Verma, C.J.
1. This writ petition is by an employer against the award (Annexure 13), dated 18th September, 1982, by which the Industrial Tribunal-cum Labour Court, Kota, has decided the reference made to it under Section 10(1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, by holding that the termination of service of the workman, Girraj Prasad, by the employer was unjustified and instead of this punishment, the punishment of stoppage of two annual grade increments with cumulative effect has been imposed. By the award, the workman, Girraj Prasad, has consequently been ordered to be reinstated with full back-wages. The employer is aggrieved by the interference made in this manner by the award. Hence, this petition to quash the award.
2. The material facts are a few only. The aforesaid workman, Girraj Prasad, whose cause has been espoused by respondent 1-union, was employed as maintenance fitter in the carbide plant of the petitioner's factory and was later on transferred in the same capacity to the ammonia plant. A charge-sheet, dated 26 April 1980, was served on Girraj Prasad alleging that he went to the house of a co-worker. P.P. Singh, on 23 April 1980, and threatened his wife with dire consequences on account of P. P. Singh not joining other workers in the agitation, and on 25 April 1980, of threatening the said co-worker while on duty in the factory to assault him and his family members for the same reason. A corrigendum to the charge-sheet was given to Girraj Prasad, who after reading it refused to accept the same. Consequently another charge was framed of refusal to accept the corrigendum after reading it on 2nd May, 19 80, which amounted to impertinence or in-subordination. The enquiry officer held that the charge relating to the incident on 23rd April 1980, was not proved, while the charge of threatening the co-worker in factory premises on 25th April 1980 was proved. The enquiry officer's report is Annexu-re 4, dated 26 September 1980. Relating to the incident on 2nd May 1980. which was the subject-matter of another charge, the enquiry report, annexure 5, dated 20 August 1980, held that Girraj Prasad after reading the corrigendum had returned it instead of acknowledging its receipt. This charge was also therefore held to be proved. Curiously enough, the employer made the final order much later on 23 March 1981, imposing the penalty of dismissal from service. Aggrieved by this action of the employer, the union raised a dispute, which was referred for adjudication to the Tribunal.
3. The Tribunal treated as preliminary issue the question whether the domestic enquiry was fair. By its order (Annexure 9), dated 3 July 1982, it held that the domestic enquiry was fair. Thereafter, by its award (Annexure 13), dated 18 September 1982, it has come to the conclusion that the charge relating to the incident on 25 April 1980, of threatening a co-worker, P.P. Singh, within the factory premises was rightly held proved. The Tribunal then proceeded to consider the circumstances of the case including the fact that the decision to terminate his service was taken about six months after getting the enquiry reports and during the intervening period a fresh charter of demands was submitted by the workmen on 19 January 1981, to which this workman, Girraj Prasad, was also a signatory. The Tribunal came to the conclusion that the punishment of termination of service was too harsh and was incommensurate with the charge found proved. Consequently, the punishment of stoppage of two grade increments with cumulative effect was substituted for the punishment of termination from service, directing reinstatement of the worker with full back-wages.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has advanced substantially two arguments. The first argument is that Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act which confers wide powers on Labour Courts and Tribunals to interfere in such cases, is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, inasmuch as it does not provide sufficient guidelines to exclude arbitrariness. The absence of any provision for appeal or revision against the Labour Court's decision also indicates that there is no check provided against any arbitrary decision. The other argument is that it was not a fit case for interference by the Tribunal with the punishment imposed by the employer. The argument is that there was no occasion to direct reinstatement of the workman in these circumstances and for payment of back-wages. In the alternative, it was contended that compensation can be awarded in lieu of reinstatement. We shall consider these arguments in the same order.
5. In our opinion, there is no merit in the first contention that there are no guidelines provided in Section 11A to exclude arbitrariness. The object of enacting Section 11A obviously is to provide a remedy of reappraisal of the employer's action by an independent authority in order to ensure fairness of the employer's action. Sufficient guidelines are indicated by the expression 'is satisfied that the order of discharge or dismissal was not justified' which enables interference by the Labour Court or Tribunal. The requirement is of satisfaction that the discharge or dismissal was not justified. The words 'satisfied' and 'justified' used in this expression are well known in legal terminology and have also assumed a known meaning and significance. Thus, there is a clear indication that interference is to be made only on satisfaction that the employer's action is not justified. On such satisfaction being reached, the relief to be given is also indicated in wide terms and in doing so the expressions 'as it thinks fit' and 'as the circumstances of the case may require' have been used. These expressions also are well known in legal terminology and the expression 'as it thinks fit' has also been judicially construed in several decisions. For the purpose of granting relief there is a clear indication that the relief which is considered fit in the circumstances of the case is to be given after the conclusion is reached that the impugned discharge or dismissal was not justified. In our opinion, these are sufficient guidelines for any authority discharging such functions and whenever challenge is made to the decision of the Labour Court or Tribunal, correctness of the decision can be tested on the touch-stone of these guidelines. It is significant that the other argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is based actually on these guidelines itself.
6. We may also refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Workmen of Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co, of India (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. of India (Pvt.) Ltd. 1973 I LLJ 278. Their Lordships, after enumerating the, principles emerging from the earlier decisions, governing the jurisdiction of the Tribunal when adjudicating the dispute relating to the dismissal or dishcarge prior to insertion of Section 11A, have also indicated changes in the legal position resulting from the insertion of Section 11A. It has been clearly indicated in this decision that even if a proper enquiry is conducted by the employer and a correct finding is reached on the question of misconduct, the Tribunal can now under Section 11A differ from the conclusions reached by the management, but in doing so, it will have to give 'very cogent reasons for not accepting the view of the employer'. It has been reiterated that, under Section 11A, the Tribunal has been given power to differ both on a finding of misconduct arrived at by the employer as well as on the punishment imposed by him. In our opinion, the requirement of giving very cogent reasons for differing with the findings and conclusions reached by the employer, which is implicit in the guidelines contained in Section 11A as earlier indicated and expressly held by the Supreme Court ensures exclusion of arbitrariness. We may also add that the absence of any provision of appeal against the decision of the Tribunal does not support the argument of arbitrariness in view of the requirement of Section 11A. In a case where the Labour Court or the Tribunal has acted contrary to the mandate in Section 11A, remedy by writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution to the High Court in addition to a remedy of an appeal to the Supreme Court directly under Article 136 of the Constitution is available. The present petition itself is a proof of the availability of this remedy. Accordingly, the first argument has no merit and is rejected.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner strenuously urged that in a case like the present where the workman's misconduct of threatening a co-worker within the factory premises was found proved even by the Tribunal, interference with the punishment of dismissal from service was not justified. It was also urged that at any rate payment of full back-wages should not have been directed since the award of full back-wages is not a normal rule where the workman has not been found free from blame. It was also contended with considerable vehemence in the alternative, that even if reinstatement could have been granted, the proper order to make is the award of compensation of an amount sufficient to provide for the workman taking into account his last drawn salary. The question is, whether any part of this contention can be accepted.
8. The charge found proved against the workman is that he had threatened a co-worker within the factory premises on account of his not joining the other workers in their agitation. The Tribunal has given several reasons for considering the punishment of dismissal to be too harsh and incommensurate with the misconduct found proved. It cannot be said that the reasons given by the Tribunal are not cogent. In this connection, learned counsel criticized the treatment by the Tribunal of the incident relating to 2 May 1980, of refusal by the workman to accept the corrigendum to the charge sheet after reading the same. In our opinion, treating this incident as the basis of a separate charge is difficult to appreciate. Assuming that the workman refused to accept the corrigendum to the charge sheet after reading it when it was tendered to him on 2 May 1980, the only effect thereof was to attribute to the workman the knowledge of the contents of that document and no more. In other words, if the workman denied knowledge of the contents of the corrigendum by which a correction was made in the residential address of the co-worker, P.P. Singh, then this fact was material for proof that he had knowledge of the correct address and the charge-sheet, dated 26 April, 1980, was to be treated as amended in this manner. In other words, it was not a separate charge of misconduct, but mere correction of some incorrect particulars given in the original charge-sheet. The Tribunal in rejecting this incident as amounting to proof of an additional charge did not, therefore, commit any error, which requires to be corrected in these proceedings. On the other hand, the employer's conduct of treating the incident of 2 May 1980, also as an act of misconduct in these circumstances indicates that the punishment of dismissal was undoubtedly influenced by this fact also. It may be mentioned that the charge found proved relating to the incident of 2 May 1980, was merely of refusing to acknowledge receipt of corrigendum given to him and no more.
9. Taking into account the charge found proved by the Tribunal and the reasons given by the Tribunal for holding that the punishment of dismissal was too excessive and unduly harsh, it cannot be said that the lesser punishment substituted by the Tribunal is inadequate in the circumstances of the case. We are satisfied that the interference by the Tribunal with the employer's action in exercise of the powers available under Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, was within the limits prescribed in the provision. It is no doubt true that the workman was not found wholly free from blame inasmuch as a misconduct was found proved against him for which the penalty of stoppage of two grade increments cumulatively has been awarded. In such a situation, award of fullback-wages till the dale of reinstatement does not appear to be justified. We are informed that during the period of suspension, the workman was paid subsistence allowance initially of 50 per cent of the wages and after some time of 75 per cent of the wages. In our opinion, the suspension could not be treated as unjustified and, therefore, the wages upto the date of reinstatement should be confined only to the amount of subsistence allowance paid to the workman, instead of full back-wages. The workman became entitled to reinstatement as a result of the award of the Tribunal. However, by a stay order, dated 1 December, 1982, passed in this petition when it was filed in 198 2, the workman has not been reinstated and he has been paid only 50 per cent of the wages every month. In our opinion, this is not a fit case where an exemption should be made to direct payment of compenstion in lieu of reinstatement. The material present is insufficient to indicate that the workman belongs to that category whose presence as an employee is undesirable and is not conducive to maintenance of industrial peace. We do not think it is a fit case for depriving the workman of normal relief of reinstatement and grant him compensation in lieu thereof.
10. Consequently, the petition is partly allowed only to the extent that the workman will be entitled only to the wages already paid for the period of suspension up to the date of award instead of full back-wages for the entire period. In the circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs.