R.S. Verma, J.
1. Learned Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Jodhpur, (hereinafter called 'the Tribunal'), by its award dated 14.2.1985 has held respondent No. 1 Brij Mohan Lal entitled to recover Rs. 25,500/-, jointly and severally from the appellant Rajasthan State Co-operative Dairy Federation (hereinafter called 'the Federation') and Haridas respondent No. 2, along with interest at 9 per cent per annum from 21.5.1980 till recovery. By this very award, it has dismissed the claim of aforesaid Brij Mohan Lal against respondent No. 3, the Pashchimi Rajasthan Dugdha Utpadak Sahkari Sangh Ltd. (hereinafter called 'Pashchimi Sangh'), Jaipur Zila Dugdha Utpadak Sahkari Sangh Ltd. (hereinafter called 'Jaipur Zila Sangh') and United India Insurance Co. Ltd. (hereinafter called 'the insurer'). Aggrieved the Federation has come in appeal.
2. In a nutshell, the case of respondent No. 1 Brij Mohan Lal, as set out in his up-to-date amended claim petition, was that on 27.11.1979, at about 3 p.m., his daughter Anita Garg, aged about 17 years, was returning from the college to her home. When she reached the intersection opposite Medical College, Jodhpur, a tanker (truck) RSB 2778 collided with great force against Anita. The collision resulted in the death of the girl. The aforesaid tanker (truck) was being driven by its driver Haridas rashly and negligently. A report of this incident was lodged the same day with police station, Shashtri Nagar. The Investigating Officer reached the spot after some time and prepared a site plan and memo thereof. Haridas driver did not stay at the spot after causing the accident but drove away the tanker (truck) from the scene of occurrence. Hence, the Investigating Officer did not find the tanker (truck) at the scene of occurrence. Likewise, he did not find Anita at the scene of occurrence because in the meanwhile, she had been removed to Railway Hospital, Jodhpur, where she was declared dead. Later on, the same day, a post-mortem examination (vide C 7/29 of the record of Tribunal) was conducted on the dead body of aforesaid Anita and following injuries were found on her person:
(1) Lacerated wound-2.0 cm. long with missing of left ear lobule.
(2) Lacerated wound 2.0 cm. long X 1.0 cm. X skin deep toward upper part of the left ear pinna.
(3) There was depression of the left upper chest below clavicle. There is fracture of 2nd and 3rd ribs on the left side of the chest in anterior axillary line with perforation of pleura and left upper lobe of the lung by the fractured end of 2nd rib and pleural cavity was full of partially clotted blood about 500-600 ml. with bleeding nose.
(4) Abrasion 23.0 cm. X 8.0 cm. on the left abdomen laterally oblique upto anterior superior iliac spine, on opening the abdomen there was rupture of spleen on its lateral aspect and peritoneal cavity was full of partially clotted blood about 600-650 ml. There was fracture of left hip bone.
(5) Abrasion 25.0 cm. X 7.0 cm. on the left thigh on its lateral aspect.
(6) Abrasion 28.0 cm. X 9.0 cm. on the left thigh on its anterior aspect.
(7) Abrasion 19.0 cm. X 2.0 cm. on the left thigh on its medial aspect.
(8) Lacerated wound-22.0 cm. X 8.0 cm. X muscle deep extending from lower l/3rd left thigh upto upper l/3rd left leg on its posteriolateral aspect.
(9) Abrasion 30.0 cm. X 3.0 cm. on the left leg medially.
(10) Lacerated wound 10.0 cm. X 2.0 cm. X muscle deep on the perineum extending from the urethral opening with perforation of hymen, posterior vaginal wall, perineum in mid line upto oval opening with bleeding.
3. In the opinion of the doctor conducting post-mortem examination, the cause of death was shock as a result of hemorrhage due to injury to left lung and spleen. Anita had died within 2 to 4 hours before post-mortem examination was done and the cause of death as per information given by police was 'truck ki tuckker se chot lagne se'. Upon such material, the S.H.O. challaned Haridas after due investigation for offences under Sections 279 and 304A Indian Penal Code.
4. Brij Mohan claimed that Anita was a brilliant girl. She was student of First Year of the three year degree course with Science and Biology as her subjects. She was preparing herself for a medical career. Had she lived a normal span of life, she would have contributed at least Rs. 1,200/- per month to the income of the family. Brij Mohan claimed Rs. 51,000/- on account of compensation.
5. In the claim petition, Brij Mohan arrayed appellant as also Pashchimi Sangh and Jaipur Zila Sangh as co-owners of the tanker (truck). Respondent No. 5 was arrayed as an insurer of the truck. Driver Haridas has disjoined as respondent.
6. Haridas did not put up appearance before the learned Tribunal in spite of service and hence, the matter proceeded ex parte against him. The appellant in its written statement to the claim filed on 24.9.1982 admitted the factum of the accident with the tanker (truck) in question. It was admitted that accident caused death of Anita. It did not specifically deny that Haridas was driving the truck. However, it pleaded that Haridas was not driving rashly or negligently, it was pleaded that Anita was walking in the middle of the road and she was trying to cross the road just before reaching the intersection. An Ambassador car was coming from the opposite direction. Seeing this, she moved backwards with the result that she was crushed beneath the rear wheel of the tanker (truck). It was admitted that the tanker (truck) was taken away by the driver and was kept in the premises of the Federation. According to the written statement of the Federation, the tanker (truck) was owned by Jaipur Zila Sangh and Federation had taken it on hire from Jaipur Zila Sangh, to which it had been paying hire money. The claim to pay Rs. 51,000/- as compensation was denied.
7. Pashchimi Sangh traversed the claim of Brij Mohan and denied that it was owner of the disputed truck. According to it, the tanker (truck) was of the ownership of Jaipur Zila Sangh. It was further pleaded that Haridas was an employee of aforesaid Jaipur Zila Sangh.
8. Jaipur Zila Sangh also traversed the claim of Brij Mohan. It denied that it was owner of the tanker (truck) in question. It denied that Haridas was in its employment. It, however, did not specifically controvert the plea taken by the Federation that the Federation had taken the truck from it on hire basis and Federation was paying hire money to Jaipur Zila Sangh. It denied any liability to pay the claim money and pleaded that the tanker (truck) belonged to the Federation.
9. The insurer in its reply traversed the claim and submitted that the vehicle in question was not tanker (truck) RSB 2778 but was another tanker (truck) No. 541 or MHP 541. According to it, the tanker (truck) did not belong to Jaipur Zila Sangh. According to it, the tanker (truck) in dispute was not covered by a valid permit on the date of the alleged accident. It was pleaded that on the date of alleged accident, the driver of the tanker (truck) did not hold a valid licence.
10. The learned Tribunal framed necessary issues. The contesting parties were allowed to lead evidence. After hearing the parties, the learned Tribunal arrived at the finding that Anita met her death due to an accident caused by rash and negligent driving of tanker (truck) No. RSB 2778 by Haridas. On a concession made by the learned counsel for the claimant Brij Mohan, the learned Judge of the Tribunal held that the tanker (truck) belonged to the appellant and not to Jaipur Zila Sangh. It found that Jaipur Zila Sangh had obtained the insurance of the tanker (truck) in question but it held that since Jaipur Zila Sangh was not liable, the insurer also was not liable. Again on the basis of the concession made by the learned counsel for the claimant Brij Mohan, the Tribunal held that the tanker (truck) in question was not covered by a valid permit. Learned Judge of the Tribunal found that Anita was 17 years of age and was studying in B.Sc. with Science and Biology as her subjects. She was an average girl. It, therefore, held claimant entitled to recover only Rs. 25,500/- jointly and severally from appellant and the driver Haridas.
11. In the present appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant has firstly contended that it has not been established beyond doubt that the accident was caused by rash and negligent driving of the tanker (truck) in question by Haridas. He also challenged the correctness of the amount of compensation awarded to the claimants. Besides the above contentions, on merits, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the Tribunal fell in error in absolving respondent Nos. 3 to 5 from liability to pay compensation. According to him, such respondents should also have been held liable, respondent Nos. 3 and 4 as the owners of the tanker (truck) and respondent No. 5 as the insurer.
12. It may here be stated that respondent Haridas has not put in appearance. Appeal is contested by claimant Brij Mohan Lal as also by respondents Pashchimi Sangh, Jaipur Zila Sangh and the insurer. All these respondents have supported the judgment and award of the learned Tribunal.
13. First, I take up the finding of the learned Tribunal on the question of rash and negligent driving of the tanker (truck) No. RSB 2778 by its driver Haridas. The learned Tribunal, in view of the admitted position that Anita was struck by tanker (truck) No. RSB 2778 and further in view of the fact that Haridas was not examined by the appellant, held on the basis of the principle of res ipsa loquitur that the accident was caused due to rash and negligent driving of the tanker (truck) by Haridas. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that there was no eye-witness to the incident and, therefore, it ought to have held that Anita collided with the tanker (truck) when she was crossing the road and had suddenly moved backwards because of an approaching Ambassador car from the opposite side. This contention of the learned counsel for the appellant has absolutely no basis. Haridas was the best person to depose about the circumstances in which the accident took place. He was not examined on behalf of the appellant. The accident took place almost in the middle of the intersection of the two main roads. One road was 72 ft. wide. The other road was 39 ft. wide. After causing the accident, the truck sped away. The driver was expected to drive his tanker (truck) on the left side of the road. He was under a duty to take care towards pedestrians going on the road. The site plan, formal proof of which had been dispensed with by the appellant, (as per endorsement appearing on the same) goes to show that the impact of the accident was very severe and the books, chappals etc. of the girl were found scattered at quite some distance from the place of accident. These facts speak for themselves. In my opinion, appellant ought to have examined Haridas to explain the circumstances in which the accident occurred. In these circumstances, learned Tribunal rightly drew adverse inference against the appellant. On a careful consideration of all the circumstances available on record, I am of the view that the accident in question occurred due to rash and negligent driving of tanker (truck) by Haridas. I, therefore, affirm this finding of the learned Tribunal.
14. This takes me to the consideration of the quantum of compensation awarded by the learned Tribunal. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that deceased Anita was a girl. In the normal course of things, she would have been married away and would not have earned anything. Even if she would have joined some service, she would not have contributed anything to the income of the claimant-respondents; rather she would have contributed to the family of her husband. Hence, respondents should not have been awarded any compensation. In my opinion, this argument deserves to be noticed only for the sake of rejection. Anita was a girl of about 17 years of age. She was pursuing a course of studies as a student of first year of the three year degree course. She had crossed the uncertainties of childhood. Had she remained alive, she would have helped her parents in domestic and outdoor chores. She would have provided them with company, love and affection. It is true that girls usually marry. But nowadays, there is nothing unusual for girls not marrying. The evil of dowry compels many young and promising girls not to marry. The face of the Indian society is changing very fast. Educated women are now occupying important positions as administrators, police officers, university teachers, doctors, etc. In my opinion, no difference should be made between a male child and a female child at all. It is male chauvinism which leads to an argument of this nature. We are in the year 1988 and in my opinion, such an argument cannot be countenanced at all.
15. In AS. Manjunathaiah v. M.V. Nanjun-daiah 1985 ACJ 295 (Karnataka), a female child of 9 1/2 years of age was involved in a fatal accident and the claimants were awarded Rs. 12,400/- as compensation. In my opinion, in the present case, the compensation granted to the claimant-respondents errs on the side of leniency. Since there is no cross-appeal on behalf of the claimant-respondents, I am not considering enhancement of the quantum of compensation. Suffice it to say that I do not find any merit in the contention that the quantum of compensation awarded is excessive or unjust. Hence, this contention of the appellant is also rejected.
16. The learned Tribunal had dismissed the claim of Brij Mohan Lal as against Pashchimi Sangh, Jaipur Zila Sangh and the insurer, on the basis of concessions made by the learned counsel for the claimant Brij Mohan Lal. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the liability of these respondents ought to have been decided on the basis of material available on record and should not have been decided merely on the basis of concessions made by the learned counsel for the claimants. It is submitted that concessions made on behalf of the claimants were not binding upon the appellant. In my opinion, so far as this argument goes, no exception can be taken to it and I agree with the learned counsel for the appellant that concessions made on behalf of Brij Mohan Lal do not bind the appellant but bind Brij Mohan Lal alone. Learned counsel on behalf of respondent Nos. 3, 4 and 5 have not been able to controvert this legal position. Hence, I will have to examine afresh whether other respondents, Pashchimi Sangh, Jaipur Zila Sangh and the insurer, ought to have been made liable in the present case along with the appellant.
17. First, I take up the question of liability of Pashchimi Sangh. The claimant in his up-to-date amended claim petition mentioned in para 9 as owners (i) the Pashchimi Rajasthan Dugdha Utpadak Sahkari Sangh Limited, Jodhpur, (ii) the Rajasthan State Co-operative Dairy Federation, 15, Uniara Garden, Jaipur and (iii) Jaipur Zila Dugdha Utpadak Sahkari Sangh Ltd., Jaipur, as owners. The Pashchimi Rajasthan Dugdha Utpadak Sahkari Sangh Ltd. in its written statement dated 16.7.1982 specifically denied that it was the owner of the tanker (truck). According to it, the owner of the tanker (truck) was Jaipur Zila Dugdha Utpadak Sahkari Sangh Ltd. There is no evidence on the record worth the name which may go to show that the Pashchimi Raj as than Dugdha Utpadak Sahkari Sangh Ltd. was the owner of the tanker (truck) in question. Learned counsel for the appellant could not point out any material on the basis of which it can be said that the tanker (truck) in question was owned by the Pashchimi Sangh, respondent No. 3. Hence it is not proved that this respondent owned the tanker or was liable for the accident in any manner.
18. This takes me to the consideration of the next question, namely, whether the tanker (truck) was owned by Jaipur Zila Dugdha Utpadak Sahkari Sangh Ltd., Jaipur and had been hired by the appellant, Rajasthan State Co-operative Dairy Federation. No oral evidence has been led by the parties on this point. The documentary evidence produced on this point consists of a certificate of insurance at page C 37/2 and certificate of registration at page No. C 42/2 appearing on the record of the Tribunal. The permit to the tanker (truck) was not filed before the learned Tribunal but has been filed before me during the course of hearing of the appeal. The certificate of insurance goes to show that Jaipur Zila Dugdha Utpadak Sahkari Sangh Ltd. obtained insurance in respect of RSB 2778 commencing on 20.3.1979 and expiring on 19.3.1980. As stated earlier, the appellant had pleaded that the tanker (truck) belonged to Jaipur Zila Sangh and had been hired by the appellant and the appellant was paying hire money to Jaipur Zila Sangh. Jaipur Zila Sangh denied the ownership but did not specifically controvert the plea that the appellant had hired the tanker (truck) from it. The non-denial of the plea of the appellant on this aspect of the matter coupled with the certificate of insurance dated 19.3.1979 goes to show that the Jaipur Zila Sangh must have been concerned with the tanker (truck), in some manner, on the date this insurance was obtained by Jaipur Zila Sangh. No evidence is forthcoming on behalf of the Jaipur Zila Sangh to explain under what circumstances, why and how it obtained an insurance for the tanker (truck) in question. It would be useful to point out that the certificate of registration was obtained in favour of the appellant on a much later date. The certificate of registration appears to have been obtained in favour of the appellant on 16.8.1979,.i.e., long after the insurance had been taken for the tanker (truck) by the Jaipur Zila Sangh. The same position is evidenced by private carrier's permit obtained by the appellant on 20.8.1979. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the only conclusion is that the tanker in question was orginally under the control of the Jaipur Zila Sangh in some manner and sometime in August, 1979, the tanker (truck) came to be registered in the name of the appellant and at that very point of time, the appellant obtained a private carrier's permit in respect of the same. These facts go to show that Jaipur Zila Sangh must have been concerned with the tanker (truck) in question in some way and this is why it got the tanker (track) insured. On the facts and circumstances of the case, it can be legitimately inferred that Jaipur Zila Sangh allowed the tanker (truck) to be plied by the appellant and further permitted it to obtain certificate of registration and private carrier's permit in the name of the appellant. However, this evidence does not establish that Jaipur Zila Sangh was owner of the tanker.
19. However, the question would be whether Pashchimi Sangh can be held liable for the accident which took place on 27.11.1979, i.e., after the tanker (truck) had been formally got registered in the name of the appellant and the appellant had obtained a private carrier's permit in respect of the same. The appellant has not led any evidence to show under what circumstances the truck came to be registered in its name, or under what circumstances the appellant obtained private carrier's permit in respect of the tanker (truck). In my opinion, in the facts and circumstances of the case, Pashchimi Sangh cannot be held liable when the tanker (truck) had come to be registered in the name of the appellant before the accident.
20. Now, I may consider the question of the liability of the insurance company. It is not in dispute that the insurer covered the tanker (truck) by the risk note C 31/2 (record of the Tribunal). This certificate of insurance was valid upto 19.3.1980. I have already noticed the pleas which were taken by the insurance company. The pleas which are open to the insurance company have been enumerated in Section 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Sub-section (1) of Section 96 creates the liability of the insurer. It is to be seen if the learned Tribunal was wrong in absolving the insurer of liability to pay compensation in connection with the accident in question.
21. One objection taken by the insurer was that on the date of the accident the driver of the tanker (truck) was not holding a valid driving licence and hence insurer was not liable. This argument deserves to be noticed only for the sake of rejection. It was the duty of the insurance company to prove that the driver did not have a valid driving licence. I am supported in this view of the matter by Divisional Manager, L.I.C. of India v. Raj Kumari Mittal, 1985 ACJ 179 (Allahabad). In my opinion, the burden to prove this fact was on the insurance company and the insurance company has failed to prove that driver Haridas had no valid driving licence on the date of accident. Hence, this contention need not detain me.
22. The next contention of the insurance company was that the insured had ceased to be the owner of the vehicle on the date of the accident and it was not informed of the accident by the owner of the vehicle and as such, it was not liable. The discussion made by me already goes to show that prior to the accident, the vehicle had come to be registered in the name of the appellant. The appellant has not led any evidence to explain how it came to be registered as an owner. Learned counsel for the appellant cited judgment of this court in Shankerlal v. Shankerlal, 1988 ACJ 866 (Rajasthan) and the New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Sheela Rani, 1988 ACJ 206 (Rajasthan), in support of the proposition that even after change of ownership, the third party liability of the insurer continues. In the first case, after reviewing the case law on the subject, it was observed as follows:
The upshot of the aforesaid discussion is that in claims arising out of the motor accidents where a policy regarding the vehicle involved in the accident is in force, i.e., it could not have lapsed but for the death or bankruptcy of the insured or on account of the transfer of the vehicle by the insured to the third person, the only defences available to the insurance company in such claims are those which are provided by Section 96(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act.
23. In the second case, the proposition was stated as follows:
It is thus abundantly clear that these provisions have been enacted with a view to protect and compensate third party, who is not a party to the insurance policy between the insurer and owner but the benefit of such insurance passes to the third party who may be involved in the accident. Therefore, when a vehicle is transferred and the transferor foes not inform the insurance company as provided under Section 31 of the Act, it will be deemed that the transferor has allowed the purchaser to use the vehicle in the public places on his behalf and the policy is in operation so far as it relates to third party risk.
24. It may here be stated that the third party liability of the insurer does continue even after the transfer of the vehicle in favour of the appellant. But it is extremely doubtful if the appellant can get any benefit under the aforesaid insurance, particularly when the claimant himself did not press the liability against the insurer. Only a certificate of insurance has been placed on the record of the learned Tribunal and the insurance policy itself has not been placed on record. Hence, it is doubtful if the appellant who had no privity of contract with the insurer could claim to be reimbursed for compensation payable on behalf of the claimant Brij Mohan Lal. Reliance was also placed upon L.I.C. of India's case 1985 ACJ179 (Allahabad), but this ruling has no applicability to the facts of the present case. Reliance was placed on Narcinva V. Kamat v. Alfredo Antonio Doe Martins 1985 ACJ 397 (SC), but that ruling also has no applicability on the facts of the case before me.
25. This takes me to the consideration of another important matter, namely, whether at the time of the accident the tanker (truck) was not covered by a valid permit. Since the permit has been produced before me, this objection is no longer available to the insurer. However, learned counsel for the insurance company submits that there was a breach of contract of the policy in as much as according to the appellant itself, the tanker (truck) was being run on hire. It is submitted that this defence arises out of the plea taken by the appellant itself and hence, the insurer is entitled to rely upon it.
Clause 6 of the certificate of insurance Clause 31/2 reads as follows:
(6) Limitations as to use: Use only under a private carrier's permit within the meaning of Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. The policy does not cover use for-
(a) hire or reward,
(b) organised racing or speed testing.
26. It may be recalled that the appellant in its written statement had specifically stated that it had hired a tanker (truck) from Jaipur Zila Sangh and it was paying hire money to Jaipur Zila Sangh. Of course, this plea does not travel beyond the realm of pleadings but so far as the appellant is concerned, it cannot be permitted to back out of this plea. This plea admits that the appellant was using the vehicle on hire. Such a use was not permitted under the terms of the insurance certificate. Thus, there was a clear breach of the terms of the policy. Such a plea is available to the insurer by virtue of Section 96(2)(b)(i)(a). Certain rulings were cited before me in connection with the above contention but I find that such rulings have no applicability on the facts of the present case. However, I may take note of such rulings in passing. National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rajendra Hematsinh, 1987 ACJ 349 (Gujarat). In this case, there was an accident between a private luxury bus and a State transport bus. It was contended by the insurance company that as no valid permit was issued by the R.T.O., therefore, insurance company was not liable. It was held that bus was a public service vehicle and was used as private carriage and this was not the breach of the terms of the permit. The conditions of the policy nowhere laid down that the vehicle could not be used unless allowed by the R.T.O. Upon such view of the matter, the insurance company was held liable. The case of Skandia Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kokilaben Chandravadan 1987 ACJ 411 (SC), pertained to a case where exclusion clause in the policy prohibited driving by a person other than one holding driving licence. It was held that mere breach of such clause does not absolve insurer of his liability. In Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Bishan Dass 1988 ACJ 106 (HP), it was held as under:
The contract between the insurer and the insured may permit the insurer to avoid his liability under various circumstances. However, if those circumstances do not fall within the purview of Sub-section (2) of Section 96 of the Act, the insurer cannot invoke them in aid and escape liability for the third party risk. The terms of the contract between the insurer and the insured, which determine their inter se rights and liability, are not and should not be confused with the statutory liability of the insurer for the third party risk.
In my opinion, this ruling has also no applicability to the facts of the present case.
27. Reliance was further placed on National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nathibai Chaturabhuj 1982 ACJ 153 (Gujarat). In this context, it has been pointed out that on the date of contract of insurance, the insured vehicle was not covered by a permit and as such insurer was entitled to disclaim the liability. In this ruling, it has been held as follows:
Now, in an action in which the claim of statutory coverage is advanced in respect of a passenger, who was carried on the insured vehicle when the accident giving rise to the claim occurred, the claimant will have to show that the statutory insurance coverage was available. In other words, he will have to show that the passenger risk was covered either by virtue of the provisions contained in Section 95(1)(b)(i) read with the first part of the second clause of the proviso or by reason of the provisions of Section 95(1)(b)(ii). The insurer, if he wants to disclaim the liability to satisfy the decree that may be passed in favour of the claimant in such an action, will have to establish:
(1) that on the date of the contract of insurance, the insured vehicle was expressly or implicitly not covered by a permit to ply for hire or reward, that is, by a permit to carry any passenger for hire or reward,
(2) that there was a specified condition in the policy which excluded the use of the insured vehicle for the carriage of passengers for hire or reward, and
(3) that the vehicle was, in fact, used in the breach of such specified condition on the occasion giving rise to the claim.
If all these facts are established by the insurer, then, by virtue of Section 96(2)(b)(i)(a), he may succeed in avoiding the liability to satisfy the decree that may come to be passed in the action. In such a case, the coverage of the insured vehicle by a permit to ply for hire or reward, which does not authorise the carriage of passengers for hire or reward, on the date of contract of insurance, would be a matter of no consequence.
No exception can be taken to the aforesaid propositions of law. There is no material before me to conclude that on the date of contract of insurance, the insured vehicle was covered by a permit. It is an established fact that there was a specified condition in the policy which excluded the use of the insured vehicle for hire or reward. On the plea of the appellant itself, the vehicle was, in fact, used in the breach of such specified condition. In this view of the matter, I find that appellant is not entitled to any reimbursement from the insurer.
28. In view of the above discussion and particularly, in view of the fact that the claimant himself did not press his claim against the insurance company, I find that the appellant is not entitled to claim any reimbursement from the insurer with which it had no privity of contract. The case of the claimant-respondent stood on a different footing altogether and had he pressed his claim for recovery of compensation against insurance company, perhaps the case would have been different.
29. In view of what has been stated above,I hold that neither Jaipur Zila Dugdha Utpadak Sahkari Sangh Ltd., nor Pashchimi Rajasthan Dugdha Utpadak Sahkari Sangh nor the United India Insurance Co. Ltd. are liable to reimburse the appellant.
30. No other point was pressed before me.
31. In view of the above discussions, this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.