ORDER
D.L. Mehta, J.
1. Petitioner Union filed the suit in the Court of learned Addl., Munsif No. 4, Jaipur City, Jaipur and prayed therein that the orders dated November, 30, 1984 transferring the petitioners from the post of Assistant Inspector (Encroachment) quashed. Application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151, C.P.C. was submitted by the Union which was dismissed by the learned District Judge, vide order dated February 23, 1985.
2. The case of the respondents is that the petitioners were appointed substantively on the post of Munshi in the year 1981 or so. All these employees were required subsequently to perform the duties of Assistant Inspector (Encroachment) on work charge basis. The grade and the scale of the Munshi and the Assistant Inspector (Encroachment) is the same. However, on November 9, 1982, again all the persons were asked to perform the duties of Munshi/L.D.C and to discontinue functioning as Assistant Inspector. It was submitted that the order dated November 9, 1982 was challegned by the members of the present Union before the Court. However, the writ petitions were dismissed. This Court held that the substantive appointment of the present petitioners was on the post of Munshi who were later on deputed to discharge the function of Assistant Inspectors. Subsequently, again the present petitioners were asked to perform the duties of Assistant Inspectors (Building). However, vide order dated November 30, 1984, the present petitioners were asked to work as Munshi again. The contention of Mr. Mehta is that the present petitioners were never appointed on the post of Assistant Inspector but they were working against the post of Assistant Inspector.
3. On the last date a query was made by the Court to the counsel for both the parties whether regular civil suit can be instituted by the Trade Union. Order 29, Rule 1, C.P.C. provides that the suit can be instituted by or against the Corporation and the pleadings will be signed and verified on behalf of the Corporation by the Secretary or by the Director or other principal officer of the Corporation who is able to depose the facts of the case.
4. A Corporation is a fictitious or an imaginary person invested by law. For the purpose of Order 29, it may be stated to be a body authorised by law to act as one individual and constituted either by prescription, by Letters Patent or by Act of Legislature. A Registered Company under the Companies Act may be a Corporation. The Trade Unions Act, 1926 defines the Trade Union as under:-
Trade Union' means any combination, whether temporary or permanent, formed primarily for the purpose of regulating the relations between workmen and employers or between workmen and workmen, or between employers and employers, or for imposing restrictive conditions on the conduct of any trade or business and includes any federation of two or more Trade Unions;
5. Application for the registration is filed under Section 5 and Trade Union is registered under Section 8 of the Act. Thus, Trade Union is a body corporate created by way of registration under Section 8 of the Trade Unions Act, 1926. In the case of Bonsor v. Musicians Unions (1955) 3 ALL ER 518, Their Lordships have held that a member of the Union can institute a suit against the Union and may pray therein that his expulsion order may be set aside. I am fortified to this extent by the case cited above that suit can be instituted against the Union by its member against the expulsion.
6. Trade Union activity is a basic and fundamental right of the labour for the achievement of the object of social democracy. We will have to interpret the beneficial legislation which has been enacted in favour of the labour for their benefit and we will have to give wider interpretation. Order 39 is an enabling provision under the Code of Civil Procedure and it mainly deals with the requirement of verification, deposition and signing etc.
7. If any law does not prohibit directly or by implication the institution of the suit by a Trade Union, then the law should be interpreted in a way which will serve the cause of the labour. Collective bargaining is a civil right and even going on strike to achieve the rights of the labour has been recognised by the Courts of law. In matters relating to the labour dispute, may be a 'civil right' and may fall within the purview of Section 9 C.P.C. Thus, the Civil Courts have the jurisdiction to try suits of the civil nature, may be relating to the labour dispute unless specifically prohibited under the various industrial laws. Thus, I am of the view that the Trade Union is a legal distinct entity and a suit can be filed by the Trade Union or against the Trade Union and it is not necessary to invoke the provisions of Order 1, Rule 8, C.P.C. Order 1, Rule 8 only comes into play when the suit is filed by a person in a representative capacity. The Trade Union files a suit for the benefit of its members, for the protection of its own rights and for the enforcement of its duty cast under the labour laws and so, it cannot be said a representative suit in an ordinary manner though it may have the representative character. Thus, I am of the view that the suit filed by the Trade Union is maintainable and the provisions of Order 8 will not come into play.
8. In the instant case the order passed on November 30, 1982 is still in force. Petitioners have been appointed against the post of Field Inspector and they have not been appointed on the post of Field Inspector. At the time of the appointment even on ad hoc basis, temporary basis or against a higher post on ad hoc basis, the process of selection may be held and there is no bar to it. The appointment of the petitioners is on the post Munshi substantively. There is no appointment on regular basis on the post of Assistant Inspector. The members of the Union have been appointed on ad hoc basis/work charge basis against the post of the Inspector. A person who has been appointed against the post of the Inspector has substantive lien on the substantive post of the Munshi and cannot claim that he should be continued indefinitely on the said post of Inspector. However, it is the duty of the non- petitioners to see that the provisions of Section 101(1) are applied in all cases where they are applicable. The J.D.A. Act has come into force since 1982, prior to that there was an ordinance, Urban Improvement Trust Act. Petitioners were the employees of the Urban Improvement Trust, as such, they have a right to be screened under Section 101(h) of the Act.
9. Mr. Mehta pointed out that during the pendency the screening proceedings have already taken place and all members were absorbed as Lower Division Clerks and some of them have been promoted as Assistants. Apart from that it will not be out of place here to mention that out of 7 or 8 members of the Union, five filed the writ petitions before this Court and the same were dismissed. In the said writ petitions the order dated November 9, 1982 was under challenge. Mr Calla submitted that the options were asked in the year 1979 and all of them have opted for the post of Inspector. May it be so. Mr Calla further submits that the writ petitions were disposed of on the main ground that they are premature. It will not be out of place here to mention that the order dated November 9, 1982 is an order by which the members of the petitioner Union were asked to act as Munshis and that order has not been reversed by any Court. Under that order the members of the Union are holding the substantive post of Munshi. Subsequent order directing or allowing a person to act against a higher post on ad hoc basis or work charge basis may not create any right. I will not express any specific opinion as the matter is sub judice in the Court below.
10. I do not find any infirmity in the order of the learned District Judge and it is not the case in which a temporary injunction should be granted. Revision petition is dismissed. No order as to costs. Record of the case may be sent back. Court below may expedite the matter.