the Payment of Wages Act has no jurisdiction to decide a claim that the employer has not paid to its employees the minimum wages fixed under the Minimum Wages Act which according to claimant amounts to deduction of wages.'
16. In : Raj as than State Ware-Housing Corporation v. The Authority appointed under the Payment of Wages Act, Jaipur, and Anr. 1987 RLW 16, the Raj as than State Ware-Housing Corporation deposited the arrears of dearness allowance admissible to its employees in the General Provident Fund or in some similar account and did not pay in cash to the employees. The question came-up for consideration before the learned Single Judge of this Court was : whether such deduction can be made and whether such dispute can be entertained by the Authority under Section 15(2) of the Act? The Single Bench of this Court, held that 'this case clearly falls within the purview of Section 15 of the Act as it is a matter concerning delay in payment of wages and deduction from salary and in determining this question, the Court can, also, adjudicate whether the deduction is authorised and permissible under the provisions of the Payment of Wages Act.'
In this case, the amount was an unascertained (sic.) sum which was admittedly not paid to the applicant and was deducted from the wages and deposited in General Provident Fund. The question of deduction was, therefore, Incidental to the matter and was rightly considered by the learned Single Judge. This case has no application to the present case looking to the facts and circumstances of the case.
17. Learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon a Single Bench judgment of this Court in the matter of: Smt. Gaindi Devi v. Secretary, Community Development and Panchayat Department and Ors. 1988 RLW (1)412. This judgment is of no avail to the petitioners as the scope of Section 15(2) of the Act was not under consideration before the learned single Judge in that case and the case was decided purely on the principles of 'equal pay for equal work' in a regular civil suit.
18. In R.S.B. and Ors. v. Faleh Chand and Anr. 1988 RLR (2) 629, the scope of theLabour Court under Section 33C(2) of the Act, 1947 to grant emoluments claimed by the workman on the basis of principles of 'equal pay for equal work' was considered. The Division Bench of this Court held that 'in view of the proposition of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the above referred case, we are of the opinion that the right to claim wages for the work done is based on existing rights and, thus, the Respondent No. 1 was entitled to file an application before the Labour Court for computation of his wages.'
19. The remedy provided under Section 33C(2) of the Act, 1947 is wider in scope and morefavourable to the workman than the remedy under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, which is restricted only to the cases where any deduction has been made from the wages of an employed person or any payment has been delayed. In viewof the limited scope of Section 15 and in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in (1969-I-LLJ-762) (supra), the ratio of this case does not apply to the present case.
20. Learned counsel for the respondent-employee has, also, placed reliance over severaljudgments laying down the proposition that therespondent is entitled to the same wages as theother permanent employees in the departmentemployed on the identical posts, are getting.Learned counsel for the respondent has based theclaim of the respondent on the doctrine of 'equalpay for equal work'.
21. It has been held by the Supreme Court inFederation of All India Customs and CentralExcise Stenographer (recognised) and Ors. v.Union of India and Ors. (1994-III-LLJ(Suppl)-979) (supra):
''Equal pay for equal work' is a concommitant of Article 14 of the Constitution of India butequal pay for unequal work will be negation of that right. Equal pay must depend upon the nature of the work done; it cannot be judged merely by the volume of the work; there may be qualitative difference as regards the reliabilityand responsibility. Functions may be the same but the responsibility makes a difference.'
The principle of 'equal pay for equal work' is attracted only when two sets of employees are similarly situated and are discharging the similarfunctions but yet are getting different scales of pay. The daily wages employees employed on a temporary basis for getting the urgent need cannot be equated with a permanent employee employed after due selection. However, it is not necessary to go into this question as this question can be gone-into by the competent authority in accordance with law if so approached by the respondent-employee. The judgments relied-upon by the learned counsel for the respondent do not deal with the controversy regarding the scope or power of the Authority under Section 15(2) of the Act and, therefore, it is not necessary to embellish this judgment with these judgments cited and relied-upon by the learned counsel for the respondent.
22. The question, which, now, requires consideration is: whether in view of the limited jurisdiction of the Authority under Section 15(2) of the Act, the learned District Judge, Churu was right in applying the doctrine of 'equal pay for equal work' and directing the employer Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti for fixation of pay of the employee in the regular pay scale of Class IV employee and make payment of the amount in accordance with the regular pay scale?
23. The Authority, under this Section, has only limited jurisdiction. From the governing words 'where contrary to the provisions of this Act' used in Section 15(2) of the Act, it is clear that the Authority under this Section had the jurisdiction to entertain the applications only in the cases where (i) any unauthorised deduction has been made from the wages; or (ii) any payment has been delayed beyond the period prescribed under Sections 4 and 5 of the Act. No claim under Section 15(2) of the Act on the footing of the doctrine of 'equal pay for equal work' can be entertained on the ground that the claim is for wages within the meaning of Section 2(vi)(d) of the Act and the payment has been delayed by the employer. It is only the ascertained sum which can be ordered to be paid under this Section. There must be preexisting right or corresponding obligation of the employer for such payment. The applications under this Section cannot be entertained when there is no pre-determination of the question regarding the entitlement of the applicant. The entitlement of the applicant (respondent Gauri Shanker) on the basis of the doctrine of 'equal pay for equalwork' has to be determined by the competentforum and this enquiry is beyond the scope of theAuthority acting under Section 15(2) of the Act.Failure to pay according to the doctrine of 'equalpay for equal work' by the employer cannot besaid to be either a deduction which is unauthorisedunder the Act or a failure under the class of delayedwages as envisaged under Sections 4 and 5 of theAct. In view of the limited jurisdiction underSection 15(2) of the Act, the District Judge,exercising the appellate powers in the matterrelating to Section 15(2) of the Act, was notauthorised to deal with such questions. RespondentGauri Shanker's grievance in the applications underSection 15(2) of the Act was only that he had notbeen paid the wages in the regular pay scaleapplicable to the Class IV employee, to which hewould have been entitled on the basis of thedoctrine of 'equal pay for equal work'. Thecontroversy, thus, relates to the dispute concerningthe wages and fixation of pay in the regular payscale. This question can be decided only by thecompetent authority in a detailed inquiry and theadjudication of this controversy is not within thescope and ambit of Section 15(2) of the Act. Noadjudication regarding the dispute in respect ofwages and fixation of pay in the regular pay scalecould have been made by the Authority or by theDistrict Judge under Section 15 of the Act.
24. The learned District Judge, in ordering for fixation of the pay of the respondent on the principal of 'equal pay for equal work' and directing the employer to make payment to the employee inthe regular pay scale, has encroached upon the jurisdiction not vested in him. He has power under this Section only for the purpose of enforcement of the payment of wages already agreed upon as per the contract and not for the purpose of makingpayment on the principle of 'equal pay for equal work'. The learned District Judge, therefore, committed material illegality and irregularity in the exercise of the jurisdiction in passing the order dated March 13, 1992 and directing the petitionersto make payment of salary to respondent Gauri Shanker in the regular pay scale. The judgment passed by the learned District Judge, therefore, deserves to be quashed and set-aside. However, the respondent-employee was entitled to wageswhich were agreed-upon but not paid to him.
25. In the result, the revision petitions filed by the petitioners are partly allowed. The judgment dated March 13, 1992 passed by the learned District Judge, Churu is quashed and set-aside and the orders dated September 28, 1989 passed by Authority under the Payment of Wages Act are restored as the payment of Rs. 9980/- at the rate of daily wages of Rs. 240/- per month has alreadybeen made to the respondent-employee. The respondent-employee will, however, be free, if he so likes, to get the matter for the grant of wages in the regular pay scale on the basis of the doctrine of 'equal pay for equal work' decided by the competent Authority. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we leave the parties to bear their own costs.